Amazigh/berber Memory Work

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MemoryWork Berber/Amazigh BRUCE M ADDY- WEIT ZMA N

The transnational Berber lAmazighl culture movement that emerged in recent decadeshas been a multifaceted phenomenon. As is the casewith all ethnonational projects, the 9!a!-o-141i9g-apd.diss-esi-n-aflpn-o-f-modern lerber identity has been accompanied by th-e fashiaa-i-ng*-o-f-a*memorycommunityi' This involved a search for a useable past and, once found, its enshrinement in new narratives, rituals, and collective commemorations. Shared memory, Anthony Smith tells us, is as essentialto the survival of a collective cultural identity as is the senseof a common destiny.2It goes without saying that the greater the successof the process of "remembering, recovering and inventing" Berber history,3 the greater the influence it will have on Algerian and Moroccan societies.a Berber "memory worK' is carried out in a variety of ways and on a number of different levels. In its more popular form, the promotion of Berber history and memory involves a considerable degree of myth making and essentializingof the Berber "spirit" (embodied in |ean Amrouche's memorable phrase, "the eternal fugurtha").5 In the realms of scholarship and journalism, the_te-o*pe_fllug_OfNsrth Africanhistory to includelheBerher-q pften pqqgs*real challenges ts*the 1'offieiat:-history propagated"bg-e9,nIglT"tp_g1ary!.igrth. Affiean states and .the-.largerArab.=Islamic,milieg-nfrathich Ee-rbrrs.are a pafi. Related to but distinct from the work of historians are acts of commemoration, namely, the creation, elaboration, and vigilant protection of "memory sitei' (Iieux de memoire) that enable groups to buttress their identities againstthe constant push and pull ofhistorical currents that threaten to sweep them away.6Musicians, poets, and writers have taken a preeminent role in this regard, and some, such as writer Mouloud Mammeri and singer-poetLounes Matoub, havebecome a kind of "memory site" themselves,as either cultural icons, martyrs to the cause,or both. The task of Berber memory work is formidable. From the begirrrrirrgof recordedhistory in North Africa, the Berlrershavc lrccttclcpicleclrtsscttti

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savageqqls,idersrequiring a Siv,illzi{lglad. Iheyhav"e"he.en especially..b,"uryilh gl]"F3;-tsrn dengdby the lpg+gy_-o"-f Iplamieh_Lrtory4*riehprovide-dthgm inJhe-zrn4g,"gL!-eit 1pd Arab"origin.myth::-that,-legitimize&theie"i.nelusion as 4 pgimitiv.e"c.ommunity,r€-qqtr-"ing theiErnisthe..Islamic-faith..to."iustify "submissionj' gion and-assumption.of-power.7 Part of this istislam,or involvedthe seeminglynatural superiorityconferredon the Arabic language, the languagethrough which God'sword wastransmittedand subsequently interpretedby the doctors of the holy law. Ironically,it was a non-Berber, the premierMaghribi historianIbn Khaldun,writing nearlysevenhundred yearsafter the Islamic conquestof North Africa, who made the Berbersa 'greatnation'like othersinthe umma.evenashe usedthemto demonstrate historicallawsof the rise and declineof societies. Up until recently,the essentiallyoral culture of the Berbers and the 4earth of written texts in TamazightplacedBerber memory workers at a di_sadv'?n-tage..The steadypolitical, social,and cultural marginaliza-_severe tion of Berbercommunitiesover the lastfive hundredyearsmadememory work evenmore difficult. Smith'sdescriptionof the difficultiesconfronting demotic and peripheralethniesseemsapt for the Berbers:"Excludedfrom p,ndbq1eft of institutionalsupport, lhc instlumcnls of political q1,nsmlssion and sometimeswithout 1-!bT of.sp_eci3lip{sand developedcodesof communication[,] , , . thei-rme3gdg:-.j"lttg"ll_s,r"l,tr,'9if hqq"ggs-shadowy, and their

jiooityao-9"m"ni"a:'t . .qf.udttisnu ".,.,l+t-.'h"g;rd

Nonetheless, the threatspg.s_ed 1oBgrberlapguageand identity_-b-y.{r-pl-""1yo-fcentralizalipn4nd Alabi-zgtioq,qp.mingon lndependentstatesl.policies bl Eur-ope,g1 coloniaJig;ppnd lmJhe.m-as-si-v..e-,rrphe.avals.g9ng5ated lgp -o_-f p*qrgl!.s,9.pd.tqppsd.offby the.often pernicioushomogeq!7i.nggffectsof globali?ationpfoq_e,-s 9Son local cultures,havealsohad a salutaryeffect.The quest for cultural authenticity,perceivedas the basisof collectivedignity and hencefreedom,is a worldwide contemporaryphenomenonin which Berberintellectualsand activistsactivelyparticipate.As Smith says,if "the secretof identity is memory,the ethnic past must be salvagedand re-appropriated,so asto renewthe presentandbuild a common future in a world of competingnationalcommunities."eNo wonder,then, that the Amazigh movementplacesa premiumon memorywork. The PremodernPast Moroccanhistory,as it appearsin lhe oftc1alep11qg!_iq.-c-p1.{,i_qu,!ggr-,_!s.eIplicitly"nalionalist/clynastici' incorporating Islamichistoly_ lnto a specific

Maddy-Weitzman 52 / Bruce Moroccan historical experiencebeginning with the arriYal of Islam and continuingthrough the establishmentof the Idrisid dynastyin A.D. 788by Idris I, a descendantof the family of Ali, the ProphetMuhammad'sson-inlaw.Although Berbersaresubsumedin this history,they at leastcarry some implicit standing:The Idrisis are known to have married Berberwomen' and Moroccan dynastiesbetweenthe eleventhand fourteenth centuries By contrast,narrativehistory as taught in indepenwere Berber-based.l0 dent Algeria'sschoolshasbeen strikingly lacking in any Algerian-centered orientation.ThusAlgeria'sBerberityhasbeenconsignedto Algeria'sdistant past or ignored entirely.Moreover,the twentieth-centuryAlgerian Salafi historian Tawfiq al-Madani regardedthe Berbersas "noble savages"in a pristine state,a cultural blank page.It wasthe Islamic conquest,he wrote, that brought aboutthe "perfection"of the Maghribi peoplethrough a fusion of Arabs and Berbersinto one comtnuniryll Only recentlyhas this official Salafireadingof Algerianhistorybegunto be questioned,for example,with of Algeria asthe productof the interacMahiedineDjender'srepresentation tions of a Mediterraneancivilization.lz qligll]LsPggqc 4uqz-tgLnLeo0*o-ry-,1c-p,rkers*regar-dle-rg.althertcpcnlrx-sf

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the defining featureof culture and history (notwithstandingthe fact that Amazigh heroesduring the Roman and Byzantineperiod had Latinized namesand may or may not havebeen fluent in the Amazigh language). As such,Amazigh history can be tracedeven further into the past,many hundredsof yearsbeforethe barbaroibeganappearingin Greekchronicles. Moroccan-bornethnologistHeleneHaganhaswritten a fascinatingmonographon the Amazighunderpinningsof ancientEgyptiancivilizationbased on the etymological roots of its language.lsThe "Libyan' pharoanic dynastyfoundedby SheshounkI in 945 B.C.is now commonly referredto by Amazigh memory workersasthe moment of entry of the Amazigh people into history.Indeed,the Paris-basedAcadimie Berbdrechoseto propagate a Berber calendarwith the year of Sheshonk'sascentas its starting point. Accordingly,the year A.D. 2005is equivalentto 2955.Both datesare used on the mastheadof the Rabat-based monthly Le MondeAmazigh(al-'Alam al-Am azighiI Am adalAm azigh). No lessimporta!-t &r Amazigt-A9m.g1'_yo_1kp_1g, {t"-",Jplgntr9!19gg_lt-he Tf of hi.story did nof srrbor inatefheirjdgtJ-iff_per $mZrgb-wasnoUneend se,nor brin&it tp a mqst Berfectstate.In fact, it was the Amazigh people themselves,Chafik emphasizes,who played an important role in the disnstipn-a!1-lerritpr,.r"alp""riqrilie-s-,.d.pgr-e-e''''''''p1:n-il*p:s-x"sr.g9--*gsJgtvlthlheil*f .historical-accura,c;"a.r,e-Jiks:mjn$sdin..their-emphasisnnJhelgr-seminationof Islam in both Africa and Spain.To that end,Tariq BinZiyad, jgr..ds.of the fabledBerber commanderof the Muslim forcesthat first crossedinto astravinga+re*Islanic"pasLand"p.ne.invs..hi€lilt"h-eJ"*\eeJs.aq[ivg3ggqts, P..pxs j.pd Iberia in A.D. 711,very much belongsin the pantheonof Berber heroes, poJ.merel}"xoicc!e-qs.".namelp".s-aJo--ql"s-oJdi.e.:"s-"ga-d-rll.rlsrglgJnr-he-s4sgg Amazigh epitomized today by the Rabat center disseminatingBerber culture that stories of ancient the for children tell books Illustrated f.pasantsKahina. queen Dihya/the bears his name.l6Conversely,and not surprisingly,the destructionwrought Berber heroes,such asfuba, Massinissa,and the in Andalusiain the twelfth century by the troops of the religiouslyzealous The Kahina holds particularly rnythical statusamong Arnazigh memory Almohad Berberdynastyfounded by Ibn Tumart is conspicuouslyabsent workersasthe heroic leaderof Berberresistanceto Islamic invaders(for a from Berbermemory work. Collectivememory aswe know is alwaysselecrecentand contesteduseof the Kahina in Algeria,seebelow).l3 tive, asmuch aboutforgettingasaboutremembering.lT MohamedChafik,the deanof MoroccanBerberistintellectuals,hasconits idenhence Chafik laid out his interpretationof MoroccanAmazigh history during memory, and Maghribi collective to redefine sought sistently the Islamicperiod starkly,and at timespolemically,in the BerberManifesto, trty,by rehistoricizingMorocco'spre-Islamicpast.RecordedNorth African issuedin March 2000 and signedby more than two hundred Berberinteldatesback to the Rornans,Greeks,Carthaginians, history, he emphasizes, populectuals. While providing a detailedexposdof the shortcomingsof the indeAmazigh-speaking native Egypt.The and even,at times, Pharoanic pendenceera,the manifestoalsoplacesthem in abroaderhistoricalcontext, lation was part and parcel of this history, accordingto Chafik, and proalbeit one not commonly found in the history books.Most people,it says, duced numerous historical figures, such as Terentius (a Carthage-born recognizethat the imposition of colonialismin 1912was madepossibleby B.C'), century the second playwrightwriting in Greekand Latin during the sorry stateto which Moroccohad sunk.The reasonfor this wasthe triTertullianus(an important Christian writer from Carthagein the late first umph of the makhzeniants political tradition of despotismand oppression, century-early secondcentury A.D.), Arnobius (another Christian writer' "haughtiness, accompanied A.D)' by ostentationand pomp."This tradition is said born in a Numidian villagein the secondhalf of the third century to havebeeninherited from the Ummayadand Abbasidempires,'tontrary and St. Augustine.laFor Chafik and other Amazigh activists,languageis

54 / BrurcMaddy-Weltzman to the spirit of political consultationprescribedby Islami' and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliphs.Coincidentallyor not, this latter spirit, asdefinedby the manifesto,wasin line with Amazigh political traditions,which were'gearedtowardsmanagingthe affairsof the jama'a ('local community') . . . through dialogueand consultationl'The makhzen,"pursuantto its heavyHeraclian-Khurasanheritagej'wassteered who could"makeor breaki'who for centuriesby "influentialpeopleJ'those preachedhatred toward anything Amazigh, while reducing the historical roles playedby "Berbers."Occasionally,the rnanifestostated,enlightened Sultansmadecommendableeffortstoward the Amazighpopulation.However,the makhzeniancircles"taught hatred towardsanything Amazigh to generationaftergenerationoftheir offspringi'Theirdesireto preservetheir privilegesled them to blindly adhereto political traditionsbasedupon dogmatic and tightly closedreligious thinking. The clashbetweenthesetwo worldviews resultedin violenceand disorder,rendering the country easy prey for foreign invaders. Chafik'semphasison the purlty of Muhammadand his immediatesuccessors,the rashidun (the "rightly guided" caliphs),is a theme common to Islamic reform currents dating back to the late nineteenthcentury.In that sense,Chafik'sapproachis a consensualone,which seeksto incorporate Moroccan Islam into Amazigh identity. To be sure, Chafik seemsto be advocatinga more thoroughgoingliberal reform of Islam than that of reformersof earliergenerations,in line with modern times.Still, eventhis

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due to them that the Berbersdid not write down their own history was simply inaccurate,accordingto Idrissi.such a view,he said,ignoredthe fact that "the Berbersmixed with the Arabslike pure waterwith wine,'(quoting Mokhtar soussi,a famousBerberMuslim intellectualof the earlytr,rrentieth century).TheBerbers,saidIdrissi,beganto havea collectivememory when they learnedto write in Arabic, aspart of the Islamic umma.z0 France,sMoroccan protectorate

The Berber Manifesto'scritique of 'bfficial" Moroccan history during the yearsof the Frenchprotectorateis withering. Makhzeniancircles,it claims, actually welcomedthe French protectorateand were the main beneficiaries of its rule. Together,they werealignedagainstthe "rebelliousBerbers," who weremilitarily subjugatedand then consignedto marginalizationand nondevelopment.when the time came for national rebellion againstthe French,it was the Irnazighenwho willingly provided the necessarymanpower.At the sametime, the manifestostudiouslyavoidsany mention of the most powerful Berberleaderduring the protectorateyears,Thami alGlawi, an omissionthat can only be understoodasa willful act.A positive referenceto Glawi, whosepower rivaled that of the Sultan's,would situate contemporaryBerber discourseon the side of the Frenchcolonial power and opposedto Moroccan nationalism,not to mention the legitimacy of the monarchy;mererepetitionof the dominant nationalnarrativet negative p*ama-zigb-"LcgyrslseJlr[ggitr glugr treatmentof Glawi would run counterto the manifesto'soverallcritique of Iglcls neLtruivgpe:sg"I!9i-1g-fl that narrative.Given Glawi'sprominent role in Moroccan history during containsmanymilitanl g-gpSl.ar.:sls,"amp-ng-tk3$SSd"t:gfg*dJgbhqhsl*of those 7sWr!:!nqzts.!',,.-hiih*s*'sr'-:tt*I-'vs-l,x-4gg.-"q-el*'set**lhel1ltl'.!.ltumultuousdecades,one canperhapsexpectthat at somepoint both dispassionatehistorians and Amazighactivistsmore militant than those endardateonitsmasthS_+.d,_$g'l?4x_tlS_:Ig!sip"99j9l9gJg*itg!-Rsyilde affiliatedwith the manifestowill take up the subject.2r RCAM)"isnptuniyersalk-iriewedwirhfuvs*arnone leC-g.l-tu:c.A$ez1ghe"fi In contrastto the silenceon Glawi,the leaderof thelg2l-26Rif rebellion for being essenhave also been criticized againstspanishand Frenchforces,Muhammadbin Abd al-Krim Khattabi, On occasion,Chafik'swritings hasbecomea preferred,evenreveredfigurefor modern-dayMoroccanBer_ tialist and ahistoricaland henceunhelpfulto the Amazighcause.Moroccan bers engagedin memory work. Abd al-Krim combinedcharisma,military scholarRachidldrissi takesChafik to task for ignoring history for stating prowess'educationboth traditionaland modern,and a politicalagendathat without proof, for example,that ancientBerberkings soughtto uniff all of led him to seekto uniSrthe historicallyfeudingtribesof the Rif into a single the Berbertribes under one centralpower,or for trying to forcibly bridge political unit. In the process,he accumulatedthe ultimate anti.imperialist Morocco'spre-Islamicand Islamic eras(for example,by holding up both credentials,inflicting a crushingdefeaton Spanishforcesat the battleof Anthe Kahina and the twentieth-centuryRiffianleaderAbd al-Krim asBerber oual in 1921,an outcomethat resonatedwidely throughout the Middle East heroesand models;for more on the latter,seebelow).Chafik'sdeclaration Berbers, like all other the enemies of the and beyond.This triumph alsosuppliesimportant ammunition to modernthat the conqueringArabs were day Berberactivistsdeterminedto combatthe accusations conquerorsof North Africa from ancienttimesto modern,anclthat it was that Berberstoo

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olicn collitboratcdwitlt colottiarlrule and that their assertionof Berber identity is linkcd to olclercolonialistprojectsto divide Berbersfrom Arabs. At {irst glance,appropriating bin Abd al-Krim may not seemlike an entirely smooth matter for secular Berberists. He is generally understood by historians to have been a promoter of Islamic reform,23in line with wider Islamic currents at the expenseof popular religious practice, which Berber activists often recognize as central to their specific heritage. Nor did bin Abd al-Krim emphasize an explicitly AmazighlBerber identity in his efforts to mobilize fellow Rifians againstthe foreigner.Hence, in addition to he is often viewed as a premodern type of his Islamic reforrnist creder.rtials, leader, leaclinga nol-untyl.ricaland ultimately futile nativist revolt against the corrcluerors. As with all lristorical personalities,bin Abd al-Krim'.sactualbehavior and views do rrot corrpletely lit the requirements of an idealized Berber hero. But contemporary Arnaz.ighactivistshave not been deterred by thesecaveats.They concentrateon portraying bin Abd al-Krim as a leader who heroically led his people againstthe occupier,unlike the urban Arab class,which sat on its hands during the Rifian revolt rather than lend a hand againstthe colonial oppressor.The recovery of the history of bin Abd al-Krim and his short-lived "Rifian Republic" is hence an ongoing project, intimately connected to the themes of marginalization and identity denial that characterize the contemporary Berberist discourse. Only recently, Amazigh activists initiated a campaign to return Abd al-Krim's remains from Cairo, where he died in 1963,and to construct a combination mausoleum-museum-cultural complex in his Ajdir redoubt.2aIn August 1999,the newly crowned King Muhammad VI conferred an important measure of legitimacy on Rifian Amazigh memory work. Aware of the Rif's problematic status,economically, socially, and historically vis-ir-vis the Moroccan central authorities, and seeking to bolster his own legitimacy in a region that his fathet as crown prince, had bombed and repressedin 1958-59, Muhammad made a high-profile visit to the region, something his father had always avoided. Moreover, his gestures to the Rifian Berbers were not limited to pledges for material improvement but also included a promise that the Ajdir ruins would be reconstructed and a visit with bin Abd al-Krim's son, who came especiallyfrom Cairo for the occasion. Notwithstanding Muhammad VI's gestures,however, he has failed to address a painful episode that highlights the makhzent historic indifference

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to the Rifian war, namely, the Spanish military's systematic use of poison gas against Rifian fighters and civilians, with the assistanceof French and German manufacturers. It is only in recent years that this matter has come to light, thanks in part to the work of a number of Spanish scholars and British historian SebastianBalfout25aswell astwo German journalists, who revealed German involvement in Spain'sactions. Le Monde Amazigh,which has played a prominent role in recent years in promoting and disseminating the Abd al-Krim story through articles and conferences,has given prominence to this shocking and sorry episode in a number of issues.The battle qg_ .q!I]9Imarginalizatiqn and official.indifference.extendsto,.the-ptgqent: S.ul, yfvols 9f pgison gas attacks and their offspring"are. said-_t9".pgftrfr.o-mpumer_o99..l.r;qlthp5'abl-e_ms, including inordinatqlyhigh,faleEpJge.1r 9r.But up until now, Moroccan authorities have ignored Amazigh demands and been unwilling to raise the matter of possible acknowledgment and compensation for elderly survivors with the Spanish government, fearing that it would adversely affect bilateral ties.26In response,one speaker at a conference held in the Rifian city of Tetouan in the spring of 2004 proposed a number of concretemeasures,including suing the German and French companiesthat participated in the manufacture of the toxic gasesusedby Spain and appealing to the European Court of Human Rights.27 Praising bin Abd al-Krim's anticolonial exploits is only part of the {paTigh

the

movement!^effo-rts to. deb.unk the stigrna-of eollaboration-wifl

r-qlers,whicf.,gqlp-ed,currency especially.after -the.jssuing."of 99!9n!gl (royal qo;_q?lle-d .dahiir ed.ic"t) b-y.theFrench authoritiesin.JgS0" "Berber the France'sattemptto institutioqalizgBerbercustoma.rylaw.at.theexpense.of the.,formationof.-the..natipnaliCl Qurani-claw serveda$.a.cruci.al.catalyst.in movement.In recentyears,someBerberactivistshavetaken anotherlook at the episode.MuhammadMounib blamedthe nationalistsfor the false "Berber" appellationof the dahir, for it implicitly implicatedthe Berbersin the Frenchproject to divide them from the Arabs.z8Chafik found another wayto debunkthe myth of Berbercollaborationwith the Protectorate,emphasizingthe importanceof transcribingand studyingAmazighpoetryas llte reservoirof the memoryof resistance to the Frenchoccupationduring 191244.2e Commemorationsof battlesagainstthe colonizers,suchas the orteof llougaferin the Middle Atlas in 1933,areconnectedby organizers kr olht:r historicaland contemporaryeventsin differentregions,so as to t.rrrplrirsizc t lresupra-tribal,collectivenatureof Berberidentity.3o

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Battlingthe lstiqlal The Moroccan Berberist counternarrativehas drawn an almost straight line betweenofficial indifferenceto the Rif and the subsequentfounding of the stateand marginalizationof the Berbercommunitiesby the Istiqlaldominatednationalistmovement.The failure of the stateto officially commemoratethe battleof Anoual or other episodesof resistanceto the French pacificationcampaigns,wrote one commentator,contrastedsharplywith its attentionto eventscommemoratingthe Istiqlal.3lThe murder of Rifian LiberationArmy leaderAbbasM'sa'adi in 1956,apparentlyon the order of the Istiqlal'sMehdi Ben Barka,has becomeanother subjectof discussion as has the authorities'forcible repressionof the 1958-59 in recentyears,32 Ironically, one of the eighteendemandssubmittedto the king in rebellion. November1958by a Rifian committee(which includedbin Abd al-Krirds son)wasfor the rapid Arabizationof the educationalsystemthroughoutthe country.The context of this demand was the use of Frenchin the former Spanishzone,to which the Rif belonged,which put the local populationat ofcourse, Subsequently, a disadvantagerelativeto the centralauthorities.33 Arabizationbecameone of the chief bugaboosof the Amazigh moverirent, owing to the overt threat it posedto Tamazightand to the alreadyunequal, subordinatesocialstatusof its speakers. As with the Rifian demandsfor indemnity for the victims of Spain'spoisongasattacks,reopeningthe woundsof tr958is not just a matterof concern to historians,or evento identitybuilders.In February2004,the Committee of Victims of the 1958WalmasEventswas established.The committeedemandednot only the revelationof the truth but alsoindemnity for the survivorsof the repressionof the mostly BerberArmy of Liberationmembers, from the Walmastribal grouping,by the "militia" of the Istiqlal party.As is usuallythe case,the royal family'srole in the eventswasdownplayed.3a The first Amazigh intellectualto speakout publicly againstthe falsification of Moroccanhistory by the Istiqlal-dominatedestablishmentand the systematicignoring of the Berbers,thosewho representthe "real cultureof Ali Sidqi Azaykou(d. 2004).Charthe countryi'was the recentlydeceased acterrzingthehistoricalorigins of Morocco'scultural problem asstemming from repeatedcolonizationby outsiders,including Arabs, and publishing his viewsin Arabic,no less(addingfuel to the fire), he wasconvictedin 1982 Beginof 'disturbing the securityof the state"andimprisonedfor oneyear.35 ning in the 1990s,however,the Moroccanauthoritiesbegantreating such more benignly.By 2001,the BerberManifestocould address expressions

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Morocco'smore recenthistory in an unabashedlyrevisionistand explicitly political tone. It hammeredawayat the denial of Morocco's'Amazighness" and the arrogationby professionalpoliticiansand most membersof Morocco'selites,since 1956,of "monopolistic rights to 'patriotism' and 'political action."'Even speakingof this monopolization,the manifestonoted, has long beena taboo in Moroccanlife. Little by little, statedthe Manifesto,it becameclear after independence that none of the extantpolitical forces,whetherpro-monarchyor not, were going to give the Amazigh their due and include them in the definition of a modern Morocco.Instead,successive nationalgoyernmentspursuedthe 'Arab policy of building an exclusively Maghribi' led by an ArabizedMorocco.In presentingtheir demandsfor a reorderingof national priorities, the signatoriesof the manifestowere determined"to combat the cultural hegemony"that has been programmedin order to bury a very important part of [Morocco's]civilizationalheritage[emphasisin original].36 Although the broad dichotomy laid out in the manifestobetweenthe "good' Berbersand the "bad" Istiqlallmakhzenmay be generallyaccepted by the Amazigh movement,a more complex reality has begun to be acknowledged.SomeBerbers,including former Liberation Army members, joined the Union Nationaledes ForcesPopulaires(UNFP) in 1959,which was formed by Ben Barka as a breakawayfrom the Istiqlal. They did so, accordingto veteranactivist Muhammad al-Kassimi,in order to stop the injustice causedto authentic"resisters"by the appointmentto high positions of "collaboratorsi'e.g.,Gen. Muhammad Oufkir, who servedin the French army (as did tens of thousandsBerbergoums [tribal irregulars]) and eventuallybecamethe king'sright-hand man until his ultimate demise inl972, and "feudalistsj'a referenceto the Berberrural notableswho made common causewith the monarchy through the Mouvement Populaire.3T The state'scrackdownon the tribes of the Khenifra region inI973 followed an attempteduprisingin MoulayBouazaby the UNFP'ssecretmilitary wing led by Sidi Muhammad Umed, which, accordingto Kassimi,had won a measureof sympathyamongthe civilian population.The punishment inflicted on his family, friends and the region in generalis now being spoken of openly,along with demandsfor indemnities.Meanwhile,Umed fled to Algeria,where he had previouslyresidedfor twelveyears,died during the 1980s,and wasburied therewith honors.To complicatethe picture further, the UNFP itself may have been involved in the unsuccessfulcoup d'6tat againstKing HassanII the previousyear,through Lt. Col. Muhammad Amokrane. This of coursewas the event that brought Oufkir, held up by

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Kassimi as the'tollaborator" par excellenceduring the 1950s,to ruin.38The very fact that Le Monde Amazigh published the interview with Kassimi while he was being treated in an army hospital at the state'sexpense for injuries he suffered while in prison, indicates the increasing possibilities of conducting open discussion of formerly repressedepisodesof Morocco's recent past. It also signals that at least some within the Amazigh movement are opposed to reductionist, one-dimensional representationsof that past.3e

Subaltern History Recovering and remembering rural and tribal history is very much part of the Amazigh culture movement's agenda.Here the primary factor in determining identity is not language per se but land, around which society is organized. In Morocco, the authorities, whether French or Moroccan' are depicted as running roughshod over Amazigh communal land rights and traditions. For example, Le Monde Amazigh published a long article denouncing the administrative confiscation of the lands belonging to the Zayan tribes in the Khenifra region, pointing to similarities between current policies and those used by the Protectorate authorities, who had bought out one of the leadingcailds,Mouha U Hamou Zayani. Previously, he had joined with Arab tribes in their fight againstthe French during their "pacification' campaign. However, in return for his agreement not to fight the French any further, Mouha U Hamou was granted the lands of neighboring tribes. The confiscation of communal lands also had important negative effects on social and cultural life. For example,a traditional spring holiday gathering of the Zayan tribes, which featured a theatrical performance by tribal notables involving pledges of mutual solidarity and a sharing of the lands, according to Berber customary law, vanished with the transfer of the lands to Mouha U Hamou. The administrative means for doing so were and remain Royal dahirs, which do not recognize customary law and view tribal lands as belonging to the state.ao The question of the relationship between customary law and Islamic law has been ofcontinuing interestto scholars.The French Protectorateauthorities stepped into a minefield when they tried to formally institutionalize customary Berber practicesand thus officially place them on an equal fooling with the Sharila. It is generallyheld that Berber customary law (izcr.l)is not diametricallyopposedto the Shari'a and takesit irrtoaccourrl.Howcvcr,

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Injaz Abdallah Habibi, in writing aboutthe Zayantribes,openly questions whetherthis is the case,indicatinga desireto diminish the religiousaspects of Berberidentity.His emphasison the positiveaspectsof communalvillage customsis part of a broaderthemeof Amazigh memory work, namely,the essentiallydemocraticnature of village societyand, by extension,Berber cultureasa whole(asarticulatedin the BerberManifesto).Theuplandvillageis presentedas the repositoryof deep-rootedBerbertraditions,with the traditional art, handicrafts,and householdmanagementbywomen who stood at the centerof daily life.arS_uch trgatmgn-!.al timggspillsover into an idealizationof tra{ltlgqal life, reminiscentof the"nostalgiarladen presenta tlg gf th" Eptern Europeanlewishshtetl(v!f!agg)by writers and publicists k99n on promotlng and presel-vingJewiqh.i_denil* "andculture, evenas its wasbeing erodedand then violeqtly qr.a{lcated.Another writer even fgg went so far as to describevillagesocietyt organizingconceptof jama'a, which is usuallyassociatedwith a (negative)tribal mentality,ashaving the attributesof love,altruism, love of the land and the 'bther," and hencebeing not in contradictionwith the requirementsof modernity but rather in harmony with it.azThis may seemcontrived; however,it may also fit the categoryof reinterpretingone'shistory and societyin a usefulfashion. Ali Azaykou,for his part, recommendedstudyingMorocco'spastvia the methodof /?istoiretatoude,a metaphorfor unwritten documentspreserved by geographyand archaeology,in addition to the oral traditions embodied in the Amazigh collectivememory.In addition, one may learn something evcpfrom the actualtaltoo often engravedon the Berbers'skin.Useofthe tattoo metaphoris especiallypoignant,given the fact that in contemporary Morocco,the tattoo is often seen as an emblem of inferiority inflicted by .one'sparents,and considerableefforts are made to surreptitiouslyremove it, often resultingin scarringof the skin.a3 Algeria'sBerbers- Kabyleand Chaouior Amazigh? The Berberistreadingof the broad historicalthemesof Amazighhistory in both the pre-Islamicand Arab-Islamicperiods,aswell asthe challenges posedby the postcolonialstate,cut acrosscontemporaryinter-stateboundrries.France's abortedeffortsto baseits rule on a policyof dividingBerbers lhrnr Arabs,underpinnedby a well-constructed setof origin and character tttylhs,aa pr
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culture movementaccuseit of promoting colonialismin a new guise.But unlike earlierdecades,Berberinsistenceon their anticolonialistcredentials doesnot deter them from sharplycriticizing Arab nationalism,the dominant ideologyof all modern statesin North Africa. More and more, Arab nationalisrnappearsin Berberdiscourseasa perniciousforeignimport, its fuller appellationbeing'Arab-IslamicBa'athism"or, alternately,'Arab-Islarnic totalitarianism."In rejectingthe Arab nationalistdoctrine of a single Arab homeland(al-Watanal-'Arabi) from the Atlantic Oceanto the persian Gulf, Berberistsemphasizethe existenceof a singleAmazigh people existing from time immemorial in its homeland (Tamazgha),stretching from the CanaryIslandsto the Siwaoasisin westernEgypt.Effortsto desacrahzethe Arabic languageinclude labelingthe Arabic script'Arameanl'as Concurrently,a modified versionof the ancientTifinagh script, preserved for usageby the TouaregBerbersof the Sahara,is held up as an important symbolof Berberidentity, and its usageis activelypromoted.In the realm of commemorativeefforts,pan-Berberidentity was recentlymanifestedin a petition by the Paris-basedCongrdsMondial Amazigh to the UN's Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) demanding that Franceadd to its list of officiallysanctionedholidaysthe Amazighholidaysof Yennayer(Amazigh New Year,a traditional agricultural festival), occurring on |anuary 12,and the'Amazigh Spring" (commemoratingthe eventsin Algeriain 1980;seebelow),on April20.a6 At the sametime, the particularhistoricalexperiences and socialrealities of the berberophonecommunitieshaveshapedtheir memory work, resulting in a type of"Berberism in onecountryi'carrying at leasta potentialtension with the pan-Berberistview. Nowhereis this more evidentthan with the Kabylians,who makeup two-thirds of Algeria'sberberophonepopulation. To be sure,Kabylianshaveplayeda vanguardrole in laying the foundation for the modern Berber culture movement,embodiedover the last four decadesby the France-based intellectualproduction ofsuch bodiesas the Acad6mieBerbdre/AgrawImazighen,the Group d'EtudesBerbdresde lluniversitd de Paris-vIII, and the centre de RechercheBerbdreat Institut NationaldesLangueset CivilisationsOrientales(INALCO) in paris.However,the samefactorsthat placedthem in the vanguardof "pan-Berberism" alsoresultedin a sharpeningofKabylian specificity.By contrast,the second largestberberophonegroup,the Chaouia(from the AurdsMountains),has historicallybeenlessisolatedfrom its Arab surroundingsand slowerto developa modern Amazighidentity. Thefirst manifestations of a moderntypeof Kabylian-Berber conscious-

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ness'expressedthrough new kinds ofcultural expressionssuch asthe poetry of resistanceof colonization,were alreadymaking their appearanceat the end of the nineteenthcentury.At this point, therewas no intermediate referenceto an 'Algerian" or "Maghribian' community,only the immediateKabylianidentity and the wider Islamic one.47 |ean Amrouchdschants Berbdresde Kabylie(1939)was followedby many other works in the fields of music and poetry (e.g.,works by Mouloud F6raoun,TaosAmrouche, Mouloud Mammeri, and Ait Menguillet).Their recovery,transmission,and production of Kabylian cultural artifactswere crucial to the development of modern Kabylian identity. on the more explicitly political level,young radical Kabylian militants who fomentedthe so-calledBerberistcrisis in 1948-49,sharpenedmatters further. According to the analysisof Melha Benbrahim,the textsof thesemilitants are dominatedby referencesto the Berber, and specificallyKabylian, patrimony: the reclaiming of the pre_ IslamichistoricalfiguresMassinissaand fugurtha,and the heroicresisterto the Arab conquest,the Kahina;the fierceKabylianresistanceto the French forces(1857,l87l); referencesto the Djurdura and the montagneladraras a symbol of resistance;the honor of the group; and their fidelity to their ancestorsand symbolicheritage.YoungKabylianintellectuals,statessalem chaker, werethus situatedat the intersectionof radical nationalismof the modern type (laique)and the specificBerbercultural tradition.as Interestin the "Berberistcrisis" is part of the wider interestamongKabylian activistsin reopeningfor scrutiny the eventsof Algeria'swar of independenceand its immediate aftermath.Scholarshavegenerallydownplayedthe specificBerber dimension of the Algerian revolution'sinternal blood-lettingsand political purges,for example,the assassinations ofAbane Ramadaneand BelkacemKrim and the failure of Hocine Ait Ahmed'sopposition to the newly independentauthoritiesin 1962-63.ae Nonetheless, theseepisodes,underpinnedby the wholesaledenial of Kabylianspecificity-and any diversity,for that matter-in favor of a stridentlyuniform and uni-dimensional nationalism,are now increasinglyviewed as part of the backgroundto the cultural flourishing and simmering proto-political opposition amongthe Kabyliancommunity during the 1970s.politically,Ait Ahmed organizedhis supportersin 1963under the bannerof the Forcesdes Front socialistes.This organizationwould be joined at the end of the l9g0s by the smaller,more militantly secular-BerberistRassemblement pour la Cultureet la D6mocratie.so Theproblematicnatureof the Algerianstateand its failure to adequately acconrmodate the Kabylianregiongenerated a confluence of circumstances

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Acthat fedtcrthe now-mythical"BerberSpring"(LePrintempsBerbdre).sr eorellngto BenjaminStora,"Theeffectof the'Berberspring'wasto produce, fur the first time since independenceand from within Algeria, a public counter-discourse of real import, in a country operatingon the principle of unanimism.In that compactuniverse,wheresocietyand state,privateand public mingled together in a singlebloc, the blossomingof autonomous popular associationsand organizationsgavetexture to Algerian society. Theappearance of cultural,democraticpluralism allowedconflictsexisting 'within the people'to be expressedand resolvedby political means."sz In terms of memory work the anniversaryof the BerberSpringhasbecomea centralcommemorativeeventfor Amazigh cultural associationsin Algeria and the diaspora.53 Since2001,it hasbeenjoined by Le Printemps Nolr (BlackSpring),the bloody eventssparkedby the deathof a youngKabylian in policecustodythat resultedin the deathsofover one hundredpeople, a veritablecivil revolt againstthe authoritiesand the creationof a new body outsideof existingpolitical parties,the aarouch(lit. 'tribes"), which led an ongoingstruggleto changethe natureof Kabylian-staterelationsand, by extension,the natureof the Algerian stateitself.Theextentto which the aarouchconstituteda modern,grass-rootsorganizationdrawingsustenance from traditional collectivevillage symbolsor, alternatively,constitutedan unwelcomereversionto factionalized,premodern antidemocratictribal norms remainsto be determined.sa The two "Springs"of 1980and 2001serveasbookends,of a sort, to the breakdownof the postindependenceFLN Algerian stateand the descent into horrific violenceduring the 1990sbetweenthe authoritiesand Islamist oppositionforces.Thesetumultuoustimesresultedin the creationof Kabylian "martyrs,"from the numerousintellectualsand artistsslain during the violenceof the 1990s,ss to GuermahMassinissa, the youth whosekilling touchedoff the BlackSpringin 2001.Singerand poet LounesMatoub is perhapsthe most prominent martyr of them all. His murder in fune 1998, allegedlyby Islamistextremists,touchedoffmassiveantigovernmentdemonstrationsthroughout Kabylia, and his last CD, releasedposthumously, containsa withering indictment of the postindependenceAlgerian state, set to the tune of Algeria'snational anthem,with the refrain of "Betrayal, BetrayalJ'Thecoverof the CD drawn by Ali Dilem, one of Algeria'sleading caricaturists,containsimagesof dripping blood, the Amazighflag,Algeria's military and political leadersand leadingIslamists,a referenceto the Arabization languagepolicy, and a sign that reads'AlgeriassicPark."It serves asan almosticonicposteqbeingusedby Berbersatellitetelevisiorr(llRl'V)

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broadcastingfrom paris,for example.Matoub'sdeath,and thoseof others, quickly cameto serveasa referencepoint for increasedKabylian militancy. Giventhe centralityof cultural producersin the fashioningof modern KabylianlAmazighidentity,it wasfitting that a veteransinger/poet/activist, Ferhat Mehenni,hastakenthe reaclin recentyearsin proiroting autonomyfor Kabylie,a radical idea indeed.s6whatever the courseeventJwould take,it wasclearthat the fearsof Mouloud Mammeri, the Kabylian cultural icon of the previousgeneration,of another "absurddeath of the Aztecs,,was premature,at the very least.57 Although Kabyliahasbeenat the centerof the ArgerianAmazigh movement'spolitical and cultural ferment,it would be misiaken to assigi it exclu_ sivity.ssBerbermemory work in the Aurdsregion,the site of th. Lbl"d 8".ber resistanceto the invadingArab-Muslim forcesat the end of the seventh century,has recentlyreacheda new level.In February2003, rlAssociation Aurds El-Kahina erecteda large statueof the heroic Berber queenin the centerof the town of Bagha'iin the wirayaof Khencher". Th" statuewas designedby a graduateof the EcoleNationaledes Beaux-Arts dAlger. of course'sucha public commemorativeact could not be done in Algeria (except perhapsin Kabylia)without the consentof the authorities. In fact, the ceremonywasattendedby the presidentof the republichimsel{, AbdelAziz Bouteflika.Thepresident'spresencewasclearlyintendedas a gestureto the Amazigh community,with whom the statehas been at logge-rheads for so manyyears(thoughprimarilyin Kabylia,not in the Aures); ii alsoindicated a desireto placegreateremphasison specificallyAlgerian history, albeit a particular readingof it. Indeed,one shouldn'ttakethis too far; hispresence at the unveiling of the Kahina statuewas ignored entirely by the national press. of course,Amazighactivistscontestthe state'sorientationto Berber heritage,whetherit involvedappropriationor neglect.one Aurds-centered web site,displayingthe picture of the new Kahina statue,added superimposed imagesof the Amazigh flag on both sidesof the Kahina statue's pedestal.se Activists bemoan the degradationand official neglectof the archaeological site' which is consideredto havebeenthe mountainousredoubt of the Kahina. Someacademicshave urged that uNESCo be approached to include it on its list of protectedworld Heritagesites,and that the Ministry of culture take the lead in promoting its va1ue,as it was inhabited from prehist.ric times until the eleventhcentury Hilalian invasion.60 According to chaouia activists,the endangered statusof anothersite posesa threat lo their collectivememory:the mausoleumof Imadghacen, a cylindricar

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lrcderldl eighteerrand a half meters high and fifty-nine meters in diamclrlr' iu tlrc' wilirya of Batna, which is among the oldest material evidence rl'tlre Massyle Amazigh dynasty, and which under the subsequentrule of Massinissais consideredto have sought to unifr the Maghrib into a single entity. A suggestion to rename the Batna airport after Imadghacen (Imedhassen) was rudely rejected, prompting the following rejoinder from the disappointed former governor of Batna, who had been removed by Bouteflika allegedly following the pressure of the "local mafia": "|ust as you have negated our origins at this moment, there will come a generation which will negate youi'61Meanwhile, chaoui Amazigh activists have begun using the name anyways.62

Berber/Amazigh MemoryWork / 67 includes the date according to the Jewish calendar on its masthead!) Alternatively, will space be made for multiple, even competing narratives? will Amazigh commemorative efforts be legitimized or repressed? And what may be the impact on the Amazigh movement's memory work of varying state policies? one may only say that the fashioning of Amazigh identity through memory work promises to be an ongoing and ever_increasing en_ terprise that will surely have an impact on, and interact with, parallel processescurrently reshaping the identity of Algerian and Moroccan societies as a whole.

Notes Concluding Thoughts As Lawrence Rosen has shown in his study of a Moroccan village, day-today social boundaries between 'Arabs" and "Berbers" are generally fluid and negotiable,63 belying the all-too-common tendency among pundits and policy makers, past and present, to cast in stone the "Berber-Arab dichotomyi' Nonetheless, in light of the social, cultural, and political developments in Morocco over the past thirty years, it would behoove researchersto revisit this relationship, particular as Berber memory work proceeds apace. The same is true regarding neighboring Algeria. In his insightful analysis of "the Berber" as a national signifier in Algerian historiographies, fames McDougall warned against the possibility that the development of a Berber counter-narrative to the Algerian state'sdominant narrative might harden social boundaries and intolerance in the name of cultural authenticity, a process that would in effect substitute one essential "authenticity" for another.6aIndeed, one can identifii without difficulty this tendency among some Amazigh militants. At this point, Berber memory work, and the Berber/Amazigh culture movement to which it belongs, is clearly a genie that has been let out of a bottle whose cork was then discarded. Its future course, permutations, and points of emphasis will depend in no small measure on the policies of the Algerian and Moroccan states toward the phenomenon. will their dominant national narratives be sufficiently modified to include Amazigh elements?can one imagine, for example, that daily newspaperswill include the Amazigh year on their masthead, alongsidethe year according to the Muslim and Gregorian calendar?(Perhapsthis is not so far-fetchec.l; after all, the Moroccan palace'sFrench-languagemouthpiece, Le Motitt tlrt snltttrtt,

Note: This studywas supported by the Israel ScienceFoundation (grant no.5 25104_2U5). special thanks to samir Ben-Layashifor his assistancein researching this article. 1.For convenience'ssake,the terms "Berber" and .Amazigh'will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter. 2. Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationarism in a Global Era (carnbridge: polity Press,1995),133. 3. Bernard Lewis,History-Remembered, Recovered, Invented(princeton, N.J.:princeton University Press,1976). 4' The percentageofberberophones in Algeria is generaily deemed to be 20-25 percent, and in Morocco 40-45 percent. 5' fugurtha was the king of a united Numidia between 156ancr104 B.c. and grandson of Massinissa.He died in a Roman prison. The article is remembered as depicting the Berbers as eternally rebellious; in fact, there was much more to Amrocuhes 1946 article, which described the duality of Berber culture in response to the .bther" and recommended the shedding of (female) cultural characteristicsthat prevented the Ber_ lrers from becoming agentsin history. Michael Brett anclElisabeth Fentress,TheBerbers ( l,ondon: Blackwell, 1996), 269-7 0. 6. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: LesLieux de Mdmoirel' Representa_ /iors, Memory and Counter-Memory specialissue,26 (Spring l9g9): 12. 7. Abdelmajid Hannoum, coronial Histories,post-colonial Memories: TheLegendof lha Kahina, a North African Heroine (portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 2001),7-9; Brett ittttl l:entress, Berbers,l20-32;MichaelBrett,..IbnKhaldun and the Arabisationof North A liica," MaghrebRevi ew 4, no. I (f anuary_Febr rurry 1979),:9_16. ll. Srnith, Nationsand Nationalism,64. 9. ll)i(1.,146. f0. Mrrya Shatzuriller, The Berbersand the Islamic state: The Marinid Experiencein Itrt l'rolcclorrilaMorocco(princeton,N.J.:Markus Weiner,2000). ll. lirn('s Mcl).ugall, "Myth and counter-Myth: 'The Berber'asNational signifier in AlgclirrrrI lisloriogrirplricsl' IladicalllistoryReviewg6 (Spring2003):75,g0_gl. l , l . l l t i r l . .t l ? .