Bongalonta V. Castillo -nadayag Grageda.docx

Republic of the Philippines Supre me Court Baguio City

The anteceden ts:

On Septemb er 25, 200 0, Fe rdin and A. Cruz (petitione r) file d

THIRD DIVISION

before the MeTC a fo rma l Entry o f Appe arance, as p rivate FERDINAND A. CRUZ, P etitioner,

prosecu to r, in Criminal Case No. 00 -1705 fo r G ra ve Th rea ts, wh ere

G.R. No. 154207

his father, Marian o Cru z, is the co mplain ing witn ess. P resent:

- versus -

The petition er, describ ing h imse lf as a third year law studen t,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA -MART INEZ, CALLEJO, SR., CHICO -NAZAR IO, and NACHURA, JJ.

justifies h is appea ranc e as p rivate pro secu to r on the ba ses o f Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Ru les of Court a nd th e ruling of the

ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO and HON. P romu lgated : ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Responden ts. April 27, 200 7 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

Court En Banc in Can timbuhan v. Judge Cru z, Jr . [ 2 ] th at a non lawyer ma y appear before the inferior co urts as an agen t or friend of a party litigan t. T he petitione r furthermore a ve rs tha t his appearan ce was with th e prio r confo rmity o f the pub lic p rose cutor and a written au tho rity of Mariano Cruz appo intin g h im to be his

D E C I S I O N

agent in the prosecu tio n of the said crimina l c ase.

AUSTRIA -MART INEZ, J.: However, in an Order dated Feb ruary 1, 200 2, the MeTC den ied Before the Court is a P etition for Certiora ri u nder Rule 65

permission for petitio n er to appea r a s p riva te pro secu tor on the

of th e Rules of Cou rt, grounded on pure questions o f law, with

ground that Circu lar No. 19 go ve rn ing limited law studen t prac tic e

P rayer for P relimina ry In junc tion assailing the Resolu tion dated

in con junction with Ru le 138 -A of th e Rules o f Court (La w Stu dent

May 3, 2 002 p ro mu lg ated b y the Reg iona l Trial Court (RTC),

P ractice Ru le) sho uld take p recede nce o ver th e ru ling of the Cou rt

Branch 11 6, P asay C ity, in Civil Ca se No. 02 -0137, which denied

laid do wn in Can timbuhan ; and se t the case for con tinu ation o f

the issuance o f a writ of p relimina ry in ju nction again st the

trial. [ 3 ]

Metropolitan Trial Co urt (MeTC), Branch 45, P asay City, in Criminal Case No. 00 -1705; [ 1 ] an d the RTCs Order d ated June 5 , 2002

den ying

the

Motio n

fo r

Reconsideration. No

preliminary injunction was issued b y th is Court .

writ

of

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed be fore the MeTC a Motion fo r Reconsideration seek ing to re ve rse the Feb rua ry 1 , 2002 Order alleg ing th a t Ru le 138 -A, or the Law S tuden t P rac tice Rule, do es not have th e effec t o f supe rsed ing Section 34 of Rule

138, fo r the au tho rity to in terp re t the rule is the source itself o f

Motion

fo r

Recon sidera tion

dated

June

7,

2002

with

the rule, which is the S upre me Court a lone.

the MeTC seek ing the reve rsa l of the Ma rch 4, 2002 Denial Orde r of the said court, on the streng th of Bar Ma tte r No. 730, and a

In an Order dated Marc h 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Mo tion fo r

Motion to Hold In Abe ya nce the Tria l da ted June 10, 2002 o f

Reconsid eration.

Criminal

On April 2, 2002 , the petitione r filed be fore the RTC a P etition

the certio rari p roceed ings be fore the RTC.

for Certiora ri and Ma n damus with

On June 5, 2002, the R TC issued its Order d en ying the pe titione rs

P ra yer

for

P reliminary

Injun ction and Te mporary Restra in ing Order again st the private

Case

No.

00 -1705

pend ing

the

ou tco me

of

Motion fo r Recon sid era tion .

respond ent and the pub lic re sponden t MeTC. Likewise, in an Orde r dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied th e After hearing th e p ra ye r for pre liminary injunctio n to

petitioners Second Mo tion for Recon sid era tio n and his Motion to

restrain pub lic respon dent MeTC Judge fro m proceedin g with

Hold in Abeyan ce the T ria l on the grou nd tha t the RTC had alread y

Criminal Case No. 0 0 -1705 p endin g the Certio rari p roceed ing s,

denied the Entry of Appearanc e of petitio ner before th e MeTC.

the RTC, in a Reso lu tion da ted Ma y 3, 2002, reso lved to d en y th e issuance o f an in junc tive writ on the gro und that th e crime of Grave

On July 30, 2002 , the p etitione r direc tly filed with th is Court, the

Threats, the sub jec t of Crimina l Case No. 00 -1 705, is one that can

instan t P etition and assigns the fo llo wing e rro rs:

be pro secu ted de o fic io , the re b eing no c laim for civil indemn ity,

I.

and that th erefore , the interven tion of a p rivat e prosecu to r is no t legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, th e pe titioner filed befo re th e RTC a Mo tion for Reconsid eration. The p etitione r argues that no where does the law pro vid e that the c rime of Gra ve Th rea ts has n o civil aspect. And

THE RESP ONDENT REGIO NAL TR IA L C OURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETIO N WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE P RAYER FOR THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION OF T HE HEREIN P ETITIONER DESP ITE P ETIT IONER H AVING ESTABLISHED THE NECESSITY O F GRA NTING THE WRIT; II.

last, p etition er cites Ba r Ma tter No. 730 da ted June 10, 1997 wh ich expressl y p ro vid es fo r the appea rance of a no n -lawyer before the inferior cou rts, as a n agent o r friend o f a p arty litigan t, even withou t the supervision of a me mb er o f the bar.

P ending

the

reso lution

of

the

fo rego ing

Mo tion

for

Reconsid eration b efo re th e RTC, the pe titio ner filed a Second

THE RESPONDENT TRIA L COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOU NT TO IGNORANCE O F THE LAW, WHEN IT RESO LVED TO DENY THE P RAYER FOR THE W RIT O F P RELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE S UBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION O F THE HEREIN P ETITIONER ON THE BA SIS THAT [GRAVE ] THREATS HAS NO CIV IL ASP ECT, FOR THE

SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

The basic question is whether th e pe titione r, a la w stud ent, ma y appear befo re an infe rior court a s an agen t or friend o f a party

III.

litigan t.

THE RESP ONDENT METRO POLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS D ISCR ETIO N WHEN IT D ENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIA L, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESP ONDENT REGIONAL TR IA L COURT I S THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT O F P RELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND WHEN THE RESP ONDENT REGIONAL TR IA L COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE P E TITION FOR CERTIORARI;

THE RESPONDENT COURT [S] ARE CLEAR LY IGNORING THE LAW WHE N THEY P ATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LA P UT , CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WE LL AS BAR MA TTER NO. 730, P ROVID ING F OR THE APP EARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BE FORE T HE LOWER C OURTS (MTCS). [ 4 ]

This Court, in exc eptio nal ca ses, and fo r co mp elling reasons, o r if warran ted b y the n ature o f the issue s reviewed, may tak e cognizance o f petitions filed direc tly befo re it. [ 5 ]

tha t

th is

case

in vo lves

the

interpretation,

clarification, and imp le mentation o f Se ction 34, Rule 138 o f th e Rules of Court, Bar Matter No . 730, Circu lar N o. 19 govern ing law studen t practice a nd R ule 138 -A of th e Rules of Court, and th e ruling of th e Cou rt in Cantimbuhan , the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

encapsu lated in Rule 1 38 -A of the Rules o f Court, p roh ibits the petitioner, as a law stud ent, fro m en tering h is a ppearanc e in b eha lf of his father, the priva te co mp lain ant in the c rimina l case witho ut the supervision of a n a ttorne y du ly acc red ited b y the la w schoo l.

Rule 138 -A o r the La w Studen t P ractice Rule, pro vid es:

IV.

Considering

The courts a qu o he ld tha t th e La w S tuden t P rac tic e Ru le a s

RULE 138 -A LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RU LE Section 1. Conditions for Studen t Prac tice. A law stud ent who has su ccessfu lly co mplete d his 3rd year o f the regu lar four -yea r p resc ribe d la w curricu lu m a nd is en rolled in a recogn ize d law school 's clin ica l lega l education p rogra m app ro ved b y th e Sup re me Co urt, ma y a p pear withou t co mpensation in an y c ivil, crimina l or ad ministrative case befo re an y tria l co urt, tribuna l, board o r o fficer, to represen t ind igen t c lie nts ac cep ted b y the leg al clinic of the la w schoo l. Sec. 2. Appea rance . T he appea rance o f the law stud ent au tho rized b y this ru le, sh all be under the d irect sup ervision a nd control o f a me mber of the Integ rated Bar o f the P hilipp ines du ly acc red ited b y the law schoo l. An y and a ll p lead ings, mo tion s, briefs, memoranda or o ther pape rs to be filed, must be signed b y the supe rvising a tto rne y fo r a nd in behalf of th e legal c lin ic.

However, in Resolution [ 6 ] dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No.

which is the preva ilin g ru le a t the time the pe titioner filed his

730, th e Court En Banc cla rified:

Entry of Appearanc e with the MeTC on Sep te mber 25 , 2000. No

The rule, how ever, is different if the law studen t appear s befor e an infer ior court, w here the issues and p roced ure are re latively simple. In inferior cour ts, a law studen t may appear in h is persona l capa city w ithout the superv ision of a law yer. Section 34 , Ru le 138 pro vides: Sec. 34. By whom litig atio n is conducted. - In the co urt of a justice of the peac e , a pa rty ma y con duct h is litigation in pe rson , with the aid o f an agent or frien d appo in ted b y h im fo r that purpo se, o r with the aid of an attorne y. In an y o the r court, a party may conduc t his litiga tion p ersonall y or b y a id of a n atto rne y, and his appearan ce must be e ither personal o r b y a du ly au tho riz ed me mber o f the bar.

real d istinction ex ists for und er Sec tion 6 , Ru le 5 of the Ru les o f Court, the term "Mun icipa l Trial Courts" a s used in these Ru le s shall include Metropolitan Tria l Courts, Mun ic ipa l Trial Courts in Cities, Mun icipal Tria l Courts, and Mun ic ipa l Circu it Tria l Courts. There is really n o prob le m as to the app lica tio n of Sec tio n 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138 -A. In th e former, th e app eara nce of a non -lawyer, as an agen t o r friend o f a party litig ant, is ex pre ssly allowed , while th e la tter rule p ro vides fo r co ndition s when a la w studen t, no t as an ag ent or a friend of a party litigan t, ma y appe a r before th e cou rts.

P etitioner expressly anc hored h is appe aranc e on Section 34 of Ru le 138. The co urt a quo mu st ha ve bee n con fu sed b y the fac t tha t petitioner referred to himself a s a law stud ent in h is e ntry of

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior cour t as an agent or friend of a party w ithout the superv ision of a member o f the bar. [ 7 ] (E mph asis supplied) The phrase In the cou rt of a justice of th e peace i n Bar

appearan ce. Ru le 138 -A should not ha ve be en used b y the courts a quo in den ying permission to ac t as priva te pro secu tor aga inst petitioner for the simp le rea son tha t Rule 13 8 -A is no t th e ba sis for the p etition ers appe arance.

Matter No. 730 is su bsequen tly ch anged to In the cou rt of a mu nicipality as it no w appears in Sec tio n 34 o f Rule 138, thus: [ 8 ]

Section 34, Ru le 138 is cle ar tha t appea rance before the in ferio r courts b y a non -lawyer is a llowe d, irrespec tive of wheth er o r no t

SEC. 34. By whom litig atio n is conducted . In the Court of a munic ip ality a party may condu ct h is litigation in pe rson, with the a id o f an agen t o r friend appoin ted b y h im fo r th at purpo se, o r with the aid of an atto rney. In an y oth er court, a party may conduct his litigation p e rson ally or b y a id of an attorn ey and his appearanc e must be eithe r personal or b y a duly autho rized me mbe r of the bar. (E mph asis supp lied)

he is a law studen t.As succinctly c larified in Bar Matter No. 730, b y virtue o f Section 34, Rule 13 8, a la w studen t ma y a ppear, as a n agent o r a friend o f a party litiga nt, witho ut the su pervision o f a lawyer b efo re inferior courts. P etitioner further argue s tha t the RTC errone ou sly he ld tha t, b y its very nature, no civil liability ma y flo w fro m the cri me o f Gra ve

Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecu to r is no t po ssible.

WHEREFORE, the P etition i s GRANTED . The assa iled Resolu tio n and Order of the Regio nal Trial Court, Branc h 116, P asay City are REVERSED and SET

It is clear fro m the RT C Decision that no such conclusion

Metropolitan

T ria l

Court,

Bran ch

ASIDE . The 45, P asa y City

had been in tended b y the RTC. In den ying the issu ance of the

is DIRECTED to ADMIT the En try of Appea rance of pe titioner in

inju nctive cou rt, the RTC sta ted in its Decision that there was n o

Criminal Case No. 00 -1 705 as a priva te p rose c utor unde r the direc t

claim for civil liab ility b y th e priva te c o mp lainan t for d amages,

control and su pervision of the pub lic p rosec utor.

and that the records o f the case do no t p ro vide fo r a claim fo r indemn ity; and th at th erefo re, pe titioners ap pearance as private

No pronounce ment as to costs.

prosecu to r appears to b e le ga lly un tenab le. SO ORDERED. Under Article 100 of the Re vised P enal Code, ever y perso n crimin ally liab le for a felo n y is also civilly liab le except in instances wh en no ac tu al da mage resu lts fro m an offense, such as espion age, violation of neutrality, flig ht to an e nemy coun try, an d crime against popu lar repre sen tation . [ 9 ] The b asic rule applies in the instan t case, such that wh en a crimina l action is in stitu ted, the civil action fo r the re covery of civil liability arising fro m th e offen se charged sh all be dee med institu ted with criminal action, unless the offended party wa ive s the civil actio n, reserves the righ t to institu te it sepa ra tely o r institu tes the civil actio n p rio r to the crimin al action. [ 1 0 ] The petitioner is c orrec t in sta ting tha t there being no reservation, waiver, n or p rio r institutio n of the civil asp ect in Criminal Case No. 00 -1705 , it fo llows that the c ivil a spect arisin g fro m Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the c riminal action, and, hen ce, the private pro secu tor ma y rightfu lly intervene to prosecu te the civil aspect.

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA. On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2] On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement

of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues. In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside. Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 19621986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003? We rule in the negative. An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper

cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.[5] The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6] Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.[7] Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration. The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus: For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction. The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued. As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP. Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise: . . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities. As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION [A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000] SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."

DECISION

Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.

MENDOZA, J.:

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that: On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available) Annex A.......-

"Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B.......-

"Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex C.......-

"An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div. This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall

Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts). Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by: 1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA ) 2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals). Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. MacalinaoJavier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.

3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing. Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law. The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150. Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending. Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law. 4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months. The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows: On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents nonindication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint,

more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years." The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991." While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example." .... The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum). Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue. First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992. Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof. Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues. Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC x----------------------------------------------------x PETITION FOR LEAVE TO B.M. No. 1678 RESOLUTION

RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,

CORONA, J.:

Petitioner,

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.

Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,* YNARESSANTIAGO, SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA,

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.[1] On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition. In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section

VELASCO, JR.

2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

NACHURA, REYES and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated: December 17, 2007

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar. Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain

bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular

modifications.

standing is entitled to practice law.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.[2] It is so

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court

delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the

mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the

State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and

Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a

promote the public welfare.[3]

resident of the Philippines.[5] He must also produce before this Court satisfactory

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the

evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving

highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal

moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.[6]

profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as

Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in

furnishing

the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of

qualifications;[7] passing the bar examinations;[8] taking the lawyers oath[9] and

any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which

signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a

the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional

certificate of the license to practice.[10]

privilege.[4]

satisfactory

proof

of

educational,

moral

and

other

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good

becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine

standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and,

citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also

concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;[11] payment of

deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no

the annual professional tax;[12] compliance with the mandatory continuing legal

automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

education requirement;[13]faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the

[14]

Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still

(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such

practice law in the Philippines? No.

practice.[18] Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.[15] Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino

pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax;

citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.[16]

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of

him of legal developments and

naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].[17]Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the

Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar. WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016 CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX CRUZANGELES, ATTY. WYLIE M. PALER, AND ATTY. ANGELES GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES, GRANDEA & PALER LAW OFFICE, Respondent. DECISION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

excuses for the delay, saying that: (a) they still had to look for a psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) they were still looking for a "friendly" court and public prosecutor; and (c) they were still deliberating where to file the case.3 They promised that the petition would be filed on or before the end of June 2004, but such date passed without any petition being filed. As an excuse, they reasoned out that the petition could not be filed since they have yet to talk to the judge who they insinuated will favorably resolve complainant's petition.4chanrobleslaw Sometime in the third week of July 2004, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler asked for an additional payment of P250,000.00 in order for them to continue working on the case. Hoping that his petition would soon be filed, complainant dutifully paid the said amount on July 23, 2004, which was again received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.5 However, to complainant's dismay, no appreciable progress took place. When complainant inquired about the delay in the filing of the case, Atty. Cruz-Angeles attempted to ease his worries by saying that the draft petition was already submitted to the judge for editing and that the petition will soon be finalized. 6chanrobleslaw

The Facts

In the last week of September 2004, complainant received a text message from Atty. Cruz-Angeles informing him that the National Statistics Office bore no record of his marriage. The latter explained then that this development was favorable to complainant's case because, instead of the proposed petition for annulment of marriage, they would just need to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She also informed complainant that they would send someone to verify the records of his marriage at the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet (Civil Registrar) where his marriage was celebrated. However, upon complainant's independent verification through his friend, he discovered that the records of his marriage in the Civil Registrar were intact, and that the alleged absence of the records of his marriage was a mere ruse to cover up the delay in the filing of the petition.7chanrobleslaw

Complainant alleged that sometime in May 2004, he engaged the law firm of respondents to handle the annulment of his marriage with his wife, Mutya Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In his meeting with Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was told that: (a) the case would cost him P300,000.00, with the first P100,000.00 payable immediately and the remaining P200,000.00 payable after the final hearing of the case; (b) respondents will start working on the case upon receipt of PI00,000.00, which will cover the acceptance fee, psychologist fee, and filing fees; and (c) the time-frame for the resolution of the case will be around three (3) to four (4) months from filing. Accordingly, complainant paid respondents P100,000.00 which was duly received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.2chanrobleslaw

Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his petition for annulment, complainant went to respondents' law office to terminate their engagement and to demand for a refund of the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 he earlier paid them. However, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler refused to return the said amount, and to complainant's surprise, sent him two (2) billing statements dated October 5, 20048 and October 10, 20049 in the amounts of P258,000.00 and P324,000.00, respectively. Notably, the October 5, 2004 billing statement included a fee for "consultants (prosecutors)" amounting to P45,000.00.10 In view of the foregoing, complainant filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit before the IBP-CBD, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1426.

From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case with Attys. CruzAngeles and Paler. However, despite his constant prodding, Attys. CruzAngeles and Paler could not present any petition and instead, offered

In her defense,11 Atty. Cruz-Angeles admitted to have received a total of P350,000.00 from complainant,12 but denied that she was remiss in her duties, explaining that the delay in the filing of the petition for annulment of marriage was due to complainant's failure to give the current address of

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on February 11, 2005 by complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as (complainant), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), against respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles (Atty. CruzAngeles), Atty. Wylie M. Paler (Atty. Paler), and Atty. Angeles Grandea (Atty. Grandea; collectively, respondents) of the Angeles, Grandea & Paler Law Office (law firm), charging them of various violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for, inter alia, refusing to return the money given by complainant in exchange for legal services which respondents failed to perform.

Mutya and provide sufficient evidence to support the petition. 13 Further, Atty. Cruz-Angeles alleged that it was Atty. Paler who was tasked to draft and finalize the petition.14 For his part,15 Atty. Paler moved for the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action, arguing too that complainant filed the present administrative complaint only to avoid payment of attorney's fees.16chanrobleslaw The IBP's Report and Recommendation In a Report and Recommendation17 dated July 10, 2012, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that they be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for four (4) months. However, Atty. Grandea was exonerated of any liability as his participation in the charges has not been discussed, much less proven.18chanrobleslaw The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed engaged the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler in order to annul his marriage with his wife, Mutya. Despite receiving the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 from complainant, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler neglected the legal matter entrusted to them, as evidenced by their failure to just even draft complainant's petition for annulment despite being engaged for already five (5) long months.19 Moreover, as pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, despite their preliminary assessment that complainant's petition would not likely prosper, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler still proceeded to collect an additional P250,000.00 from complainant. Worse, they even billed him an exorbitant sum of P324,000.00. 20 Thus, the Investigating Commissioner opined that the amounts respondents had already collected and would still want to further collect from complainant can hardly be spent for research in connection with the annulment case that was not filed at all. Neither can they cover just fees for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler who did nothing to serve complainant's cause.21chanrobleslaw In a Resolution22 dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended penalty to two (2) years suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cruz-Angeles moved for reconsideration,23 which was, however, denied in a Resolution24 dated June 7, 2015. The Issue Before the Court The essential issue in this case is whether or not Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR. The Court's Ruling A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in May 2004, complainant secured the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler for the

purpose of annulling his marriage with Mutya, and in connection therewith, paid Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the aggregate sum of P350,000.00 representing legal fees. However, despite the passage of more than five (5) months from the engagement, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler failed to file the appropriate pleading to initiate the case before the proper court; and worse, could not even show a finished draft of such pleading. Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to them by their client constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Case law exhorts that, "once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable,"25cralawred as in this case. In this relation, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when they failed to return to complainant the amount of P350,000.00 representing their legal fees, viz. : CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03– A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand, x x x. It bears stressing that "the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics."26chanrobleslaw Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler misrepresented to complainant that the delay in the filing of his petition for annulment was due to the fact that they were still looking for a "friendly" court, judge, and public prosecutor who will not be too much of a hindrance in achieving success in

the annulment case. In fact, in the two (2) billing statements dated October 5, 200427 and October 10, 2004,28 Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler made it appear that they went to various locations to look for a suitable venue in filing the said petition, and even paid various amounts to prosecutors and members of the National Bureau of Investigation to act as their "consultants." Such misrepresentations and deceits on the part of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler are violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.: CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "[a]s officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."29Clearly, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fell short of such standard when they committed the afore-described acts of misrepresentation and deception against complainant. Their acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they also reveal basic moral flaws that make Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler unfit to practice law.30chanrobleslaw As members of the Bar, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should not perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as insinuating that they can find a "friendly" court and judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in complainant's annulment case. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky foundations.31 This is the very thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as in this case.[32]chanrobleslaw Moreover, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession" for the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. It is every lawyer's duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It must be reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from lawyers which tend to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to safeguard the good name of the legal

profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor, prestige, and reputation of the judiciary.33 In this case, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler compromised the integrity not only of the judiciary, but also of the national prosecutorial service, by insinuating that they can influence a court, judge, and prosecutor to cooperate with them to ensure the annulment of complainant's marriage. Indubitably, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Canon 7 of the CPR, and hence, they should be held administratively liable therefor. Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client's affairs, failed to return the latter's money and/or property despite demand, and at the same time committed acts of misrepresentation and deceit against their clients, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. In Jinon v. Jiz 34 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal services which he never performed. Also, in Agot v. Rivera, 35 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his (a) failure to handle the legal matter entrusted to him and to return the legal fees in connection therewith; and (b) misrepresentation that he was an immigration lawyer, when in truth, he was not. Finally, in Spouses Lopez v. Limos, 36 the Court suspended the erring lawyer for three (3) years for her failure to file a petition for adoption on behalf of complainants, return the money she received as legal fees, and for her commission of deceitful acts in misrepresenting that she had already filed such petition when nothing was actually filed, resulting in undue prejudice to therein complainants. In this case, not only did Attys. CruzAngeles and Paler fail to file complainant's petition for annulment of marriage and return what the latter paid them as legal fees, they likewise misrepresented that they can find a court, judge, and prosecutor who they can easily influence to ensure a favorable resolution of such petition, to the detriment of the judiciary and the national prosecutorial service. Under these circumstances, the Court individually imposes upon Attys. CruzAngeles and Paler the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering Attys. CruzAngeles and Paler to return the amount of P350,000.00 they received from complainant as legal fees. It is well to note that "while the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."37 Hence, since Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler received the aforesaid amount as part of their legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order. WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie

M. Paler are found GUILTYof violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, each of them is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Likewise, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie M. Paler are ORDERED to return to complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as the legal fees they received from the latter in the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty. Meanwhile, the complaint is DISMISSED for

as against lack

Atty. Angeles of

Grandea merit.

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance and be attached to respondents' personal records as attorney. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 3232 September 27, 1994 ROSITA C. NADAYAG, complainant, vs. ATTY JOSE A. GRAGEDA, respondent.

MELO, J.: In a letter-complaint dated April 15, 1988, Rosita C. Nadayag charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a practicing attorney and notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction wherein complainant was the vendee. Complainant's affidavit, which accompanied her letter-complaint, alleged that respondent: . . . prepared and notarized a PACTO DE RETRO sale with me as the Vendee-a-Retro last January 21, 1987 in this City using Original Certificate of Land Title stolen from the Office of the Register of Deeds herein in Iligan as a result of which I was swindled in One hundred eight thousand pesos (P108,000.00) because the said land sold to me by Pacto de Retro was already sold ahead of time to another party, using the owner's duplicate copy of the title. That during our pacto de retro sale, as I was suspicious already of the appearance of the Original Certificate of Title, having many annotations and old patches thereof, when I brought the matter to the attention of Atty. Jose A. Grageda, notarizing the same, he simply answered me that the title was all right and that he told me further not to worry as he is an attorney and besides he knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose business transactions especially notarial matter has been and in fact always handled by him (Attorney Jose A. Grageda).

That said stolen Original Certificate of Land Title was confiscated by Iligan City Register of Deeds, Attorney Reynaldo Baguio on the occasion when I applied for registration of my Pacto de Retro. Findings showed that many other cased of stolen original certificates of land titles have taken place in the said office but the said Attorney as the Register of Deeds did not prosecute the thieves thereof. I filed Estafa case against the Vendor-a-Retro together with her accomplices to include said Attorney Jose A. Grageda, coursing it through the local Barangay Captain last May 1987 yet, then forwarded to the City Fiscal through the Police Station Commander in June 1987 but that and until the time of this Report was not tried in Court yet but that the Information did not include said Atty. Jose A. Grageda, hence this report. (p. 2, Vol. I, Record.) Respondent filed his counter-affidavit dated March 29, 1989, pertinently alleging: 6. That they showed me a copy of the title which I examined and found out the title was clear and there was no annotation or entry so I told them that as far as the title was concern there was no encumbrances or annotation and can be the subject of the Pacto de Retro; 7. That they insisted that I notarized the document so I proceeded to translate the document in Cebu, Visayan dialect to make sure that the parties understood the deed and they replied that they understood this and I asked then further if they have any more to add or delete; they answered that there was no more and they will sign the same; 8. That I told them to sign the document above their typewritten name which they did and witnessed by the other person with them who were present, so after their signature in good faith based upon their documents I notarized the same.

(p. 10, Vol. II, Record.) Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April 12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled hearings for reception of evidence but complainant manifested that she cannot proceed to Manila and attend to her case due to financial constraints. Upon the other hand, respondent could no longer be located, having moved without leaving any forwarding address. Nonetheless, said Commission, on the basis of the complaint and the supporting affidavit, as well as the counter-affidavit of respondent, found that "there is reason for disciplining the respondent" premised upon the following observations: Respondent first admits that he was consulted by the vendor-a-retro and the complainant (vendee-a-retro) on the matter of the title when he was asked to notarize the Deed of Sale a Retro. He admits that he rendered an opinion based on the title that was presented to him. It turns out that the title presented to him is the Original Certificate of Title which only the Register of Deeds has custody of and he should have sensed foul-play or irregularity. As a lawyer and officer of the court, he should have been alerted and should have reported the irregularity of an Original Certificate of Title, which should be in the exclusive safekeeping of the Register of Deeds, in the possession of unauthorized persons. Even if it were the photostat copy of said Original Certificate of Title that was presented to him, the same did not bear any certification by the Register of Deeds which could have alerted him of the irregularity. The testimony that the Original was shown to him has not been controverted. The Vendee was in fact in possession of the Original because it was testified that when the Register of Deeds found that respondent was in possession, the original certificate was confiscated by the Register of Deeds. The Commission takes special note of a notary public acting more than a notary public and goes beyond mere

certification of the presence of the signatories, their having signed, and having contracted. By transcending these bounds, such notary public has entered the realm of giving "legal advice" — thus "acting also as counsel aside from notary public" to the parties to the contract. Treated as counsels for the vendee, he had the legal duty to advice him properly of the irregularities and the dangers of holding the Original Certificate which should have been in the custody of the Register of Deeds. Respondent had acted recklessly at the least, in his advise of the vendee. He rendered an opinion that was irresponsible that his client relied upon — which recklessness is censurable. (pp. 3-4, Commissioner's Report; ff. p. 22, Vol. Record.) A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 [1992]). Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra). In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of a transaction for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would aid the parties in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. After all,

notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Jose A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months commencing from receipt of this Resolution, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be spread on the records of said respondent, with copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts. SO ORDERED.