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FromHasan II toMuhammad VI / 133 .7 I

Vl FromHasanll to Muhammad Plus(a Change?

DANIEL Z ISENW IN E

The smooth accessionof Morocco's King Muhammad VI to the throne in luly 1999, following the death of his father, Hasan II, was grounded in the protocols and customs of the Moroccan monarchy. Thesetraditional rites of passagefacilitated the transition of power in the kingdom, alleviating previous concerns that it would be marked by instability and uncertainty, leading even to the monarchy's collapse.Within hours of his father's death, Muhammad somberly announced the news in a nationally televised addressand assumed his official responsibilities and duties as Morocco's new king. He later received the traditional oath of allegiance (bay'a) from the kingdom's religious leadership, which recognized his position as the "Commander of the Faithful" (amir al-mu'minin), the spiritual and political leader of Moroccan'sMuslims. The new king's first task was to meet with world leaders who traveled to Rabat in order to participate in the late King Hasan's funeral. Apart from the ceremonial aspects,the new king's discussionsfocused on issuesthal occupied a prominent place on Morocco's diplomatic agenda, such as the future of the western Sahara and its relations with neighboring Algeria. Il was evident that a new era in Morocco's history had begun. Even as the kingdom mourned King Hasan's death, the public by and large optimistically embraced the country's new leader.l King Muhammad was well aware of the high expectations that accompanied his rise to the throne both at home and abroad. Many Moroccarrs had known no other leader than the late King Hasan, whose reign extended over thirty-eight years.zThey now pinned their hopes on the new yountl monarch. His numerous statementsand interviews as crown prince seernetl to indicate that he would promote a political agendacentereclon strengllr ening democracyand pluralism.They alsohopeclthrrlltc wottkl rtggrcssivcly

confront the country'schroniceconomicproblemsandamelioratethe living conditions of millions of poverty-strickenMoroccans(seethe chapterby Paul Rivlin in this volume). Accompanyingtheir hopeswere expectations that the new king would introduce a more open styleof leadership,appropriate for the twenty-first century,and discardthe monarchy'straditional opacityand secrecy.Indeed,the new king'sinitial actionssuggestedthat he wasintenton pursuingsucha course,leadingsomeMoroccansto proclaim that their country wason the thresholdof sweepingchanges.3 During his first months on the throne, Muhammadrepeatedlydeclared his intent to transformMorocco'spolitical systemand transcendtraditional and structuralbarriers that hinderedthe move toward greaterdemocracy. Over time, he eveninstigatedan unprecedentedexaminationof the anndes deplomb (lit. "yearsof lead"),the initial decadesof Hasan'sreign characterizedby the harsh repressionof political dissidents.But despitethe king's declaredintentions,and despitea number of bold initiatives,the country's historicallegacyremainslargelyat oddswith the conceptof greaterdemocracy and genuinepolitical pluralism and continuesto castits shadowover political life. The monarchy'sposition in societyremainsomnipotent and its control of the political systemnearly absolute.To be sure,this system hasbeen refashionedunder Muhammad,but the monarchyremainsthe motor of Moroccanpolitics.Thecountry'sparliamentarysystem,which had begun its own reform processduring the later yearsof Hasan'srule, still lagsbehind the royal palace'sauthority and hasnot emergedasan alternative centerof substantialpolitical activity.Moreover,variouscomponentsof Muhammad'spolitical and economicreformswereactuallyinitiated during his predecessor's reign,suggestingthat the new king'scoursemaybe far less revolutionary than the perceptionsthat surrounded them. Muhammad's initiativesmay thereforebe more about continuity than changeand might be viewed more as 'bld wine in new bottles" rather than a fundamental transformationof Moroccanpolitics. Nevertheless, in the eight yearssinceMuhammad'saccession,Morocco hasexperiencedconsiderablepolitical change.Many facetsof its domestic political landscapehavebeen significantlyalteredand are now a far cry l'rornthe past.Politicalactsand deedsthat wereonceunthinkablehavenow bccorrrestandardand routine.Many taboosthat previouslyrestrictedpoliticnl nctivitylravebeenlifted.Politicalfigureshavebecomemore outspoken and lesstimid in their generalconduct.New political itr llrcir staterrrents frrre:cs iurd pcrsonalities havecometo the fore,and manyof the old guard wrr(' r('nlov('cl l-rorrtthc'irpowerfulpostsand recededfrom the publicspot-

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light. Themonarchyhasadopteda more open stylein its day-to-dayactivito the generalpublic.At the sametime, tiesand hasbecomemore accessible Morocco has had to face unexpectedchallenges,such as Islamist-related terrorism.Economicreformshavebeenintroducedand promotedat a very slow pace,and economicconditions remain difficult for millions of Muhammad'ssubjects.Progressin other areashas alsobeenspotty.Moreover, a number of potentially explosivesocialand political questionsstill await resolution.For example,althoughMorocco'shighly contestedpersonalstatus codehasbeensignificantlyrevised(seebelow),the impact of its practical implementationon Moroccansocietyand the statusof women remains unclear.Similar uncertaintiessurround debatesconcerningreforming the country'spolitical system. This essaywilladdressMuhammad'sfirst eightyearson the throne,elucidatethe diverseand often contradictorytrackson which he hasproceeded, and assessthe impact of his policieson Moroccanpolitical life. In situating recentdomesticdevelopmentsin a broadercontext' I will alsodiscuss whether they indeed mark a departurefrom earlier political practices'or are primarily a continuationof the slow-pacedreform processinitiated by the king's father.Teasingout the answersto thesequestionsshould help clarify the Moroccangovernment'scurrent position regardingthe process of democratizationand liberalization,and the courseit is likely to pursue during the next decade. King Muhammad'sStyleof Leadership Thebeginningof King Muhammad'sreignwasshroudedin uncertaintyregardingthe young monarch'sability to promotea reformistpolitical agenda while maintaining social and political control over a complex polity. Although many of Muhammad'spolitical opinionsand inclinationswereeasily discernable,it was unclearwhether his initial personalgestureswere a harbingerof meaningfulchangesin the kingdom'spoliticalcultureor merely cosmeticalterationsof traditional royal policies.In the realm of ceremonial pomp and circumstance,it wasclear that new king recoiledfrom the more ostentatiousaspectsof Moroccancourt life, suchashis preferencefor handshakeswhen meetinghis subjectsratherthan havinghis hand kissed, accordingto time-honoredcustom,and the closingof the royal harem.Beyond suchsymbolicgestures,the king assertedthe needto introducea "new conceptof authority"that would championidealsof fairness,transparency,

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and the rule of law in governmentaffairs.But such statementscould not be translatedinto political reality if the new king lacked his own source of legitimacy.Indeed,the skepticismregardingMuhammad'saptitudeand ability to shepherdMorocco into a new era compoundedthe king'sneedto seekhis own imprint on Moroccanpolitics. Muhammadt initial activities underscoredhis intentions. Seekingto shakeoff the lethargy that had surrounded the palaceduring Hasan'sfinal years,Muhammad soughtto project an imageof an energetic,handson leader.Accordingly,the king conducteda seriesof high-profile visits to variousparts of the country,including remoteprovincesthat his father had avoidedfor years,fearingvocalopposition.In eachvisit, the assembled crowdsenthusiasticallyembracedthe new monarch,who would often personallyapproachand speakwith them ratherthan speedby in a motorcade. The welcomingthrongsdubbedMuhammad the "king of the poor,',a king who appearedcommittedto his people! personalwelfare.His mannercontrastedsharplywith that ofhis latefather,whoseauthoritarianstyleinstilled his subjectswith fear and awe. It seemedthat most Moroccansfound Muhammad'simage of a con_ cerned,caring, and involved monarch appealing.The months following Muhammad'saccessionwere a period of widespreadferment and excitement, asMoroccansbecameacquaintedwith the new king'sstyleand noted the removalof many barriersthat in the pasthad overshadowed public life. seekingto alter the monarchy'sopaqueimage,Muhammad appointedthe first-everspokespersonfor the royal palace,HassanAourid, who was one of Muhammad'scloseassociates and wasassignedto help explain the new king'spoliciesto both domesticand foreign audiences.It wasexpectedthat thesechangeswould be complementedby a strengtheningof Morocco'sparliament.a A further indication of the king'snew approachwasthe unprecedented publicity that accompaniedhis 20a2 marriagg Traditionally,all aspectsof the Moroccanroyalfamily'sprivateliveshavebeenkept far frorn the public! scrutiny.Indeed,when King Hasanpassedaway,his wife, who had never been seenin public and washardly everevenmentionedby name,did not publicly participatein the rites of burial and mourning. By contrast,Muhammad'sbride, salmaBennani,appearedin public and held severalinterviews with the media, along with her husband.Theseinterviews exposed the royalcouplet personallife in a mannerthat waspreviouslyunthinkable. she hassincetaken an activepublic role and maintainsa relativelyhigh

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profile. Commentatorsalso noted the king's decisionto marry an urban woman (from Fez)insteadof solidi$ing political alliancesby marrying the daughterof a Berbertribal leader,the traditional Solomonic-likepractice.s But the king did not limit his initial actionsto highly publicized,symbolically laden public activitiesand set out to leavehis imprint on a host of domesticpolitical and socialquestionsthat were considered"sensitive" poduring Hasan'sreign. Theseincluded strengtheningthe representative legal litical systemand the parliament'srole in public life and revisitingthe statusof women.Doing so wasa delicateand problematicundertaking,for it threatenedto exposethe deep fissuresand cleavageswithin Moroccan society.At times, thesefissureseven appearedto endangerthe countryt stability and causedthe reform-minded king to pauseand reevaluatethe impact of his reforms on social and political structures.Theseperiodic pauseswereperplexingto many Moroccans,especiallyduring momentsof crisiswhen the public anxiouslywaitedto hear the king'spronouncements someof the earlydoubtsconcerning on the mattersat stake.Consequently, Muhammad'sability to skillfully lead Moroccointo a new era resurfaced. Suchwasthe case,for example,in the aftermathof the Islamistterrorist attacksin Casablancaon May 16, 2003.The attacksshockedthe Moroccan populace,which quickly turned to the king, looking for guidanceand But Morocco'spreviouslyoutspokenand visible monarchwas reassurance. curiously absentfor weeksfrom the ensuingdebateabout the attacksand their impact on Moroccansociety.Apart from the kingt initial visit to the attackedsites,therewere no official statementsconcerningtheseevents.It seemedthat Muhammadand his adviserswereuncertainabouthow to respond.Theyalsomay havebeenwaiting to gaugethe public'sviewsregarding the appropriatemeasuresto be adoptedby the government.Although the governmenthastily enactedemergencylegislationaimed at combating terrorist activity,and crackeddown heavilyon the perpetrators,supporting networks,and suspectedsympathizers,it initially refrained from further reform measures.Indeed, it seemedas if the entire political systemwas by the attacksand their aftermath.6 overshadowed Eventually,however,the king gatheredhimself together and asserted anew his commitment to shepherdinghis country into a new political era. In an October 2003 speechto parliament,Muhammad announceda widespreadchangein Morocco'sfamily law, which had long been a contestedtopic. Earlier attemptsto introducechangesin Morocco'sfamily law had beenvehementlyopposedby Islamistand other sociallyconservative groupsand thus shelved.Muhammad'sdecisionto adopt the new law was

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clearlypart of his overallresponseto the May 16attacks,ashe soughtto put the Islamist opposition,both legal and extralegal,in its place.The timing was propitious: Most of thesegroups and their leaders,fearful of statesponsoredrepressionin the wake of the attacks,were especiallycareful to toe the line, declaringthe king's decisionto adopt a new family code a sound interpretation of religious law. other segmentsof societywarmly welcomedit. Emboldenedby the public response,the king now appearedto be far more determinedto confront the burning questionson Morocco'spolitical agenda'But Muhammad'ssubsequentpolicies and deedsdid not always meet expectationseither at home or abroad,raising anewthe question,to what degreewas the new king really departing from the practicesof his predecessors, particularlyhis father? Reformingthe political System Already in 1996,King Hasan had initiated -reformsin Morocco'sparliamentary systemas he soughtto improve Morocco'simage internationally and preparethe ground for an orderly transition of power to his son.They included the establishmentof a bicameralparliament,in which the lower house (chamber of Deputies)would be electedby a direct ballot for five years'a departurefrom the previousunicameralparliamentin which only two-thirds of the memberswere electedby direct ballot. The newly establishedupperchamber(chamber of counselors)would be chosenby special bodies drawn from local and regional councils,professionalassociations, and trade unions.Memberswould be electedfor nine years,with one-third ofthem to be chosenevery three years.The upper house would be able to proposelegislationand also dissolvethe governmentwith a two-thirds vote. , However,thesestructuralchangesdid not significantlyalterthe natureof Morocco'spolitical system,asHasanand the monarchyremainedthe dominant force. Moreover, the 1997parliamentaryelectionswere plaguedby doubtssurroundingthe vote'stransparencyand fairness.opposition parties raisednumerouscomplaintsof fraud and other abuses, demonstratinganew that achievinggenuinedemocracyin Morocco wasto be an arduousroad. The next stepin Hasan'spolitical reformswasthe formation of an arternancegovetnment,which he had been promoting for a number of years. After a long period of negotiations,Hasanwasablein March l99g to establish a cabinetbasecl on veteran,mostlyleft-of-center oppositionparties,red

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by Abderrahmanlbussoufi of the union Socialistedes Forcespopulaires (usFP). Greetedwith much fanfare,the new governmentwas expectedto forcefully addressthe country'sdire socioeconomicsituationwhile repositioning the cabinet'srole in the governingof the country.The idea behind the formation of an alternancegovernmentwas to increasethe influence of political partieswithin Morocco'spower structureand promotegovernrnental responsibility.such a developmenthad the potential for a kind of power sharingbetweenthe monarchyand the governmentthat would by definition' modifr the monarchy'shegemonyover political life. conversery, the new government'scompositionaffectedMorocco'scomplexpower relations betweenstateand society.The participation of oppositionpartiesin the governmentcompelledother playersin the politic;i ur"nu to redefine their own often ambivalentpositionstoward officialpoliciesand the political establishment.T This wasparticularly relevantto Islamistgroups,which wereforcedto reconsidertheir statedpreferenceto refrain from participation in public life. Although some,suchasHarakatal-Adl wal-Ihsan(Justice and spirituality movement),remainedoutsidethe formal political system, others'under the rubric of the Farty of fusticeand Development(plD), felt compelledto play accordingto the makhzen'ss rules (seeMichael l. willis's chapterin this volume). But Youssoufi'sgovernment did not live up to expectations,dashing hopes that Morocco would evolverapidly toward the establishmentof a full-fledged constitutional monarchy. The government'seconomic programs were considereda far cry from the measuresrequired to improve the livesof most Moroccans.By the time of Muhammad'saccessionin fuly 1999,Youssoufi's cabinethad lost much of its public luster.Moroc cdsalter_ nanceexperimenthad also affectedits political parties.Ironically,joining the governmenthad eroded the historic opposition'sability to offer a viablealternative.The USFB in particular,was now perceivedasa co*opted, weakenedmovement.The 2002parliamentaryelectionsthus seemed to comejust in time, offering an opportunity to energizepolitical life. unlike the 1997vote,theseelectionswerewidely perceivedastransparentand fair bereft ofglaring incidentsofcorruption. But the successfulvoting process could not eclipsethe widening fissureswithin and betweenthe ranks of politicalparties,andtheir inabilityto playan activerolein political life.For example,interparty disagreements over technicarvoting proceduresprior to the electionsforcedthe Interior Ministry to intervene.Thepublic seemecl to be generallydissatisfied with politicalpartiesanclcliclnot view tlrcrnns importantagentsof potentialchange.Instead,rrraryM'r'ccolrs alliliatetl

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themselveswith organizationsthat werenot part of the officialpolitical system andviewedthem asalternativeforums for political involvement.These includedIslamistgroupsand variousNGOs.e Many observersnoted the need to reinvigoratewhat appearedto be a lethargicgovernment,whoseprogram for political reform had stalled.The 2002parliamentaryelectionsthus seemedto comejust in time. unlike the 1997vote,theseelectionswerewidely perceivedastransparentand fair, bereft of glaring incidentsof corruption' However,the new governmentformed after the election was in many waysa disappointment.Insteadof appointingaparty leaderasprime minister, as befitting a genuineparliamentarysystem,Muhammad appointed Driss fettou,a nonpartytechnocratknown asa palaceloyalist and a skilled administrator.10Someobserversviewedfettou'sappointmentasa potential opening for the businesselite to becomemore involvedin policy making. In that sense,the appointmentconstitutedanother step in incorporating new socialelementsinto political affairs.On the other hand, one could argue that the appointmentdemonstratedthat the entire alternanceexperiment had beenan insignificantaberrationin Moroccanpolitical life, which remainedcenteredon the king's personalpolitical calculations.llIndeed, support for affettou'ssurprising nomination signifiedthat Muhammad's into a translate not did parties fording greaterresponsibilitiesto political willingnessto loosenhis hold over the government.Henceit remainedunclearhow Morocco'spolitical partiesand parliamentwould everbe ableto "maturity level"if they continuedto be sidelinedby the obtain the necessary palace. Morocco'spolitical partiesinitially reactedwith consternationto |ettou's appointment.A USFPofficial noted that the new cabinet did not reflect eiectionresults,and raiseddoubtsover the new cabinet'sability to confront Morocco'schallenges.The left-leaningPPS(Parti du Progrdset du Socialisme) alsoexpressedits displeasureover the connotationsand implications of |ettou'snomination. Questionswere raisedabout the thinking behind asthe Jettou'snomination and the king'snew measures.Other parties,such center-rightIstiqlal,soughtto reinforcetheir influentialposition within the aboutendorsing|ettou.It was new government,and werelessapprehensive unclear,however,whetherthe new cabinetwould providethesepartieswith greaterpoliticalmuscle.12 'lhe king'.spoliciesand statementsin other areasalsoraisedquestions role in politicallife. Muhammad'ssocialinitiatives' abrlutlhe lttttttnrclry',s longstandinggrip on the palace's Irovelrrsllrey were,clid nol corrrprurnisc'

rT 140 / DanielZisenwine political and economic affairs. Indeed, Muhammad did not significantly alter the established balance between the monarchy and the government. In fact, he established a mechanism that endowed the monarchy with even greater responsibility and power. Shortly after his ascent to the throne, for example, Muhammad announced the establishmentof the Hasan II Fund for Development, a major philanthropic organization independent of government supervision, which was given the task of alleviating the social and economic plight of Morocco'slegions of poor people.l3This policy was reminiscent of the Moroccan state'sheavy involvement in the construction of civil society in the early 1990sand reflected the historical legacy of a coopted political system.la The Hasan II Development Fund and a number of other permanent royal commissions charged with treating "strategic" issueshave emerged as the central conduits of reform in contemporary Morocco, eclipsingparliament, political parties,and other governmentalinstitutions. The outcome hasbeen a hybrid system, in which royal commissions and governmental institutions are charged with similar tasks. There is no clear division of responsibility between thesetwo poles,but the royal commissions have become the agencies in Muhammad's Morocco that make many decisions later endorsed by the government or approved by parliament. In that sense,the essenceof Moroccan politics has not changed under Muhammad. Examplesof these new commissions include the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture, established in 2001to promote Morocco'sAmazigh/Berber identity (seeMickael Bensadount chapter in this volume) and the Commission on Equity and Reconciliation, which was given the task of investigating previous human rights abuses(see below). Both were widely viewed as palace-controlled mechanisms. Their establishment was frequently accompanied by the cooption of former regime critics through their appointment to important positions. Hence, the likelihood of genuine public debate on the issuesat hand became lesslikely, leading many to speak of the emergenceof a neomakhzen,which includes the king and his closeadvisers.This neo-makhzen is in essencea reproduction of monarchical dominance, suggestingagain that the king's underlying modus operandi is more similar to that employed by his forebears than the proponents of reform had hoped would be the case.l5

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Human Rights and Press Freedoms The oscillation between continuity and change has been particularlyevident in the realm of civil liberties, human rights and press freedoms, where the regime has been historically vulnerable to international criticism. Improvements in the regime'shuman rights record, which began in the last decadeof Hasan'srule and accelerated after Muhammad's accession,included greater respect for basic civil and political rights and the expansion offreedom of expression and association and were duly noted by human rights organizations. More recently, the Moroccan authorities have added an additional element to the picture. In an unprecedentedundertaking among Arab countries, the authorities opened up a public revisiting ofa dark chapter during Hasan'slong reign.l6 As in other instances, it was the monarchy, not other political or social forces, that defined the discourse and parameters of a debate concerning a sensitive and potentially explosive topic.l7 In a speech delivered shortly after his rise to power, Muhammad acknowledged the state'sresponsibility for the disappearance of dissidents, mostly during the 1970s.Muhammad initially established an %rbitration panel" charged with compensatingvictims or their surviving heirs. By the time the panel ceased to function, in fuly 2003,it had settled nearly four thousand claims. Critics argued that the panel offered compensation but did not establish a process to seek either justice or the truth. The accompanying publication of testimonies and memoirs recounting theseeventsincluding prison experiences further fueled the public's interest in the process. The task of further investigating these abuses was then assigned to a state-createdCommission on Equity and Reconciliation (Instance Equit6 et Reconciliation,or IER) in |anuary 2004.The IER was hailed by the king as "the last step in a process leading to the definitive closure of a thorny issue," and the commission's mandate was described by regime spokesmen as the most serious effort ever by Moroccan authorities to recognize and make amends for past abuses.Besides investigating and recording testimonies, it was charged with continuing the arbitration panel's work of compensating victims, as well as to produce a historical account of repressiveacts during llasan'.s rule. Mirny cloubts were raised regarding the commission's likely effectiveness, duc lo a rrurnberof restrictionsin its mandate.For starters,critics noted that tlrc llilt wns nol permitted to prosecute individuals charged with human lipilrlsviolrrtiorrs,lhis lo thc clisrnayof former victims and Moroccan hu-

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man rights activists. Nor was it able to compel testimony. The commission's work was thus a far cry from similar investigations in other countries, such as South Africa. Former victims raised doubts whether the commission would end Morocco's cycle of repression, pointing to the enfeebled nature of the country's judicial system, which was unlikely to indict suspects,some of whom continued to hold public office. Indeed, Morocco had retained formal continuity between Hasan'sabusive regime and the current monarchy, with the commission itself being beholden to the state. Reports on the commission's work avoided any direct criticism of the deceasedmonarch's policies and conduct, merely acknowledging that bad advisers were responsible for previous misdeeds and misguided Hasan. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the IERs establishment was an important development, underscoring the monarchy's stated quest to initiate a "housecleaning process" by confronting earlier dark chapters in Moroccan history and thus permit Morocco to enter a new era. What remains unclear' however, is whether the commission's proceedings will exorcise the ghosts of the past and be the harbinger of a new era where human rights and civil liberties will be the cornerstone of a revised Moroccan polity. Meanwhile, the renewed repression against Islamist dissidents following the Casablanca bombings in 2003 appeared to mark another swing of the pendulum back toward the modus operandi of the past-arbitrary arrests, abuse of human rights, and torture. A hastily enacted tough antiterrorist law led to widespread arrests and harsh sentencesimposed on Islamist activists. What was saucefor the goose was not necessarily saucefor the gander.l8 A closer look at these actions revealed,however, that these heavy-handed policies were in fact already in place prior to the May attacks. Many radical Islamists had been arrested, unauthorized mosques that served as hotbeds of Islamist activities shut down, and radical Islamist publications banned. These measures did not prevent the Casablanca attacks. Nonetheless, the effect of the government's repressivemeasureson public life was not as deep as some analysts had argued. The aftermath of the attacks did not dramatically change the regime's orientation and intentions.le Another area of uncertainty regarding Morocco's future path was the degree of freedom to be accorded to the press, which had been heavily restricted during much of Hasan'sreign. On the one hand, the new atmosphere occasionedby Muhammad's rise to power was reflectedin the print media"s unprecedentedwillingness to address sensitive topics. New publications, such as the popular French-languageweekly TelQueltransformed the medirr landscape,treating thorny issuesthat had never before beelr atlclresscclitt

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the Moroccanmedia,suchaspastincidentsof humanrights abuses,the status of women,or historically chargedquestionsconcerningthe collaboration of influential Moroccanswith the Frenchcolonial governmentduring the nationaliststrugglefor independence.2O Although Moroccanjournalists enjoyeda higher degreeof freedomthan everbefore,important limitations remained.For example,the authoritiesrefusedto abolishlong-heldred lines relatedto the king's person,the monarchy'slegitimacy and opaqueinner workings,and the justnessof Morocco'sclaim on the territory of Western Sahara.fournalistsand editorswho soughtto testthe continuingvalidity of thesetaboosfound themselvesembroiledin court proceedingsand facing economicpenaltiesand evenimprisonment. The focalpoint for the authorities'firmnessin dealingwith misbehaving journalistswasthe longtime gadflyAli Lmrabet.In April 2005,Lmrabet wasbannedfrom exercisinghis professionfor ten years,and fined a hefty sum to boot, following Lmrabet'sseeminglysympatheticcommentstoward Sahrawirefugeesin Algerian campsrun by the Polisariomovementstruggling againstthe impositionof Moroccansovereigntyin the WesternSahara. Theban followedon the heelsof his imprisonmentin2002-3 for publishing satirical cartoonsof Moroccan officials and for the more seriousoffense of publishing data on the royal palace'sannual budget.Information concerning the inner workings of the monarchy remainstightly classifiedin Moroccoand is a sensitivetopic rarelyraisedin public. Another journalist, Hamid Naimi, was convictedin March 2005 in severallibel casesdating back to 1998,lawsuitsthat had been reactivatedin late 2004 after Naimi publishedan article about the embezzlementof public funds by a number of officials.Concurrently TelQuelwasreprimandedby the palaceafterpublishinga report aboutthe daily life of PrincessLalla Salma.The magazine wasaccusedof "meddling in the princess'sprivate life" and warned not to publish any information or news about the private life of membersof the royal family. A more seriouscaseinvolving the royal family'sposition and freedomof the pressemergedin fune 2005.NadiaYassine,a MoroccanIslamistactivist and daughterof |ustice and Spirituality head ShaykhAbdessalamYassine, elenounced the Moroccanmonarchialregime,noting that it did not suit and Morocco, expressedher preferencefor a republicanform of governnrent.A governmentspokesperson noted that Yassine's statementsviolated lhc Moroccanconstitution,and that the presscodedefiningthe responsibiliticsof pcrsonswho makesuchstatements, thosewho publishthem,and tlrosewlroelislribulellrenrwereperfectlyclear.Legalproceedings werethus

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initiated againsther and againsttwo journalistsfor publishing"anti-monarcomAlthough Moroccannewspaperscriticized Yassine's chy statements." "deliberate closely provocation]'they were ments,noting that they were a following the government'sbehaviorin the unfolding case,seekingto gage the government's"red lines" concerningfreedomof the press.zl Thesecasesgeneratedcriticism from international organizationsthat regularlymonitor the degreeof pressfreedom in Morocco.22Overall, the seemingresurgenceof curbsplacedon pressfreedom,and the difficulty of journalistsin transcendingtaboosand barrierslimiting their work indicatedagainthat Muhammad'spoliciesweremore in line with the pastthan his oft-espousedvision for the future. The FamilyCodeReformand lts lmplications ThevagariessurroundingMuhammad'spoliciesandhis vision of Moroccan life in the twenty-firstcentury eventuallyvanishedfrom at leastone highly contentiousarena-the long-running debateover the status of women. Ffere,one could point to exponentialchanges,which were likely to havea significantlong-term impact on Moroccansociety.In light of the vehement opposition that had emergedduring the 1990sagainstany changein the statusquo, it had initially been far from clear that the new king would be willing to challengethe traditional normativeand legalframework underpinning Moroccanfamily life. Hencethe king'sdecisionin autumn 2003on the sideof far-reachingchangecaughtmanyby surprise. The statusof women has long servedas a bone of contention within Moroccan society.Many advocatesof sweepingchangesin the laws that governedfamily life and definedthe legalstatusof womenbasedtheir calls for reform on Moroccobeconomicsituation, pointing to the high rate of illiteracy amongwomen asone of the reasonsfor Morocco'sdire economic straits.At the sametime, women'slives had been substantiallyalteredin a number of important areasduring the closing decadesof the twentieth urbanization,decliningbirth rates,changing century,including accelerated socialnorms,and a rising averagemarriageage. Notwithstandingthe significanceof thesechanges,manyobstaclesto the fuller integration of women in society remained.Entrenchedsocial attitudesand norms underpinnedthe legalstatusof women, as articulatedin the existingMoroccanpersonalstatuscode,the Moudawwana(completecl and officiallyreleasedin 1959),andwerein turn shapedby the code.Womctl and liberal activists,therefore,had long madethe Moudawwanathe pri-

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mary targetof their agenda.Beginningin the early1990s,they campaigned in favorof a new codethat would redefinethe role of womenin the country. Over time, the issuebecamea touchstoneof the broaderstrugglebetween tradition and changeacrossMoroccan society,with religious clerics ilrd other conservativefactionslikening any departurefrom the religiousprinciplesthat governedthe existinglaw to apostasy.Although secularleft-ofcenterpolitical partiesin Morocco suchasthe USFPexpressedsupport for changingthe law,little actionwastakenapartfrom palace-initiatedcosmetic alterations,demonstratinganewthe impotenceof the formal parliamentary system.23 A renewedeffort to fundamentally alter the Moudawwanagot under way in 1999.This time the initiative came from reformist elementsfrom within the alternancegovernment,which presenteda comprehensiveplan to advancethe statusof women in the legal,economic,and socialspheres. But widespreadprotestsagainstthe plan gavethe authoritiespause,and the king shelvedthe idea.A yearlater,he appointeda blue-ribbon commission composedof both secularand religiouselementsto examinethe existing law and recommendmodifications,in the spirit of ijtihad (lit. the interpretation of the Holy Law to promotehuman welfare,by qualifiedindividuals, on the basisof reason).By spring 2003,the commissionhad finishedits work and tenderedtwo setsof recommendationsto the king, one more narrow in scopeand one more far-reaching.The choice,asin so much else in Morocco,would be left up to the monarch. Although it was not immediately evident, the Casablancabombings apparentlyresolvedwhateverremaining doubts Muhammad had. Clearly seekingto counteractthe radical Islamistvision with a more modern and tolerantonecombiningIslamicpreceptswith modernity,the king presented his comprehensive plan to the openingof parliamenton October 10.Three months later,the new family law wasenacted.Among its far-reachingprovisions,it equalizedof the statusof men and women asjoint headsof their household,removed the guardianship (wali) requirement from women upon reachingthe ageof eighteen,raised the minimum marriage ageto eighteen,expandedwomen'srights in mattersof divorceand child custody while limiting men'sability to repudiatetheir wivesaccordinga simpledecree(talaq),and placedsevererestrictionson the ability of men to contract polygamousmarriages. The king's determination to implement fundamentalreform on behalf of Morocco'swomen reassuredthe country'sliberalizingforces.In addition of tlre changesthemselves, lo lhe subslarrce the fact that Muhammadhad

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forged ahead in the face of vocal opposition marked his boldest assertion of leaclership yet. At the same time, although civil society did contribute significantly to the process of discarding the Moudawwana, ultimately the changes came about by royal fiat, not through the actions ofrepresentative institutions. Ironically, the king's actions thus affirmed anew that the monarchy remained the country's central political force.

Conclusion An assessmentof Muhammad's policies during his first eight years on the throne reveals ongoing tension between two seemingly conflicting trends, reform and change, on the one hand, and retention ofpreponderant power by the makhzen, on the other. Muhammad often advocated the expansion of democracy and a strengthened role for political parties in public life. It should be noted, though, that these reforms and their guiding ideology were rooted already in the final decade of Hasan'sreign, making them as much about continuity as change, with only the pace of the latter being slightly accelerated.Similar examples of continuity lay in some of the king's initiatives, which strengthened the monarchy's grip over public life and often co-opted elements of Morocco's nascent civil society. As a result, Muhammad's reign, contrary to early expectations, has bolstered the monarchy's grip over Moroccan society at the expenseof political parties. Concurrently other elements of civil society while newly stirring, remained heavily dependent on makhzen policies. The monarchy has maintained its position as Morocco's preeminent proactive force because at the moment, no other political institution can match its ability to implement widespread reforms' Morocco's political parties, stifled and marginalized during Hasan's reign, lack the leadership and public standing to play a major role in political life, and await new younger members. Whether a new generation of Moroccans will choose to join and transform these parties into powerful political forces, with the monarchy's support, remains an open question' In the eight years since Muhammad's rise, Morocco's political landscape has experienced substantial changes toward greater openness. Morocco'.s foreign friends, namely the United Statesand the countries of the EU, have continuously voiced their support for reform measures already taken ancl have urged the Moroccan government to continue with other planned reforms. At the same time they, like the authorities themselves, are keetr l
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experimentwith democracyand swift implosion. They thereforeremain carefulto sidewith the authoritiesin their policiesof controlled,measured liberalization.As for conservativeand Islamistfactions,the economic,social, and cultural impact of acceleratedglobalizationand the regime'sown stepstoward liberalization pose both threats and opportunities to their world viewsand political and socialprograms. In spiteof the uncertaintiesconcerningMuhammad'sreign andhis longterm goals,one should alsobe cognizantof his country'srich history, and its ability to maintain a senseof cohesiveness notwithstandingits myriad cleavages. If history is any guide, the kingdom is more likely to continue to evolveincrementally,avoiding suddenand far-reachingruptureswhile inching its way toward an alteredpolitical, social,and economicreality. Notes l. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Moroccoi in Middle East ContemporarySurvey(MECS) 23 (1999),edited by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 424-28 (Boulder, Colo.: Westvieq 2001). 2. R6my Leveau, "The Moroccan Monarchy: A Political Systemin Quest of a New Equilibriuml' in Middle East Monarchies:The Challengeof Modernity, edited by foseph Kostiner 117-30(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,2000). 3. Maddy-Weitzman, "Morocco" (1999), 429-30. 4. Ibid., 430-3l' Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Moroccoj' MECS 24 (2000), edited by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 415-16(Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Easternand African Studies,2002). 5. For two classicstudies of the Moroccan monarchy's political and social role, see fohn Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political EIite-A Study of SegmentedPolitics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1970);R€my Leveau,Le felIah marocain: Ddfenseurdu trbne (Paris: Pressesde fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1985).On King Muhammad's family life, seeCaroline Pigozzi, "Mohammed VI en famille (une interview)i Paris-Match, May 13,2O04. 6. Frangois Soudan, "bmbre du 16 maii' leune Afrique/tlntelligent, September 21, 2003. 7. |ames Sater, "The Dynamics of State and Civil Society in Moroccoj' lournal of North African StudiesT,no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 101-18;Marguerite Rollinde, "Ualternance clCmocratiqueau maroc: Une porte entrouvertej' ConJluences Mdditerande5l (Autumn 2004):57-67: Hamid Barrada, "Comment Youssoufia form6 son gouvernement?"leune Afrique, March 17,1998;Hamid Barrada,"Le printemps marocain-faut-il y croire!' leune Al'rique,March 31,1998. tl. l,itcrally "strongbox" or "treasuryi' the word is the traditional name for the Moroceurrrulirrg rrrorrarchical-military-bureaucratic apparatus. 9. f irrrnqrris Soudan,"llanndccletous les espoirsj'/euneAfrique/Llntelligent,Decem-