The New Front Line: Security In A Changing World

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TheNewFrontLine: Securityinachangingworld ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity,WorkingPaperNo.1 byIanKearnsandKenGude February2008 ©ippr2008

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch Challengingideas– Changingpolicy

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Contents Aboutippr ................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Abouttheauthors ........................................................................................................................................................................ 5 Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Commentsandfeedback............................................................................................................................................................. 5 Executivesummary...................................................................................................................................................................... 6 1.Introduction............................................................................................................................................................................ 10 2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape .......................................................................................................... 12 i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion....................................................................................................................................... 12 ii)Povertyandfailingstates ................................................................................................................................................... 19 iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity................................................................................................................................ 20 iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam ............................................................................................................................................. 23 v)Socio-economicvulnerability.............................................................................................................................................. 25 Driversandeffects:conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 26 3.Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape ...................................................................................................................... 28 Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy................................................................................................... 28 Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach ................................................................................ 30 Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy .............................................................................................................................. 32 4.Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................................. 37 References .................................................................................................................................................................................. 38 Appendix:Thenewfrontlineofnationalsecuritypolicy .......................................................................................................... 42

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Aboutippr TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,producing cutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld. Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Through ourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepractical solutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues. WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible, whileourinternationalandmigrationteamsandclimatechangeprogrammeextendourpartnerships andinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch. ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected] www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065 ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinFebruary2008.©ippr2008

ipprCommissiononNationalSecurity ThisworkingpaperformspartoftheongoingactivitiesoftheipprCommissiononNationalSecurity. Thisisanall-partyCommissionpreparinganindependentnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUK.Itis co-chairedbyLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon.Thefull Commissionmembershipincludes: •Lord(Paddy)Ashdown,Co-Chair,formerleader oftheLiberalDemocraticPartyandformer HighRepresentativeforBosnia. •Lord(George)Robertson,Co-Chair,former SecretaryofStateforDefenceandformer SecretaryGeneralofNATO. •DrIanKearns,DeputyChair,DeputyDirector, ippr. •SirJeremyGreenstock,DirectoroftheDitchley FoundationandformerBritishAmbassadorto theUnitedNations. •SirDavidOmand,formersecurityand intelligencecoordinatorintheCabinetOffice andformerPermanentSecretaryintheHome Office. •Lord(Charles)Guthrie,formerChiefofthe DefenceStaff. •ShamiChakrabarti,DirectorofLibertyand formerHomeOfficelawyer. •Lord(Martin)Rees,PresidentoftheRoyal SocietyandMasterofTrinityCollege, Cambridge. •SirChrisFox,formerChiefConstableof NorthamptonshireandformerPresidentofthe AssociationofChiefPoliceOfficers. •ProfessorMaryKaldor,CentreforGlobal Governance,LondonSchoolofEconomics.

•ProfessorMichaelClarke,Director,Royal UnitedServicesInstitute,andProfessorof DefenceStudiesatKing’sCollegeLondon. •FrancescaKlug,ProfessorialResearch FellowattheLondonSchoolofEconomics andacommissionerontheCommissionfor EqualityandHumanRights(CEHR). •ProfessorTariqModood:Director,University ofBristolResearchCentrefortheStudyof EthnicityandCitizenship. •SenatorTomDaschle,formerMajority LeaderoftheUnitedStatesSenate. •ConstanzeStelzenmüller,Directorofthe BerlinofficeoftheGermanMarshallFund. •DavidMepham,DirectorofPolicyatSave theChildrenandformerlyHeadofthe InternationalProgrammeatippr. •ProfessorJimNorton,formerchief executiveoftheRadioCommunications AgencyandnowattheInstituteof Directors. •IanTaylorMP,ChairoftheConservative PartyPolicyTask-forceonScience, Technology,EngineeringandMathematics, ConservativeMPforEsherandWaltonand formerministerforScienceandTechnology attheDepartmentofTradeandIndustry.

TheworkingpaperserieseditorisIanKearns. FormoreinformationontheworkoftheCommissionpleasegotowww.ippr.org/security

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Abouttheauthors IanKearns isDeputyChairoftheCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,Deputy DirectorofipprandiscurrentlyleadingtheInstitute’sinternationalandsecurityprogramme.Hehasa broadrangeofexperienceintheprivatesector,asaformerDirectorintheGlobalGovernment IndustrypracticeatElectronicDataSystems(EDS),andinacademia,asformerDirectorofthe GraduateProgrammeinInternationalStudiesandLecturerinPoliticsattheUniversityofSheffield. KenGude isaVisitingFellowatipprandSeniorAdvisertotheCommissiononNationalSecuirtyin the21stCentury.HeiscurrentlytheAssociateDirectoroftheInternationalRightsandResponsibility ProgramattheCenterforAmericanProgressandhaspreviouslyworkedforseveralleadingAmerican thinktanks,includingtheCenterforNationalSecurityStudiesandtheCouncilonForeignRelations.

Acknowledgements Asisthecasewithmostprojectsofthisnature,thispaperistheproductofthelabourofmany,and withouttheirassistanceandsupport,weneverwouldhavebeenabletopublish.Theauthorswishto thanktheCommissionersoftheippr’sCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whose discussionsprovidedthesparkformanyoftheideaswehaveputforwardhereandallowedthis analysistobetestedanddebated.WewouldalsoliketothanktheincomparablestaffattheInstitute forPublicPolicyResearch,especiallyAlexGennieandKatiePaintinfromtheInternationaland SecurityProgrammeandmanyothersincludingGeorginaKyriacou,CareyOppenheimandMatt Jacksonwhohelpedgetustothefinishline.Finally,wewerefortunatethatmanyofourcolleagues andassociatesworkingoutsideipprtookthetimetoreadandreviewourworkandprovideinsight andguidancethatenabledustosharpenthemanuscriptandimproveourarguments. ipprwouldliketothankEDSandRaytheonwhoaresupportersofalltheCommission’sactivities.We wouldalsoliketothankthefollowingfortheirsupportforspecificstreamsofworkfeedingintothe Commission'sdeliberations:BoozAllenHamilton(energysecurityandprotectionofcriticalnational infrastructure),DeLaRue(bordersandidentitymanagement),andtheDepartmentforInternational DevelopmentandtheSwedishForeignMinistry(conflictpreventionandpost-conflictreconstruction). Theviewsinthisworkingpaperarethoseoftheauthorsaloneandarebeingpublishedhereinthe hopeofadvancingpublicdebate.TheydonotrepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionpanelorthe viewsofanysponsoringorganisation.

Commentsandfeedback Wewelcomewrittencomments onallsectionsandaspectsofthematerialpresentedhere,andthese shouldbesentinthefirstinstancetotheCommission’sDeputyChair,IanKearns,on [email protected].TheCommissionwillalsoberunningaseriesoftargetedcallsforevidence throughout2008andmoredetailsofthesecanbefoundatwww.ippr.org/security

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Executivesummary Thispaperanalysesthekeychangestakingplaceinthenationalandinternationalsecuritylandscape andassessestheirimplicationsforpolicy,examiningthecontextwithinwhichanationalsecurity strategymustnowbeforged.Itisasubmissiontoippr’sindependentCommissiononNational Securityinthe21stCentury,capturingsomeoftheearlydeliberationsoftheCommission.However,it shouldnotatthisstagebetakentorepresenttheviewsoftheCommissionitself.

Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape Thepaperidentifiesfivedriversofchangeandtheireffects: i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates iii)Climatechange iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam v)Socio-economicvulnerability. Asaresult,itbecomesclearthatthecontemporarysecuritylandscapeisaboutmuchmorethan terrorismalone. i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion Aglobalisation-drivendiffusionofpowerisunderwayinthreesenses. Thefirstisarelativediffusionofpowerwithinandamongthecommunityofstates.Thisisvisiblein theriseofChinaandIndia,intheemergenceofawiderangeofnewlyimportantenergystatesand regions(includingtheCaspianSearegion,centralAsia,Nigeria,Iran,Qatar,AlgeriaandVenezuela) andinthepotentialriseofnewnuclearpowers(notjustviaIranandNorthKoreabutalsothrough theregionalnucleararmsracestheymightprovoke).Thiselementofpowerdiffusioniscreatingnew centresofpower,newregionsofpotentialtensionandconflict,andraisesfundamentalquestionsover theextenttowhichimportantinternationalinstitutionsstillreflecttherealitiesofglobalpower. Thesecond dimensionofpowerdiffusionisfromstatetonon-stateactors,andtoterroristgroupsand organisedcrimenetworksinparticular.Thisisdrivenbyaprocessoftechnologydispersalandis evidentintheincreaseddestructivepotentialofsuchgroups(aparticularworrybeingthepotential linkbetweenterroristgroupsandaccesstoweaponsofmassdestruction)andintheiraccessto communicationsandencryptiontechnologieswhichamplifytheirvoice,extendtheirorganisational reachandincreasetheircapacityforevadinglawenforcement.Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors raisesquestionsoverwhatwaspreviouslyseenasastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce.It also,particularlythroughcorruption,raisesquestionsaboutthecapacityoforganisedcrimenetworks tochangetheverycharacterofstates,turningsomeofthemintopariahterritories. Third,anunplannedincreaseininter-statepower-sharingisconsideredintheformofincreased securityinterdependence,bothintermsofglobalinterdependence(onissuessuchasclimatechange) andintermsofthespecificsoftheUK’sinterfacewiththeglobalisedworldeconomy.New vulnerabilitiesareidentifiedhere,onenergysecurity,ondrugsmugglingintotheUK,onthe vulnerabilityofkeystrategictraderoutesandonourexposuretoanewpandemic.Onalltheseissues, thekeypointmadeisthattheUKisreliantforitssecuritynotonlyondecisionstakenathomebuton decisionstakenelsewhereandbyothers. ii)Globalpovertyandfailingstates Theseconddriverofchangeidentifiedrelatestotheclutchofissuesinthe‘security-development’ nexus.Thisisthepointatwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonof weakandfailingstatesinteract,todevastatingeffect.Povertykillsmorepeoplethanpolitical violence,andisadriverofconflictandinstabilityinmanypartsofthedevelopingworld.Whilenotall weakandfailingstatesarepoor,manyofthemare,andpovertyisakeyfactorintheproliferationof ungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspacesintheinternationalsystem.Theseinturn,asAfghanistan

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andSomaliahaveshown,canbecomesafehavensforterroristandorganisedcrimeactivity.Inthis context,thestrongignoretheweakattheirperilandforwealthiercountriesliketheUK,moral imperativestoaddressglobalpovertyhavenowbeenjoinedbynarrowersecurityinterests. iii)Climatechange Evenundermid-rangeIPCCtemperatureincreasescenarios,climatechangeissettohaveanumberof profoundimplicationsinthenexttwotothreedecades.Chinawillfaceseverewaterstressand decliningfoodproductioninimportantregions,atthesametimeasfacinghugepressuretomaintain veryhighlevelsofeconomicgrowth.Howitrespondstothesepressurescouldbeoneofthedefining featuresoftheinternationalsecuritylandscapefordecadestocome.SouthAsia,particularly Bangladesh,willbebadlyaffectedbytheshrinkageoftheHimalayanglaciers,possiblycausinghuge flowsofenvironmentalrefugeesacrosstheregion’sborders,andresultinginregionalinstability.Anew ‘hydrologicalsecuritycomplex’maydevelopintheMiddleEastaswaterdependencyrelationships, particularlyforIsrael,maybecomenewsourcesoftensioninanalreadyvolatileregion.North,East andWestAfricawillallbebadlyaffectedbywaterstress,placingadditionalstrainonsomeweakand failingstatesandpossiblycausingpopulationmovementsacrosstheSaharaandintoSouthernEurope asaresult. TheUKitselfwillalsobeaffected,inareassuchasEastAngliathatwillbepronetostormsurgesand floods.Importantmilitaryassets,suchasnavalandRAFbases,mayalsobeatrisk,asmightoverseas assetssuchasthesupplyandlogisticsbaseatDiegoGarciaintheIndianOcean. Climatechange,inshort,islikelytoaccentuateanumberofexistingproblemsonthesecurityagenda, andaddnewdifficultiestothosealreadypresent.Asasecurityissue,itmayquicklycometodwarfthe issueofterrorism. iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam OurfourthdriverofchangeispoliticalIslam,whichwedefinehereasapoliticalmovementusing religionforcoverratherthanasareligiousmovementengagedinpolitics.Thismovement,inits extremeforms,dividestheworldintocategoriesofgood(thosewhobelieveintheIslamists’ interpretationofIslam)andevil(countriessuchastheUK,theUSandFrance).Thepolitical programmeofgroupsthatsubscribetothisideologytendstobebasedonaccusationsofthe manipulationoftheMuslimworldbyboththesecountriesdirectlyandbytheapostaterulerstheyare saidtoimposeonpredominantlyMuslimcountries.TheIslamists’objectivesthereforefocusonthe removalofsuchapostaterulers,theendingofmaligninterferenceintheaffairsoftheMuslimworld, andeven,forsome,ontheoverthrowoftheentiresystemofliberaldemocracyintheWest. ThesemovementsmakeappealstothegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandtothoseinterested inpossibleconversiontotheIslamists’versionofIslam,andmayconnectwithconcernsoversocial exclusion,IslamophobiaandidentitycrisesexperiencedbysomesecondandthirdgenerationMuslims livingintheWest.Wearguethatunderlyingradicalisationprocessesarenotwellunderstoodand policyresponsesasyet,arenothighlynuancedandwelltargeted. v)Socio-economicvulnerability Theissueofsocio-economicvulnerability,ourfifthdriver,isrisingupthesecurityagenda,partlyasa consequenceofchangestoUKbusinesspractices(movingtoleanproduction,reducedinventories, justintimedelivery),partlyasaresultofstretchedglobalsupplychainsandpartlyasaconsequence ofsomechangestoourowndomesticinfrastructure.Theresultistheemergenceofamoretightly coupledsociety,increasinglyreliantonacriticalinfrastructurethathaslittlesparecapacity.This exposestheUKtopossiblesevereconsequencesintheeventoffailuresininfrastructurebrought aboutbyterrorism,accidentorsevereweatherincident,asthefloodsofsummer2007madeclear. Changesinownershipandcontrolstructuresinrelationtoinfrastructurealsocreategovernance challenges(around80percentofimportantUKinfrastructureisownedbytheprivatesector). Conclusions:wheredoesallthisleaveus? First,thelandscapedescribedisoneinwhichthepowertocontrolthesecurityenvironmentisslipping

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beyondthereachofgovernmentsactingalone.Thisistrueatthegloballevelonissueslike climatechangeandthegrowthofungovernedspaces,anditistrueathomeonissueslike protectionofacriticalnationalinfrastructurethattheGovernmentnolongerowns. Second,andconsistentwiththisdevelopment,weincreasinglyliveinaworldofshareddestinies inwhichthegrievance,policyfailureorinsecurityofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityand policyproblemofothers.Inthiscontextsecuritymustbecommontoallorisunlikelytobe deliveredforany. Third,andgiventheabove,itisclearthatthecorechallengeofsecuritypolicytodayisto enhanceandextendourmechanismsofgovernancesuchthattheybettermapontoandreflect thecurrentrealitiesofglobalpowerandbetteraddressthesecurityconcernsofall.

Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape Belowweaddresstheimplicationsthatflowfromthisanalysis. Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy Weneedtobroadentheterraincurrentlyclassifiedasrelevanttosecuritypolicy.Aconcernwith defendingtheUKagainstexternalmilitaryattackisstillimportantbutmustnowbenestedwithin concernformoreissues,morethreatsandrisks,awiderrangeofactors,andalsomanymorelevels ofanalysis(fromtheglobaltothelocal).Itisalsoarguedthatoldnotionsofthesecurityfront linenolongerworkandthatsomefrontlinesnowexistoverseasinplaceslikeAfghanistan,while somealsoexistatthelocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Manyfrontlinesinvolvethemilitary, butothersinvolveeconomicactors,communitygroups,andprivatesectorbusinessestoo.Thenew terrainofsecuritypolicyisthereforemorediverseandcomplexthantheold. Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach Arethinkinoverallstrategicapproachisalsorequired.Itisnotjustthatpowerisbeingdiffused morewidelyandthattherangeofchallengesisbecomingbroaderandmorecomplex,butthatthe requirementsofprojectinginfluenceinthesecircumstanceshavechangedtoo. BelowwesummarisefiveprinciplesthatunderpinUKpolicyresponsesinthesecircumstances:

• Principle1:Adoptthenotionofintegratedpower,thatis,amoreintegrateduseofawider rangeofpolicyinstruments,frommilitaryandpolicinginstrumentsatoneendofthe spectrumtoeconomic,socialandculturalpolicyinstrumentsattheother.

• Principle2:Workinpartnershipwithothers,notjustatmultilaterallevelbutalsobetween differentactorswithinthesamestateandbetweenstateactorsandactorsfromtheprivate andvoluntarysector.Inanerainwhichpowerisbeingdiffusedacrossawiderrangeofactors, influencewillbemaximisedbythoseabletoorchestrateandfacilitateawidelydistributed response.

• Principle3:Committolegitimacyofaction.Partnershiprequiresanagreedobjectiveand visionacrossmanyactors.Thisitselfcanonlybebuiltonawidelyperceivedbasisof legitimacy.Althoughitisnotalwayseasytoachievewidespreadagreement,itisworththe effortaslegitimacyactsasaninfluencemultiplier,turningpotentialinfluenceinthesecurity environmentintoactualinfluenceasmanymoreactorspullinthesamedirection.

• Principle4:Movetomoreopenpolicymaking. Legitimacyisaboutprocess,notjustsubstance. Itcanonlybedemonstratedifallactorsfeelagenda-settingapproachesanddecision-making processesareopen.Officialactorsandmultilateralpartnersmustthereforelooktosharemore informationandtoopenupdecision-makingprocessesiftheywanttobeeffectiveincurrent circumstances.

• Principle5:Beopentoinstitutionalreform.Giventheneedtothinkdifferentlyabouthowto influencethesecurityenvironment,acommitmenttoinstitutionalreformwillbeessential.Old institutionaloperatingproceduresandboundariesshouldnotbeallowedtostiflenecessary innovation.

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Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy Anumberofapparentlypressingpolicyquestionscanbeidentifiedgiventheprecedinganalysisofthe securityenvironment.Onesetisrelatedtoanticipatoryactiononthesourcesoffuturepossible threatsandrisks,andanotherisrelatedtoareasofcurrentvulnerability. Anticipatoryquestionsfocuson: • Howbesttoreformkeyinternationalinstitutionsandhowbesttostrengthenarules-based internationalorder

•Thelinkagesbetweenclimatechangeandotherelementsofthesecurityagenda,bothathome andabroad

• Thestepsthatmightbenecessarytostrengthenthenuclearnon-proliferationregime • Thelinksbetweennationalenergystrategyandinternationalsecurity,includingonsecurityof energysupply,andthesecurityissuesthatmayberaisedbyaninternationalexpansionincivil nuclearpower

• TherequirementsofapoliticalstrategytodefeatthechallengeofpoliticalIslam • Howbesttotacklethepovertyandinequalitythatarekeyfactorsinmanyfailedandweakstates andinmuchconflictandinstabilityinthedevelopingworld

• Howbesttoenhanceourcapacitiesforconflictpreventionandpost-conflictinterventionin failedandfailingstatesandconflictzones

• Howbesttoprepareforthedangerofanewdiseasepandemic. Questionsoncurrentvulnerabilitiesfocuson: •HowbesttoreducetheUK’ssocio-economicvulnerabilityandtobuildnationalandlocal resilience

• Howbesttointegratepolicyinstrumentsinthefightagainsttransnationalorganisedcrime • Thesecurityofstrategictraderoutes • Thesecurityofglobalstocksoffissilematerial. Byidentifyingsuchawiderangeofquestions,thepaperhopestoframesomeoftheforwarddebate onthedevelopmentoftheUK’sfirstnationalsecuritystrategy.

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1.Introduction OverthelasttwentyyearstheUKandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthaschangeddramatically. TheendoftheColdWarandthehorrificattacksof9/11arebuttwodevelopmentsamongmanythat havesignalledthearrivalofanew21stcenturylandscape.Newprocessesanddrivers,from globalisationtoclimatechange,andfromthegrowthofpoliticalIslamtoamoreinfrastructure-reliant societyhavecometotheforeandnowchallengebothoutdatedanalyticalframeworksandoldpolicy prescriptions.Poweritselfisonthemove,beingdiffusedmorewidelywithinandamongthe communityofstatesandouttoawidergroupofactorsincludingprivatebusinesses,terroristgroups andorganisedcrimenetworks.Inthedevelopingworld,interactivecyclesofpoverty,conflictand instabilityareplaguingmanyareas,creatingungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspaceswhichinturn becomesafehavensforthosewhowoulddousharm.Thescaleofunderlyingchangeishuge,andthe consequencesbecomingmoreandmoreapparent. Policymakersareworkinghardtoadaptandtokeepupwiththepaceofchangebutthedifficulties presentedaresignificantandtheprogressuneven.Asaresult,whilemanyoftheeffortsalready underwayaretobecommended,andtheGovernment’scommitmenttothedevelopmentand publicationofaUKnationalsecuritystrategyfortheveryfirsttimeistobewelcomed,now,more thaneverbefore,theneedforconstructiveexternalchallengeisgreat. TheipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,whichhasnowmetseveraltimesunder theco-chairmanshipofLordRobertsonofPortEllenandLordAshdownofNorton-sub-Hamdon,has beensetuppreciselytoprovidesuchchallengethroughthedevelopmentofanindependently arrived-atnationalsecuritystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.

Purposeofthispaper Inthisipprdiscussionpaper,whichisasubmissiontotheCommissionfromtheDeputyChairand CommissionSecretaryandnotanexpressionoftheviewsoftheCommissionitself,wecapture someoftheemergingthemesfromtheCommission’searlydeliberations.Indoingso,wetakestockof thechangesoccurringandofferanaccountofthemanychallengestheynowpresent.Wealsoassess theimplicationsofchangebothforthescopeofsecuritypolicyitselfandforthestrategicpriorities thatmaynowneedtobeaddressed.Assuch,thisisnotsomuchapaperexpressingviewsonwhat theUK’snationalsecuritystrategyshouldnowbe,asapaperanalysingthecontextwithinwhichthe UK’snationalsecuritystrategyoughtnowtobeforged.

Structureofthepaper Thematerialthatfollowscomesintwomainparts.InPart2 wepresentanaccountofcontemporary securityconditions.Weaddressshiftsintheglobaldistributionofpower,issuesrelatedtoterrorism, thechangingroleofbothstateandnon-stateactors,andsecurityrelevantfeaturesofeconomic interdependence.Wealsoexaminethelinkagesbetweenglobalpoverty,inequalityandconflictand thenationalsecurityimplicationsofaworldincreasinglythreatenedbyclimatechange. Inthispartofthepaper,ourobjectiveistoshowthattherangeandcharacteroftoday’ssecurity challengesincludesbutgoesbeyondatraditionalconcernforthemilitarydefenceofourhome territory.Indescribingamuchwiderlandscape,werelocatethedebateonsecuritypolicytonewand differentterrainandprovide,intheprocess,thebasisformuchneededreflectiononhowwemight changestrategyandpolicyinresponse. Thisisfollowed,inPart3,withamoredetailedassessmentoftheimplicationsoftheanalysis presented.Weofferanewaccountoftheterrainofsecuritypolicy,whichopensupthefieldtomany moreactors,issuesandlevelsofanalysisthancanbecapturedbyamoretraditionalapproach.A concernwithglobalpoverty,withcriticalinfrastructureprotectionandwithdomesticpublicsafety frompandemicdiseasesandnaturaldisastersisadded,forexample,tomoretraditionalmilitaryand diplomaticconcerns.Nextwesetoutourthoughtsonthecharacteroftheoverallstrategicresponse requiredinthenewcircumstances,beforegoingontoidentifysomeofthekeyquestionstowhichwe believeanyforward-lookingnationalsecuritystrategymustnowbesensitive.

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Emergingthemes Threethemesemergeasthepaperdevelops.Thefirstisthatweneedtorethinkournotionofwhat doesanddoesnotconstitutethefrontlineinthebattleforsecurity.Indeed,ifthereisoneprimary distinguishingfeatureofthenewenvironmentfromtheolditisthattraditionalnotionsofasecurity frontlinenolongerapply.Todaywefacemultiplefrontlines,acrossamuchwiderrangeofissuesand threats,someoutsideofourownterritoryattheothersideoftheworldoratgloballevel,andothers downatlocalcommunitylevelhereathome.Thehighlycomplextaskofasecuritystrategyinthis environmentistodirectactivityinacoherentwayacrossallissues,frontsandlevelsofactionatthe sametime. Second,thepaperarguesthatpublicauthoritiesatalllevelsfromthelocaltotheglobalarefindingit hardertomaintainsufficientcontrolovertherapidlychangingsecurityenvironment.Poweriseither slipping,orinsomecaseshasalreadyslipped,beyondthem.Thekeychallengeofthetimes,therefore, relatestohowbesttostrengthenourgovernancemechanismssuchthattheyarebetterableto maintainand,wherenecessary,regaincontroloverthatenvironmentatalllevels. Third,thepaperspellsouttheneedforcommonsecurity,oraneedtobeinterestednotjustinour ownsecuritybutalsointhesecurityofothers.Thisneedisnotaltruisticbutgroundedinabeliefthat wenowliveinaworldofgenuinelyshareddestiniesinwhichthegrievance,insecurityorpolicyfailure ofonequicklybecomestheinsecurityandpolicyproblemofothers.Inthiscontext,acollaborative approachtosecuritypolicy,builtonawiderandmoreeffectivelyintegratedrangeofpolicy instrumentsbutalsodrawingintheeffortsofawidelydistributedrangeofactors,islikelytobethe keytosuccess.Here,thestressisonnationalgovernments,internationalorganisations,regional bodies,NGOs,communitygroups,localauthoritiesandindividualcitizensneedingtopulltogetherto deliverthedesiredoutcomesinacollaborativeprocess.Governmentsnolongersimplydelivernational securityto,oronbehalfoftherestofusinthisenvironment,butmustalsofacilitate,coordinateand orchestratetheactivitiesofmanyotheractorsthatarenowrelevanttopolicysuccess.Toputit anotherway,wearguethatanincreaseinthesocialdepthofsecuritypolicycancontributetoits ultimatereachandeffectiveness.

TheCommissiongoingforward Theideaspresentedinthispaperareaworkinprogressandtheintentioninpublishingistostimulate, andtofocus,furtherdiscussion.Theviewsexpressedhere,toreiterate,capturetheflavourand characterofsomeoftheCommission’searlydeliberationsbutaretheviewsoftheauthorsonlyand nottheviewsoftheCommissionitself.TheCommissionwillpublishaninterimreportlaterin2008 andafinalreportin2009,settingoutitsviewsandofferinganindependentlydevelopednational securitystrategyfortheUnitedKingdom.

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2.Driversandeffectsofachangedstrategiclandscape Inthispartofthepaperwepresentouraccountofthekeydriversofthecontemporarysecurity environment.Wedothisthroughatreatmentoffivecorethemes.Theseare: i) Globalisationandpowerdiffusion ii) Povertyandfailingstates iii)Climatechange iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam v)Socio-economicvulnerability. Webelievethatindividually,eachofthesecapturesbothanimportantdriverofchangeandan importantsetofeffectsandthatwhentakentogethertheyamounttoavaluableframeworkfor thinkingaboutthesecurityenvironmentasawhole.Inthematerialthatfollows,thethemeof globalisationandpowerdiffusionisdealtwithatgreaterlengththaneachoftheothers(primarilyasa resultofitscomplexity),butall,inourview,haveequalsignificance.

i)Globalisationandpowerdiffusion Akeyfeatureofthesecuritylandscapetodayisanongoingprocessofpowerdiffusion.1 Power diffusionisoccurringlargelyasaconsequenceofglobalisationandfundamentallyislinkedtosomeof globalisation’sunderlyingfeatures,namelytechnologyadvanceanddispersal,improved communications,andreducedtransportationcosts.Itisvisibleinseveralrespects: • First,andperhapsmostobviously,itisvisibleinarelativeredistributionofpowerwithinand acrossthecommunityofstates. • Second,itisreflectedintheincreasedimportanceofarangeofnon-stateactorssuchasglobal businesses,terroristgroups,transnationalcriminalnetworksandsometransnationalpolitical movements. • Third,itisevidentintheunplannedgrowthofpower-sharingbetweenstates,suchthatthe securityofonenowoftendependsondecisionstakeninandbyothers.(KeohaneandNye1973) Wedealwitheachoftheseinturnbelow. Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstates Powerdiffusionwithinandacrossthecommunityofstatesrelatesfirsttoarelativeredistributionof powerfromtheAtlanticseaboardtoAsiaandthePacific.Thisisnot,intheshorttermatleast,about asignificantshiftinthemilitarybalance:giventhedemiseoftheSovietUnion,noonestateoreven collectionofstateswillrivalthemilitarypoweroftheUnitedStatesintheimmediatefuture.This dimensionofpowerdiffusionis,rather,economicsledandissignalledprincipallybytheriseofChina andIndia. China’sincreasedpowerisaproductoftworelateddevelopments.Thefirstisitssustainedandrapid economicgrowthwhich,overthelast20years,hasaveragedanannualrateofjustbelow9percent,a figurecomparabletoJapan’saverage10percentannualgrowthrateduringitsboomyearsof1955to 1972.China’sGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)isnow,asaconsequence,theworld’sfourthlargest behindthetheUnitedStates,Japan,andGermany.2 Second,China’sincreasingeconomicpowerisa functionofitshugeforeigncurrencyreserveswhichhavebeenbuiltonthebackofitsseemingly endlesssupplyoflow-costlabour,aconsequentriseinitsmanufacturingsector,andtheunprecedented 1.Bypowerinthiscontext,wemeantheresourcesandcapacitiesthatmaypotentiallybeusedto achieveinfluenceoverthesecurityenvironment.Inthissectionofthepaper,wediscusstherelative distributionofsuchresourcesandcapacitiesamongactorsintheinternationalsystem.InSection3we returntotheissueofwhichresourcesandcapacitiesarethoughtmostimportantincurrent circumstances,andtohowtheymightbestbecombinedformaximumeffect. 2.ThoughinGDPpercapitaterms,in2006,itlaggedbehindLebanon,KazakhstanandArmenia.All figuresbasedonUSBureauofLaborStatisticsandHumanDevelopmentReport,2006.

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tradesurplusesthathavefollowed.China’sforeigncurrencyreservessoaredpastUS$1trillioninearly 2007andkeptracinguptomorethan$1.3trillionbythemiddleoftheyear.Reservesofthisscale effectivelygivetheChinesegovernmentthepowertodumpdollarsonworldmarkets,forcingacrashin thevalueofthedollarandpotentiallyputtingtheUSandglobaleconomyintorecession.3 India,foritspart,isalsoenjoyinganenhancedpowerpositionbasedonitsownrecentrapideconomic growthandonitspotentialtosustainahighgrowthratefarintothefutureduetoitsmassiveand youngpopulation.CurrentprojectionshaveIndia’seconomysurpassingBritain’sby2020andthenow famousGoldmanSachsBRICanalysispredictsthatby2050itspercapitaGDPwillhavemultiplied35 times(GoldmanSachs2003). Theseareprofounddevelopments,thoughitisalsoimportanttosoundanoteofcaution.Despite currenteconomictrendsinbothChinaandIndia,thecontinuedriseofbothcannotandshouldnotbe takenforgranted.Eachcountryhasenormouschallenges.Chinamustcontinuetogrowtoliftits massesoutofpoverty,hastodealwithpervasiveenvironmentalproblems,andmustanswer fundamentalquestionsaboutthesustainabilityofCommunistPartyruleinthelongterm.Indiatoo, hasamassivetasktoimprovethelotofitspoor,hassignificantweaknessesinitseducationsystem(it hasaliteracyrateofonly60percent)andhighHIV/AIDSprevalenceincertainstates.BothChina andIndia,moreover,mustnavigatedifficultsecuritychallenges,ChinainrelationtoTaiwan,andIndia initsdisputewithPakistanoverKashmir. Thatsaid,evenonthebasisofthegrowthachievedtodate,itisalreadypossibletodiscerntwo geopoliticalconsequencesoftheriseofChinaandIndia. First,itispossibletoseetheriseofbothasstimulatingashiftingreatpowerrivalryfromthelargely Europeanstageinthelastcentury,totheglobalstageinthisone.Perhapstheclearestsignofthis wastherecentandcontroversialnucleardealbetweentheBushadministrationandtheIndian government.ThisdealeffectivelycondonedIndiandevelopmentanduseofarangeofnuclear technologiesoutsideofafullinternationalinspectionregimeandwasrightlycriticisedbymanyfor potentiallydealingaseriousblowtothenuclearnon-proliferationregime.Ithasbeenjustifiedbyits supportershoweverasadealdesignedtodrawIndiaclosertotheWest,helpingtobalancetheriseof Chinesepowerintheprocess. Second,whateverthefutureholdsforChinaandIndia,bothalreadynowholdpivotalpositionsin relationtoissuessuchasclimatechangewhich,aswillbeoutlinedlater,isanincreasinglysignificant driveroftheinternationalsecuritylandscape.ChinasurpassedtheUSastheworld’slargestemitterof greenhousegasesin2007anditisnoexaggerationtosaythatwithoutthecooperationofbothChina andIndia,asuccessfulresponsetothechallengeofclimatechangecannotbefound.Werewealready tobewitnessingthehighpointofChinaandIndia’srelativeriseatthispoint,therefore,theworld wouldstillbeaprofoundlychangedplace,whateveronepredictsforeachoftheminfuture. BeyondtheriseofChinaandIndia,afurtherbutrelatedsetofdevelopmentsdrivinganew distributionofpoweramongthecommunityofstatesconcernsenergy.Anewcadreofpotentially powerfulenergystatesandregionsisemergingonthebackofongoingchangesintheinternational energyorder.Ontheonehand,asChinaandIndiahavegrown,theyhavebecomemajorconsumers ofenergyandthishashadasignificanttighteningeffectonworldenergymarkets,drivingupprices, raisingthespectreofincreasedcompetitionandevenconflictoverscarceenergyresourcesinthe decadesahead,andplacingrenewedemphasisontheissueofenergysecurity. Ontheotherhand,theRussianeconomy,onthebackofitsextensivenaturalenergyresources,has beenonemajorbeneficiaryofthis,suchthatitisnowenjoyingannualGDPgrowthat7percent, currencyreservesupmorethan600percentinfouryears,exportsup,andinflationdown.Russia,as

3.Thiswouldbeunlikely,however,becauseChina’smanufacturingbaseistiedtoconsumerdemandin WesterneconomiesandbecausetheChineseCommunistParty’sgriponpowerisdependenton continuedeconomicgrowthandrisinglivingstandardsforthemorethan400millionChineselivingin realpoverty(foranaccountofthisseeHutton2007).

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severalrecenteventshaveshown,isnotaversetoflexingitspoliticalandmilitarymusclesagainstthis newsituation.Forexample,ithastemporarilycutoffgassuppliestoUkraineandresumedlong-range strategicbomberpatrols.Otherstatesandregionstooareincreasinginimportanceasenergymarkets change,theCaspianSearegion,theformerSovietstatesofcentralAsia,Iran,Qatar,Nigeriaand Venezuelaamongthem.Thisallcreatesnewcentresofpowerintheinternationalsystem,new potentialflashpointsbetweenstatesinneedofenergysupplies,andnewareasofstrategicinterest andsignificanceforallthemajorpowers. Third,intermsoftheissueswehighlightasdriversofpowerdiffusionamongthecommunityof states,wecometothespreadofnuclearweaponstechnology.EventhoughIsraeldevelopeditsown nuclearcapabilityoutsidethenuclearnon-proliferationregime,thisregimeremainedrelativelystable untilthelate1990s,withthefivedeclarednuclearpowers(theUS,Britain,Russia,ChinaandFrance) largelymaintainingamonopolyovernuclearweaponscapabilitiesuptothatpoint. Thelastdecade,however,haswitnessedadisturbingtrendtowardswiderstateproliferation.Indiaand Pakistaneachconductedaseriesofnuclearweaponstestsin1998,bringingthetotalof acknowledgednuclearweaponsstatestoseven.NorthKorearesumedthereprocessingofplutonium in2002atafacilitythathadbeenunderInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)inspectionsince 1994.TheNorthKoreans,whowerepreviouslybelievedtohavedevelopedenoughnuclearfuelto maketwobombs,nowpossessenoughmaterialtoconstructtwobombsperyear.In2006,moreover, NorthKoreaconductedalow-yieldnucleartest,becomingtheeighthacknowledgedmemberofthe nuclearclub,althoughithasnowonceagainsuspendedreprocessingactivityatitsYongbyonnuclear reactor.InIran,meanwhile,thegovernmentisbelievedtobepursuinganuclearweaponsprogramme, eventhoughitmaintainsthatitseffortsarepurelyintendedtoproducepeacefulnuclearenergy. Westernintelligenceagenciesandindependentanalystsbelievethatonitscurrentcourse,Iranisfrom twototenyearsawayfromobtaininganuclearweapon. ThesedevelopmentshavespurredatleastanotherelevencountriestohedgeagainstanIranianbomb andtoseekassistancefromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)todeveloptheirown nuclearenergyprograms.Egypt,Turkey,andSaudiArabia,allSunniMuslimcountriesfearfulthat masteryofnucleartechnologybyShiaIrancouldentrenchtheIslamicRepublicasaregional hegemonicpower,areleadingthisnewwaveofnucleardevelopment.Turkeyhaspledgedtobuild threenewreactors,Egyptfour,andSaudiArabiahaspushedthefiveothermembersoftheGulf CooperationCounciltopursuenucleartechnology(CirincioneandLeventner2007).Ifcurrenttrends arenotreversed,by2015theperpetuallyvolatileMiddleEastcouldhavetwonuclear-weaponsstates (IsraelandIran)andadozenothercountrieswithscoresofnuclearreactorsrequiringlargeamountsof nuclearfuel.Theseareprofoundshiftsaffectingthestabilityofanalreadytroubledregion. Evenmorefundamentally,however,theproliferationofnucleartechnologiesandweaponsrepresents asignificantadditionalmodificationtothewiderrelativedistributionofpoweramongstatesinthe internationalsystem.Whenseenincombinationwiththeotherchangesdescribedinthissection,this representsashifttoanewandpotentiallyfarlessstableeraofinter-staterelationsandalso, importantly,tooneinwhicharangeofinternationalinstitutionsandregimesfromtheUNSecurity CounciltotheNuclearNon-ProliferationTreatynolongerappeartoreflectorcapturetherealitiesof globalpower. Powerdiffusiontonon-stateactors Thesecondevidentdimensionofpowerdiffusionthatweobserveisthatinvolvingarelativediffusion ofpowerfromstatetonon-stateactors.Someofthisdiffusionhasbeendrivenbystatesthemselves throughuseofprivatemilitaryfirms.Muchofit,however,hasoccurredinspiteof,andnotbecauseof theviewsanddecisionsofstates.Terroristgroups,groupsengagedintransnationalorganisedcrime, andsometransnationalpoliticalmovements,particularlyintheMiddleEast,haveallbeenvisible beneficiariesofthiswiderprocessinrecentyears.Inthissection,wefocusprimarilyonthislatter groupofactors,believingtheyareofmoreimmediateandpressingsecurityconcern. Totaketerroristgroupsfirst,thesehaveobviouslybeenofincreasedsignificancesince9/11,thepoint

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atwhichanewformof‘super-terrorism’tookcentrestageininternationalaffairs(Freedman2002). Theyarealong-termandstructuralchallenge,however,whatevertheirideologicalorientation,fortwo underlyingreasons. Thefirstconcernstheirincreasinglydestructivenatureandpotential.Thisisevidencedbythefactthat thelevelofviolenceinactsofterrorismhasbeenincreasinginrecentdecades.Thebombingofthe WorldTradeCenteron26February1993tooksixlivesandinjured1,000.HugebombsattheUS embassiesinKenyaandTanzaniainAugust1998killed220andwounded4,000betweenthem.The eventsof11September2001saw2,986peoplelosetheirlivesasthreeairlinersflewintothe PentagoninWashingtonandbothtowersoftheWorldTradeCenterinNewYork. Thetrend,therefore,isclear.Itmaynotbesmoothandannualdeathtollsfromterrorismarenot goingupatanevenrateyearonyear,buttherecordnowstandsatnearly3,000deathsforasingle terroristoperationcarriedoutonasingleday.Inthiscontext,PlutaandZimmermanwererightto recentlyconcludethat‘fewpsychologicalbarrierstotruemass-casualtyterrorismremain’(Plutaand Zimmerman2006:66).Intermsoffuturepotential,moreover,thekeyworryisthatterroristgroups willgainaccesstoweaponsofmassdestructionandtoanuclearweaponinparticular.Some,suchas RobinFrostinarecentAdelphipaper,havedismissedthisasanunrealisticpossibility,arguingthat ‘theriskofnuclearterrorism,especiallytruenuclearterrorismemployingbombspoweredbynuclear fission,isoverstated’(Frost2005:7).Butthisseemsanextraordinarilycomplacentpositiontotake whenoneconsidersthewidercontext. First,weknowthatsometerroristgroupshaveaclearintenttoaccessweaponsofmassdestruction, includingnuclearweaponsandmaterials,ifatallpossible.ThisiscertainlytrueofAlQaeda.Drawing oninsideexperienceandseniorintelligencesources,formerUSAssistantSecretaryofDefenceGraham AllisonnotesthatOsamaBinLadentriedtoacquireHighlyEnrichedUranium(HEU)fromSouthAfrica asearlyas1992andalsothatBinLadenandotherseniorAlQaedarepresentativesmetwithsenior figuresfromthePakistaninuclearweaponsprogrammein2001(Allison2006).Materialsdiscoveredin AlQaedasafehousesinAfghanistan,moreover,showthatAlQaedaofficialsspenttimeresearching theprocessesrequiredtobuildanuclearweaponandalsounderstoodthepossibleshortcutsthat couldbetakeninbuildingacrudenucleardevice.OthergroupsbeyondAlQaeda,suchasJaish-eMohammed(JEM),agroupfocusedontheKashmirconflictbutwithreportedlinkstothePakistani establishment,andHezbollah,withitscloselinkstoIran,cannotberuledoutasorganisationsalso seekingthenuclearoption. Ifdemandforthisoptionexiststhensotoo,worryingly,doespotentialsupply.Thedangerherecomes intwoforms,namelythatterroristgroupswillillegallyacquireeitheraready-madenuclearweapon,a so-called‘loosenuke’,orthefissilematerialrequiredtomakeone.Controversyhasragedontheissue ofloosenukeseversinceAlexanderLebed,theformernationalsecurityadvisertoPresidentYeltsin, confidedtobothpublicandprivateaudiencesintheUnitedStatesin1997thattheRussian governmentcouldnotaccountfor84one-kilotonSovietsuitcasenucleardevices(Allison2006).Since thattime,despitesomeimprovementsinsecurityaroundRussia’snuclearfacilities,onlyjustover50 percentofRussia’snuclearweaponsandmaterialshaveundergoneacomprehensivesecurityupgrade (NuclearThreatInitiative2006). Onthesecondthreat,thatterroristgroupswillgettheirhandsonweaponsgradefissilematerial,the pictureishardlymorereassuring.Toachieveanuclearexplosion,aminimumof15.9kgofHighly EnrichedUraniumor4.1kgofplutoniumisrequired.4 ArecentstrategicdossieronnuclearblackmarketsbytheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,usinghighlyconservativeestimatesdrawn fromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)andtheDatabaseonNuclearSmuggling,Theft andOrphanRadiationSources(DSTO)statedbaldlythat:‘ThetotalamountofHEUandplutonium seizedinstate-confirmedandotherhighlycredibleincidentsregisteredintheperiod1991-2006is

4.Theseamountsapplyifaberylliumreflectorisusedinthedevice.Withoutsuchareflector,more fissilematerialisneeded.

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roughly38kg’(IISS2007:126).Notallofthis38kgwasweaponsgradematerialbutaround8kgofit was,andthisrepresentsonlytherecoveredamountsofbomb-relevantmaterialfromknown attempts atsmugglinginrecentyears.5 Bydefinition,itdoesnottellustheamountofnuclearmaterialstolen butnotdetectedbylawenforcementagenciesoverthesameperiodandwecannotretrospectively calculatewhatthatamountmightbesincethereisnoglobalinventoryofHEUandplutoniumandit isnotknownexactlyhowmuchplutoniumandHEUhasbeenproducedsince1945(Plutaand Zimmerman2006). Thepointaboutallofthesedevelopmentsisthat,withoutfurthersignificantefforttoaddressthe trendsandchallengesdescribed,theypointtoa21stcenturyinwhichitishighlyunlikelythatstate actorswillretaintheirmonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforce. Aseconddevelopmentthatisenhancingtherelativepowerofterroristgroupsresidesinthe advantagesnowbeingbestoweduponthembydigitaltechnologyandcommunications.Thesehave amplifiedthevoice,extendedtheorganisationalreach,andenhancedthelawenforcementevasion capabilitiesofterroristgroups.Satellitecommunicationshavealsoshrunkdistanceandmadeitmuch easierforterroristgroupstobothmakeandsustaincross-borderconnections.TheInternethas becomeakeyplacefortherecruitment,radicalisationandmobilisationofmanyyoungextremistsand, forthoseseekingtomaketheswitchfromextremismtooperationalterrorism,akeyknowledgesharingtoolandaidforattack-coordinationandplanning(Ryan2007).Strongencryptiontools, meanwhile,availablemorecheaplyandeasilythaneverbefore,arefacilitatingterroristuseofsuch communicationschannelsinasecureandsecretenvironment(MinistryofDefence2007).Thislast developmentinparticularrepresentsasignificantshiftinrelativepowerfromstatetonon-stateactors since,onlythreedecadesago,strongencryptiontoolsrequiredsuchparticularfinancialand computingresourcesthattheyeffectivelyremainedthepreserveofstates. Turningtoorganisedcrimenetworks,thesetooarebecomingmoreprominentandthreatening. Increasingly,theyareoperatingacrossbordersbecausedecliningtransportcosts,improvedglobal communicationsandtheincreasedcross-borderflowsofbothpeopleandgoodsmakesthisfareasier thaneverbefore.Thesheerscaleofcriminalactivityisalsoincreasing,partlybecauseoftheextended geographicalreachofthecriminalnetworksthemselves,partlybecauseforsome,particularlyinthe developingworld,criminalactivityisseenasonepotentialrouteoutofpovertyandpartlybecausein somepatrimonialstatesthereisnowanattitudethatnationalresourcesaretheretobeexploitedfor thebenefitofthecorruptfewinpower.Consequently,theUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneral’sHigh LevelPanelonThreats,ChallengesandChangesrightlyidentified,inareportin2004,transnational organisedcrimeasoneofthemajorsecuritychallengesfacingtheworld(UnitedNations2004). Theillicitdrugstradeisthemostlucrativeoftheactivitiesunderway(accordingtotheUnitedNations OfficeonDrugsandCrime,theoverallturnoveroftheworldwideillicittradeindrugsalonenow standsataround$300bnannually[UNODC2006]),thoughthevarietyofcriminalactivitiesisalso widening.AstheUN’sAntonioMazzitellirecentlypointedout,‘criminalactivitiessuchastraffickingin people,stolenvehicles,naturalresources,firearmsandcontraband,counterfeitingandintellectual piracy,smugglingofmigrants,andcybercrimeallfeatureonthemenuofservicesoffered’(Mazzitelli 2007:1074). Launderingofmoneyandcorruptionarethetwofurtheressentialfeaturesofthisactivity,thefirstto allowcriminalstobenefitfromtherevenuesraisedandthesecondtoreducetheriskofcapturebylaw enforcementagenciesandtoincreaseinfluenceoverpoliticaldecisionsincountriesofoperation. Transnationalorganisedcrimethereforeflourishesmostwherestateinstitutionsareopento corruption,whereenforcementoftheruleoflawisweakandwherebordersareporous.Evenmore importantlyfromthepointofviewofunderstandingthecontemporarynationalsecurityenvironment, criminalnetworksnotonlylocatethemselvesinareasthathavesomeofthesecharacteristics,suchas

5.Forweaponspurposes,HEUneedstobeenrichedtoatleast80percentoraboveandmorenormally to90percentorabove.

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inWestAfrica,butdothemselvesalsohavethepotentialtocreateandsustainpariahstates6 which, nomatterwhattheirformalarrangementsofgovernanceare,actuallyserveassafehavensforcriminal gangsandtheiractivities.Thisisaserioussituation,bothbecausethestatesinquestioncan effectivelyspreadinstabilitythroughouttheregionsinwhichtheyarelocatedandbecausethereare alsolinksbetweencriminalnetworksandterroristgroups,withtheformeroftenprovidingmoney launderingandotherfinancialservicestothelatteraswellasassistingintheillicittraffickingofgoods thatmaybeofvaluetothem. Whereasterroristgroupsarechallengingastatemonopolyontheuseofdevastatingforceandare increasingly,therefore,notfindingstatebordersahindrance,transnationalorganisedcrimegroupsare changingtheverycharacterofsomestatesintheinternationalsystem,turningthemintovehiclesfor privateprofitandspreadinginstabilityandmiseryintheprocess. Athirdandfinalsetofnon-stateactorswebelieveitimportanttohighlightarethetransnational politicalmovementsthathavecometoexertimportanceinfluenceoninternationalaffairsinrecent years.OnesuchmovementisHezbollah,aparticularlyimportantorganisationinthecontextofthe contemporaryMiddleEast. Hezbollah,anIslamistpoliticalgroupformedin1982toresistwesterncolonialisminLebanonand acrossthewiderregion,toengageinarmedstruggleagainstIsraelandtoworktowardsthe establishmentofaLebaneseIslamicRepublic,runsschools,hospitalsandmediaservices,andhas implementedmanydevelopmentprogrammesinareasinwhichitisoperational.Itsso-called‘Martyr’s Institute’givesfinancialassistancetothefamiliesofthosewhodieinconflictand,followingtheJuly 2006waragainstIsrael,Hezbollahhasbeenextremelyactiveinthereconstructionprocess,often doingmoreonthisfrontthantheLebanesegovernmentitself.Hezbollah,inotherwords,anddespite thenarrowcoverageofitsactivitiesintheWest,paysmuchattentiontoawiderangeofsocialwelfare activitiesaswellastotheconflictwithIsrael(Salem2006). Inhighlightingthisgroup,thepointwemakeisnot,ofcourse,apoliticaloneinsupportofit. Hezbollahhasanobjectionablepolicyplatformonmanyissuesandislessthanfullyconstructivein relationtobringingpeaceandstabilitytotheMiddleEast.Thepointwemake,rather,istheanalytical onethatinconditionsofconflictandweak,absentorineffectualstateinstitutions,transnational politicalmovementssuchasHezbollahcananddoemergetofillthevacuumandtoplaysignificant rolesintheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Theyalsooftendosoonthebasisofacarefully cultivated,deep-rootedandoftenlong-termrelationshipoflegitimacywiththepopulationsthey claimtorepresent.Sometransnationalpoliticalactorswithsocialpower,inotherwords,havebecome seriousplayersininternationalpolitics.Whiletheymighthavestatebackers(inthiscaseSyriaand Iran)theyarenotentirelyinthepocketsoftheirbenefactors.Assuch,theycannoteasilybebypassedorignoredwhenthinkingaboutpolicyresponsesand,inthiscase,theyareapopulist challengetothelegitimacyofmanyWest-backedstateactorsintheMiddleEast. Non-stateactorstoday,therefore,enjoyincreasedpowerandinfluencewhethertheyareterrorist groups,transnationalcriminalgangsortransnationalpoliticalmovementsactiveontheinternational stage.Someoftheseactorsareacquiringsomeofthepowerattributesofstates,arealteringthe characterofsomestatesand,farmoreeffectivelythaninthepast,areofteninfluencing,undermining, destabilisingandevenquestioningthelegitimacyofstates.Thisaddsanewsetofdynamicsand challengestotheinternationalsecurityenvironment. Powerdiffusionbeyondstateborders:securityinterdependence Thethirdandfinaldimensionofpowerdiffusionwehighlightrelatestomorepower-sharingbetween statesintheformofincreasedsecurityinterdependence.Thisitselfcomesintwoforms.Thefirst relatestoasetofchallengesthataretrulyglobalinnatureandwhereconsequentlyonlysolutionsof

6.Bypariahstates,wemeanonesthatessentiallybehaveasoutcasts,alienatedfrommostotherstates andacceptednormsofinternationalbehaviour.

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globalreachandwithallthemajorpowersinvolvedwilldo.Climatechangemitigation,orattemptsat effectivecontrolofglobalstocksoffissilematerial,wouldbeemblematicissuesinthiscategory:there isastrongsenseontheseissuesthatthecommunityofstateseithersinksorswimstogether. Thesecondform,however,relatestothespecificthoughdifferentvulnerabilitiespresentedtoeach stateasaby-productofitsowneconomicinterdependencewithtoday’sglobalisedworldeconomy.In thecaseoftheUK,thereareatleastfoursuchvulnerabilities. First,intermsofenergysupplies,theUKisadvancingintoaperiodoflesssecurityofsupplythanit hasexperiencedinrecentdecades,asitmovesfrombeinganetenergyexportertoanetenergy importer.Norwayiscurrentlyourmostimportantenergypartnerasamajorsupplierofbothoiland gas(Norwayaccountedfor75percentofUKoilimportsin2005).However,intheyearsahead Russia,theCaspianSearegion,Nigeria,Algeria,andtheMiddleEast,arealllikelytobecomemore importantsupplierstotheUK.OurkeyEuropeantradingpartners,meanwhile,arealsowitnessing shiftsintheirenergysupplybase.TheInternationalEnergyAgency,forexample,‘predictsthatthe biggestsupplierofgastoEuropein2030willbeAfrica,followedbyRussiaandtheMiddleEast’(Bird 2007:12;IEA2006).Thesechangesincreaseourvulnerabilitytoeventsin,andpressurefrom,awide rangeofsuppliercountries. Second,ourincreasingrelianceontrade(in2006,tradeaccountedfor60percentoftheUK’sGDP) makesthesecurityofkeystrategictraderoutesmoreimportantforbothBritainandtheEUthanever before.Onesuchstrategictraderouteofgrowingimportanceisthealreadymassiveandrapidly expandingmaritimefreightroutelinkingtheeconomiesofAsiatothoseofEurope(seeFinancial Times 2007b).Anysignificantdisruptiontothisorotherroutes,broughtonbymaritimeterrorismor otherevents,couldhavemassiveeconomicconsequencesfortheUKandindeedfortheEUasa whole(seeRichardson2004). Third,transnationalcrimeisamajorsourceofvulnerabilityfortheUK,comingonthebackofthe vastlyincreasedmovementofbothpeopleandgoodsacrossourborders.7 Wecannotandshouldnot ruleoutcollaborationbetweencriminalgangsactiveacrossourbordersandterroristgroupsintenton smugglingharmfulmaterialsintotheUK.Suchcollaborationcouldhaveveryserioussecurity consequences.Thepotentialeconomicimpactofsuchcriminalactivityisalsogreat,however.Tax revenuesattheborder,forexample,currentlyamountto£22billionperannum,oraround5percent ofthetotaltaxtakeofaround£420billion.Inthiscontext,successfullarge-scalecross-borderfraud couldhaveaseriousimpactonthepublicpurse(CabinetOffice2007). Anestimated25-35tonnesofheroin,meanwhile,enterstheUKannuallyalongwith35-45tonnesof cocaineandbothcontributetoadrugsproblemthatisestimatedtocost£15.4billionayearinthe formoflawenforcement,crimeandhealth-relatedcosts(ibid:22).Therearealsosocialvulnerabilities. Activitiessuchasdrugsmugglingimpactdirectlyonourcommunitiesintheformofsocialbreakdown andareducedsenseofpublicsafety. Fourthandlast,givenourpositionasaglobalhubforpeoplemovementinaneraofpeople movementonanunprecedentedscale,theUKisinanexposedpositioninrelationtothreatssuchas aninfluenzapandemicbroughtinfromtheoutside.Apandemicisnowconsideredabiological certainty,theonlyuncertaintiesbeingoverthestraininvolved,theseverityoftheoutcomeandthe timingoftheoutbreak.ManyexpertsbelievethatH5N1birdfluisthestraintoworryaboutandthis, asweknow,cankillhumanbeings(globally,therewere79fatalitiesin2006alone).IfH5N1wereto mutateintoavirusthatcouldbepassednotonlyfrombirdstohumansbutalsodirectlybetween humanbeings,thatwouldbeapotentiallycatastrophicdevelopment.Recentstudieshavesuggested that,‘incontrasttoseasonalinfluenza,whichprimarilyinvolveslunginfection,theH5N1virusmight

7.Thecurrentannualflowofmorethan218millionpassengerjourneysacrossUKbordersisexpectedto increaseto450millionby2030.Totalfreightflowsarealsonowmassive,witharound440milliontonnes offreightflowingacrossourborderseachyear,afigurelikelytoincreaseto580milliontonnesby2030 (CabinetOffice2007).

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bedisseminatedthroughoutthebodyandaffectmultipleorgansthanksinparttoaconditionofthe immunesystemknownasacytokinestorm.Thisisasignificantfindingsincecytokinestormshelpto explainwhythe1918-19pandemicwassodeadly’(Osterholm2007:50).Consequently,inassessing thelikelyoutcomeofapandemic,arecentstudybytheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy (McKibbin2006)foundthat‘wereapandemicassevereasthatof1918-19tooccur,over142million peoplewoulddieandtheworld’sGDPwouldsufferalossofsomeUS$4.4trillion’(McKibbinquoted inOsterholm2007:48). Ourreadinessandlevelofprotectionfromsuchaneventisinadequatebutmorethanthat,itisalso intricatelytiedupwithandreliantuponthepublicandanimalhealthsystemsandfreedomof movementstrategiesadoptedbymanyothercountriesandnotonlyonthestrategiesweputinplace hereintheUK. Infact,inalloftheformsofvulnerabilitydescribedinthissection,thekeypointtonoteisashiftin thepowertoaddresspolicychallengesawayfromtheindividualstatelevelandtowardseitherthe globallevelontheonehand(verticalshift)ortoanotherstate,orgroupofstatesontheother (horizontalshift).Thisappliestoclimatechange,tothesupplyofenergy,tothesecurityofourtrade routes,tolawenforcementactivitiesoverseasonorganisedcrimeandterrorismandtoprecautions takenagainstanewpandemic.Theoutcomeofsecurityinterdependence,inshort,isaworldinwhich thesecurityofonestateanditspeopleismoredependentthaneverbeforeondecisions,actionsand eventsunfoldingelsewhereinothers.

ii)Povertyandfailingstates Ourseconddriverofchangeinthesecuritylandscaperelatestoglobaleconomicconditionsandtoa clutchofissuesaroundwhatismostoftencalledthe‘security-developmentnexus’.Thisisthepoint atwhichglobalpoverty,inequality,violentconflict,andthephenomenonofweakandfailingstates interact,todevastatingeffect. Povertyitselfhasbeenhighontheinternationalagendainrecentyearsthanksinnosmallparttothe Britishgovernmentand,globally,thankstothehighprofilegiventoattemptstomeettheMillenium DevelopmentGoals.Therehavebeensomerealandquantifiablesuccessestoo.Thenumberofpeople livinginabjectpovertyonlessthanUS$1perday,forexample,hasmorethanhalved,fallingfrom 40.1percentoftheworld’spopulationin1981to18.1percentin2004(WorldBank2007).An estimated135millionpeoplewerepulledoutofpovertyintheperiod1999to2004alone.Muchof thiseffort,however,hasbeenconcentratedintheeconomicmiraclesinChinaandotherpartsof rapidlydevelopingEastAsia,ratherthanbeingevenlyspread(Sachsetal 2007).Consequently, accordingtotheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,almost50percentoftheworld’schildren werestilllivinginpovertyin2005.Indeed,theterm‘developingcountry’isstillamisnomerwhen appliedtosomeoftheworld’spoorestcountries,asmorethanthreebillionpeoplearelivingonless thanUS$2aday,withlittleimmediatehopeofmajorimprovement. Thislevelofcontinuedpovertyiscentraltoourargumentsforthreereasons. First,povertyisamajorthreattohumanlife.Inanygivenyearinwhichthereisanabsenceofamajor globalconflict,povertydirectlyaccountsformorelossofhumanlifethanpoliticalviolenceandthisin itselfprovidesapowerfulargumentforthinkingaboutsecurityintermsthatgowellbeyondthe traditionalfocusonexternalmilitaryattack.8 Whilenearly3,000peoplediedintheattacksof9/11, forexample,preventablediseaseinducedbypovertyclaimstentimesthatnumberofchildrenevery day.Bythatmeasure,oureffortstocombatpovertyhavesofarbeenadismalfailureandasaresult, inmoraltermsatleast,thelegitimacyofthecurrentinternationaleconomicordermustbe questionableatbest(Rice2007).

8.Thisisoneofthemajorreasonsforwhichmanyanalystshavecalledfortheadoptionofa‘human security’perspectivewhenthinkingaboutsecuritypolicy,aperspectivethatwesupportandreturnto later.

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Second,povertyonthisscaleisamajorconcernbecauseitisnowagrowingthreattointernational peaceandstability.Thereisadirectrelationshipbetweenacountry’spercapitaGDPandits susceptibilitytocivilconflict.Evidenceshowsthatifacountryranksinthefiftiethpercentileofper capitaGDP,ithasa7.5percentriskofcivilconflict,halfofthelevelforcountriesthatrankinthe tenthpercentile(Collieretal 2004).Povertyisalso,importantly,akeydriverofthephenomenonof weakandfailingstates,itselfagrowingandcorrosiveproblemontheinternationalstage.Weakstates lackthecapacitytopreventviolentconflict,togovernlegitimately,tomeetbasichumanneedsandto fostersustainableandequitableeconomicgrowth(Weinsteinetal 2004).Notallweakstatesarepoor, buttheentiretopteninForeignPolicymagazine’sFailedStateIndexrankinthebottomthirdof statesintermsofpercapitaGDP,andpovertyisclearlyakeyfactorintheseungovernedorbadly governedspaces(ForeignPolicy 2007).Suchspacesthemselvesserveasactiveorpassiveincubators ofinstabilitythatcanspilloverintoneighbouringcountriesandwholeregionsintheformof economicdisruption,refugeeflows,andthespreadofarmedconflictacrossinternationallyrecognised borders. Anelevatedriskofconflictis,infact,oneofthemostsignificanteffectsofweakandfailingstates andthisisnowalsoreflectedinchangingpatternsofconflictaroundtheworld.RatherthantheinterstatewarsthatmarkedmuchofmodernhistorythroughtoWorldWarII,conflictpatternsoverthelast sixtyyearshavebeencharacterisedmorebyintra-stateandcivilconflict.Ninety-fivepercentofall conflictsarenowofthiskind(HumanSecurityCentre2005).Civilconflictslastlonger,moreover,and arehardertoresolvethaninter-statewars,oftenlockingcountriesintoa‘conflicttrap’ofmutually reinforcingpovertyandconflictleadingtoaprocessdescribedbytheWorldBankas‘developmentin reverse’(WorldBank2003). Third,thiscombinationofpovertywithweakandfailingstatesisaconcernbecauseitisnow providingadirectthreattoourownsecurity.PresidentJohnF.Kennedy’sstatement,inhisinaugural addressin1961,that‘ifafreesocietycannothelpthemanywhoarepoor,itcannotsavethefewwho arerich’(Kennedy1961)istruertodaythanitwasnearlyfivedecadesago.Thisisbecauseterrorist groupsandcriminalnetworks,bothofwhichoftenhaveglobalreach,cananddonowtakeadvantage ofweakandfailingstates.EvenwiththousandsofNATOtroopsnowinAfghanistan,thatcountrystill produced87percentoftheworld’sheroinin2005(UNODC2005).Ofcourse,drugshavenotbeen theonlydangerousexportemergingfromthatcountrysinceterroristsusedthesafe-havengrantedby theTalibantosetinmotiontheattacksof9/11.Somalia’stotallackofnationalgovernancehasalso, inrecenttimes,allowedthatcountrytobeusedasaprimarybaseofoperationsandshelterfor terroristsactivethroughoutEastAfrica.Severaloftheindividualssuspectedofinvolvementinthe bombingsofUSembassiesinKenyaandTanzaniain1998,forexample,arebelievedtostillbeatlarge inSomalia(Payne2007). Morality,concernsoverwiderinternationalpeaceandstability,andoverourownphysicalsecurity, therefore,allmakepovertyandtheattendantgrowthofweakandfailingstatesasignificantdriverof thecurrentinternationalsecuritylandscape.Asaresult,fordevelopedandwealthiercountriessuchas theUK,thelong-standingmoralimperativetotackletheissuesinthesecuritydevelopmentnexushas beenjoinedbyanimperativebasedonself-interest.

iii)Climatechangeandresourcescarcity Athirdandmorerecentlyemergeddriverofchangeintheinternationalsecurityenvironmentis climatechange.Thisislikelytohaveamajorshapinginfluenceoninternationalaffairsinthedecades ahead,thoughpreciselyhowandtowhatextentwilldependonthelevelofglobalwarmingthat actuallyoccurs.TheFourthAssessmentReportoftheInternationalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC) producedarangeoffuturetemperaturescenarios,basedonassumptionsaboutpopulationgrowth, patternsofeconomicdevelopment,andthedevelopmentandadoptionofnewenergytechnologies (IPCC2007).Thesescenariosshowbest-estimateprojectionsofaglobalaveragetemperatureincrease thiscenturyintherangeof1.8°Cto4.0°C.Inthematerialthatfollows,webaseourdiscussiononthe likelyimpactofthemid-rangescenario,whichsuggestsabest-estimatetemperatureincreaseof2.8°C duringthecourseofthecenturyandanincreaseinthenexttwodecadesof1.5°Cto2°C.Underthis

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scenario,anumberofdevelopmentsinkeyregionsfromEasttoSouthAsia,theMiddleEastandon throughmuchofAfricawilllikelyimpacttheinternationalsystem. First,theIPCCprojectsthatChina willbeatgreatriskfromclimatechange,particularlycomingunder pressureinrelationtowaterstress,statingthat:‘InpartsofChina,theriseintemperaturesanddecreases inprecipitation,alongwithincreasingwaterusehavecausedwatershortagesthatledtodryingupof lakesandrivers’(IPCC2007:477).China’sownfirstnationalreportonclimatechange,releasedinlate 2006,alsoforetoldacomingfoodproductioncrisis,withasmuchasaone-thirddecreaseofkeycrop yieldsby2030(Li2007).Afurtherworryfortheregimemustalsobethecountry’svulnerabilitytosea levelrise,sincemanyofitshighlypopulatedcitiesaresituatedonthecoast. TheprojectedimpactsofclimatechangeonChinamayplayabigroleinshapingboththecharacter andstabilityofCommunistPartyruleintheyearsahead.Inthelastfewyears,concernsover environmentalissueshaveprovokedthousandsofChinesecitizenstodemonstrateacrossthecountry, andthepotentialimpactsofclimatechangearenowhighinthemindsoftheChinesepeople.A2006 pollconductedinChinabytheChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairsandWorldPublicOpinion.orgfound 80percentofrespondentsagreedthatwithintenyearsglobalwarmingcouldposeanimportant threattotheircountry’s‘vitalinterest’(ChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairs2006).Keyquestionsforthe Chineseleadershipthereforearewhetheritcanmaintainrobusteconomicgrowthwhilerespondingto thesedemandsforenvironmentalimprovementsandwhetheritcandosotosuchadegreeandat suchpaceastoavoidtheneedforrepressivemeasures.Howtheregimehandlesthesechallenges couldhaveaprofoundeffectalargepartofinternationalaffairsinthedecadestocome. Anotherarealikelytobeseriouslyaffectedbyclimatechangeinthenearandmediumtermisthe HimalayanregionofAsia,andthiswilllikelyimpactnearlyallofthesub-continent(IPCC2007). TheHimalayanglaciersarethelargestbodyoficeoutsidethePolaricecaps,occupyingapproximately 500,000km2,andtheyarerecedingatanalarmingrate,farfasterthananyotherglacialareainthe world.UndercurrentIPCCprojections,thereisaveryhighchancetheycoulddisappearaltogetherby 2035andavirtualcertaintythattheywillshrinkbyatleast80percenttocoveronly100,000km2. ThiswillhavetheeffectofdeprivingtheIndus,Ganges,andBrahmaputrariversystemsoftheirmain sourceofwater,likelymakingthoseriversseasonalandbringingmassivechangesinagriculturalfood production,decliningcropyields,andseverewaterstress.Atthesametime,risingsealevelswillalso harmfreshwaterecosystemsinthemany‘mega-deltas’intheregion,furtherstressingagricultureand foodsuppliesdependentonfishing. ItishighlylikelythatthesedevelopmentswillputstressonBangladeshtosuchanextentthatthe widerstabilityofSouthAsiaisthreatened.ThepopulationofBangladeshisexploding(itisprojected tonearlydoubleto250millionby2035)asclimatechangedestroysasignificantportionofthe country’salreadylimitedhabitableland,forcingmanypeopletomoveinlandandtoseekastable environmentwithoutregardtotheregion’smanycontestedborders(Barnett2001).India,whichwill alsofaceclimatestressalthoughnotassevereasitsneighbour’s,isalreadybracingitselfagainsta waveofBangladeshienvironmentalmigrantsbyconstructinganeight-foot-highironfencealongthe 2,100-mileIndia-Bangladeshborder(Joehnk2007). TurningtotheMiddleEast,thealreadycomplexpoliticsofthatregionwillbecomplicatedfurtherby whatsomehavedescribedasanew‘hydrologicalsecuritycomplex’(Schultz1995).TheMiddleEast regionishometo6.3percentoftheworld’spopulationbutonly1.4percentoftheworld’s renewablefreshwater.Thewaterthatisavailable,moreover,isconcentratedinonlyafewcountries, namelyTurkey,Iran,IraqandSyria.Acomplexsetofwaterdependencyrelationshipsthereforeexists andissettogetworse,withIsraelinoneofthemostvulnerablepositionsofallstatesintheregion (Campbelletal 2007).Israelwillhavefewerthan500cubicmetresofwaterpercapitaby2025;1000 cubicmetrespercapitaisconsideredtheminimumreasonableamountforadevelopedcountry (Homer-Dixonetal 1993).Muchofthatmeagrewatersupplyisalsolocatedinpoliticallyfraught territory:onethirdofitintheGolanHeightsandanotherthirdinthemountainaquiferthatunderlies theWestBank.Thiscouldaddfurtherflash-pointstotheIsraeli-SyrianandIsraeli-Palestinian relationshipsandwaterscarcityingeneralcouldbecomeasignificantnewdriveroftensionand

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conflictintheregion(Bitar2005). InAfrica,highertemperaturesandlesserandmoreseasonalrainfallwillalsoplaceupto250million moreAfricansunderseverewaterstressby2020.ThiswillaffectEast,WestandNorthAfrica,the lattersufferingarapidandseveredeclineinpotablewater,possiblybyasmuchas50percentupto 2050.EastAfricawilllikelyseeupto20percentmorewinterraincausingfloodingandsoilerosion, whileatthesametimethesummermonthswillbesignificantlydryerresultinginseveredroughtsand additionalstressonagriculturalregions(Case2006).Agriculturalproductionmakesupnearlyhalfof EastAfrica’sGDPandemploysfouroutofeveryfiveworkersintheregion.Anylossinsovitalan economicsectorcouldhavedevastatingconsequencesontheregion’soveralleconomicandpolitical development(ibid).WestAfrica,foritspart,isalreadysufferingasevereproblemofdesertification: approximately1,350squaremilesofNigerianlandturnstodeserteachyear,uprootingfarmersand herdsmanandcausinginternalmigrationtowardscoastalareas(PodestaandOgden2007).Asa result,by2020,migrationintheregionwillcreateaWestAfricanurbansprawlof50million inhabitantsthatextendsfromAccrainGhanaacrossthebreadthoftheNigerRiverdelta,thougheven thisreliefwillbetemporaryforthoseconcernedsincetheentireareaisalsoatmajorriskfromsea levelrise(McCarthy2006,IPCC2007). ThissetofdevelopmentsinAfrica,insomeoftheworld’spoorestregions,maywelladdfurtherstress totheexistingconditionsofpovertyandconflictdescribedintheprevioussection.Climateevents themselvesarelikelytoclaimhumanlivesonaverysignificantscalebutmigrationflowsarealsolikely tobeafurtherfactoroverwhelmingthecapacityofstateauthoritiestorespondinanumberofareas. ThismaybeaparticularlyacuteprobleminEastAfricawheretheconcentrationofweakorfailing statesisalreadyhighandnumerousunresolvedpoliticaldisputescharacterisetheregion.Inshort, climatechangemaybeasignificantdriveroffurtherstatefailureinAfrica. Movingclosertohome,manyoftheclimatepressuresandimpactsdescribedabovepointto significantinternationalmigratorypressuresanditcannotbeassumedthattheseflowsofpeoplewill staywithintheregionsmostdirectlyaffected.Indeed,itishighlylikelythatsomeoftheseflowsof peoplewillbedirectedattheWestandattheEuropeanUnionandtheUKinparticular.British colonialandfamilytiestoSouthAsia,forexample,meanthatflowsfromBangladeshandthe surroundingareamustbeanticipated.Waterstress,massivepopulationdisplacementandtheongoing mixofconflictandpovertyinAfricawillalsomeanthatSouthernEuropegrowsasanEUentrypoint ofchoiceformanyseekingtoescapethechallengesanddifficultiesoflifeinAfrica.Thiswilllikely presentadditionalchallengestosocialunityintheEU,evenasEUmemberstatesturntomigrant labourasaresponsetotheirowndemographicandlabourmarketchallenges. IntheUK,therearealsolikelytobedirecteffects,asmuchoflow-lyingEastAngliainparticularislikely tobeatincreasedriskofflooding.Observedmeasurementshaveshownthatthesea-levelofftheEast Angliancoastisrisingbyanaverage4.5mmperyear,which,combinedwith1.5mmperyearofisostatic adjustment(groundlevelsinking),isleadingtoa6mmperyearsealevelriseintheregion(Edwards 2005).IncreasedwindsandstormsintheNorthSeawillalsolikelycausemorepowerfulstormsurges thatcouldbreachcoastaldefences,floodinginlandareas.Thesechangestothephysicalenvironmentof theUKarelikelytobesmallrelativetosomeotherareasintheworld,butstillsignificant. Severalimportantmilitaryassetswillalsobeatriskfromenvironmentaldamage.Sealevelrisecould negativelyaffecttheSouthCoastnavalbasesatPortsmouthandDevonport.TheMinistryofDefenceis currentlymodellingtheimpactofclimatechangeonthesebases(Liddell2007),andalthoughno seriousdamageispredictedoverthenext20-25years,theIPCCpredictsthatsealevelrisealongthe Englishcoastlinecouldbeupto50percenthigherthantheglobalaverage,whichunderworst-case scenarioscouldseverelydisruptoperationsatthesebasesincurrentoperatingconditions.Increased floodingcouldalsojeopardiseseveralRAFbases,namelyValleyontheIsleofAngleseyoffWalesand twobasesinEastAngliacurrentlyusedbytheUSAirForce,LakenheathandMildenhall(Ministryof Defence2006).Eachofthesethreeairfieldsisonly10metresabovesealevelleavingthemhighly vulnerabletoflooding.AmongtheUK’soverseasmilitaryassets,thenavalstationatDiegoGarcia,a tinyatollintheIndianOceanonlyonemetreabovesealevelatitshighestpoint,isinmoreimmediate dangerfromrisingsealevels.TheCenterforNavalAnalysisintheUnitedStateswarnedina2007

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reportthatthebase,amajorforwardlogisticshubforbothBritishandAmericanforcesoperatinginthe PersianGulfandMiddleEastregion,couldbelosttosealevelrise(CenterforNavalAnalysis2007). Tore-cap,climatechangeissettohavedirectconsequencesfortheUKbothhereathomeandin relationtoimportantoverseasassets,islikelytoprovokenewinter-statetensionsandtogeneratenew sourcesandinstancesofstatefailure,particularlyinAfrica,andmayevenplayamajorroleinshaping thecharacterandoutlookofamajorpowerlikeChina.Itmayalsoputaddedpressureonsocialunity indevelopedcountriesinacontextinwhichthatunityisalreadyunderstrain.Thisallamountstoa verysignificantdestabilisingpressureinanumberofimportantstatesandregionsaroundtheworld andintermsofitssecurityconsequences,mayyetcometodwarfandover-shadowthecurrently high-profileissueofterrorism.

iv)ThegrowthofpoliticalIslam Thefourthandpenultimatedriverofthecontemporarysecuritylandscapethatwehighlightisthe growthofpoliticalIslam,orIslamism.9 Thisnowrepresentsbothanimmediatethreattopublicsafety andalong-termpoliticalchallengetoWesternliberaldemocracies.Thoughitsoriginscanbetraced backovermanycenturies,initsmodernformpoliticalIslamowesitsdevelopmenttowritersand thinkersactiveinthemid-20thcentury,suchasAbulAlaMaududiinSouthAsiaandSayyidQutbin Egypt(forathoroughanalysisoftheoriginsanddevelopmentofpoliticalIslamseeRoy2004and Burke2003).Themovementsthesemenspawned,Jamaat-e-IslamiandtheMuslimBrotherhood, werethevanguardinwhatMaududiopenlydescribedas‘arevolutionarydoctrineandsystemthat seekstooverthrowgovernments’(MaududiquotedinHusain2007).ModernIslamism,then,isbest viewedasapoliticalmovementthatutilisesaparticularinterpretationofreligionratherthanasa fundamentalistreligiousmovementthatattimespractisespolitics.NeitherMaududi,norQutb,nor othersofnotelikethem,wereeventrainedclericsortheologians. Intermsofitsideologicalcontent,Islamismisbasedonadivisionoftheworldintoconflictingcamps ofgoodandevil.Good,inthisstoryline,arethe‘true’MuslimsfullydevotedtotheIslamists’ interpretationofIslam.Evilontheotherhand,consistsinagroupofcountriesincludingtheUnited States,theUnitedKingdom,France,andRussiawhicharesaidtorigtheinternationalsystemagainst MuslimsandtouseanetworkofapostaterulersintheIslamicworldtoplunderitsresourcesandkeep itscitizenssubdued.Consequently,Islamistpoliticalobjectivesrelatetotheremovalofsuchapostate rulersfromtheMuslimworld,totheintroductionofmoretrulyIslamic(undertheirinterpretation) societies,totheremovalofWesterninterferenceinMuslimaffairsandforsome,attheextreme,tothe completeoverthrowofWesternliberalsocietyinitsentirety. Inmorerecenttimesandinsomemanifestations,Islamismhasofcoursebecomeviolent,intheform ofAlQaedaandAlQaeda-inspirednetworks,andintheformofothergroupsnotlinkedtoAlQaeda inanyway.AkeyturningpointinrelationtoIslamistviolenceappearstohavebeentheSoviet invasionofAfghanistan.IslamistorganisationsissuedacalltoMuslimseverywheretohelpinresisting theSovietoccupation.Thousandsansweredthatcalland,furtherradicalisedbytheexperience, subsequentlyreturnedtotheirhomecountrieswiththeviewthatviolenceconstitutedalegitimate formofpoliticalexpression(Mamdani2005).Apsychologicalthresholdhadbeencrossedandviolence becameameanstoachieverevolutionarypoliticalobjectivesinplacessuchasAlgeria,Egypt,Yemen, Chechnya,Indonesia,andthePhilippines(BergenandReynolds2005). Asweknow,politicalIslamtoday,eveninitsviolentforms,hasalsonowextendeditsreachinto Westernliberaldemocraciesdirectly,beyondcountriesthatarepredominantlypopulatedbyMuslims. ItseekstotargetandtorecruitboththegrowingMuslimpopulationinEuropeandthosenonMuslimswhomaybesusceptibletoconversiontotheIslamist’sparticularinterpretationofthereligion ofIslam.

9.Thereisadebatetobehadontherightlanguagetousetocapturethisphenomenon.Wearestill reflectingonthisbutforthepurposesofthispaper,thekeypointtonoteisthatwearedescribinga politicalandnotareligiousphenomenon.

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Organisationallyandpolitically,politicalIslamisnothomogeneousanditsadherentscanbestbe describedasexistinginaseriesofconcentriccircles.Atthecentreisasmallgroupofhard-core radicalscommittedtoorchestratingviolentactioninfurtheranceoftheirpoliticalagenda,though membersofthisgrouparenotoftentheperpetratorsoftheviolencethemselves.Inthenext,larger, circle,arethefoot-soldiersmostlikelytocommitactsofviolence.Beyondthisgroup,inalargercircle still,arethemembersofthemostradicalIslamistorganisationsfromwhoseranksthefoot-soldiersof Islamistviolencecanmosteasilybedrawn.Then,attheouteredges,therearethemembersofmost otherIslamistorganisationswhopursueIslamistpoliticalobjectivesbutdosobyworkingthrough existingpoliticalsystemsratherthanthroughattemptstoviolentlyoverthrowthem.Finally,andat leastpartiallymovingbeyondthosewhocanbedescribedinanyrealsenseasbelieversintheIslamist politicalmessage,theremaybeatacitcircleofsupport(Saggar2006,Klausen2007). IntheUKcontextthistacitcircleofsupporthasbeencapturedinopinionpollquestionnaire responses.APopuluspollofattitudesamongBritishMuslimscarriedoutforTheTimes attheheight oftheDanishcartoonscontroversy,forexample,had7percentofaweightedsampleagreeingwith thestatementthat:‘TherearecircumstancesinwhichIwouldcondonesuicidebombingsonUKsoil’ (Saggar2006:314).Thisfigureapproximatestoover100,000MuslimslivingintheUK.AfurtherICM pollshowedthatafifthofrespondents‘hadsomesympathywiththefeelingsandmotivesofthose whocarriedouttheLondonattacks’(ICM/SundayTelegraph2006).Finally,asurveyofMuslim studentsintheUK,bytheFederationofStudentIslamicSocieties,showed4percentunableto condemnthe7/72005attacksonLondon,afurther11percentrefusingtobackorcondemnthe attacksand20percentsayingthattheywouldnotreportapossiblesuicidebomberintheirranksto thepolice(FOSIS2005). DespitetheseriousnessofthissituationandoftheIslamistchallengeaswehavedescribedithere,in bothsecurityandpoliticalterms,policymakersstilldonothaveagoodunderstandingofwhatis drivingit.OnecontextualfactorthatmayhaveassisteditsgrowthinWesterncountriesisthedecline andcollapseofrevolutionaryleftistpoliticsinrecentdecades,whichhaseffectivelyleftpoliticalIslam asthepredominantrepositoryforradicalpoliticalexpression.Anotherpotentialfactoristhegenuine senseofpoliticalgrievancefeltbymanyMuslims.ThiscentresonWesternforeignpolicyand,tobe morespecific,onperceptionsofinjusticeandhumiliationinrelationtotheIsrael-Palestinequestion, onperceptionsofalossofeffectivecontrolofthenaturalenergyresourcesoftheMiddleEastin particular,andonperceptionsoftheWesternroleinthemaintenanceandsupportofoppressiveand autocraticregimesinseveralpredominantlyMuslimcountries. SomeanalystshavefurthernotedasenseofalienationamongMuslimcommunitieslivingintheWest. Thisappearstobeanissueamongsecond-andthird-generationMuslimcitizensinparticularandmay begroundednotjustinoppositiontomuchWesternforeignpolicyintheMiddleEastbutina complexmixoffactorsincludingperceivedsocialexclusionongroundsofraceandstrongconcerns overIslamophobia.AsShivMalik’srecentpieceofinvestigativejournalismintosomeofthoseinvolved intheattacksof7/7inLondonalsomakesclear,forsomeyoungMuslimsintheUKtheremayalso beaparticularlyacutecrisisofidentityinwhichneitherthedominantculturalvaluesoftheparent population,northemainstreamcultureofthenew‘home’countryisseenasappealing(Malik2007). Thetruth,however,isthatweareinsufficientlyclearaboutwhattheunderlyingcausesofthegrowth inpoliticalIslamare,evenatthishighlevelofgenerality.Moreover,theradicalisationprocesses,for thosemovingfromtacitcircleofsupporttofullacceptanceoftheIslamistworldview,andfrom radicalisedpoliticstoactiveengagementinpoliticalviolenceareboth,ifanything,evenlesswell understood.ThepersonalaccountsofthosewhohavebeeninvolvedinIslamistpoliticsandhavethen pulledback,suchasEdHusain(Husain2007),haveprovidedvaluableinsighthere,buttheliterature pointstoawiderangeofpossiblefactorsintheradicalisationprocessincludingpersonalrelationships, psychologicalfactors,socialgroupdynamics,andtheparticularcommunicationopportunitiesofthe internet,andtheoverallpictureremainsconfused. Makingpublicpolicyinthiscontextisnoteasy.TheIslamists’useofreligiontomaskthepolitical natureoftheirprojecthasputWesternliberaldemocraticregimesinadifficultpositionastheyseek

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topreserveacommitmenttotoleranceanddiversityintheirownsocietiesontheonehandwhile addressingtheIslamistchallengewithoutappearingtodemonisefollowersoftheIslamicfaithonthe other. Thepolicychallengeitselfisalsocomplex.Onekeychallengeforgovernmentishowbesttoprotect citizensfromtheIslamistthreatwithoutintroducingsecuritymeasuresthatinadvertentlyexpandthe outercirclesofsupportforIslamistgroupsorpushmorepeoplefromtheoutercirclesofsupport towardstheviolentcore.Anotherchallengeistounderstandhowbesttoproactivelyshrinktheouter circles,bothathomeandinternationally,tosuchanextentthatthoseintheinnercorebecomeso isolatedthatitisdifficultforthemtocontinueoperations.Bothareprofoundlydifficultand,without animprovedunderstandingoftheradicalisationprocess,almostimpossible.Onlylimitedprogressis likelytobemadeintheshorttermtherefore,andtheIslamistchallengeislikelytoremainakeydriver ofboththedomesticandinternationalsecurityagendaforalongtimetocome.

v)Socio-economicvulnerability Ourfifthdriverofchangeinthesecurityenvironmentissocio-economicvulnerability.Thishasrisen upthesecurityagendapartlyasaresultofrecentchangesinthestructureoftheUKeconomy,partly asaconsequenceofchangestotheconditionofsomeelementsofourcriticalnationalinfrastructure, andpartlyasaconsequenceoftheincreasedthreatofterrorismand/ordisruptiveclimateevents. Whenitcomestothestructureofoureconomyanditsbusinesses,overthelastdecadeagreatdeal ofworkhasbeendonetoencourageBritishcompaniestoadoptaleanapproachtobusiness operations.Movingto‘justintime’manufacturing,squeezingoutstock,removingwarehousingand intermediaries,sheddingexcessstaff,allofthesedevelopmentshavesubstantiallyimprovedthe competitivenessoftheUKeconomy.Atthesametime,thesupplychainsofBritishbusinesseshave becomestretchedasaconsequenceofglobalisation.Thishasitselfbroughtefficiencygainsandhas increasedtherangeofproductsandservicesavailabletotheUKconsumer.However,asJimNorton haspointedout,‘thereisaghostatthisparticularfeast’(Norton2008).Runninglean,morediverse andstretchedsupplychainsmakesexcellentbusinesssensebutitassumesthatthebasic infrastructureintheUKandbeyond,inenergy,communications,andtransportation,issecureand reliable.Themoreefficientlyweoperate,thelessslackthereisinthesystemtocopewithmajor disruption. Sadly,theassumptionofasecureandreliableinfrastructureisnotasafeone.Justasour organisationshaveimprovedtheircollectiveefficiencyandthustheirdependenceonsupporting infrastructure,wehavemadeinfrastructuredecisionsthatincreaseourvulnerabilitytodisruption.In communications,forexample,therehasbeenashiftfromsecureprivatemobilesystemstoshared (non-resilient)publicmobilecommunicationsinsomekeysectors.Effectivecommunicationinthe eventofextrapressurebeingplacedonthemobilenetworkinanemergency,therefore,cannotbe guaranteed. Thereisconcern,also,overalackofstoragefacilitiesforgas,justasaccesstoourownNorthSea suppliesrunsdown,andanequivalentconcernoveralackofinvestmentinlocalandregional electricitydistribution,whichhasresultedinincreasedfailuresandthelossofsomekeyskillsandsubcontractors. Inothersectors,weoperateclosetocapacitylimitsinwaysthatcouldhavesevereconsequences.In theeventofaflupandemic,forexample,areasonableassumptionwouldbethatupto20percentof theUK’sHeavyGoodsVehicledriverswouldbeunavailable,afigurelargeenoughtocripplethe nationalfoodsupply,leavesupermarketshelvesempty,andpossiblycausecivilunrest. Weaknessesinoneareaofourinfrastructure,moreover,canleadtobreakdowninothersbecause severalkeyelementsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructureareinterdependent.Power,transport, communications,water,andbroadcastingforexample,couldallbebadlyaffectedbyalossof electricitysupply,thelattercausingacascadingeffectintoeachoftheothers.WhenpartsoftheUS andCanadasufferedthelargestelectricpoweroutageintheirhistoryon14August2003,50million peoplelostpower,4millionpeoplelostwater,andmanyrailroadsandairportswereshutdown(Doshi

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etal 2007).IntheUK,thesummerfloodsof2007,thoughonamuchsmallerscale,also demonstratedthepoint. Terroristorganisationsappeartohavenoticedthisvulnerabilitytoo.InMarch2004,policeraidedthe homeofOmarKhyam,the24-year-oldringleaderoftheso-calledOperationCreviceterroristplotand foundCD-ROMswithdetailedplansofBritain’selectricityandgassystems.AccordingtoaNewYork Times reportlaterin2006,Khyamwasalsorecordedtalkingaboutaplannedsimultaneousattackon Britain’sgas,electricity,andwatersystems(Wolsey2007). Thecascadeeffectsofalossofkeyinfrastructure,whetherbroughtonbysevereweather,terrorist attackorsimplemaintenancefailures,wouldobviouslyalsogofarbeyondanimpactonother infrastructuresectorsthemselves.FeworganisationsorservicesintheUKwouldbeabletofunction effectivelyforlonginsuchcircumstances.Giventhis,theCabinetOfficeCivilContingenciesSecretariat haspreviouslypublishedplanningguidancethataskskeyorganisationstopreparefor:

• Lossofmainselectricitysupplyforuptothreedayslocallyor24hoursregionally • Lossofwatersupplyforuptothreedays • Lossofthepublicswitchedtelephonenetworkforuptothreedays •Disruptiontofuelsupplyforuptotendays •Significantdisruptiontotransportforuptotendays • Accessdeniedtomainpremisesforuptothreemonths. However,itisunclearhowmanyorganisationscouldreallyclaimtohaveplansinplacetocope withtheseguidelinesandmakingprogressinthiswholeareaisdifficultingovernanceterms. DavidOmand,forexample,hasnotedthat80percentoftheUK’scriticalnationalinfrastructure isinprivatesectorhands,notallofitevenownedbyUKcompanies.Evenwithinthesectors definedascorepartsofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,thereremainsasignificantchallenge tocoordinateactivityacrossmanydifferentsectorsandthischallengeonlymultiplieswhenone considerstheneedtoplanforwiderbusinessandorganisationalresiliencethroughouttheentire economyandsociety.Giventhesecircumstances,theissuesofcriticalnationalinfrastructure protection,businessandorganisationalresilience,andemergencyplanningandpreparedness havetakenonnewsecuritypolicyprominence.

Driversandeffects:conclusion Wehaveattemptedinthispartofthepapertocapturethemultipleandinteractingdrivers shapingthecurrentsecuritylandscape.Bothindividuallyandcollectivelyglobalisation,poverty, climatechange,thegrowthofpoliticalIslamandsocio-economicvulnerabilityarecreatinganew setofdynamicsandanewsetofchallengesforpolicymakerstodealwith.Thedistributionof powerbetweenstatesischangingandthismay meanmoreinstabilityandconflictintheyears aheadiftheprocessofchangeisnotwellmanaged.Non-stateactorsareincreasinglyimportant too,bothintheirownright,andduetotheircapacitytoinfluencetheverycharacterand behaviourofstates. Poverty,inequalityandconflictareinteractinginpartsofthedevelopingworldtocreate instabilityandagrowingproblemofungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspaces.Theseinturn arebecomingjumping-offpointsforterroristgroupsandtransnationalcriminalgangsintenton exportingharmtotheUKandotherlocations.Wearewitnessingenvironmentaldamageand resourcestressonenergy,waterandfoodsourcesinparticularwithapotentialforsuchdamage andstressnotonlytobecomeindependentdriversoftensionandconflictbutalsotofuelother relatedbutdistinctdynamicsofinter-staterivalryandpoliticalconflictintheyearsahead. Comingclosertohome,wehavewitnessedtheemergenceofarangeofnewandchangedsocioeconomicvulnerabilitieswithintheUK,partlyasaresultofourinterfacewiththeglobal economyandpartlyasaresultofthechangestodomesticbusinesspractices,economicsystems andinfrastructuresthattogethermakeupthemoretightlycoupledsocietythatwehave described.

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Wedrawthreeconclusionsfromthisanalysis. First,tosomeextentandinrelativeterms,webelievewearewitnessingadowngradingoftheability ofstateinstitutionstocontrolthesecurityenvironmentandtoprovidepublicprotection.Powerhas movedtonewlocationsandthemechanismsofaccountablepubliccontrolhavenotmovedwithit. Thisisevidentinthepotentialendtostatemonopolisationofweaponsofmassdestruction,inthe reducedcapacityofindividualstatestodelivertheirownsecurityinaworldofinterdependenceandin theproliferationofungovernedandcorruptlygovernedspacesintheinternationalsystem.State actorshaveliterallylostprimarycontrolofsometerritoriesandenvironmentsastheearlierdiscussion offailedstates,pariahstatesandencryption-protectedpartsoftheinternetmakesclear.Onsome issues,moreover,suchasclimatechange,wherewehavenotyetbeenabletoconstructeffective multilateralgovernanceframeworks,thereisevenaquestionmarkoverthecurrentcapacityofthe entirecommunityofstates,actingcollectively,todeliverwhatisnecessaryforsecurity. Second,andconsistentwiththisdevelopment,itfollowsthatnoindividualstateorgovernment,no matterhowpreponderant,hasthepowertoguaranteeitsownsecurity.Wenowliveinaworldof shareddestiniesinwhichinsecuritiesorpolicyfailingsinonepartofthesystemquicklygenerate policyproblemsandinsecuritiesinothers.Inthisenvironment,werelyoneachotherforsecurityand securitymustbecommontoallindividuals,communitiesandstatesorelseitwillnotlikelybe deliveredforany. Third,andagainstthisbackground,itisclearthatthecorechallengeforsecuritypolicytodayrelates tohowbesttoenhanceandextendourmechanismsofgovernancesuchthattheybetterreflectand mapontothecurrentrealitiesandlocationsofpower,bringingarenewedmeasureofinfluenceand controloverthesecurityenvironmentasaresult. InPart3ofthepaper,weaddresstheimplicationsofthisoverallanalysis.Wearguethatthereisa needtoarticulateandtoadoptanew,morecollaborative,approachtosecuritypolicy,andwesetout arangeofsubstantivequestionstowhichwebelieveanynationalsecuritystrategymustnowbe sensitive.First,however,weturntoaredefinitionoftheterrainofsecuritypolicyitself,suchthatit bettercaptureswhatis,ineffect,anewandmorecomplexfrontlineinthebattlefornationalsecurity andpublicsafety.

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3.Implicationsofachangedstrategiclandscape Thenewfrontline:delimitingtheterrainofsecuritypolicy Notsurprisingly,giventhechangeswehavedescribed,therehasbeenmuchdebateinscholarlyand policycirclesinrecentyearsabouttheneedtorethinktheconceptofsecurity.Sincethe1980s,in fact,academicshavesoughtamoreelasticdefinitionofsecuritythatcouldencompassenvironmental, economic,humanrightsandotherfactors.Theseattempts,thoughanalyticallyimpressiveinmany cases,haveforthemostpartcomeupagainstthebuffersofastillinfluentialtraditionalviewof nationalsecuritypolicywhichismorerestrictiveinscope. Thetraditionalviewstressestheprimaryroleofstates,theimportanceofstatesovereignty,inter-state competition,andthecentralimportanceofmilitaryissuesandmilitaryforce.Itretainsitsinfluencefor theobviousreasonthat,whateverelsemayberelevant,securitybetweenstatesisanecessary conditionforwiderhumansecurityandbecausethesecuritypressurescentraltothelogicofalargely anarchicinternationalstatesystemstillcastalongshadowovermuchofinternationalaffairs.States tooofcourse,alsoretainsomecrucialcapacityforactioninresponsetomanyofthewiderrisksand threatsthatwehavealreadydescribed. Thatsaid,webelievethatwhenseenagainstthecurrentworldsituation,therearemajorweaknesses withthisapproachthatmakeittimelyandnecessarytogetbeyondit.First,itlackssufficient descriptiveandexplanatorypowerinrelationtocontemporaryevents.Whileitisrelevanttosome debates,suchasthatovertheNorthKoreanandIraniannuclearprogrammesandthepossible regionalnucleararmsracesthatmaybeprovokedasaresultofthem,itsprivilegingofstateactors andtheinter-statelevelofanalysismeansitmissestherelevanceandimportanceofmanynon-state actorsoperatingatavarietyofdifferentlevels.Terroristgroups,privatesectorbodies,international organisationsandNGOsareallcasesinpoint.Second,thetraditionalviewalsoprivilegessomeissues (themilitary)andsomestrategicdrivers(thebalanceofpowerandinter-statecompetition)over othersandagain,theresultistomissmuchofimportance.Widersocialandeconomicissuesare underplayed,asarekeystrategicdriversofcontemporaryeventssuchasglobalisationandclimate change.Thetraditionalconceptionofsecuritypolicy,inshort,leavestoomuchout. Theseweaknessessuggestanurgentneedtoreconceptualiseandredefinetheterrainofsecurity policytogetbeyondtheprivilegedactors,issues,levelsofanalysis,anddriversofstrategicchange tiedupwiththetraditionalapproach.Thisisnottosaythetraditionalapproachshouldbeentirely discarded,buttosaythatitnowneedstobenestedwithinawiderviewoftherelevantterrain. Onewayofapproachingthisistoadoptthenotionof‘humansecurity’(HumanSecurityCentre2005, CommissiononHumanSecurity2003).Inanswertothecentralquestionofwhomorwhatistobe madesecureandfromwhatrangeofrisksandthreats,humansecurityanalystsmakepeople,not states,thereferentobjectofpolicyanddefineasrelevantanyrisksandthreatswithacapacitytoput people’ssecurityindoubt.Thishastwoeffects.First,itexpandsradicallytherangeofissuesdefined assecurityissues,sincepeoplesuffermenacesthatincludebutgowellbeyondthethreatofexternal militaryattack.Humansecurityincludesprotectionofcitizensfromenvironmentalpollution, transnationalterrorism,massiveandsuddenpopulationmovements,andlong-termconditionsof oppressionanddeprivation.Second,itexplicitlyrejectsanactor-ledapproachtodefiningtheterrain ofsecuritypolicyinfavourofanissue-ledapproach.Inotherwords,theterrainofnationalsecurity policyisnotdefinedprimarilybywhatthemilitary,thepolice,theintelligenceservicesandthekey security-relatedgovernmentministriesdo.Rather,itisdefinedanddelimitedbyreferencetothe issuesthatrepresentthemostpotentthreatsandriskstothesecurityandpublicsafetyofpeople. Traditionalsecurityinstitutionsareclearlycrucialtotheterrain,buttheyarenotinandofthemselves theembodimentofit. IntheAppendix,wehavecombinedthisgeneraloutlookwiththespecificsoftheanalysispresentedin Section2ofthepapertooffer,intabularform,anewdelimitationoftheterrainofnationalsecurity policytoday.Thisliststheissueswebelievetobecentral,definesmanydifferentstateandnon-state

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actorsasrelevant,anddistinguishesbetweenfivedifferentlevelsofactivityinandacrosswhichthose actorsmaybeactive(thesub-national,national,bi-lateral,regionalandglobal). Otheradvantagesofthisapproach Aswellasbringingtheentiresecurityagendaintooneanalyticalframework,thisapproachhasfour otheradvantages. First,itmakesclearthatweneedtorethinktraditionalnotionsofwhatandwherethefrontlineisin thebattleforsecurity.Ifdirectthreatstothesafetyofourcountryanditscitizenscancomeoutof failedorpariahstatessuchasAfghanistan,thentheactionsofBritishtroopsinplaceslikeHelmand Provincemustclearlystillbeseenasactionsinthefront-linedefenceoftheUnitedKingdom.If poverty,inequalitywithinstatesandconflictareallkeydriversoftheexistenceoffailedandpariah statesinthefirstplace,however,thensotoomustactionstotackleglobalpoverty,toaddress economicinequitiesandtoprevent,containandrecoverfromconflictsinotherpartsoftheworld Similarly,whiletheinter-statemilitarybalanceremainsafront-lineissueinaworldofchangetoday,it isjoined(inacontextwhereclimatechangeissettobecomeakeydriverofresourcecompetitionand inter-stateconflict),byclimatechangemitigationandadaptationmeasuresasfront-linesecurity issuestoo. Evenwithinourownsociety,wherethecounter-terroristeffortsofthepoliceandsecurityservices representaclearfrontlineinthedefenceofusall,ournotionofwhatandwherethefrontlineis mustchange.Thepoliceandsecurityservicesrelyoncitizens,localcommunityorganisationsand businessestobothchallengetheprocessofradicalisationinthefirstplaceandtohelpminimisethe extentofdisruptionintheeventofasuccessfulattack. Inthiscontexttheactivitiesofcitizens,localcommunitygroupsandbusinesseswithinourcountry andonourownterritorythemselvesconstituteactivitiesatthesecurityfrontline.Thesinglebiggest distinguishingfeatureofthenewfrontlinefromtheold,therefore,isthatthereisnotjustonefront lineandnotjustonetypeofthreattobefacedbutmany.Somethreatsandfrontlineslieoutsideof ourownsociety,atglobalorregionallevel,andsomewithin,atlocallevel.Somerelatetomilitary issuesandsometoeconomic,environmentalornaturalphenomena.Aneffectivesecuritystrategyin thiscontextmustbesimultaneouslysensitivetothemanyissues,frontsandlevelsofactivity,while seekingtobuildacoordinatedresponsefromthemanyrelevantactors,acrossall. Second,aswellasfacilitatinganalysisofasingleissueacrossmultiplelevels,theapproachsetoutalso facilitatestheanalysisofagroupofissuesatasinglelevel.Thatistosay,forexample,thatitallows boththeanalysisoftheterroristthreatandtheactionsrequiredtomeetitatalllevelsfromthesubnationaltotheglobalbutalsoallowsUKpolicymakerstoseealltheissuesfacingthemat,say,the regionallevel. Third,andasaconsequenceofthis,theframeworkmakesiteasytogroupissuesandtostudythe linkagesbetweenthem,aswellastoseetherangeofactorswhosecontributiontoaneffective responsemightneedtobejoinedup.Onterrorismandfailedstates,togiveanexample,itmakes clearthatelementsofforeignpolicy,overseasinterventionanddomesticcounter-terrorismpolicy mightneedtobejoineduptoensurethattheformerdoesnotundermineorrenderthelatter ineffective. Finally,thisapproachcanallowustothinkaboutindividualsecurity-relatedinstitutionsand organisationswithinthewidestconceptionoftheirstrategicenvironment.Thismeanstherole, purpose,andfunctionofeachinstitutioncanbereframedandreassessedagainstthisbackground.To taketheroleofthemilitaryforexample,theAppendixmakesclearthatmilitaryinstitutionsnowtake partnotonlyintraditionalactivitiessuchasthedefenceofhometerritory,overseascombat operations,andaidingthecivilpowerintimeofemergency,butmustalsoplayaroleinconflict prevention,internationalpeacekeeping,andpost-conflictreconstructioneffortsaroundtheworld. Forthesereasons,webelievethetableintheAppendixdefinesanddelimitsthescopeofsecurity policyreasonablywell.Itisaworkinprogressbutcapturesthekeyissues,thelevelsofanalysisand theactorsthataremostrelevant.Thatsaid,itisimportanttobeclearaboutwhatthisissue-led

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approach,aswehavesetitout,isnot.TheAppendixmayembodyawayofdelimitingtheterrainof securitypolicybutitisnotatoolforprioritisingbetweentheissuesidentifiedthemselves.This prioritisationremainsamatterofstrategicjudgement. Thereis,furthermore,adebatetobehadaroundthemarginsonwhichissuesshouldandshouldnot beincludedintheframework.Somehumansecurityanalystsmakenodistinctionbetweensecurity policy,healthpolicy,developmentpolicy+andenvironmentpolicywhileothersconcentrateonlyon politicalviolence.Inourdelimitationoftheterrainwehaveincludedbutgonebeyondpolitical violencetoincludeissuessuchasglobalpoverty,thethreatofdisease,andthepotentialofclimate eventstodestroycriticalnationalinfrastructure.Evenwhereourfocusisonelementsofviolent conflict,wedescribethepolicychallengesinsuchawayastoincludeanawarenessofissueslike povertyandclimatechangeaskeydriversofit.Somewillarguethatthisistogotoowide,othersthat itisnotwideenough.Webelieveitstrikestherightbalanceofconcernwithlong-termdriversand short-term,pressingthreats.

Integratedpowerandcollaborativesecurity:anewstrategicapproach If,aswehaveargued,weliveinaworldofshareddestinies,wherethefrontlineismadeupof manycomplexissues,ofmultiplerelevantactors,andofmanylevelsofaction,andifthecentral challengeforpolicytodayistoenhanceandtoextendourmechanismsofgovernanceoverthe relevantterrain,thenanumberofimplicationsflowfromthisintermsoftheoverallstrategic orientationnowrequired.Itisnotjustthatpoweritselfhasbecomemorewidelydiffusedamong actorsinthesecurityenvironmentorthattherangeofissuesanddrivershasbecomemorevaried andcomplex,butthatwhatisrequiredtohaveinfluenceoverthatenvironmenthasitselfchanged too. Thisisnotjustaboutawiderrangeofpolicyinstrumentsbeingrelevanttosecuritypolicytoday (thoughthisisclearlyoneconclusionthatdoesneedtobedrawn),butalsoaboutinfluence requiringadistributedandcoordinatedresponseacrossawiderangeofactors.Thisisanecessityin asystemthathasmanycentresofpowerandahighlevelofsecurityinterdependenceandthis realisationitselfimpliestheneedforacollaborativeapproachtosecuritypolicy. Inthissection,webrieflysetoutwhatwebelievearethecoreprinciplesofanapproachto policymakingthatisbothsensitivetotheuseofawiderrangeofpolicyinstrumentsand collaborativeinoverallapproach. Principle1:Adoptthenotionofintegratedpower Webelieveafarwiderrangeofinstrumentsmustnowbeseenasrelevanttosecuritypolicyandthat theseinstrumentsmustbemoreeffectivelyintegratedtoachievemaximumeffect.Therehasbeen anongoingdebateonthisissueinrecentyears,centringonnotionsofhardandsoftpower,where ‘hardpowerrefersessentiallytotheexerciseofmilitaryforceand/orthethreateneduseofsuch forceforpurposesofcoercivediplomacyandsoftpowerreferstoeconomicleverageandinfluence accruedthroughtradeandaid,diplomaticcooperationandculturalexchange’(Khana2008:378-9). Giventherangeandcomplexityofthesecuritychallengesweface,andthediversenatureof today’sfrontline,webelieveachoicebetweenthesetwoapproachesisafalseone.Thequestionis notsomuchwhichinstrumentsaremosteffectiveandmostrequiredperse, butwhichcombination ofthemwillbemostsuccessfulandinwhichcircumstances.Weneed,inotherwordstothinknotin termsofhardorsoftpower,butintermsofintegratedpower(CenterforAmericanProgress2006). Thismeans,togivejusttwoexamples,beingcommittedtoabetterlinkageofmilitary,economic, socialandculturalpolicyinstrumentsinanyactivityfocusedonrestoringgovernancetoafailedor failingstateontheonehand,andbeingcommittedtobettercoordinationofintelligence,policing, andlocalcommunitypolicyinstrumentsusedtocombatradicalisationandterrorismathomeonthe other.Italsomeanssometimesintegratinginstrumentsacrossthetraditionaldomesticandforeign policydivide,suchthatelementsofpolicyfrombothdomainsformpartofawiderstrategic responsetochallengesthatdonotrespectborders,suchastransnationalorganisedcrime.

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Principle2:Workinpartnershipwithothers Attheheartofacollaborativeapproachtosecuritypolicywillalsobeanewcommitmenttoworking inpartnership.Thisisclearlynecessaryatinternationallevel,throughfreshattemptsatmultilateral cooperationacrossawiderangeofissues.Tobesuccessful,however,weneedtomovebeyondthe arrangementsforgedinthepost-WorldWarIIperiod. Thegeniusofthemultilateralinternationalsystemthatsurvived,andsomewouldsaywon,theCold War,wasitsfoundationonanetworkofcapablestatesworkingtogethertocreateanalliancegreater thanthesumofitsparts.Thatalliancestillexiststoday,butthethreatsarrayedagainstitaremore diffuseandthebreadthofitscontributingmembersdoesnotmatchthescopeofthechallenge. Complicatingmattersfurther,thegeneraldissatisfactionwithAmericanleadershipundertheBush administrationmayhaveerodedthenecessarypoliticalwilltoworkcollaborativelytoaddressthe world’sproblems. However,theformulauponwhichourearliersuccesseswerebuiltisstillvalidandthesecurity challengeswedescribedinPart2ofthepapermustnowinspireandconsolidateanewageof multilateralpartnerships.AspowershiftsawayfromtheAtlanticseaboard,thesenewpartnerships mustreachbeyondtraditionalboundariesanddrawnewandemergingpowersintothecollaborative systemofcommonsecurity. Partnershipworking,moreover,nowneedstobeaboutmuchmorethanenhancedmultilateral cooperationamongstates.Dependingontheissueathand,partnershipswillberequirednotjustat globalandregionallevelbetweenstatesbutalsooftenbetweendifferentinstitutionsandelements withinthesamestate(acrosscentralandlocallevelsandacrossdifferentfunctionalresponsibilities) andbetweenpublicsectoractorsandprivateandvoluntarysectorbodies.Thisisanobviousnecessity onissuessuchasprotectionofthecriticalnationalinfrastructure,wheremanyprivatesectorplayers areinvolved,andonissuessuchascounter-terrorism,wherethesecurityservicesandthepolicewill bemuchmoreeffectiveifworkinginclosepartnershipwithmembersofthecommunitiestheyare tryingtoserveandprotect. Principle3:Committolegitimacyofaction Suchpartnershipscanonlybesustainedthroughavoluntarycommitmenttoactionandavoluntary commitmenttoactionwillnotbeforthcomingfromawiderangeofactorsifdefiningproblems, objectivesanddecision-makingprocessesarenotseenaslegitimate.Nogovernmentcanorshouldbe deniedtherighttotakeunilateralactiontoprotectitscitizensfromaclearandimminentdanger,but thelessontodrawfromthecontextwehavedescribedisclear:establishingthewidelyperceived legitimacyofanyactionwillmobilisemorepartnerswithmoreresourcesandwillmoreoftenbea routetosecuritypolicyeffectivenessthanabarriertoit.Legitimacy,inotherwords,isamajorsource ofpowerandactsalmostasaforcemultiplier,turningpotentialpowerresourcesintogreateractual influenceovertheenvironment. Thatsaid,insubstantivetermswidelyperceivednotionsoflegitimacywillnotbeeasytodeliver. Othersclearlywillhavedifferentviewsonwhatisandisnotlegitimateanditcannotbesimply assumedthattherewillalwaysbewidespreadacceptancethatUKgovernmentactionsarelegitimate. Indeed,therearealreadysignificantchallengestothelegitimacyofcertainaspectsofaprevailing orderwithwhichtheUK,asawealthyandinfluentialcountry,isstillverymuchassociated.These stretchfromquestionsoverthemoralsustainabilityofcurrentlevelsofglobalinequalitytoquestions overthedistributionofdecision-makingrightsinimportantinternationalbodiesliketheUNSecurity Council.TheyincludeconcernsovertheapparenthypocrisyofWesterndemocraticregimesproviding supporttonon-democraticregimesintheMiddleEastandelsewhere,andencompassissuesrelatedto socialexclusion,accusationsofIslamophobia,andthelegitimacyorotherwiseofadditionalpolice powerstocrackdownonterroristshereathome. Nevertheless,despitetheserealtensionsanddifficulties,inthelongterm,ifweundervaluepolitical legitimacyandalienatepotentialpartnerseitherelsewhereintheinternationalcommunityorwithin ourownsocietyhereathome,ourcapacitytoinfluencethesecurityenvironmentandthereforeto

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deliverthesecurity,well-beingandpublicsafetyofourpeoplewillmostlikelybeeroded,not enhanced.Ifthepriceofadditionallegitimacyisbeingself-reflectiveandflexibleontheissues withoutcompromisingourbasicvalues,therefore,thisisapricewellworthpaying. Principle4:Movetomoreopenpolicymaking Legitimacy,ofcourse,isaboutprocessaswellassubstance.Ifpolicysuccessislikelytocomedownto thebreadthandqualityofthepartnershipsthatcanbebuiltandifpartnershipworkingrequiresa majorinvestmentinsharednotionsoflegitimacy,itishighlyunlikelythatanyofthiscanbeachieved whileoldmodelsofinformationsecrecyandcloseddecision-makingremaininplace,either domesticallyorinternationally.Whiletherewillalwaysbeaneedforsecretoperationsandtoprotect theanonymityofsomesources,andwhilethespecificsofparticularsecurityarrangementsshould alwaysbemanagedonastrictlyneed-to-knowbasis,muchsecuritypolicymakingtodayistooremote andclosedofffromthewiderrangeofactorsthatcouldnotonlyenjoybutalsocontributetoit. Governments,inanycase,nolongerthemselvesownandcontrolalloftherelevantandnecessary expertiseandassetsrequiredinthemakingofaneffectivesecuritypolicy.Fromemergencyplanning toclimatechangeandfromtheprotectionofcriticalnationalinfrastructuretocounter-terrorism, citizens,privatebusinessesandinternationalorganisationscanalladdvaluetothepolicymaking process. Thisallraisesdifficultquestionsforthoseinofficialpositions,particularlyinrelationtohowmuch informationtoshareandwhere,whenandhowtoopenupparticulardecision-makingprocesses. Again,however,theeffortshouldberewardedasmorepartnershaveagreatersenseofbuy-into boththeprocessandthesubstanceofpolicy,andmorepartnersactivelyplayaroleinpolicy implementation.Addedsocialdepthinthedecision-makingprocessshould,inotherwords,contribute togreaterpolicyreachandeffectiveness. Principle5:Beopentoinstitutionalreform Finally,giventheneedtothinkdifferentlyabouttherequirementsofinfluenceinthenewsecurity environment,theneedtointegratepolicyinstrumentstogethermoreeffectivelyandtheneedtoopen uppolicymakingtoawiderrangeofinfluences,itseemsclearthattheperiodaheadwillalsoneedto beoneofsignificantinstitutionalreform.Organisationsatalllevels(seetheAppendix)shouldalready beaskingquestionsabouthowtheirroleshavechanged,whethertheycurrentlyhavetherightskills toperformtheirnecessarytasksandwhichotherorganisationstheyshouldnowbepartneredwith.It isnotsimply,however,thatthesameoldinstitutionsneedtochangethewaytheybehavebutthat somenewinstitutionsmayalsoneedtobecreatedandoldonesscrappedintheperiodahead.Thisis nevereasy,butexistinginstitutionalboundariesshouldnotbeallowedtostifleandlimitthenecessary innovationrequiredincurrentcircumstances. Weareawarethatsome,asever,willsaythattheprincipleswehaveoutlinedherearemerelyliberal niceties,fineinwordbutimpossibletoapplyinpractice.Inourview,however,inthechangedsecurity landscapeoftoday,somecommitmenttotheseprinciplesisastrategicnecessity,notaliberalnicety. Wewouldalsostresswhatacommitmenttointegratedpowerandcollaborativesecurityisnot.Itis notanexcuseforinactioninthefaceofmountingthreats.Therewillstillbetimesandplaceswhen governmenthastotakedifficultdecisions,onbehalfofusall,toactlargelyinisolationfromothers whereitperceivesthethreattobeseriousenoughtojustifyit.Thepoint,however,isthatsuch instancesshouldbealastresortandbekepttoanabsoluteminimumsincethepricepaidintermsof lostlegitimacyandlostinfluenceishighandgettinghigher.

Questionsforanationalsecuritystrategy TheultimateobjectiveofanynationalsecuritystrategyfortheUKmustbetoclearlyprovidethe countryanditspeoplewiththebestprotectionpossibleagainstthefullrangeofthreatsandrisks facingus.Deliveringonthisrequires,asDavidOmandhaspointedout,‘(a)takinganticipatory actiontoinfluencedirectlythesourcesofmajorrisksfacingsocietyandatthesametime(b)taking stepstoreducesociety’svulnerabilitytothetypesofdisruptivephenomenathatwemayface’ (Omand2007:1).

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Weturn,finally,toadiscussionofthepressingpolicyquestionstowhichanyforward-lookingnational securitystrategyoughtnowbesensitive.Wefirstexaminequestionsrelevanttoanticipatoryactionon futurepossiblesourcesofthreatandriskandthenmoveontotheidentificationofissuesrelevantto areductioninourcurrentvulnerabilities.Ourapproachthroughoutisnottoofferpolicysolutionsbut totablequestions.Inaworldofchangeasprofoundasthis,dwellingonthequestionsthatoughtto beaskedisjustasvaluableanexerciseasspeculating,nomatterhowthoughtfully,onthenatureof theanswersthatoughttobefound. Questionsrelatedtoanticipatoryaction Thereformofkeyinternationalinstitutions Ifthe21stcenturyisseeingadiffusionofrelativepowerawayfromtheAtlanticSeaboardtoAsiaand elsewhere,andifthisprocessitself,ifbadlymanaged,becomesasourceofinternationalinstabilityin future,thenapressingissueishowbesttodrawtheemergingpowersintothealreadyexisting structuresoftheinternationalsysteminanorderlyway.Inaworldinwhichsecuritymustbebuilt collaborativelyifitistobebuiltatall,thiswillbeacriticallyimportanttaskbutalsoahighlydelicate anddifficultone.Theemergingpowersmaynotfeelthattheirinterestshavebeenwelllookedafterin recentdecadesbythepreponderantpowersofthelate20thcenturyandmaynotbewelldisposedto lookingafterourinterestsnowthattheirownstrengthgivesthemagreatervoice.Nevertheless,the issuemustbeaddressed. Attheheartofthisisaseriesofquestionsrelatedtothereformofkeyinternationalinstitutions:

• WhatkindofUNreformwillnotonlybestaccommodatenewlyemergingpowersbutalso,asa result,contributetotheincreasedeffectivenessoftheUNsystem?

•Howshouldreformofdecision-makingstructuresintheInternationalMonetaryFundandWorld Bankproceedsuchthatawiderrangeofvoicesandinterestsareheardwhentheagendas, priorities,andapproachofsuchorganisationsarebeingshaped?

• HowcanthemembershipoftheG8bebestopenedupanditsreachandlegitimacy consequentlyextended? Thestrengtheningofarules-basedinternationalorder Afurther,relatedsetofquestionsrelatestohowbesttocreatearules-basedinternationalorder. Thiswillbeakeyfeatureofanyattempttobuildlegitimacyofactionintotheinternationalsecurity arena.Thereareseveralpressingquestionsattheforefrontofthedebateonhowtobestgoabout this,suchas:

• HowcanthereachandeffectivenessoftheInternationalCriminalCourtbefurtherextended? • Howcanthelegalframeworksthatareintendedtoprotecthumanrightsbemoredeeply enshrinedandmoreeffectivelyenforced?

• WhatarethenextstepsrequiredtofurtherembedtheResponsibilitytoProtect,bothasawidely acceptedmodificationtomoretraditionalnotionsofstatesovereigntyandasalegitimatebasis uponwhichtheinternationalcommunitymayinterveneinthedomesticaffairsofastatefailing tofulfilitsresponsibilities? Climatechange • Athome,areforward-lookingclimatechangeimpactassessmentsbeingfullytakenintoaccount inplanningdecisions,particularlyastheserelatetocriticalnationalinfrastructureinvestments, thelocationofimportantmilitaryandsecurityassets,andfuturecommunitysafety?

• Aresufficientprotectionsbeingputinplacetodealwithweathereventsthatalreadyappearto bebecomingmorevolatile?Significantquestionshavealreadybeenaskedinrelationtohow recentfloodingeventsimpactedonGCHQ.

• InordertopoliticallyandsymbolicallybolstertheUK’sactivecontributiontointernationalclimate changemitigationdiplomacy,oughtwenowtoelevateclimatechangetothestatusofaclear

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threattonationalandinternationalsecurityandtouseourdiplomaticinfluencetoensurethat climatechangeanditsemergingeffectsreceivesustainedattentionwithintheUNSecurityCouncil?

• Istheinternationalcommunityinvestingenoughindevelopingitsunderstandingofwhere climatechangeimpactswillbefeltfirstandhardestand,asacorollary,ofhowclimatechange effectswillimpactonalreadyexistingzonesofconflictandfailedorfailingstates?

• ShouldtheUK,withitsinternationalpartners,bedoingmuchmoretostrengthenclimatechange adaptationcapacitiesinthecountriesandareaslikelytobemostseriouslyaffected,notjustasa humansolidaritymeasurebutasafront-linedefenceofinternationalstabilityandeffective governanceintheyearsahead? Nuclearnon-proliferation • Givenconcernsoveranewwaveofstate-basednuclearproliferation,andalackofbeliefamong non-nuclearweaponstatesintheseriousnessofintenttodisarmamongtheexistingnuclear powers,oughtwenowtobeactivelypursuingavigorousprogrammeofmultilateral denuclearisationamongthecurrentpossessorstates?

• Isthelackofrealprogressandhighlevelattentiononthisissueintherecentpastundermining thepolitical,ifnotthelegal,legitimacyofattemptstopreventfurtherproliferationincasessuch asIranandNorthKorea? Energypolicyandinternationalsecurity • Giventhetighteningofinternationalenergymarkets,andthepotentialforfuturecompetition andevenconflictoverscarcefossilfuelresources,oughtwenowtobetakingfarstronger measurestocoordinateandmanageinternationalsupplyanddemandforenergy?Theexpansion ofrenewable,low-carbon,energysuppliesisobviouslyakeyimplicitfeatureoftheongoing Kyotoprocessbutoughtwenowtobeattemptingasignificantandinternationallycoordinated improvementinenergyefficiencytoeaseoratleastlimitcompetitivedemandforfossilfuelsin thedecadesahead?

• Oughtwealsotobeactivelyseekingthecreationofaninternationalnuclearfuelbank,suchthat thosecountrieswishingtoadoptnuclearpowerforeitherclimatechangemitigationorsecurity ofenergysupplyreasonsareabletodosowithouttheresultbeingamajorinternational expansionanddispersalofenrichmentandreprocessingactivities?Thelatteroutcomeitself wouldbeaseriousnuclearproliferationriskandablowtotheNon-ProliferationTreaty. ThechallengeofpoliticalIslam Britishmilitaryandintelligenceservices,alongwiththoseofmanyofourallies,areactiveoverseas andourpoliceandintelligenceservicesareactivehereathomeinattemptstocontainIslamist violence.GiventhenatureofthepoliticalprojectbeingpursuedbytheIslamists,however,itseems appropriatetonowaskwhattheelementsofacoherentstrategytodefeatthempolitically,both overseasandathome,mightbe:

• Shouldwebedoingmoretosupportthegrowingcallsforpoliticalandeconomicreforminsome predominantlyMuslimcountries,particularlyintheMiddleEast?

• IstherelianceofmanyWesterneconomiesonoilandgasfromthatregionabarriertosupport forreformandifso,isashifttolessenergyrelianceonsomeoftheautocraticregimesinvolveda keyprerequisiteofachangedWesternrelationshipwiththeMiddleEast?

• CanmorebedoneinthefieldofeconomiccollaborationwithMuslimcountriessuchthattheir economicprospectswithintheglobalisedworldeconomyimprove?

• Shouldwebebuildingamorenuancedunderstandingoftherangeofopinionscontainedwithin theIslamistmovement,broadlydefined,andshouldwebeseekingoutdialoguewiththose Islamistscommittedtonon-violentpoliticalmethods?

• WithintheUK,oughtwetobeconductingarootandbranchinvestigationnotjustintothe tacticsandmethodsofIslamistgroupsbutoftheradicalisationprocessitself,suchthatamore

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nuancedpublicpolicyresponsecanbebuiltonthebackofit?Shouldwebelookingatcloser integrationofintelligenceandpolicingworkwithelementsofsocialpolicy,labourmarket interventionsandlocalcommunitycapacity-buildingmeasurestomorecoherentlyaddresssome ofthesocio-economiccontextthatmayberelevanttotheradicalisationprocess?

• Whatmoreshouldwebedoingtoensurethatnewlyarrivedimmigrantsaremoreeffectively integratedintoBritishsocietysuchthattheydonotbecomeisolated,alienatedandvulnerableto radicalisation? Tacklingpovertyandinequality • Giventheincreasinglyvisibleandmorallyindefensiblelevelofglobalpovertyandeconomic inequalityandthecomplexlinksbetweenpoverty,inequality,conflictandfailedstates,isitnow timetoseestrongermovestoafairerglobaleconomicordernotonlyasmoralimperativebutas animportantinvestmentininternationalstabilityandinourownlong-termsecurity?

• Howcanaid,trade,investmentandclimatechangeadaptationassistanceinstrumentsbemore effectivelycombinedwithconflictpreventionandpost-conflictinterventionmeasuresto positivelyimpactthosecountriesmostatriskofstatefailure?

• ShouldwenowbeseekingtostrengthenfurtherthecontributionoftheEuropeanUnionto effortstowidenthecircleofeconomicopportunitytoareasoftheformerSovietUnion,North AfricaandtheMiddleEastandifso,how? Pandemics • Givenconcernsoverapossiblenewinfluenzapandemic,andLondon’sstatusasahubforglobal peoplemovement,shouldwebeinvestingmore,withinternationalpartners,inthesearchfora universalfluvaccinethatcouldsavetensofmillionsoflives?Shouldwealsobeextendingthe UKfrontlineinthefightagainstapossiblepandemicbyassistingmorewithanimalhealth protectionmeasuresinpossiblepandemicsourceregionssuchasSouthEastAsia? Questionsrelatedtocurrentvulnerabilities Turningtotheissueofactiontoreducecurrentvulnerabilities,keyissuesandquestionsthatflowfrom theprecedinganalysisrelatetosocio-economicvulnerability,transnationalorganisedcrime,the securityofstrategictraderoutesandthesecurityofmaterialsthatmaybeofinterestandvalueto terrorists. Socio-economicvulnerability TheGovernmenthasalreadydonemuchtothinkaboutemergencyplanningandprotectionofthe criticalnationalinfrastructurebutkeyquestionsremain:

• HowmuchoftheUK’scriticalnationalinfrastructureisconnectedto,andreliantupon, infrastructurebeyondourbordersandhowstrongaretheinternationalarrangementstoprotect suchinfrastructurefromdisruption?Shouldwebedoingmoretoaddressconcernsinthisarea?

• Howmuchofthe80percentofUKcriticalnationalinfrastructurethatisinprivatehandsis ownedandoperatedbycompaniesheadquarteredoutsideoftheUKandwhat,ifany,arethe policyimplicationsandchallengesassociatedwiththis?

•Whatmorecanbedonetostimulatebetterbusinesscontinuityplanning,notonlyinthecritical nationalinfrastructuresectors,butmorewidelyacrosssectorsandthroughoutthebusiness organisations,largeandsmall,thatcollectivelymakeupthelife-bloodoftheUKeconomy?

• Whatkindsofnewpublic-privatepartnershipsarebestsuitedtodeliveringontheneedsofa moreresilientUKeconomyandsociety?

• Inthelongterm,whatwouldamoreresilientsocietylooklike,intermsofthenatureand distributionofcriticalinfrastructureandtherolesplayedbygovernment,businessesand

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citizens?Aresomeinfrastructurestrategiesanddesignsinherentlymoreresilientthanothers? Shouldwe,forexample,bedevelopingamorewidelydistributedenergygeneration infrastructuresuchthatdisruptionstoanyonegeneratingplantwouldonlyhavelimitedimpact?

• HowcantheGovernmentmoreeffectivelyplanforandfacilitateakeyroleforcitizensin emergencies?Timeandagaininemergencysituations,itisnotonlywhattheemergencyservices dobutwhatcitizensdoforeachotherthathasmadeanimportantdifferencetoeventual outcomes. Transnationalorganisedcrime • Giventhemassivescaleoftransnationalorganisedcrimeanditssignificancetointernational stabilityandtosecurityonourownstreets,oughtwenowtobeexploringamoremulti-layered, holisticstrategyinresponse?Atthelevelofforeignanddevelopmentpolicy,couldwebedoing moretousesofteconomicpowerinstrumentstoimpactcorruptstates,bothattheleveloftheir elitesandatthelevelofthepoorwhoaretemptedintoorganisedcrimeasarouteoutof poverty?

• ThepromiseofEUmembership,ofaccesstoEUmarkets,andofaccesstoassociatedflowsof aidandinvestmenthas,forexample,beenusedtogoodeffectinsomecountriesinEastern Europe.Isthisamodelthatcouldbereplicatedelsewhere,andifso,throughwhichinstitutional vehicles?

• ShouldwemassivelyandrapidlyexpandtheroleofJointInvestigationTeamsacrossinternational jurisdictionstoensurethatbordersdonoteffectivelyundermineeffortstoinvestigatecrime,to buildstrongcasesandtoachievesuccessfulconvictionsofthecriminalsinvolved? Securityofstrategictraderoutes TheUKgovernmenthasrecentlypublishedawelcomepaperonbordersecurity(CabinetOffice 2007),includingthesecurityofourports.Givenourstatusasamajortradingnation,further questionsstillneedtobeasked:

• Arewealertenoughtothepotentialhazardsandthreatstointernationalmaritimesecurity? • Shouldwebedoingmoretodiversifystrategictraderoutes,particularlyinthegrowing relationshipbetweenEuropeandAsia,suchthatwewouldnotbeasexposedtoanysuddenand massivedisruptiontothegrowingAsia-Europemaritimeroutes?Shouldwe,forexample,in collaborationwithourEUpartners,beassistinginthedevelopmentofthecentralAsiantransport infrastructure,suchthatitbetterconnectstheEUwithChinaalongwhatmightbecalledanew SilkRoad? Thesecurityoffissilematerial Thereisasignificantworrythatterroristgroupsareseekingtoacquireeitheranuclearweaponorthe fissilematerialrequiredtomakeone.TheUKiscurrentlyactiveonthisissue,ininitiativessuchasthe GlobalThreatReductionPartnership,throughtheG8,butfissilematerialisstillnotbeingmadesecure fastenough.

• Giventhatitistheessentialingredientinanuclearbombandgiventhethreatofnuclear terrorism,oughtwenowtoberampingupouractivitiesinthisareaor,toparaphraseGraham Allison,sinceterroristorganisationsareracingtogetabomb,oughtnotweberacingtostop them?(Allison2006).

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4.Conclusion WehavesoughtinthispapernottospelloutwhattheUK’snationalsecuritystrategyshouldbe,but toanalysethewidercontextwithinwhichthatstrategyoughtnowtobeforged.Insodoing,wehave identifiedkeydriversofchangeandtheireffectsonthesecuritylandscape,wehaveofferedaviewon whatthesemightmeanforthenatureanddiversityofthesecuritypolicychallengesbeingfaced today,andwehavesetoutanoverallstrategicapproachwhichwebelievethiswidercontextnow needstocallforth.Wehavealsotabledasetofpressingquestionsthat,inourview,nowneedtobe addressed. Weshouldfinally,perhaps,makenoteofthethingswehavenotdone.Wehavenotgivenanaccount ofthevaluesthatoughttounderpinandshapeUKpolicy,thoughourcalltoacommitmentto legitimacyofactioninSection3isrichinnormativeimplications.Wehavealsonotprovidedan accountoftheuniqueassetsandpointsofleveragethattheUKmightbeabletobringtobearonthe challengesdescribed.Otheromissionsincludeatreatmentofcurrentpolicyinitiativesandofthemany areasofactivitythattheUKanditsalliesabroadarequicklygettingbetterat.Muchlearningis ongoing,forexample,inareassuchasinterventioninpost-conflictzonesandonissuessuchas counter-measuresinrelationtoterroristfinancing. Thesearebigomissionsandallareissuesthatwillbeaddressedintheinterimreportoftheippr CommissiononNationalSecuritylaterthisyear.Wedonotbelieve,however,thattheabsenceofa treatmentofthemherefatallyunderminesthevalueofthematerialthatispresented.Onedoesnot needtobeabelieverinablueprintapproachtostrategytothinkthatanoverviewinvestigationinto thewidercontextofstrategicthinkingisavaluableexerciseinandofitself.Wehope,therefore,that asacontributioninthislatterarea,thispaperisaworthwhilecontributiontoongoingpolicydebate.

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Not an immediate threat. But obvious requirement to be ready for defence of national territory. Ensure legitimacy and effectiveness of key institutions such as UN Security Council. Understand challenge and the radicalisation process. Create policies to win hearts and minds; prevent attacks on UK soil (through intelligence work/ policing/protection of UK borders; build domestic consensus around counterterrorism strategy; combat the terrorism/organised crime interface. Eliminate terrorist safe havens; build governance capacity in other failed and failing states through development and climate change adaptation assistance, conflict prevention measures, peace-building, postconflict reconstruction. Prevent genocide and human rights abuses; respond to emergency situations. Prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons to either state or non-state actors.

External military attack on the UK

Weapons of mass destruction proliferation

Humanitarian intervention

Failed and failing states

Terrorism

Breakdown of international security institutions

Policy challenge

Issue

Actors and institutions securing nuclear facilities and materials within the UK.

UK based development and aid NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children.

UK based development and aid NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children.

Local Authorities (e.g. Preventing Political Extremism Pilots); Police Constabularies, including the Met; Police Community Tensions teams; community and religious groups; individual citizens.

Sub-national

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FCO/MoD work on counterproliferation; Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (BERR).

Armed Forces; MoD; DfID.

FCO; Armed Forces; Ministry of Defence (MoD); Department for International Development (DfID); Police.

Home Office; Cabinet Office; Intelligence Services; GCHQ; Serious and Organised Crime Agency; Border Police; Transport Police; organisations protecting critical national infrastructure; Armed Forces as aid to civil power.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

Armed Forces

UK national

With United States and Russia, to encourage denuclearisation efforts.

United States and other allied countries (intelligence service cooperation). Intelligence sharing relationships with countries in the Middle East.

Permanent 5 (UK, US, France, Russia, China) plus India and possibly Brazil.

UK bilateral relationships

Level of policy action and actors involved

UN Secretary General; Security Council, other parts of the UN system.

UN Security Council

Global

EU nuclear exports control regime; EU counterproliferation efforts.

EU; NATO

EU (Human Security Force?) NATO (as in Afghanistan)

International Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty; Nuclear Suppliers Group; G8 Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme; Proliferation Security Initiative.

UN Security Council

UN Security Council; other regional bodies, such as African Union, acting under UN mandates; G8; International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank; World Trade Organisation (WTO).

EU counter-terrorism Interpol; G8 Counterstrategy; Europol. EU Terrorism Cooperation. diplomacy on Middle East Conflict; EU policy on Turkish entry to the Union.

EU (possible EU seat on Security Council).

NATO Alliance; EU

Euro/Atlantic regional

Transnational organised crime

Disease/bio-security

Socio-economic resilience

Global poverty

To limit scale in overseas source countries; tighten UK border to make penetration of UK more difficult; achieve prosecutions where possible.

Prevention of further global warming through postKyoto global agreement; adaptation to climate changes already inevitable, both for basic human survival and to ease conflict, migration and failed state pressures. Ensure security of supply, minimum exposure to unstable regions and climate change mitigation. Reduce it and widen the circle of economic opportunity both for its own sake and to remove a key background factor to conflict and failed states. Protect critical national and international infrastructure from terrorist attacks, climate events and accidents; ensure strong emergency planning and preparedness; ensure strong business resilience and recovery. Prevent, contain and if necessary eliminate serious disease outbreak, whether occurring naturally, or as result of bio-terrorism.

Climate change

Energy security

Policy challenge

Local communities; Police Constabularies, including the Met.

Local authorities and local emergency services; transport authorities; local media.

Local authorities; regional government offices; private sector companies in key infrastructure sectors and throughout economy; community groups.

UK-based development, aid, and poverty reduction NGOs.

Energy companies; energy consumers.

Individual businesses and business groups; Local Authorities; energy consumers

Sub-national

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Issue

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UK bilateral relationships

Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat; Health Protection Agency. Possibly the armed forces as aid to civil power. Border police. National media. Home Office; Cabinet Office; Intelligence Services; Serious and Organised Crime Agency; Border Police; Transport Police. FCO for assistance on source country policy (e.g. in West Africa).

Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat; Home Office; BERR; Confederation of British Industry/Institute of Directors.

DfID, FCO, Treasury.

DEFRA, BERR, FCO.

Arrangements with individual countries on extradition and joint investigation teams.

Forward activity in possible source countries, such as Vietnam and other countries in South East Asia.

With supplier countries (Norway, Russia, Nigeria, Algeria, Caspian Sea region and others).

Department for Environment, United States, India, China Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), BERR, Environment Agency.

UK national

Global Corporations; UN (on some issues, such as space infrastructure).

World Bank; IMF; WTO; increasingly important private foundations.

OPEC, International Energy Agency

Kyoto Process; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

Global

Europol; EU for use of wider economic policy instruments aimed at tackling international corruption.

Interpol

EU public health coordination World Health Organisation

EU coordination on critical national infrastructure issues

EU (trade and aid policy)

EU

EU (Emissions Trading Scheme)

Euro/Atlantic regional