The Nuclear Renaissance: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation And Terrorism

WWW.IPPR.ORG

TheNuclearRenaissance: Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism ApolicybrieffortheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityforthe21stCentury

byFrankBarnaby EmeritusConsultanttotheOxfordResearchGroup March2009 ©ippr2009

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch Challengingideas– Changingpolicy

2

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Aboutippr TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,producing cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.Since 1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughour independentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutions tochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues. WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible, whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnerships andinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch. ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected] www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065 ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinMarch2009.©ippr2009

ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependent nationalsecuritystrategyfortheUK.Itisco-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLord AshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon.ThefullCommissionmembershipincludes:

•LordPaddyAshdown,Co-Chair,formerleader •SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableof oftheLiberalDemocraticPartyandformer HighRepresentativeforBosnia.

•LordGeorgeRobertson,Co-Chair,former SecretaryofStateforDefenceandformer SecretaryGeneralofNATO.

•DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,DeputyDirector, ippr.

•SirJeremyGreenstock,Directorofthe DitchleyFoundationandformerBritish AmbassadortotheUnitedNations.

•SirDavidOmand,formersecurityand intelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOffice andformerPermanentSecretaryintheHome Office.

•LordCharlesGuthrie,formerChiefofthe DefenceStaff.

•LordMartinRees,PresidentoftheRoyal SocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege, Cambridge.

NorthamptonshireandformerPresidentof theAssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers.

•ProfessorMichaelClarke,Director,Royal UnitedServicesInstitute,andProfessorof DefenceStudiesatKing’sCollegeLondon.

•ProfessorTariqModood,Directorofthe LeverhulmeProgrammeonMigrationand Citizenship,BristolUniversity.

•ConstanzeStelzenmüller,Directorofthe BerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund.

•ProfessorJimNorton,formerchiefexecutive oftheRadioCommunicationsAgencyand nowattheInstituteofDirectors.

•IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservativeParty PolicyTask-forceonScience,Technology, EngineeringandMathematics,Conservative MPforEsherandWaltonandformerminister forScienceandTechnologyatthe DepartmentofTradeandIndustry.

ThispolicybriefisoneofaseriessupportedbytheEconomicandSocialResearchCouncil(ESRC). FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommissionpleasegotowww.ippr.org/security

Theviewsinthispaperarethoseoftheauthoraloneandarebeingpublishedhereinthehopeof advancingpublicdebate.TheydonotrepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionpanelortheviewsof anysponsoringorganisation.

3

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Introduction Globalclimatechangeisoneofthegreatestchallengeswefacethiscentury.Thereisanoverwhelming consensusamongclimatescientiststhattheworldisheatingupbecauseofhumanactivitiesthatemit greenhousegases,particularlycarbondioxide,intotheatmosphere(seeIPCC2007),andfewserious commentatorsdoubtthaturgentactionisneededtopreventcatastrophicchangesintheclimate.1 Therearetwoschoolsofthoughtaboutthebestwaytodealwithglobalwarming.Onewantstobring aboutasocialrevolution,tomakesocietylessconsumeristandlessmaterialisticandtolowerthe consumptionofenergyintheprocess.Theotherislessambitious,andperhapsmorerealistic.It believesintheuseoftechnologytosolvetheproblembyexpandingtheuseofnuclearfission reactorsandrenewableenergysources,bydevelopingawaytocaptureandstorecarbondioxide emittedbyexistingfossilfuelpowerstations,and,inthelongterm,bycreatinganewandrelatively carbon-freesourceofenergysuchasnuclearfusion. Moreradicalideasinclude:reflectingsunlightbycreatingartificialcloudstoreducetheamountof sunlightreachingtheEarth’ssurface,mainlyattheArctic;growingphytoplanktonintheoceansto capturelargeamountsofcarbondioxide;andusingmachines(‘scrubbers’)toabsorbcarbondioxide fromtheatmosphere. Eachofthesebroadsocialandtechnologicalsolutionshasitsdifficulties.Asustainablesocial revolutionwouldtakegenerationstobringabout.Meanwhile,atechnologicalfix,thoughattractivein somerespects,willalsorequiretimeandconsiderablefinancialresourcestoovercomeverydifficult technicalproblems;namely,thefactthatappropriatetechnologyhasnotyetbeendeveloped. Britain’sPrimeMinisterGordonBrownisanenthusiasticadvocateofarelianceontechnology, backingbothnuclearpowerandcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)technologiestogetherwith improvementsinenergyefficiency(Grice2008).Manyotherpoliticalleadersarelookingtonuclear powerasthebestwaytoreducetheemissionsofgreenhousegases.Wemustthereforeexpecttosee alargeincreaseintheglobaluseofnuclearpowerforelectricitygeneration:whathasbecomeknown asanuclearrenaissance. Atpresent,thereisasurprisinglackofacademicdebateandresearchabouttheglobal,regionaland nationalsecurityconsequencesofthespreadofnuclearknowledgeandtechnology,andabouthow theinternationalandregionalcommunitiescancopewiththisspread.Thereisgeneralagreementthat inthenuclearrenaissancemanycountrieswillhaveaccesstoplutoniumthatcouldpotentiallybeused tofabricatenuclearweapons,bothbycountriesandbyterrorists,sincetheinformationneededto producenuclearweaponsiswidelyavailable.Butthereisstillapoorunderstandingoftherangeof riskspresentinanunregulatednuclearworld. Researchisurgentlyneededonhowtocontroltheserisks.Anobviouscontrolmeasurewouldbeto strengthentheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT).Thiswillinvolvethequestions:Howcanthe nuclear-weaponpowersbepersuadedtogiveuptheirnuclearweapons?Istheabolitionofnuclear weaponsfeasibleorapipe-dream?Shouldnon-nuclear-weaponcountriesbeencouragedtodevelop civilnucleartechnology?Ifso,underwhatconditions?Whatmeasureswouldbejustifiedtopreventa countryacquiringnuclearweapons?Wouldmilitaryactioneverbejustified? Anotherareainwhichfurtherresearchisnecessaryisaroundthethreatofnuclearterrorism.This presentsalargenumberofquestions,including:Howlikelyisitthataterroristgroupwillacquire nuclearweapons?Whichterroristgroupswouldbeabletodevelopthem?Cannuclearterrorismbe prevented?Ifnot,whatmeasuresshouldbeputinplacetocopewithit?Howcanthelargeamount ofradioactivematerialaroundtheworldbemadesecure?Howcannuclearterrorismbecountered?

1.ForanexampleofaviewdifferentfromtheconsensusseeSvensmarkandCalder2007.

4

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Whatmeasuresshouldbeputintoplacetodealeffectivelywithnuclearterroristattacks?Andhowwill alltheseissuesbeaffectedbythenuclearrenaissance? Whilethesequestionsarebeyondthescopeofthisdiscussionpaper,thematerialbelowdiscusses someofthemoreserioussecurityissuesthatwillbeassociatedwithanuclearrenaissance,including:

•Theshortageofhigh-qualityuraniumforuseasnuclearfuel •Theconsequencesoftheuseoffastbreederreactors(FBRs)andthewidespreaduseof plutoniumtofuelthem

• Theincreasedriskinaplutoniumeconomyofthespreadofnuclearweaponstoboth countriesandterroristgroups. Beforediscussingthesesecurityimplications,thepapersetsthecontextbydescribingimportant elementsofthenuclearfuelcycleandbyaddressingissuesrelatedtouraniumsupplyandthe changingtechnologybeingusedinnuclearpowerreactors.

Scientificcontext Thenuclearfuelcycle Theproductionoffuelfornuclear-powerreactorsisbasedonuranium,whichisfoundinalarge numberofminerals(chemicalcompounds)andisembeddedindifferenttypesofrock,seawater,fresh water,andsoil.MosturaniumisdispersedthroughtherocksoftheEarth’scrustandonlyasmall fractionisfoundinoresthatcontainsignificantconcentrations.2 However,thereisnomajordifficultyintheminingofuraniumores.Abouttwothirdsoftheworld’s currentknowneconomicallyrecoverableresourcesofuraniumarefoundinfiveaccessiblecountries– Australia(24percent),Kazakhstan(17percent),Canada(9percent),theUSA(7percent)and SouthAfrica(7percent)(WorldNuclearAssociation2007).Thecomplexitycomesintheprocessing ofuranium,afactthathasbeenhelpfultodateintermsofnon-proliferation. Oncemined,theoresareprocessedinmillstoextracttheuraniumintheformofyellowuranium oxide(U3O8),calledyellowcake.Afterproduction,yellowcakeisrefinedandpurifiedandsentto conversionplantswhereitisconvertedtouraniumhexafluoride.Thishexafluorideissenttoa uranium-enrichmentplantwheretheconcentrationofuranium-235isincreasedfromthenaturalvalue of0.72percenttobetweenabout3and5percent.3 Afterenrichment,thehexafluorideisnormally convertedintouraniumdioxide(UO2),thebasicfuelusedformostcurrentnuclearreactors. Enrichmentisnotastraightforwardoperation(WorldNuclearAssociation2008a).Becausethe isotopesuranium-235anduranium-238arechemicallyidentical,theycannotbeseparatedand enrichedbyachemicalmethod;aphysicalmethodmustbeused.Moderncommercialuranium enrichmentplantsusegascentrifugesasthephysicalmethod.

2.Theconcentrationofuraniuminoresvariesoverawiderange.Therichestorescontainabout20per centuranium(about200grammesofuraniuminakilogrammeofrock).Butsomeorescontainingno morethan0.13grammesofuraniumperkilogrammeofrockarecurrentlybeingmined. 3.Therearetwomaintypesofuraniumatoms.About99.3percentisoftheisotopeuranium-238and 0.7percentisoftheisotopeuranium-235.Uranium-235isafissileisotope,fissilematerialbeingthe essentialingredientforbothnuclearpowerandnuclearweaponsproduction.Whenuraniumisenriched toveryhighlevels,typically90percentofU-235orabove,itprovidesthefissilematerialnecessaryin theproductionofanuclearexplosivedevice.Enrichedtolowerlevels(3-5percentofU-235),itprovides thefissilematerialrequiredfornuclearpower.

5

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Thesecentrifugesdependontheverysmalldifferenceinmassbetweenuranium-235anduranium238atoms,witharapidlyspinningcentrifugebeingusedtoseparatethetwoisotopes.Thecentrifuge isacylindricaldrumrotatingatveryhighspeeds.Theheavieruranium-238atomsconcentrateatthe outerradiusoftherotorandaremadetoflowinonedirection,whiletheuranium-235atomsare enrichednearthecentralaxisofthedrumandmadetoflowintheoppositedirection.Theenriched uranium-235isthencollectedthroughanexitorifice. Theoutputofuraniumisotopespercentrifugeisverysmall.Acommercialcentrifugeplantistherefore designedwithalargenumberofcentrifugesincascadetoproduceausefulamountofenriched uranium.Theveryslightlyenricheduraniumfromthefirstcentrifugeinthecascadeisfedintothe inputnozzleofthesecondcentrifuge,theslightlymoreenricheduranium-235fromthesecond centrifugeisfedintothethird,andsoon,untiltherequireddegreeofenrichmentisobtained. Theenrichmentprocessrequiressophisticatedtechnologyandonlyasmallnumberofcountries operatesignificanturanium-enrichmentplantstoday,namelyArgentina,France,Iran,Japan,Pakistan, RussiaandtheUSA.Germany,theNetherlandsandtheUKjointlyrunURENCO,auraniumenrichmentcompany. Thislimiteddispersalofthetechnologyofenrichmenthashistoricallybuttressedtheglobalnuclear non-proliferationregime,sincethetechnologytoenrichuraniumisoneoftwokeystotheproduction ofnuclearweapons(theotheristheabilitytoreprocessspentnuclearfueltoseparateandextract plutoniumfromit,towhichwereturnlater).However,theplannedshifttotheuseofmoreplutonium andlessuraniuminnuclearreactorsthreatenstosweepasidetheoldsafeguards.

Thelong-termsupplyofuranium AccordingtotheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)andtheOrganisationforEconomic CooperationandDevelopment(OECD),theknownrecoverableuraniumresourcesare4.7million tonnes(OECDandIAEA2008).Thisfigureincludesuraniumoresthatareofrelativelylowgrade, occuratgreatdepths,involvelengthytransportationdistancesandarehardertomine. Theworld’scurrentnuclear-powerreactorsconsumeuraniumattherateof65,000tonnesayear (WorldNuclearAssociation2008c).Ifthisratestaysconstant,knownuraniumreserveswilllastforless than70years.Giventhattherichesturaniumoresaredepletedfirst(becausetheseusuallygenerate thelargestprofitsfortheminingcompanies)thenetenergyextractedfromuraniumorewillalso decreaseovertime.4 Atthecurrentrateofconsumption,thehighestqualityuraniumoreswillbe depletedwithinadecadeandtheaveragegradewillfallbelow0.1percent. Itisalsoveryunlikelythatnewuraniumresourcesofhighqualitywillbediscoveredinthenextfew decades.Thisismainlybecauseuraniumdepositsthatarerelativelynearthesurfaceandtherefore mineableusingtheleastenergyemissionsofgreenhousegaseshavealreadybeendiscovered. Depositsatgreaterdepthsrequiremoreenergytobemined,andareofpoorerquality. AccordingtocalculationsmadebyJanWillemStormvanLeeuwen,anexpertonuraniumresources, assumingthatworldnuclearcapacityremainsconstantat372GW,thenetenergyfromuraniumwill falltozerobyabouttheyear2070(StormvanLeeuwen2007and2008).Assumingthatworld nuclearshareremainsconstantat2.2percentofworldenergysupply,andthatenergydemandwill increasetomeettheneedsofarapidlygrowinghumanpopulation,thenetenergybenefitwillfallto zerobyabout2050.

4.Thenetenergy,ameasureofthequalityoftheuraniumore,istheenergyproducedpertonneof uraniumfuelminustheenergyusedtoproducethereactorfuelelements.Ifthepurposeofexpanding theuseofnuclearpoweristomeetenergyneedswhilemitigatingclimatechange,thequalityofthe world’suraniumresourcesisthereforemuchmoreimportantthanthequantity oftheseresources,atleast foraslongasfossilfuelsareusedtodrivetheuraniumminingandreactorfuelproductionprocess.

6

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Movestoaplutoniumeconomy Thisisnotarosypictureintermsofuraniumsupply,giventheheavyrelianceofcurrentthirdgenerationreactorsonuranium.5 Afourthgenerationofreactorsisgoingtobenecessary,andislikely tobeattheheartofthecomingrenaissanceintheglobalnuclearindustry. Fourth-generation(GenerationIV)reactorsincludeveryadvancedreactordesigns,suchastheFast BreederReactorwhichproduces(orbreeds)morenuclearfuelthanituses(seeNuttall2005).Inthese designs,whentheuranium-238surroundingthereactorcapturesfastneutronsfromthecore,enough U-238isconvertedtoplutonium-239(itselfafissilematerial)tofuelanotherFBR.Thisplutonium239 canbeisolatedforuseaspartofareprocessingofspentnuclearfuelaimedatseparatingreusable fromunusablereactorwaste.Intheory,afamilyofFBRsshouldeventuallybeself-sufficientinfuel withonlyasmallinjectionofuranium.TheFBRhasthereforebeenseenasthesolutiontothecoming shortageofhighqualityuranium. FastBreedReactorsdonotbreedveryfast.ForeseeabledesignsarelikelytoproduceFBRsthatwill take30yearstoproduceenoughnuclearfuel(thedoublingtime)tooperateanotherFBR(Rodriguez andLee1998).However,byusingwell-designedFBRs,theutilisationofuraniumcouldeventually reachabout70percent,comparedwithlessthan1percentinlight-waterreactors.Indiaisnow activelydevelopingFBRsandplanstoconstructfour.JapanhasbuiltaresearchFBRatJoyoanda pilotoneatMonju,inTsuruga.ChinaisconstructingaprototypeFBR. ThisswitchtoFBRsisworryingfortworeasons.First,earlierattemptstoconstructandoperateFBRs inFrance,India,Japan,Russia,theUKandtheUShavehadachequeredhistory.ThefirstBritishFBR, theDounreayFastReactor(DFR),firstwentcriticalin1959atDounreay,Scotland.Thesecondwas thePrototypeFastReactor(PFR),whichstartedoperatingin1976,alsoatDounreay.TheBritishFBR programmecloseddownin1994whentheGovernmentstoppedfinancingit. GermanyconstructedtwoFBRs,butbothwerecloseddownin1991.Thebiggest,builtatKalkar, Rhine-Westphalia,wascompletedin1985butwasneveroperatedbecauseofpoliticaloppositionand concernsaboutsafety.Japan’sMonjuFBRbeganoperatingin1994butwasshutdowninDecember 1995followingaleakofthesodiumcoolantandafire.Itmaynotberestartedbecauseofdoubtsthat largequantitiesofliquidsodiumcanbehandledsafely. Second,theswitchtoFBRswillallowmorenuclearreactorstocomeonstream,whichinturn generatesarangeofnewsecuritychallenges.Forexample,iftheworldisusing3,000GWofnuclear electricityin2075,andifthisisgeneratedviatheearlieronce-throughnuclearcycleusinglight-water reactors,approximately600tonnesofplutonium(aby-productoftheprocess)willbeproduced annually(Feiveson2003).However,ifthisnuclearcapacityisprovidedbyFBRs,asthenuclear industrypredicts,morethan4,000tonnesofplutoniumwillhavetobefabricatedintofreshreactor fueleachyear(ibid).Thiswouldbeenoughplutoniumtoproduceatleastamillionnuclearweapons. LargeamountsofplutoniumwillbeneedediftheworldcomestorelyonFBRs,becauseplutonium providesamuchlargerfractionofthenuclearfuelusedinthemthandothecurrentordinaryreactors, whicharefuelledjustwithuranium(intheformofuraniumdioxide). Anycountrythatchoosestooperatefourth-generationreactorsinthefuturewillhaverelativelyeasy accesstoplutonium(usableasthefissilematerialinthemostefficientnuclearweapons)andwillhave competentnuclearphysicistsandengineerswhocoulddesignandfabricatesuchweapons.Because theycouldproduceanuclearforceinashorttime–monthsratherthanyears–thesecountrieswould needtoberegardedaslatentnuclear-weaponpowers.Itmustalsobeexpectedthatsomeofthem willtakethepoliticaldecisiontobecomeactualnuclear-weaponpowers. 5.Thefirstgenerationofreactorsweretheearlyprototypereactorsofthe1950sand1960s,mainlyused toobtainplutoniumfornuclearweapons.Thesecondgenerationwerethecommercialreactors constructedinthe1970sand1980sandthethirdgenerationaremostofthereactorsbeingbuiltright nowtoreplaceoraddtothem.

7

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Fabricatinganuclear weaponfromplutonium ThefuelpelletsinMOXfuel assembliesarecomposed entirelyofpurereactor gradeplutoniumand depleteduranium,both presentasdioxidesand fusedtogetherbyheatto formaceramic.Thematerial isdesignedtobesolublein fairlyconcentratednitricacid foreaseofreprocessing.The chemicalseparationof plutoniumdioxidefrom uraniumdioxideinMOXfuel pelletsisfacilitatedbythe factthattheseelements haveverydifferent oxidation/reduction chemistries. Theproceduresrequired wouldbesimpleandwell withinthetechnological capabilitiesofamoderately sophisticatedterrorist organisation.Thesimplest methodtoseparate plutoniumfromMOXisionexchangeusinganionexchangeresin(Chenetal 2005).Theplutonium dioxide,onceseparated, couldthenbeconvertedto plutoniummetal.The plutoniumdioxideorthe plutoniummetalcouldbe usedinaprimitivedesignto makenuclearexplosive.

Therewillalsobeaheightenedriskthatterroristswillacquireplutonium,fabricateanuclearweapon anddetonateit.Eminentphysicistswithknowledgeofthecharacteristicsandproductionofnuclear weaponshavenodoubtthateffectivenuclearweaponscanbefabricatedfromreactor-grade plutoniumproducedbycivilnuclear-powerreactors(Marketal1987). Thisriskisalreadybeingsignificantlyenhancedbytheincreaseduseofmixedoxide(MOX)fuel–a mixtureofuraniumdioxideandplutoniumdioxideusedinsomeofthenewernuclearreactorsnow replacingthosethatareobsolete.Somecurrent(secondgeneration)light-waterreactorsin Belgium,France,Germany,IndiaandSwitzerlanduseMOXfuelelementsinafraction(normally aboutathird)oftheircores.IfaterroristgroupacquiredMOXfuel,itcouldrelativelyeasily separatetheplutoniumdioxidefromtheuraniumdioxidebymeansofstraightforwardchemistry, andusetheplutoniumtofabricateanuclearweapon(seebox).Itwouldonlytaketwoorthree peoplewiththeappropriateskillstodesignandfabricateacrudenuclearexplosive(Stober2003), asshownbytheNthCountryexperiment.6 Theywouldnotneedtohaveaccesstoclassified documents,sincethenuclearphysicsdataneededtodesignacrudenucleardeviceisalready availableinopen-sourceliterature(Lovins1990). Theoperationsinvolvedwouldrequiresomeskill,butmanyterroristorganisationshaveshown themselvescapableofsophisticatedplanningandtheapplicationofscientificprinciples.The constructionoftheconventionalexplosivedevicethatdestroyedthePanAmjumbojetoverLockerbie on21December1988requireddetailedplanningandscientificskills,asdidtheconstructionofthe SarinnervegasweaponusedintheTokyoundergroundbytheAUMgroupon20March1995. Indeed,thepreparationofSarinforthatattackinvolvedconsiderablymorecomplexchemistryand greateracutedangertotheoperatorsthanthatrequiredfortheseparationofplutoniumfromMOX. Thechemistryisevenlesssophisticatedthanthatrequiredfortheillicitpreparationofdesigner recreationaldrugs.Moreover,ruthlessterroristsarelikelytoberelativelyunconcernedabouttheir safetyoraboutpollutingtheenvironment(withplutonium,forexample)otherthantotheextentthat accidentsorreleasesmayrevealtheirclandestineactivity. Otherdangersposedbynuclearterroristsinclude:theproductionanddetonationofaradiological weapon,commonlydescribedasa‘dirtybomb’,tospreadradioactivematerial;attacksonnuclearpowerreactorsoronradioactivewastetanksandplutoniumstoresatareprocessingplantlike Sellafieldtospreadradioactivity;andthesabotageorhijackingoftransportersofnuclearmaterials. Apartfromadirtybomb,allofthesetypesofnuclearterrorismhavethepotentialtocauselarge numbersofdeaths.Oftheseoptions,nuclearterroristswouldprobablyprefertosetoffanuclear explosionbecauseofthegreatdamageitwoulddo,perhapsusingastolennuclearweaponormore likelyusinganuclearexplosivefabricatedfromacquiredfissilematerial. Themostprimitiveterroristnucleardevicewouldbeadirtybomb,consistingofaconventionalhigh explosive(forexample,semtex,dynamiteorTNT),someincendiarymaterial(likethermite) surroundingtheconventionalexplosive,andaquantityofaradioisotope,probablyplacedatthe centreoftheexplosive.Whentheconventionalhighexplosiveisdetonatedtheradioactivematerial wouldbevaporised.Thefireignitedbytheincendiarymaterialwouldcarrytheradioactivityupinto theatmosphere.Itwouldthenbeblowndownwind,spreadingradioactivityasitwent.Generally,the explosionoftheconventionalexplosivewouldbethemostlikelycauseofanyimmediatedeathsor seriousinjuries.Areasaslargeastensofsquarekilometresmightbecontaminatedwithradioactivity tolevelsabovethoserecommendedbynationalradiologicalprotectionauthoritiesfortheexposureof civilianstoradioactivityandthesewouldhavetobeevacuatedanddecontaminated,averylengthy andexpensiveoperation(Barnaby1997). Themainpotentialimpactofadirtybombwouldbepsychological,inthatitwouldcauseconsiderable fear,panicandsocialdisruption:exactlytheeffectsterroristswishtoachieve.Thepublicfearof radiationisverygreatindeed,somesayirrationallyso.

6.TheNthCountryexperimentshowedthatthreepost-doctoralstudentswithnonuclearknowledge coulddesignaworkingatombomb.SeeBurkeman2003formoreinformation.

8

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Policyoptionsinanuclearrenaissance Thenuclearrenaissancewillleadtothespreadofplutoniumtomanycountries,asMOXfuelis increasinglyusedasanuclearfuelandasplutoniumisusedtofuelfutureFBRs.Thefactthatthis plutoniumcanbeusedbycountriestofabricatenuclearweaponsandbyterroriststomakenuclear explosivesisanobviousthreattoglobalsecurity. Theinternationalcommunityurgentlyneedstodotwothingstoreducetheplutoniumthreat.First, andmostimportant,istostrengthentheNon-ProliferationTreatybyactionatthenextNPTReview Conferencein2010.Second,stepsmustbetakentodiscouragenewcountriesfromobtainingthe capabilitytoenrichuraniumand/ortoreprocessspentnuclearfuel,themostsensitiveelementsofthe nuclearfuelcycleasfarasnuclear-weaponproliferationandterrorismareconcerned. Twomajorproposalshavebeenputforwardtoreducetheplutoniumthreat:theGlobalNuclear EnergyPartnership(GNEP)andtheNuclearFuelBank.However,botharediscriminatoryinthesense thattheyallowthecountriesthatalreadyhaveenrichmentandreprocessingtechnologiestomaintain thembuttrytopreventthosecountriesthatdonotnowhavethemfromacquiringthem. Somecountrieswanttheoptiontoacquirenuclearweaponsiftheylatertakethepoliticaldecisionto dosoand,therefore,toacquireenrichmentand/orreprocessingtechnologies.Anumberofthese,and especiallyIran,willnotbewillingtogiveuptheoptionofacquiringthem,arguingthatArticleIVof theNPTgivesthemaninalienablerighttodosounderinternationalIAEAcontrol.

TheGlobalNuclearEnergyPartnership(GNEP) TheproposedGNEP,announcedbytheUSDepartmentofEnergy(DoE)on6February2006,would beaninternationalpartnershiptoreprocessspentnuclearfuelinawaythatrenderstheplutoniumin itusablefornuclearfuelbutnotfornuclearweapons(USDepartmentofEnergy2007). TheUnitedStateshasproposedtoworkwithotheradvancednuclearnationstodevelopnew proliferation-resistantrecyclingtechnologiesinordertominimiseproliferationconcerns.Partner nationswilldevelopanuclearfuelservicesprogrammetoprovidenuclearfueltodevelopingnationsin exchangefortheircommitmentnottoenrichuraniumorreprocessspentnuclearfuel. On16February2006theUnitedStates,FranceandJapansignedanarrangementtoconductresearch intothedevelopmentofsodium-cooledFBRsinsupportoftheGNEP.On16September200711 morecountriessignedtheGNEPStatementofPrinciples.ThesecountrieswereAustralia,Bulgaria, Ghana,Hungary,Jordan,Kazakhstan,Lithuania,Poland,Romania,SloveniaandUkraine.Sincethen Canada,Italy,theRepublicofKorea,SenegalandtheUnitedKingdomhavejoined(WorldNuclear Association2008b). IftheGNEPoperatesaccordingtoplan,thenuclear-weaponpowerswillsellnuclear-powerreactorsto non-nuclear-weaponpowersandthenuclearfuelforthem.Theywouldthenarrangetotakebackthe spentfuelelementsfromthereactors,reprocessthemandeventuallypermanentlydisposeofthe radioactivewaste. SomeuraniumsuppliersarestronglyopposedtotheGNEP.Forexample,SouthAfricanMineralsand EnergyMinisterBuyelwaSonjicastatedthat:‘Exportinguraniumonlytogetitbackrefined,insteadof enrichingitinSouthAfrica,wouldbe“inconflictwithournationalpolicy”’(AgenceFrancePress 2007).Suppliersarguethattoaddvaluetotherawuranium,byenrichment,forexample,would considerablyincreasetheirprofit. IftheGNEPgoesaheadandtheAmericansreprocessspentreactorfuelelements,itwillreverse30 yearsofUSgovernmentpolicy.In1977PresidentJimmyCarterbannedreprocessingintheUS becauseofconcernsthattheplutoniumseparatedfromthecivilreactorfuelelementswouldbeused tofabricatenuclearweapons.SomebelievethatsuchareversalofAmericangovernmentpolicyis urgentlyrequiredbuttheoppositiontoitisprobablysufficientlygreattomakeitineffective.

9

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

Anuclearfuelbankunderinternationalsafeguards Thesecondproposalistosetupanuclear‘fuelbank’or‘reserve’,administeredbytheIAEA(IAEA 2006).Thefuelbankwouldassureaback-upsupplyoffuelfornuclear-powerreactorsonanondiscriminatory,non-politicalbasis,therebyreducingtheneedforcountriestodeveloptheirown uraniumenrichmentandplutoniumreprocessingtechnologies.Thefuelbankwould,itisproposed,be setupinawaythatwouldnotdisrupttheexistingcommercialmarketinnuclearfuels. InhisNobelPrizespeechon10December2005,IAEADirectorGeneralMohamedElBaradeiargued thatthecontrolsoveroperationsforproducingthenuclearmaterialthatcouldbeusedinweapons shouldbetightened,observingthat‘anycountryhastherighttomastertheseoperationsforcivilian uses.Butindoingso,italsomastersthemostdifficultstepsinmakinganuclearbomb.Toovercome this,Iamhopingthatwecanmaketheseoperationsmultinational–sothatnoonecountrycanhave exclusivecontroloveranysuchoperation’(ElBaradei2005). Tothisend,ElBaradeihassuggestedthatareservefuelbankshouldbesetupunderIAEAcontrol,to ensurethatallcountriesreceivethefuelthattheyneedforlegitimateandpeacefulnuclearactivities. Itistobehopedthatthissystemwouldremovetheincentiveforindividualcountriestodeveloptheir ownfuelcycle,andstimulatethecreationofeffectivemultinationalarrangementsforenrichment,fuel production,wastedisposalandreprocessing(ElBaradei2005). BoththeUnitedStatesandRussiahavestatedthattheyarewillingtomakenuclearmaterialavailable forafuelbankadministeredbytheIAEA.Russiahasproposedtheestablishmentofinternational centresunderaGlobalNuclearPowerInfrastructure(GNPI)toprovidenuclearfuelcycleservices, includingtheenrichmentofuranium,inanon-discriminatoryway,supervisedbytheIAEA. InthewordsofTariqRauf,HeadoftheIAEA’sVerificationandSecurityPolicyCoordinationSection, theestablishmentofanuclearfuelbankunderinternationalsafeguards‘isaneither/orsituation;ifwe don’tmakeitwork,thenwemustpreparetoliveinaworldwheredozensofcountrieshavethe capabilityandkeyingredientstomakenuclearweapons’(IAEA2006). AswiththeGNEP,thediscriminatorynatureofthenuclearfuelbankmayconsiderablyreduceits effectiveness,and,formanycountries,itsacceptability.Thefacthastobefacedthatacountryintent onacquiringfissilematerialand/orthetechnologytoproduceit,andthatisabletopayforit,islikely tosucceed.

StrengtheningtheNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT) Giventhestrongobjectionstotheproposalscurrentlyonthetabletoreducetheplutoniumthreat, theoptionofstrengtheningtheNPTthereforeseemsthemostlikelytosucceed.TheNPTcouldbe reinforcedthroughmoreactivestepstowardsnucleardisarmament.With188Parties,theNPTis almostuniversal,andanimportantbarriertothespreadofnuclearweapons.7 Thechallengeisto strengthenitsothatitmayserveasamoreeffectivebackdroptothetwopolicysuggestions highlightedabove. TheNPTisabargain.Thenon-nuclear-weaponPartiesarecommittednottoacquirenuclearweapons andtosubmitsafeguardstoIAEAtoverifythattheyarecomplyingwiththeircommitment;in exchange,thefiveNPTnuclear-weaponPartiesarecommittedtogivetheotherPartiestotalaccessto peacefulnucleartechnologiesandtoengageinnucleardisarmamentnegotiationsaimedatthe ultimateabolitionoftheirnuclearweapons.Themainproblemoverthepast40yearshasbeenthat thenuclear-weaponPartiestotheNPThavenotfulfilledtheirpartofthebargain,andhaveshown fewcrediblesignsofbeingwillingtogetridoftheirnuclearweapons.Withagrowingnumberof latentnuclear-weaponpowers,theworldismovingintoanunregulatedstateofnuclearanarchy.

7.Onlythreecountries,India,IsraelandPakistan,havenotjoinedtheNPT.NorthKoreawasaPartyto thetreatybutwithdrewfromitin2003.

10

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

KenBooth,ProfessorofInternationalPoliticsattheUniversityofWales,hasaptlydescribedthisworld asoneof‘radicalnuclearmultipolarity’(Booth2007).Boothagreesthatbyfarthebest,andprobably theonly,waytopreventtheworldcommunityfromfallingintoastateoftotalnuclearanarchyisto strengthentheNPT.EveryfiveyearsaNPTReviewConferencetakesplacetoassesshowthetreaty canbestrengthenedandtocheckhowwellthePartiesarefulfillingtheirobligationsunderthetreaty. ThenextReviewConferenceisin2010.Thetreatyisfragileandthe2010conferencemaybeamake orbreakeventforit.IftheNPTistobesignificantlystrengthened,thenuclear-weaponPartiesmust, attheminimum,agreeatthe2010ReviewConferencetomakeverifiedreductionsoftheirnuclear arsenalsandtotaketheirnuclearforcesoffalert(ortostandthemdown). ThenegotiationofaFissileMaterialsCut-offTreaty,banningthefurtherproductionoffissilematerials foruseinnuclearweapons,mustalsobestarted.BringingtheComprehensiveNuclear-Test-BanTreaty intoforcewouldalsohelpaswouldatreatydefiningadequatenegativesecurityassurancestononnuclear-weaponcountries. Theestablishednuclear-weaponpowersshouldnegotiateatreatytoprohibittheuseofnuclear weaponsagainstnon-nuclear-weaponPartiestotheNPT.Forexample,theUShasmadeanuclear non-usepledge,knownasanegativesecurityassurance,bywhichitagreesnottousenuclear weaponsagainstnon-nuclear-weaponNPTParties,exceptifattackedbysuchastateassociatedor alliedwithanuclear-armedstate.Butatthesametime,theUSrefusestoruleouttheuseofnuclear weaponsinresponsetoattacksusingbiologicalorchemicalweapons. TheNPTwillbestrengthenedonlyifthenon-nuclear-weaponPartiesareconvincedthatthenuclearweaponPartiesgenuinelyintendtogetridoftheirnuclearweapons,whilemeasurestosetupand extendtheGlobalNuclearEnergyPartnershipandaninternationalnuclearfuelbankwillonlyworkin thecontextofapreservedandstrengthenedNPT. Somesupportersofnuclearweaponssuggestthatabolishingthemcouldendangerworldsecurity because,bydeterringthreats,theseweaponspreventwarandstabiliseinternationalrelations.The eliminationofnuclearweapons,itissaid,mayalsoconsiderablyincreasetheprobabilityof conventionalwar(GrahamandMendelsohn1999). However,anumberofeminentpeople,includingsomewhohaveheldveryseniorpostsintheUSand UKgovernmentsandwhohavenottraditionallybeeninfavourofnucleardisarmament,havecalled fortheabolitionofnuclearweapons(seeSchultzetal2007andQuinlan2007).Theyhavebeen supportedinthiscallbyauthoritativeacademics(seeKearns2007andPerkovichandActon2008). Theargumentinfavourofnuclearweaponsalsofailstotakeintoaccounttherealdangerofalarge increaseinthenumberofnuclear-weaponpowersandtheassociatedthreatfromnuclearterrorism. Bothofthesedangerswillbeincreasedbytheexpansioninuseofnuclearpower,particularlyifbased onFastBreederReactorsandplutonium. Wearenowatacrossroads.UnlesswetakestepstoturnideasliketheGlobalNuclearEnergy Partnershipandtheinternationalnuclearfuelbankintorealityandunlesswechangethepolitical climatearoundtheNPTwithsomeconcreteprogressonnucleardisarmamentamongtheNPTnuclear weaponsstates,wearegoingtomoveintoBooth’sworldof‘radicalnuclearmultipolarity’.Tomake thatmoveasadeliberatesecuritystrategybecauseofsomemisplacedfaithinthecontinuedvalueof nucleardeterrencewouldbe,attheleast,ill-advised.Todosoasaknee-jerkreactiontoourneedto managethechallengeofclimatechangewouldbeunforgivable. Weurgentlyneedthesecuritydimensionsofarenaissanceintheglobalnuclearindustrytobe elevatedinpublicdebatesbothonUKenergystrategyandontheemerginginternationalenergy ordertowhichUKstrategywillcontribute.Andweurgentlyneedseriouspoliticalenergydirectedat deliveringthepolicyinnovationsoutlinedabove.

11

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

References AgenceFrance-Presse(2007)‘SAfricaoutofGNEPtokeeprighttoenrichuranium:minister’,18 September,availableat:http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iVN6X3NLfzljt66R_ThfRyFl6R2Q BarnabyF(1997)‘TheRadiologicalHazardsofPlutonium’, Medicine,ConflictandSurvival,Vol.13,pp. 195-206 BoothK(2007)‘NewDimensionsofSecurityandInternationalOrganizations’,paperpresentedto internationalsymposiuminJune2007organisedbytheTurkishGeneralStaff,availableat: www.aber.ac.uk/interpol/en/research/DDMI/research_trust_building_workshops.html BurkemanO(2003)‘HowtwostudentsbuiltanA-bomb’,TheGuardian,24June,availableat www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jun/24/usa.science ChenQJ,AarkrogA,NielsenSP,DahlgaardH,NiesH,YuYXandMandrupKJ(2005) ‘Determinationofplutoniuminenvironmentalsamplesbycontrolledvalenceinanion-exchange’, JournalofRadioanalyticalandNuclearChemistry, Vol.172,pp.281-288 ElBaradeiM(2005)‘NobelLecture’,10December,OsloCityHall,Oslo,availableat: www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n020.html FeivesonHA(2003)‘NuclearPower,NuclearProliferation,andGlobalWarming’,ForumonPhysics andSocietyoftheAmericanPhysicalSociety,January GrahamTandMendelsohnJ(1999)‘NATO’sNuclearWeaponsPolicyandtheNo-First-UseOption’, TheInternationalSpectator,VolumeXXXIV,No.4,Oct-Dec GriceA(2008)‘Brownsets“nolimit”onnumberofnuclearreactorstobebuilt’,TheIndependent, 14 July InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)(2006)‘IAEAseeksguaranteesofnuclearfuel’, www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2006/prn200615.html InternationalPanelonClimateChange(2007)ClimateChange2007,SynthesisReports,November, availableat:www.ipcc.ch KearnsI(2007)‘NewThinkingonNukes’,ProspectMagazine,December,availableat:www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=9889 LovinsAB(1990)‘NuclearWeaponsandPower-ReactorPlutonium’,Nature, Vol.283,pp.817-823, andtypographicalcorrections,Vol.284,p.190 MarkJC,TaylorT,EysterE,MaramanWandWechslerJ(1987)‘CanTerroristsBuildNuclear Weapons?’inLeventhalPandAlexanderY(eds.)PreventingNuclearTerrorism,Massachusetts: LexingtonBooks NuttallWJ(2005)NuclearRenaissance:TechnologiesandPoliciesfortheFutureofNuclearPower, BristolandPhiladelphia:InstituteofPhysicsPublishing OECDandIAEA(2008)Uranium2007:Resources,ProductionandDemand,Paris:OECDPublishing PerkovichGandActonJM(2008)AbolishingNuclearWeapons, AdelphiPaper396,August,London: InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,London,availableat: www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/2008-adelphi-papers/abolishing-nuclear-weapons/ QuinlanM(2007)‘AbolishingNuclearArmouries:PolicyorPipedream’,Survival,Vol.49,No.4, Winter2007-08 RodriguezPandLeeSM(1998)‘Whoisafraidofbreeders?’,CurrentScience,Vol.75,No.10, November,pp.996-1000,availableat:www.ias.ac.in/currsci/nov251998/articles13.htm ShultzGP,PerryWJ,KissingerHAandNunnS(2007)‘AWorldFreeofNuclearWeapons’,Wall StreetJournal,4January,availableat:www.2020visioncampaign.org/pages/336 StoberD(2003)‘Noexperiencenecessary’,BulletinoftheAtomicScientists, Vol.59,No.02,

12

ippr|TheNuclearRenaissance:Nuclearweaponsproliferationandterrorism

March/April,pp.56-63 StormvanLeeuwenJW(2007)‘IntotheUnknown,fuellingcivilnuclearpower?’inBarnabyFand KempJ(eds.) SecureEnergy;CivilNuclearPower,SecurityandGlobalWarming,March,London: OxfordResearchGroup StormvanLeeuwenJW(2008)‘Nuclearpower–theenergybalance’,availableat: www.stormsmith.nl/ SvensmarkHandCalderN(2007)TheChillingStars:ACosmicViewofClimateChange,Cambridge: IconBooks USDepartmentofEnergy(2007)TheGlobalNuclearEnergyPlan, availableat: www.gnep.energy.gov/pdfs/gnepStrategicPlanJanuary2007.pdf WorldNuclearAssociation(2007)‘UraniumMining’,March,availableat:www.worldnuclear.org/education/mining.htm WorldNuclearAssociation(2008a)‘UraniumEnrichment’,Informationpaper,July,availableat: www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf28.html WorldNuclearAssociation(2008b)‘GlobalNuclearEnergyPartnership’,August,availableat: www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf117_gnep.html WorldNuclearAssociation(2008c)‘WorldNuclearPowerReactorsandUraniumRequirements’,1 September,availableat:www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.htm