Refashioning Identity

2 of The (Re)Fashioning

MoroccanNationalldentitY MIC K A E L

B E N S A D OU N

II initiof his life' Morocco'sKing Hasan During the 1990s,the last decade of the political sphere'One of its ated a proces, of g'adt'ul liberalization on national wasthe emergenceof new discourses important consequences in: s-t"h--n't9-g"r'sup'q" identity. $s fr--egdpm-qf""press'io"n'exf-an'de'd'"s*eialand

1n,;drf,oiiio't .of-tHt-fvtn-''"'sl3-t'9q3!i-v''1qgmglimes s,"qugt't sr*as.ins! Islamists,the Amazigh lnovein opposition ta.the p;*evuir.lns""irtuti"y9rights organizationsall-engagedin""this ment,l feminiq! groupt' ""J ffi* redefinitioq,*rrtrr.rqr;:;ri-i-"tlher-irnplicitlyor.explicitly'-anumb*e"r'sf both At the sametime' in the face of the fopudipg myrn* oi-if'*;;d of the ofthe monarchymodified elements internal and external;;;;;; asthe while leavingthe monarchy'srole ficial discourr" o, ,rutionulidentity symbolof the nation untouched' freeminent unifying dynamicbeof thesedevelopmentswasan interesting one consequence tweenthedominantdiscourseandthecounterdiscourses.Theofficialdisto appeasethe of the counterdiscourses coursebeganintegratingelements trends they posed'In turn' the pragmatic variousgroupsand the iralenges monarchy's were temptedto acceptthe ol'tl,esevarious socialmovements and the two main forcesof conco-optation.In particular' the monarchy testation,theAmazighmovementandthe-Islamistmovement'participated national struggleover the definition of in n lively triungt'lu"Jiulogue' The part of thepoliticalgame'especially ldcnrityhashencebetot" un important fatherin |uly 1999' his deceased ninccI(ing MutramrnadVI succeeded continuedto defendthe cenAllhoughtheyoungking hasunwavefnglY emersVmbol'he hasalsotoleratedthe trnlily ol'thc nlunu"ni u' a national religious and ifi* tuy eventuallyweakenthe historic ol'tliscourses g,ettce new passionfor Morocco's ,,1',t,.,tttu'o"hy'ln particularthe legililrrrrcy againstmonarchicpracacl of accusation tetettl ltigklry risksbccorltingan t|teelttr|el|t|trl.llrrrtttrllirtgttrtlirtttalrcconciliation'Itallowsforaprofound

l,l

n"

r:

v

/ l t ' . F_ 'n '

\{t'

r "'

,t{

{

c"". od*',C #'.*/'

i!

The(Re)Fashioning ofMoroccan NationalIdentity / 15

M i c k t t t l llu r su lo r tr t

of politicaldissidents, ittic policicsof repressiotr c rit itltreol' l lasirrr l l'.ssystcrrr p ol i ti calsystenri s not fundamenth c l i rc ttl rtt l l tc c :l trre ttt r r ot wit hs liu td i rrg to the throne, Muhammad VI has in large tnlly rlillercrrl.2Siuceascertclirrg pirrl pursucclanclexpandedon processesinitiated by his father.For instance,

roi6 in September 1990 and the campaign against Morocco's systematic human rights abuses deeply damaged the country's image in the West. The end of the Cold War had led the international community to be much more concerned with the promotion of democracy. Over time, this became a cen-

lre has ernployedthe time-honored means of makhzenianpolitics, combining co-optation and repression,3to deal with the establishedopposition political parties, the Islamist current, and the Amazigh movement. Like his father, Muhammad VI has promoted a moderate Islam that recognizes the

tral aspect of U.S. foreign policy. The collapse of the Soviet Union fostered disproportionate expectations best expressedby the American political philosopher Francis Fukuyama: Capitalism and democracy would spread, and the idea of 'democratic peace" had become an achievable goal.7

national and religious legitimacy of the king and draws its main references from the Moroccan context.4,Lthe same lh1g-bg has lent4ublic'rupportro mgv€ment that is likely-to serv.easanally",agaj.pst 4ple;-I-rtAl]?f,clry--Amazigh fu_ndamenlalism-.Thetriangular political' game" has resulted in important adaptations in the official discourse on national identity. In the negotiation process over the redefinition of national identity the king plays a dual role. On the one hand, he acts as a mediator between competing groups, but on

In this-context, IVlorocco, a traditionally-.pro.--w-es.Isq4qogltry, eould not as,a brutal autocracy. Th.gry.for*q, in .ths bgglpning .acceptbeing p1_e,,septed

.,,i,''"' the other hand, he seeksto redefine the nation in such a way so as to remain

, l , , t '\rf'

L\ '

'

/

-. '

a tun'+1. tr.,, "t$-

a dominant actor of the political sphere.a This chapter explores the emergence of a variety of new definitions of Moroccan identity since the beginning of the 1990sand analyzestheir impact on the official discourse, stressingthe political factors underlying these evolutions. It focuseson the main discoursesof contestation,the Amazigh and the Islamist, against the background of the official discourse.

The OfficialVersion Although the official discourse on national identity has undergone important changesover the last fifteen years, it has not altered the founding ethos of the nation. Moroccan national identity, as expounded by the regime in the Moroccan Constitution, is basedon three pillars.sFirst, the monarchy is the primary national and religious symbol of Morocco. Along with Islam, it is the main unifying factor of the nation. Second,Morocco is a Muslim and Arab country. Third, the territory of western Sahara,adjacent to Morocco's southern border, is an inalienable part of Moroccan territory notwithstanding the absenceof international legitimacy. Theseprinciples have remained a constant in the official discourse and are challenged only by radical fringes of the Amazigh and Islamist movements. Without modifying these foundational pillars, the monarchy refashionedthe Moroccan national identity, under national and international pressure. lrool
of ftq l!90-9,'t!ng. IJa_s-ns II inftlatedp E"ampaign aimed.aL-improving..fhe M.plocs-o" H1s ggp,nael"a l-ey , AndrgAzeulay, internp!iq!-4"htr-qg9,9f 3Mp.

(alsocalledMogador),"plpy_-"d rsc-p-Ap J*9-W f"rp.m.--[ggasgjrp a,key.fqlp"inthe pl-9_n"-o_gi-Aa*af*thi6"newjmagp. The monarchy developed a new discourse on human rights and democracy.Morocco committed itself to respectfor universalvaluesand to the promotion of democracywith the establishment of the ConseilConsultatifdesDroits de I'Homme (ConsultativeCouncil for Human Rights)on May 8, 1990,and the revisionof its constitution on September 4,1992.From a nationof subjects,Moroccoappeared, however haltingly,to be becominga nation of citizensparticipatingin globalprocesses. Morocco'sofficia-lidentily dlscoursehasalwaysinsistedon the compatibilityof MoroccanIslam,-with.dernocratic-values. MoroccanIslam,symbolizedby the religiousstatusof the king as "Commanderof the Faithful,"is presentedas a tolerant and modern Islam, respectingand protectingreligious minorities.sWhile Algeria struggledwith a bloody conflict between the military-dominatedregimeand radicalIslamistoppositiongroupsdurir:gthe 1990s,Moroccopresenteditselfasa land of peaceand stability. More than ever, the Moroccan authorities delineatedtheir country's identity in oppositionto its "brother enemyi'Algeria.eAlgeria becamethe "significantother" of Morocco despitethe numeroussimilaritiesbetween the two countries.HasanII tried to convincethe West that Morocco was ilnmunefrom Muslim fundamentalism because of the religiouslegitimacy ol-themonarchy:PoliticalIslamcould not successfully mobilizethe populirtion againsta traditionalmonarchythat protectedthe Muslim identity ol'tlrc rration.loThis maxim wasmainly intendedfor consumptionin the Wesl, bul it also was diffused in the Moroccan.media.,and",reinforced""by . hisr.rictl rrarrativethat emphasized the opennes.s.pfMo,tgcc_an.Islam..Io ollrt,rr'ivilizirlions iurdreligions. Moroccowaspresented asa landof exem-

16

/

Mickael Bensadoun

plary coexistenceamong peoples of different faiths, with the authorities and bei4g.espegi4llytolerant and prot-ectivetoward jlits Jewsjl'J\{oroccan "s.ociety JewiSh.intellectuals, artists, and politicianrll particip.ated in,the dissemina[!on of this idea, publishing a seriegofbooks..and.articles pr,arsing-MuslimJ9ry1sheptepte under a benign and paternal mpnarchy.l2 Hasan II liked to claim that for geographic and historic reasons,Morocco'svocation was to build bridges between civilizations, in particular, between Islam and the West.l3 Responding to Samuel Huntington's 'tlash of civilizations" thesis,lathe Moroccan official discourse called for dialogue between civilizations. The golden age of Muslim Spain was repeatedly referred to as an ideal model to be followed, with specialemphasisplaced on the mutual enrichment in Andalusia between Tewishand Muslim intellectuals. Through the use of festivalsand other cultural manifestations,lsMorocco trumpeted the Andalusian golden age in order to show the world that today's Morocco remained a land of tolerance and could serve as a bridge betweencivilizations. At the policy level, this vocation found its expression in the supporting role played by Morocco in the promotion of the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians.The active participation of Morocco in the EuroMediterranean partnership was another demonstration of the country's ability to foster understanding and cooperation between the three monotheistic religions. The overarching theme of the official discourse, then, is that Morocco is a Mediterranean country linked to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa' historically, geographically, and culturally.l6 Its history is rich in reciprocal interactions with foreign civilizations and cultures. Thus Moroccan identity, drawing on this rich heritage, is defined as pluralist in nature, culturally, ethnically, and even religiously, and not monolithic. Such a discourse fits in nicely with the postmodern celebration of plural and hybrid identities. Whereas modernity praised the unitary national state, postmodernity values multiculturalism. Hence Morocco's modified official discourse on national identity seemsto prove the Moroccan monarchy's ability to adapt to the cultural requirements of the globalization era.17Indeed, the legitimacy of the monarchy, drawing on its status as heir to Morocco's long tradition of sharifian rule, is not principally basedon Arab nationalism, enabling a flexible management of the country's various social and cultural forces. Contrary to the old establishednationalist parties, the monarchy is not committed to the building of a monolithic national identity and to its political expression,a centralizedfacobin state.As a monarchy,thc Mor
The(Re)Fashioning ofMoroccan Nationalldentity / 17 can more easily deal with minority ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities than can other Arab statesfounded after French and British decolonization. The makhzel, system is based on the politics of fragmentation, and over time Hasan II adapted the system to deal with cultural and identity challenges.

Hasan lland the Amazigh Movement King Hasan's response to the emergence of the Amazigh movement was typical of makhzenian politics. Sorn at the"end of the l960s,'the Amazigh movement became.much".more visible.-a.t..the he.gnningof ,the.I990s, tak-

ing advantage-of,the-authoriried."willingness'ta.allp_)y--"fo[€r:eajer."libe-reliz tion in public-life..and,.1he rygion.wide crisis.of Arab nationalism As the decadg_up,f.o-_[{,9,S, ![e-,.4ewcom munication tools, partigular.lyth g Inteln el reinforced the movementt aciiviiies anJ enabled.it to connect with likeminded group.s, in A!g9;i.a*111{ Egro-p9, On August5, 1991,the main MoroccanBerberorganizationsts published I the Agadir Charter (ChartedAgadir relativeaux droits linguistiqueset cul] turelsAmazighs),which demandedthe full recognitionof Berberidentity i aspart of the country'snationalidentity. The charter did not usethe term I "Berberi'preferringthe term 'Amazigh,"indicating the movement'saspirat tions to free the identity of berberophones from the shacklesof cultural I imperialism,be it of Roman,French,or Arab origin. The charterdoesnot \. denythe'Arab-Muslim' identityof Moroccobut stresses the Amazigheth- i nic originsof the Moroccannation.le lhe Amazig[.po,v9ment is not separatisl As T^ e -d--,.__u-m_qUf "Sffp"S.Sp-s--t_hat ir democraticmovement,i!qlqp..3t_!qg1ti-fu1ng.t-he-nationalidentity, which had been hijackedby the unitary central stateand its religious ideology, Salafism.The Amazigh movement'snatural political and cultural spaceis the Moroccannation, and it doesnot havenationalist/separatist ambitions. 'lhe Amazighmovementchallenges the dominantdefinitionof Moroccan identity promotedby the nationalistparties,primarily the Istiqlal and, to a lesserextent,theleft-leaningUnion Socialiste (USFP). desForcesPopulaires Accorclingto the Amazighnarrative..Moroccois not.an.Arabnaliqn but an. Aruazigh(or, at best,an Arab;4-ngZigh).4+!j-o"{1, whi.chsufferedfrom Rp-. rrrr n, IIrcnch, and Arab cufturg!.pndpoliticako.lcnjzalion Llpurrtiltheendof the 1990s, the main opponentsof the Amazighmoverrrt.nlwerc rrot Islantistbut nostalgicpan-Arabintellectuals. For example, Mrrh;rrrurr:rtl Alrdal-fabri,a leadingMoroccanpoliticalphilosopher of Ber-

18 / MickaelBensadoun ber origin recognized throughout the Arab world, considered the-Alnazigb. a product of American and Zionist imperialism that-threatened -movement .the unity of the Arab nation.2OIn the 1990s,the Amazigh movement fashioned its identity mainly in opposition to Arab nationalist ideologiesin both their conservativeand leftist expressionswhile refraining from becoming an antimonarchical force. As far as the monarchy is concerned, the Amazigh movement does not directly threaten it, so long as its religious and political supremacyremains unchallenged,and so long as the movement does not display nationalist/ separatistambitions. Hasan II's responseto the rise of the Amazigh move-

..,i,.r-. ;:1""'"

ment fit the makhzenian mold, constituting a balanced mix of repression, fragmentation, and co-optation. Qrl Aqgust 20'1994' he delivered.on.iln: p-oftanl speegh that provided sffieiaL recognition to the Moroccan Berhgr djalecls (there are three mgin-pnesin"Morocco), characterizing them aspat!of the country's auth-entrcnational identity-?l Moreover, the king pledged to introduce the teaching of Berber dialects in Morocco's schools. Royal pronouncements almost always carry decisive weight in Morocco. This one was no exception, leading to a flourishing of the movement. A plethora of Amazigh cultural organizations sprung up, and a number of Amazigh publications were founded. True to makhzenian form, the king's speechalso marked the initiation of a co-optation policy of the Amazigh movement. A moderate, pragmatic trend led by the movement's leading intellectual authority, Mohamed Chafik, agreed to work with the monarchy' whereas a radical trend led by former militants of the far Left, some of whom are from the northern Rif region, refused the regime'sovertures. For the movement's pragmatists, common interests with the monarchy took precedence.On the one hand, the monarchy needed the Amazigh movement to weaken its main opposition, the Islamists,and to support its measuresof incremental liberalization. On the other hand, the Amazigh movement was understood by the pragmatistsas being incapableof refashioning Moroccan national identity without the monarchy's suPPort. of the 1990s,the Amazigh movement has stresqed lyom-the !-gginningthe .gorrqlpligrr between the demo"cratization pre,cessand-the recogr+ition ,pf Berber cultural-{ghts.2z According to this view, the Amazigh language and culture are marginalized because Morocco is not yet a democracy. f91lhe de{.mqqigh lqtellectuals qse the Spa4ish monarchy as an example spain is a democracy, Because it pluralism. sired management of linguistic has granted official recognition to minority languagessince 1978.lror tlre Amazigh movement, the Moroccan monarchy cannot clairn to be a tlctttoc

The (Re)Fashioning of MoroccanNational ldentity /

19

racy as long as it does not give full recognition to the 'Amazighness" of the nation. Conversely, in this view the monarchy needs the Amazigh movement, one of the leading democratic forces of the country, to create a civic nation of free citizens in order to rebuffthe Islamist challenge.

lslamism, the State, and the West Although the monarchy claimed that Morocco was immune from fundamentalism, in fact, from the beginning of the 1990s,it became obvious that Islamism constituted the main opposition force in the country. This became even more apparent as the decade wore on, ironically as a consequence of the kingt adroit orchestration of a policy of alternance,which incorporated Morocco's traditional opposition parties, mainly from the Left, into a power-sharing arrangement.23Although the Islamist movement is deeply fragmented, its different trends make use of what it views as Morocco's identity crisis in order to enlist support. For them, Westernization constitutes the main threat to the Muslim identity of Morocco.24Globalization is equivalent with Westernization, and, therefore, the monarchy's strategic choice to participate in globalization processesshould be fought. They answer to the official discourse stressing Morocco's vocation as a bridge between civilizations with a counterdiscourse stressing the inevitable clash of ideas between Islam and the West.zsFor the Islamists, Morocco can not and should not try to prove that Islam is compatible with Western values, or, to use Huntington's terminology, Morocco, unlike Turkey, should not become a country "torn' between East and West. The l99l Gulf War provided Moroccan Islamist groups with an opportunity to demonstrate their political weight. The massive demonstration organized in Rabat on February 3, 1991,26 to express solidarity with the Iraqi people served as a coming-out party, of sorts, for these groups. The invasion of Iraq was depicted by the Islamists as a new crusade against an Arab and Muslim country. Moroccan secularpan-Arabists and Islamists were united in their condemnation of the war, the West, and the Zionist enemy. The broad popular affinitywith this view made the monarchy's pro-Western discourse and foreign policy appear disconnected from public opinion. Civil socierly'.s opposition to the Gulf War seemedto suggestthat Morocco was cullurally and socially an integral part of the Muslim and Arab world. Moro(:cilnsoc:ietyhad not reacteddifferently from other Arab societiesdespite Moror't-o'.s syrrrbolictroop deployment in support of Saudi Arabia (and, by i rn pl icuI iorr, I lrc Wcslcrrr- letl coalition) againstIraq.

'-t.(l/

I

M i r h r rl l| ln yn lo tr tt

' llr c r or r rrl l y l si rrtc l l t' c l rrictll i l c a l s oc o n l ri l )utedto the strengtheni ngof i tt M o ro c c o .l l ' A l g c r i a atrclIsl ami cfundamental i sm ar r li W c $ln n l e e l i rrg ,s ( enemy' bthiilr . ,it r or r lirrpl 'o, tl reo l l i t i trltl i s c o rrrs el h, c p ri rrrarysi gr-ri fi cant i tl c rrti tyl,i rr Isl ami stand pan-A rabi sti ntel l ect ' r , ; "ol llr e M o ro t r i rn i ri rl i o rri rl and Islam'srival'bther." Prior Irr,rlr,, llre lrrtlt'o ( llrlisliirrtWe'stis Morocctt'.s Olashof Civilizations,Mehdi el-Manjra frr llrr' lrrrlrlit;rliorrol I lrrrrtirrgton'.s to describethe rrscrff frc lt'r'ru"r'ivilizalionitlw^r" (guerrecivilisationnel/e) ( irrll W;rr'.//'llris sccular-l,eftintellectualset the tone for the Moroccan crili(luf ol'llrc West,which has only increasedsincethe eventsof September ll, 2(X)1.l,ikc Moroccan Islamists, El-Manjra considered the war as a new erusade rnotivated not only by economic interestsbut also by cultural and rcligious motivations: There should be no doubt in one'smind that the Arabs are but the first guinea pigs for an experiment designed to perpetuate the military, political and economic domination of the Western world aswell asthe hegemony of its fudeo-Christian values. . . . The deployment of forces was compounded with psychological warfare of unprecedented magnitude, along with a most revealing hysterical campaign by the media of the West-even Goering would appear like a shaky novice if he saw the new mastersof the art of communication and information at work. . . . The Gulf War should not be viewed as a regional conflict nor reduced to a simple confrontation between the fudeo-Christian West and the Islamic world. It is a North-South war, a conflict arising from the |udeo-Christian civilization's inherent will to exert hegemony over all other civilizations,whether Arab, Asian or African, that is all other forms of civilization which are different from the Western one.28 Since the end of the Cold War, this type of discoursehas become dominant in both Islamist and pan-Arab leftist circles.For them, Morocco, as a Muslim country, should define its identity by opposition to the imperialist West and Zionism. Islamists and secular pan-Arab intellectuals defended similar views regarding the subsequentlaunching of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.Their common anti-Western and anti-Zionist feelings led intellectuals such as Abd al-|abri and the veteran pan-Arabist opposition leader Muhammad Faqih al-Basri to propose the establishment of a national union composed of secular pan-Arabists and of Islamists to oppose By implication, their opposition was directed not only the "new crusade."2e againstthe West but also the official policies of their own country. The reiectionof Westernculture is one of the main elementsof Islamist

The(Re)Fashioning of MoroccanNationalIdentity /

21

ideology in Morocco and the Muslim world as a whole. The West is perceived as a historical colonial power that continues to dispossessMorocco and the Muslim umma from its identity; part of the Islamists'agenda is to re-Islamize Moroccan society. Sheikh AbdessalamYassine,the intellectual leader of Moroccan Islamism, often compares corrupt westernized elites to the good soldiers of God, presenting Moroccan society as divided by an internal 'tlash of civilizations": At the head of the Islamist caravan advancing with assuranceon the road towards power and autarchy, you will find no Westernized fellow-travelers given over to the enemy both intellectually and culturally. You will find no friendships or alliances with the enemy. Neither will you find anyone of neat appearanceand "position of responsibilityi' who is in fact a dreary spy and whose life is spent in a succession of apparatchiks'conferences and parties where information about the potential of the country is hawked about in exchange of hard currency. You will find no clients of Hilton hotels, dance halls and other dens of vice or habitu6s of seminars airing views akin to those of Freemasons, Zionism, capitalism or intelligence agencies.you will find only soldiers of God mobilized to serve the material and economic cause of the community and considering this as an act of worship rewarded by God.3o For the Islamists, Morocco has achieved political independence without cultural independence. Moreover, it is undergoing an identity crisis that leads to underdevelopment.3l The decolonization process remains to be completed since the 'bccidentalizing" Moroccan elites are culturally western and attempting to import a foreign model to a Muslim country. The root of the society's problem is cultural alienation; the solution is to return to Muslim fundamentals, that is to say the implementation of the shari'a. This ideology attracts a large proportion of young Moroccans educated in Arabic. In a survey conducted at the end ofthe 1980s,out offour hundred students polled, 75 percent believed the adoption ofthe Shari'a as the law of the land to be the only solution to Morocco's problems.32 Islamists propose a model of development that is supposed to suit the local culture, but in fact, like the Salafistsofthe Istiqlal party, they generally oppose the version of traditional Moroccan Islam promoted by brother(zawiyaf). Moroccan Islamists defend a cultural model opposed to lto<>cls llre Wcstcrn elites' way of life. They adwocatethe aeeele,ratiqnpf Msr-o.c_eols tlt'r'adcsold policit's of linguistic Arabization and the marginalizationof

' . , , , 1/

The(Re)Fashioning of MoroccanNationalIclentity /

A 4 i rh r t rl llttr sn lo r r tt

2j

harsh critics of the monarchy's pro-Western foreign policy and of the official discourse portraying Morocco as a country bridging the West and Islam.

measureslargelycounterbalancedthe few secular,modernist or ecumenical 'provocations'madeby the regime(First Congresson Birth Control, the welcomingof the Shahof Iran, contactswith the Jewishcommunity and then the Stateof Israeland a more generalreticenceto align itself with the more anti-Westernpositionsof the other Arab regimes)J'3s HassanII also encouragedthe penetrationof Wahablisrn in mosques and schoolsto strengthenthe religiouslegitimacyof the monarchy.3e MoroccansociologistMohammedEl Ayadi analyzedthe efllectsof this policy on Moroccanyoung minds, blaming the educationalsystemfor diffusing anti-Westernand anti-Semiticfeelings.For instance,in the Islamiceducation schoolbooksof the EducationMinistry, Muslims are presentedas victims of a |udeo-Christianconspiracyaimed at weakeningtheir faith in Islam.TheZionist movementis consideredthe expression of a fewishconspiracyagainsthumanity and religions.Schoolbooksfor senior-yearclasses quote an imaginary fourteenth Zionist protocol: "We need to destroy all religiousbeliefs.The temporary result of this action should be the development of atheismthat we should usefor the future generationswho will \' listento the teachingsof Moses'sreligion that requiresthat we submit all the nationsto our power."ao After fudaism, the West is consideredthe secondenemy of Islam by schoolbooks because it spreads valuesandideologiessuchasMarxism,orientalism,and secularismto destroyIslamfrom inside.El Ayadi'sstudysheds light on the gap betweenan officialdiscoursepraisingdialoguebetween civilizations and a policy strengtheninganti-Westernfeelings.Statefundamentalismcontributedto the building of a Moroccanidentitybasedon rejectionof the Westand |udaismwhile promoting a peacefuldiscourse.

State Fundamentalism

MuhammadVl, the MoroccanSpring,and the AmazighMovement

o cl l l rc c ' o l < l rri z e r.tr' l hcl scck y to fashi ona hegemoni c, lir t , r r t " lrt lr , c li rrrg rrrrg ir ul h c n l i cM o ro c c n rri d c rrti tyb a s c dorr a rttytl ri creconstructedpast ir llc gt , t lly a parti cul arpoi nt s ilr olr ler lo brri k l rr g c rru i rrcl s l a rrti cs ti ttc .l s l arrri slmake which are perceivedas ol'rcjcclinl; Wcslenrlitrcralisttrartclpermissiveuess, sigrrsof the West'simpiety and moral decadence. At the sametime, Islamist movementseverywhereare a product of modernization, and they do not reject modernlty en bloc.To the contrary, they attempt to appropriate modernity and prove that Islam is not incompatible with modern values and technological progress. To- uoejfas,sinds-axpes= giq_ U ft ey are interested in'llslemizing" modern ity instead"cfm-odernizing [slam.3aIf they obviously share some values with the West, Moroccan Islamists tend to stress their differences with the "imperialistsi' They have a Manichean vision of the worl4 which opposesthe ludeo-Christian corrupt West. Islamist groups imagine the Moroccan nation as a community of Muslims struggling to gain spiritual and cultural independence from the West.3s !!r9i1i{ga1political frame-wo_rkis thp,Muslim U!!tma, not tbe-Moroccannation. However, the moderate Islamists groups that have gained legitimacy since the beginning of the 1990sand are currently embodied in the |ustice and Development party (PlD)36 recognize the temporal and religious power of the monarchy, which is a condition for their participation in the official political game.37However, like the more radical groups, spearheadedby Sheikh Yassine'sfustice and Spirituality movement (al-Adl wal-Ihsan), aswell as the smaller jihadist groups that have sprung up in recent years, they are

Ironically, the monarchy, because it has played an ambiguous game with fundamentalism, is partly responsiblefor the strengtheningof anti-Western feelings in Morocco. A two-level discourse and policy was employed by the authorities, one for the West and one for national politics. Since the 1960s, King Hasan II used Islam as a political weapon, first againstthe radical Left and then againstMoroccan Islamism following thel9T9Islamic Revolution in lran. According to Frangois Burgat, Hasan developed a fundamentalist state to limit the potential power of Islamism: "Hasan II knew how to anchor the fundamentalist discoursewithin the heart of the state,reducing the territory left to the fundamentalism of protest.Fundamentalist-inspirecl

lslamismbecameevenmore visiblefollowing HasanII's death,renderingit impossiblefor the monarchyto ignore.As the young King MuhammadVI accelerated the paceof political liberalization,allowinga degreeof freedom of expressionunprecedented in independentMorocco,Islamistmovements becamelessreluctantto displaytheir actualstrength.However,they did not producenew discourses on the Moroccannation.In contrast,tlp hum_an riglrIs movementand the Amazlgh.m,ey-egr_9_ut did,-take--advantagie._o_fJhs* so-callcclMoroccanSpringtq pfod-u"ce.ne,w-,discourses.on nati-a_n_l-!-ids,llg5i irnclrcvisilnalionalhistory.

94 /

Mlthueltlettc.rrlr,lr

Tbe Reopenlngof the Iteet (=lneenttrequence of tltc.trroliticalliberalizationhasbeenthe growingdiscunclonlu the pressof someof the darkerchaptersin the country'srecent lristory,includingthe televisedtestimoniesof torture experienced by former politicalprisoners.For humanrightsactivistssuchasDrissBenzekri, who spentsixteenyearsin prison for his revolutionaryideas,a democratic Morocco cannotemergebeforeit dealswith the darkestyearsof HasanII's reign, lesanndesdeplomb (yearsof lead),from 1965to 1975.41 Whether or not Morocco is in the processof a kind of therapeuticcatharsisthat will lay the groundfor a realreconciliationbetweenthe monarchyand the Moroccan peopleor, to the contrary,will delegitimizethe monarchicalinstitution remainsto be seen.In anycase,the formationof a new collectivememory, or memories,is now under way. Traumaticeventssuch as the repressionof the March 1965Casablanca riots, the kidnapping and murder of exiled opposition leaderMehdi Ben Barkathat sameyear,and the failed military coupsof l97I-72 arenow publicly debatedin the media and in testimonies.The Forum |usticeet V6rit6, createdin 1998to shedlight on the repressivepoliciesof HasanII and provide indemnitiesfor the victims of torture and prison,hasbecomeincreasingly activeunderthe leadershipof Benzekri.For example,on Iune26,2000, the forum participatedin the International Day in Supportof Victims of Torture,presentingnew publicationsofr torture in Morocco.a2On October 7, 2000,it organizeda pilgrimagefor five thousandhuman rights activists and journaliststo the notoriousformer prison of Thzmamart,wheremany political detaineeshad beenheld. In the winter of 2000,Ahmed Merzouki publishedan important testimonyon Tazmamart,a3 which becamea bestsellerin Moroccoand France. This new interest in recenthistory indicatesthe loss of the makhzen's monopolyin the writing of nationalhistory and the definition of Moroccan identity.aaThe narrativepresentedin the daily mouthpieceof the palace,le Matin du Sahara,is now challengedby independentmedia and historians. "The strugglefor Morocco'spast"4sis back,with the potentialof laying the groundwork for a nation of citizensdefendingtheir right to know, write, and remembertheir own history after a long period of amnesia.Benjamin Storabelievesthat this processwill be fruitful only if the victims' aim is to tell their history,to inform their citizensand not to seekrevenge,which can leadto internal conflicts.a6 Moreover,the state'swillingnessto acknowledge pastfaultsand repairthem is a positivesign for democratization and the

The(Re)Fashioning of MoroccanNationalIdentity /

25

reconciliationof the citizenswith their political institutions.The creation, by the royal dahir ("edict") of |anuary 7, 2004,of the InstanceEquitd et Reconciliation,a statecommissionpresidedoverby Benzekriand in charge of the identificationand indemnificationof victims of human rights abuses from 1956to 1999,was especiallynoteworthy,particularly becausethere is no parallel for such a body anywherein North Africa and the Middle East.aT In a speechin Agadir announcingcreationof the commission,King MuhammadvI proclaimedthat'bur goalis that all the Moroccansreconcile with themselvesand with their history,that they freetheir energiesand that they participatein the edificationof democraticand modern societyi'as He also stressedthe fact that this processwould reinforcethe democratic culture of the nation. This searchfor historical truth and quest for reconciliation and reparation may or may not lead to the emergenceof a civic Moroccan nation identifyingwith its political institutions.But in the meantime,it encourages Moroccan citizensto public involvement.The successof the 'taravans of truth' (lescaravanes de la vdritd)organizedby the Forum fusticeand v6rit6 demonstratesthe public'sappetitefor information and civic involvement. Sincethe first pilgrimageto Tazmamart,the forum hasorganizedfour more caravansto different placesthat became'des lieux de mdmoire"aeof the darkyearsof staterepression:KalaaMGouna, Agdz,Figuig,and Imilchil in the Atlas mountains. |udgingfrom the numberof recentnewspaperarticlesdealingwith different political eventsof an independentMorocco,the interestin the country's postindependence history hasonly continuedto increase.Theindependent weekliesLe lournal and TelQuelarethe primary producersof "journalistic historyi' but the officialLe Matin du saharahasalsoprovideda public space for publicationsdealing with recent history, including the history of the Rif' which wasconsideredtaboo under HasanII.50In particular,it provides increasingcoverageof the major publicationsof Berberintellectuals,an indication of the newly found importanceof the Amazigh movement. The AmazighNarrative Almost from the outsetof MohammedVI's reign,the Amazigh movement has propagateda powerful alternativenarrativeof Moroccannational history. In addition to its engagementwith contemporaryand modern history, this narrativealso concernsitself with the country'slonguedur6ein orclerto prove Morocco'.s continued'Amazighness"throughout history.

I

rr -f

t

h l i r h ttr l llr n\illt,tnl

to the opposition of Amazigh leaders Masinissa, fugurtha, and |uba I to invaders more than two thousand years ago.s8

llr c A r r r r r ig l l u ,rl l l i v e i ts s u tn e lril ti tt l l tt:rc i s i ttt i tl tttostcompl el g-gql gl u: er r rt ' lr c lwee rrl l rt' M o ro r' tu rrrri rl i o rti trttll l tc l l crl l cr i rl crtti ty.W hen the state, ll.l,ilillstthe Imazighen, clil('s,disc:rirttirtittcs rcptcsclrl(.(lhy llrt'lrrrA/r::r',,1rr,, llr t , wlr olcnrl l i o ni s w o u rrtl c drn c l l ru n ri l i a led.' l hi spoi rrti s madeycryel -e-4r in lhc AnrazighManifestool'March l, 2000,srwhiclr stresseq lhat !!p -perber rewriting of Morocco's history and the reparation of his[oriq inig-s_!i-q.es

As the above treatment of Moroccan history indicates, fhe mains[ream and extends its support to Moroccan A-mazigh.movement.is p-r.o.rmonaf,chy VI.. The Muhammad Amazigh- centered,narrative. prevides the monarchy with a historic and national legitimacy. independent,from its religious le.gitimacy. Together with the monarchy, the Imazighen are presented as the main opponents to foreign invasions in Morocco's history. Although they accepted the influence of foreign civilizations, such as fudaism, Christianity, and Islam, they always produced a national version of these cultures to survive.seEven the building of a modern Muslim state has not destroyed the Berber identity. At the same time, the Amazigh narrative stressesthe modern period and provides its own interpretation of the distinction made by French colonialist sociology between the ble-dal:rnaklxzen, that is, territory under the sultan's authority, and the hkd".Al.*jha,the "land of dissidence" controlled mainly by Berber tribes.60For Chafik, the siba is not a form of dissidencebut rather of

system emerged to provide political expression to collective identities. The Amazigh narrative contradicts many aspectsof the modernist theories of nationalism,sawhich consider the nation as a modern creation intrinsically linked with the emergence of the state. For Rachid Raha, a Rifian intellectual and editor of the monthly le Monde Amazigh, "the history of Morocco from the High Atlas rupestrian engravings of the Neolithic period until today is a continuous history and a fundamentally Amazigh one."ss "Consensual" Amazigh intellectuals such as Mohamed Chafik, Hasan Aourid, and Halima Ghazi even suggest there is a continuity between the Berber kings of Roman times and the monarchs of the modern era. For Hasan Aourid, JubaII is "a great Moroccan King of great finesseand knowledge."s6This implies that the two main pillars of the Moroccan nation are

. l',

27

( lr r e r r r r r lr . tl y i rrg o l l l ri s n p p l o i rt' lti s l o l t' pi ri r tl rc pol i ti calel i tes' p rrr' p o s r' l l rc w hol e nati on.Indeed, it t it t , r lir r 'ksr w i ttrltl re l l e tl re tsi ttttl ,l ry rl t' l i r ri ti ort,

against Berbers servethe whole nation.s2 For Amazigh movement intellectuals,Morocco is an ancient nation preAs an ethnic, dating the appearanceof Islam and the Moroccan sultanate.s3 Berber-basedentity, Morocco existed long before a modern nation-state

,"',-;.;

The (Re)Fashioning of MoroccanNationalIdentity /

its Berber identity and the monarchy. In an article published in both le Matin du Sahara and Le Monde Amazigh, Halima Gh1zi, a historian and member of the Administrative Committee of the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe (IRCAM; see below), further developed this thesis. Morocco as a political entity, she states,has existed since antiquity. There is continuity between the Berber aguellids (Berber kings) and the modern monarchs of Morocco. In opposition to the official historiography, which stressesthat only Islam and the monarchy could unif' the different tribes coexisting in the Moroccan territory, she claims that the two founding elements of the Morocco nation are the Amazigh identity and the monarchy, which gavethe nation its concrete political expression.5TChafik, the Amazigh movement's senior authority and a'tonsensual intellectual" par excellence,sharesthis historical analysiswhen he comparesthe opposition to foreign domination by SultansMoulay Ismail (1672-1727),HasanI (1873-94),and Muhammad V (1927-61,who ruled as king of newly independent Morocco from 1956),

self-defense against the makhzen, which reproduces undemocratic behaviors imported from Eastern political culture.6lAmazigh historians question the official narrative when it claims that the bled-al-makhzen was an effective Muslim state. For historian Mohammed Mounib. the bled al-makhzen was controlled by oppressive caids (governors), whereas the Berber territories were autonomous lands governed by traditionally democratic Berber institutions.6z The Amazigh Manifesto claims that the anti=B,erber policy
28

/

Mickacl lJensadoun

;9..

29

Arrrazigh Manifesto insists on the existenceof a strong ethnic Moroccan identity prior to the imposition of the French protectorate inl9l2, whereas the nationalist narrative claims that a distinct Berber collective identity, is merely a creation of "the divide and rule policy" of the.Erench-colonial

bellion in 1958-59 or the 1971and 1972 attempts at coups d€tat by largely Berber elements in the military.to Ualnq_treamAmazigh-intelle-etrr_als,.d,p_n_pl. antagonize !,he''m9p-4ry!.rg.w-hich."th-9y""e-an-cider..?-.p-s!entia! ally, espp-.cially after Mohlmmg{ -VJJook-asenes_of.symb-_o_ll€-.-mp,.qggf_e-1sati-sfi1ing pa{_gf

Indeed, the Moroccan nationalist ntovement, influenced by Salaf.po.w.er. ism and Arab nationalism, representedthe Berbersas potential alliesof the colonialists becauseof the "French Berber policyi' One o-fthg ep-i-g-gl_g!q9gls, .ip 1-[e-.historyof Moroccan nationalism, according to the prgvaill$_yt"g*, w4q the May 16,1930,"Berber dahirl'an unsuccessful French.atternp-l"auned

the lqo.Jeme.n_t$emands" On October 17, 2001, Muhammad VI, dressed in traditional Berber clothes, recognized the central place of 'Amazighness" in Morocco's national identity in a speech delivered in Ajdir (Khenifra), in the Middle Atlas, announcing the creation of the IRCAM. Putting an end to the Arab hegemonic discourse, Muhammad VI described Moroccan national identity as pluralist in nature and declared that the "historic roots" of Morocco are Berber.7l Reactions were varied. Q-o1ne Amazigh q-lilitants, such.asthe former Communist Ahmed Adgfr!rqi,7-?saw-the.-monarchylsmoye..asan attempt to cogpt 4nd Wea-ke!thg.Amazigh.movement in o,rdentp.preyent fhe emergence

at p-rovidingjuridical autonomy to some Berber tribes.6s Not surprisingly, Amazigh historians and activists have sought to rewrite this crucial episode, particularly in order to contest the accusationof the Berbers' alliance with France.66Hence they reverse the nationalist narrative of the struggle for independence,claiming that the Berber mountains were the real patriotic centers of resistanceto French rule, whereas the urban (Arab) eliteslimited their commitment to political treatises.They highlight t

The(Re)Fashioning of MoroccanNationalIdentity /

the poetry of the time, which attests to the strong patriotic feelings of the Berber tribes, notwithstanding the establishment's efforts to erase it from Moroccot collective memory.67 To be sure, the mainstream Berber critical narrative of modern history draws a clear distinction between the legitimate monarchy and the falsified dominant narrative of the nationalist movement. !h_991-emy'l-olher--ofrhe. ji{rabn'lslamisnr'1 an ideol,Amryrgf; rnov-ement !s pot !he, p_onarsh,y,.but ogy imported from the Near East and therefore deemed incompatible with the national identity of Morocco, the Islamic West.68For Hasan Aourid, the modern state dominated by the Istiqlal party's ideology was built in opposition to the Amazigh identity. The state'sArabization policy is a denial of the Amazigh language and culture,6e and the Istiqal's political elite used imported ideologies to build an Arab national identity that marginalized the natural defenders of the nation, the Berbers. 9n !q-p gf lhe p-re"-v-igus French colonization, thg lmgigl-r..gnandthqMoro.cean.nalion-as,affhslg are q"tr"iing ft;- u n"* kind of cqlouizal-ion, an.Arah.colonizatiqq.-o.-{3asLe{.n constructed the movement's _g;i$n. Moderate Amazigh intellectuals have identity in opposition to both the establishment Istiqlal and the newer Islamist parties,all of which are consideredto be "amazighophobici' In focusing on manifestations of Arabo-Islam, the Amazigh movement generally refrains from analyzing the complex relationships between the monarchy and the Berbers since independence.For instance,the Amazigh Manifesto does not mention the role of Prince Hasan in the repressionof the Rif re-

of a militanl-?.ntiregtme A.-mazlghmoyementn as had happened in Algeria's Kabylian region. However, the predominant thinking among the Moroccan Amazigh activists was that the foundation of the IRCAM, a follow-up decision to teach Tamazight in some primary schools,and the emergenceof a new discourse on national identity were positive developments. In contrast, Moroccan Arab nationalist intellectuals and Islamist leaders criticized the official recognition of the Amazigh identity becauseit endangered the Arab identity of Morocco. How is one to understand Muhammad VI's actions? Essentially, he has chosen a path familiar to Moroccan rulers, playrng the role of arbiter between competing social forces, in this case, the 'Arabo-Islamists" and the Amazigh in their contest over the definition of Moroccan national identity. Ilor instance, the issue of the transcription of the Berber languagegenerated an intense debate regarding which script to employ in the teaching of 'lhmazight: Latin, Arabic, or Tifinagh (a modified version of ancient Berber writing). Most Islamists vociferously advocated the Arabic script, whereas a majority of Amazigh militants and intellectuals preferred the use of Latin letters for both ideological and practical reasons.Royal intervention eventurrlly resultedin a controversialcompromise, the adoption of Tifinagh. Ikrr ideological and cultural reasons,the Amazigh movement is deeply opposed to the Islamist movement. This view was sharpenedby the May 16, 2(X)3,suiciclebombing attacksin Casablancaby jihadists that killed thirtyllrrcc irrnocerrt people. Amazigh activists and intellectuals, such as the lerrrirrislMcryarrrl)emnati and the radical Mohammed Boudhan, reacted hy cxporrndingitn cxplicitly seculardiscoursein opposition to Islamism

1

?ai

r l f i * r e l lle ;1 Er t*r t;;r

The(Re)Fashioning ofMoroccan NationalIdentity / 31

efid ltr€ dornlndlrl pllcc of Islam in the political system. others blamed lhe irugrollnlkrr o['oriental ideologiesto Morocco for the country's sufferlrrgr. ltrr' lloudhan, Morocco-s "irrational attachment to the'a.rab p6t" is it great soulge of s!lgnat!9,-n.73. 4.r-r' authentic" Amazigh Mo"ro_eco*onfu hand, weuld.b,ecomedemoc-ratic .other and-trence..dev-elop. Mainstream, less radical Amazigh intellectuals such as Ahmed Boukous,T4Hasan Aourid,75 and Ahmed Assid also defend a certain level of secul arization,or at least an enlightened Islam that they say is compatible with democracy. Although they generally avoid employing a radicar anti-Arab and anti-Islamist discourse' fhey also claim that North African identi.ty.is no.t-oriental"aadrrot anti-Western but rather Amazigh and Mediterranean. For those who speak in more explicit political terms, federalism is sometimes presented as an appropriate formula. In a related vein, Iraqi Kurds are pointed to as a model of a determined ethnic minority operating in a hostile milieu.76

Conclusion Moroccan national identity is in the midst of a process of contestation and reconstruction. The redefinition of national identity is the result of continu_ ous negotiations between the elites of new movements and the king who seeksto remain a unif ing syrnbol and actor.77The monarchy accepts and sometimes even encouragesthe emergenceof new discourses,such as the Amazigh discourse and the moderate Islamist discourse, as long as they do not question the pillars of Moroccan identity, including the religious legitimacy of the monarchy. Although radical streams of both movements contest the foundational pillars of Moroccan identity, the liberalizing monarchy hopes it can tame thesemovementsby integrating them into theofficial political game. The Islamist fustice and Development party seemsto accept the rules of the game by distancing itself from a wahabbi-type fundamentalist Islam, which the authorities characterize as an imported ideology opposing the values of Moroccan Islam. The mainstream Amazigh movemeni, for its part' propagatesa discourse that stands in total opposition to the Istiqlal party's and Islamists' ideology without antagonizing the monarchy. whereas the Islamists seem to abandon the nation to look East, the Amazigh movement aims at becoming the last defender of the Moroccan nation threatened by transnational ideologies. This view has even been applied to Morocco's long-running struggle to incorporate the western sahaia into the kingdom. According to Mohamed chafik, the western Sahara can only be Moroccan becauseits population is Amazigh in origin and adheresto Morocc.rr rsr.r',

which was itself born in the sahara during the golden ageof Morocco, creating a Western Islamic culture distinct from Eastern Islam.Ts

I&r"-o.c.'*g !! .9r*:grLf,,k,-r*rds:s--o-ing-en."r*fsr.nsl-p*pJilie.._al.e_nd ,infe-llep-t"1lar

gtruggl-e, !pv--o.ipg.Ea.stgrqrprien"-tedidgologies. :rr e65rF-Lr!v-u*yr,llE.'e'afJgrq:Qn9tr*tedJd*0togies,-whieh""maintainlhal-ll-IsLan which mainrein rhrr ..Tcro-

!s thgeel11!i'e'-r1-' rB,r.he-.$e,.c,cty*idgn-+ity "(I:lqrllkuwqql-h.aa an-dmare.rial crisis; W.estern:"orjented.ideologies",ruhrch"defend,thefs;bfi".fr*fri"ia fi,U_. eral demoe,racy;"and.,an--Ar.nazigh,ideology"which"stipurarec,th,.aJ-the H?xrg

90p9-"wirhmpdp"rnitx..ep.4,slsb*li,?,#lp,n*is..tq.-ef.rsnsrhs**fts.;,jp.9t114. Theseethnic,

culturar,religious,andra""i"jil"ilii"""g", *ilr Pq.b,gt-rppts" continue to influence thenatureof theMoroccan politicalsystem. oi. por-

sible positive scenario could be the emergence of a consociationardemocr.aqy'e founded on power sharing a*onglslumists, liberal democrats, and 'Amazighists" in which the monarchy would become a benign moderating and unifying actor.

Notes l' The Amazigh movement is a predominantly urban-basedmovement that defends the cultural rights of the.Berbers, the indigenous peopre of Morocco. It emproys the terms 'Amazigh' (plural "Imazighen') for Berber, "iamazight" for the Berber ranguage, and "Tamazghd' for the Berber homeland. See Bruce Maddy_Weitzman, ,.Contested Identities: Berbers, 'Berberisrn and the Statein North Africaj, Journal of North African Studies6, no. 3 (Autumn 2001):23_47. 2. Myriam et Frid6ric Vairel catusse, "Ni tout i fait le m€me ni tout d fait un aure: M6tamorphoseset continuitd du rigime maro caini Maghreb-MachreklT|(Spring 2003): 73-92. 3. Makhzen (lit. "treasury" or "strongbox') is the traditionar term for Morocco,sruling monarchichal-military-bureaucratic apparatus. For a crassicanalysisof the Moroc_ can political system, see |ohn warerbury, The commander of the riitrr\rt (New york: ( lolumbia University press,1970). 4. Karim Mezran, "Negotiating National ldentity in North Afric al,International Ne_ gotiation 6, no. 2 (2001):t47. 5' For the dominant discourse, see,for exampre, Muhammad othman Benjelloun, Itrojet National et ldentiti au Maroc (Casablanca: Eddil 2002). Also seeTerhi t.h,i.r"rr, "llcyo'd the Moroccan state-The Transnational Nation-Building of the Amazigh cul_ f rrrnl M