Actual-damages-cases-handout.docx

CASES FOR ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Arranged by ejplan G.R. No. 160110 June 18, 2014 MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ and GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, Respondents. There was a vehicle collision between and respondents’ Isuzu Elf Truck and Petitioners’ Mayamy Bus. The respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay respondents the costs of repair of the damaged vehicle in the amount of ₱142,757.40 and the amount of ₱1,000.00 per day from March 7, 1997 up to November 1997 representing the unrealized income of the respondents’ business of buying plastic scraps and delivering it to recycling plants when the incident transpired up to the time the damaged Isuzu truck was repaired. The respondents also prayed for an award for attorney’s fees. As to the costs of repair of the truck and medical expenses, the Courts granted the prayer, basing on the receipts submitted by respondents and which receipts petitioners had the opportunity to examine. As such, these are the amounts that respondents are entitled to as actual and compensatory damages. As to the unrealized income, the Courts denied the prayer. Although respondents alleged in their complaint that the damage to their Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of ₱1,000.00, such claim was not duly substantiated by any evidence on record, and thus cannot be awarded. As to the attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court denied the prayer. The RTC had nil discussion on the propriety of attorney’s fees, and it merely awarded such in the dispositive. The CA merely stated that the award of attorney’s fees is merited as such is allowed when exemplary damages are awarded. Following established jurisprudence, however, the CA should have disallowed on appeal said award of attorney’s fees as the RTC failed to substantiate said award. Doctrine: To warrant an award of actual or compensatory damages, the claimant must prove that the damage sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and the claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage.

G.R. No. 170966 June 22, 2016 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Petitioner, vs. ALBERTO LOOYUKO, doing business under the name and style of NOAH’S ARK SUGAR HOLDINGS and WILSON T. GO, Respondents. There was a sugar crisis where the petitioner imported raw sugar and delivered them to three refineries, one of which is the respondent. The delivery to the other two refineries went smoothly. However, there was a four-month delay on the delivery to the respondent’s refinery. With such delay, the respondent refused to accept. The petitioner prayed for damages for the nonacceptance of the raw sugar. Respondents prayed for the sum of ₱52,000,000.00 as damages for lost and unrealized income and business opportunities from other clients and customers which they did not accommodate on account of their Refining Contract with petitioner. As to the unrealized income, the Supreme Court held that the respondent failed to present any proof - whether testimonial or documentary - of their alleged losses. In the same way, petitioner merely gave an estimate of the value of the bags of refined sugar in the possession of respondents but likewise did not offer any testimonial or documentary evidence in support of the alleged value. Hence, both parties, therefore, failed to present any persuasive proof that they are entitled to the actual or compensatory damages. It is important to note that neither petitioner nor respondent is thus entitled to actual or compensatory damages in this case. It is significant to note that the Refining Contract between petitioner and respondent did not state the amount of the contract which may be a basis for an award of actual damages. Doctrine: The claimant must prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures.

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CASES FOR ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Arranged by ejplan G.R. No. 206236 July 15, 2013 GILFREDO BACOLOD, a.k.a. GILARDO BACOLOD, Accused-Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Respondent. Accused Bacolod was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson. However, a substantial detail left out by the RTC, and, later on, by the CA pertained to the civil liability to be assessed against the petitioner in favor of the Spouses Cogtas as owners of the burned house. The RTC and the CA were bound to have then adjudged him civilly liable to compensate the Spouses Cogtas for their substantial economic damage and prejudice as the owners of the house. The Supreme Court held that the unfair omission should be rectified. In the records was testimony given by an architect to the effect that the Spouses Cogtas would need to spend ₱869,590.00 to restore their burned dwelling to its condition before the crime. However, in the absence of a showing that such amount had been actually expended in a manner capable of substantiation by any document or receipt, the architect’s valuation remained a mere estimate, and could not be the measure of an award for actual damages. Failure to present competent proof of actual damages should not deprive the Spouses Cogtas of some degree of indemnity for the substantial economic damage and prejudice they had suffered. According to Article 2224, temperate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages. Doctrine: Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.

G.R. No. 177250 November 28, 2016 ROSITA B. LIM, on her behalf and on behalf of her (then) minor children namely, JENNIFER, LYSANDER and BEVERLIE, Petitioners vs. LUIS TAN, ALFONSO TAN, EUSEBIO TAN, WILLIAM TAN, VICENTE TAN, JOAQUIN TAN, ANG TIAT CHUAN, Respondents In light of the death of Florentino Lim (1973), murder charges were filed against the respondents. The petitioners filed a separate civil action for damages. RTC granted actual and compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity (₱15,100,000.00) but the CA deleted it and instead, awarded civil indemnity for ₱50,000.00. The Supreme Court agreed with the CA. The deletion of the award of actual and compensatory damages which included the loss of earning capacity of the victim is also proper. The RTC awarded damages for loss of earning capacity based solely on the deposition of Rosita without even requiring other documentary evidence to prove the same. Although Rosita testified as to the annual income of Florentino, she failed to substantiate the same by documentary evidence. Evidently, Rosita merely gave a self-serving testimony of her husband’s income. No proof of the victim’s expenses was adduced; thus, there can be no reliable estimate of his lost income. Considering that there was an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees can likewise be awarded. Since this case has been hauled on for too long, the Court concurs with the RTC in awarding attorney's fees and litigation expenses of ₱150,000.00 and ₱350,000.00, respectively, bearing in mind the legal extent of the work undertaken as well as the length of time that had elapsed to prosecute this case. Doctrine: The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof. For loss of income due to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average income. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.

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CASES FOR ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Arranged by ejplan G.R. No. 190957 June 5, 2013 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. APAC MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by CESAR M. ONG, JR., Respondents. There was a purchase transaction between the petitioner (buyer) and the respondent (seller). Respondents filed with a complaint against defendants-appellees for collection of sum of money with damages. The lower courts ruled in favour of the respondents awarding actual damages and attorney’s fees. The petitioner’s challenges the award of attorney’s fees to the respondent. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the petitioner. The only discernible reason proffered by the RTC in granting the award was that respondent, as complainant, was forced to litigate to protect the latter’s interest. Thus, we find that there is an obvious lack of a compelling legal reason to consider the present case as one that falls within the exception provided under Article 2208. Doctrine: It must be noted that the general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. Due to the special nature of the award of attorney’s fees, a rigid standard is imposed on the courts before these fees could be granted. Hence, it is imperative that they clearly and distinctly set forth in their decisions the basis for the award thereof.

G.R. No. 201436 July 11, 2016 SPOUSES MAMERTO and ADELIA*TIMADO, Petitioners vs. RURAL BANK OF SAN JOSE, INC., TEDDY MONASTERIO, in his capacity as its President/Manager, and ATTY. AVELINO SALES, Respondents Petitioners obtained a loan from the respondent and secured by a real estate mortgage and a chattel mortgage. Petitioners eventually failed to pay their loan amortizations. Petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of instruments with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order and damages. Respondent extrajudicially foreclosed of the real estate mortgage and sold the property at a public auction. Petitioners filed a petition for indirect contempt with damages alleging that the latter had preempted judicial authority by foreclosing. Respondent filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of writ of possession to which the petitioners answered with another case of indirect contempt. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. The petitioner assailed the award of attorney’s fees (acceptance fee, appearance fee, and other services of counsel) to the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the award of attorney’s fees was proper in this case. RTC expressly stated in the body of its decision its basis for awarding attorney’s fees, to wit: “the vexatious and baseless action filed by plaintiffs-petitioners gave rise to a cause of action for damages against them in favor of respondents for unnecessarily dragging the latter to Court and compelling them to defend themselves as well as for causing them to suffer anxiety and embarrassment.” The RTC’s findings also support the award of attorney’s fees: first, the petitioners knew that they had executed two mortgages in favor of Rural Bank to secure their loan; second, they failed to pay their loan amortizations; third, they instituted the complaint for reformation of instruments to stop the foreclosure proceedings of the two mortgages; fourth, they filed a complaint for indirect contempt against the respondents with full awareness that no writ of injunction or TRO was ever issued to stay the foreclosure proceedings; and fifth, they even tried to deceive the court by changing their signatures in their submissions in an attempt to support their claim. Clearly, the petitioners' filing of unfounded actions forced the respondents to litigate to protect their interests. Doctrine: The award of attorney’s fees to the winning party lies within the discretion of the court, taking into account the circumstances of each case. Such an award should have factual, legal, and equitable basis, not founded on pure speculation and conjecture. In addition, the court should state the reason for the award of attorney’s fees in the body of the decision.

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CASES FOR ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Arranged by ejplan

G.R. No. 160709 February 23, 2005 NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG, respondents. There was a collision between a jeepney (petitioner) and a motorcycle (Castillon). It was held that the driver of the jeepney was proximate cause of the incident but there was contributory negligence on the part of respondent Castillon which mitigated the damages awarded. As such, the respondent shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner. As to the loss of earning capacity, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in the computation of the net earnings. Life expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) which was adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living expenses)]. NET EARNING CAPACITY (X) X X X X

= LIFE EXPECTANCY [2/3 (80-age at the time of death)] = [2/3 (80-35)] = [2/3 (45)] = 30 = P478,140.00

x GROSS ANNUAL INCOME (GAI) x [P31,876.00 x [P31,876.00 x 15,938.00

- LIVING EXPENSES (50% of GAI) -50% x P31,876.00] - P15,938.00]

Doctrine: In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the following factors are considered in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.

G.R. No. 203902 July 19, 2017 SPOUSES DIONISIO ESTRADA and JOVITA R. ESTRADA, Petitioner vs. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and EDUARDO R. SA YLAN, Respondents A Philippine Rabbit Bus incurred an accident wherein one of its passengers, respondent, suffered injury to his right arm, which was eventually amputated. RTC granted moral damages of P500,000 and actual damages of ₱57,766.25, among others. It thus appears that while petitioners denominated their claim for ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, their computation was actually based on the supposed loss/impairment of Dionisio's earning capacity. The Supreme Court held that it is unlikely that petitioners presented evidence to prove a claim for actual damages based on loss/impairment of earning capacity since what they were claiming at the outset was an award for moral damages. As it stands, there is no competent proof substantiating his actual income and because of this, an award for actual damages for loss/ impairment of earning capacity cannot be made. Nonetheless, since it was established that Dionisio lost his right arm, temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss/impairment of earning capacity may be awarded in his favor. Doctrine: Documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss [or impairment] of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased [or the injured] was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased was employed as a daily worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.

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CASES FOR ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Arranged by ejplan G.R. No. 133803 September 16, 2005 BIENVENIDO M. CASIÑO, JR., Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and OCTAGON REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. Respondent filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against petitioner, owner and proprietor of the Casiño Wood Parquet and Sanding Services. The trial court, upon a finding that petitioner is the one who breached the parties’ agreement, rendered judgment for respondent and awarded P2,111,061.69 by way of actual and compensatory damages; and P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees. CA modified the actual and compensatory damages to P1,662,003.80, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the finality of this judgment until fully paid. The Supreme Court held that respondent must be indemnified for the following damages it sustained by reason of petitioner’s breach of contract since it was the petitioner who incurred in delay in the delivery of the remainder of Narra wood parquet. Finding respondent’s claim justified, this court awards the following: P912, 452.39, representing respondent’s estimated losses on new price, unliquidated damages and cost of money, which was substantiated; and P 1,198,609.30, representing the cost incurred by respondents in engaging the services of 3rd parties for the completion of the work unfinished by petitioner. Doctrine: There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses, and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him. In the latter instance, the familiar rule is that damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred as ‘ganacias frustradas’ or ‘lucrum cessans,’ are not to be granted on the basis of mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise, but rather by reference to some reasonably definite standard such as market value, established experience, or direct inference from known circumstances.

G.R. No. L-11037 December 29, 1960 EDGARDO CARIAGA ET AL, plaintiffs-appellants vs. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, defendant-appellant MANILA RAILROD COMPANY, defendant-appellee There was a collision between the respondents (bus and train) which caused the petitioner, a 4th year medical student of UST to sustain major injuries. The right frontal lobe of the petitioner’s brain was removed. The court awarded ₱10,490 compensatory damages but the petitioners found such amount to be inadequate. The Supreme Court held that the compensatory damages should be increased to P25,000.00. It further explained that the income which the respondent could earn if he should finish the medical course and pass the corresponding board examinations must be deemed to be within the same category because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at the time he boarded the bus. Among the evidence presented, the psychiatrist opined that because of the physical injuries suffered by Edgardo, his mentality has been so reduced that he can no longer finish his studies as a medical student; that he has become completely misfit for any kind of work; that he can hardly walk around without someone helping him, and has to use a brace on his left leg and feet. As regards the income that he could possibly earn as a medical practitioner, it appears that, according to Dr. Amado Doria, a witness for the LTB, the amount of P300.00 could easily be expected as the minimum monthly income of Edgardo had he finished his studies. Doctrine: Before such damage can be recovered, the plaintiff must show that the particylat condition which made the damage a possible and likely consequence of the breach in contract.

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