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Background Briefing: Thaksin in Cambodia Carlyle A. Thayer November 10, 2009
[client name deleted] Question: I would like to have your opinion on the Thailand ‐ Cambodia tension over ex‐Thai PM Thaksin. What do you think about Hun Sen's offer to Thaksin? What will Hun Sen gain from this? And what's Thaksin's strategy? Some Thai newspapers said the two have had many business dealings in the past, is it true? Answer: Prime Minister Hun Sen’s appointment of ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra as his economic adviser is an appalling decision that will inflame Thai‐Cambodian relations. Thaksin has been convicted in a Thai court for violating conflict of interest and sentenced to two years in prison. Hun Sen has denounced the decision of the Thai court as “politically motivated.” This amounts to interference in Thailand’s internal affairs. Thailand has indicated it would seek Thaksin’s extradition while Cambodia has stated it would refuse the request. Hun Sen is in fact giving sanctuary to a fugitive. His actions have caused Thailand to withdraw its ambassador to Cambodia. And the Thai Cabinet has retaliated by refusing to proceed further with the joint offshore development of oil and gas reserves in the Gulf of Thailand. Hun Sen’s action is a tit‐for‐tat response to Thailand’s hosting of Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy in September. During his visit to Bangkok Sam Rainsy criticized the Hun Sen government’s human rights record and relations with Vietnam. Hun Sen is sending a message to the Thai government to refrain from such action in the future. But Hun Sen’s action is also designed to bolster his standing among the Cambodian public as a nationalist leaders who is defending Cambodia’s sovereignty against Thailand. In fact both Cambodia and Thailand are in conflict over territory surrounding Preah Vihear Temple. Hun Sen is stoking the fires of nationalism for his personal political benefit. Thaksin’ strategy is to keep his name and image in the news as an international statesman with expertise in economics. This will embolden his “red shirt” supporters in Thailand. Although Thaksin will not live in Cambodia permanently, he can use Cambodia as a political base for a possible return to power after the next election. Thaksin’s presence in Cambodia will add to the problems of political stability in Thailand and undermine the government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.
2 When Thaksin was Prime Minister he offered to invest in Koh Kong province with the aim of converting it into Cambodia’s “Hong Kong.” Thaksin reportedly invested in Cambodia’s telecommunications and gambling industries. The precise financial details are not known but they are assumed by many analysts to be substantial.
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Year
Vietnam Defence Budget as percent of GDP, 2001‐07 (in billion U.S. dollars) VPA Size Defence Budget GDP DB as % of GDP (DB)
2001
484,000
2.6
33
7.9
2002
484,000
2.9
34
8.5
2003
484,000
3.2
39
8.2
2004
484,000
3.17
45.4
7.0
2005
455,000
3.15
52.2
6.0
2006
455,000
3.43
61.1
5.6
2007
455,000
3.73
71.2
5.2
Source: International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (2000‐01 to 2007‐08).
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The chart below compares estimates by Australia's Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) and the International Institute of Strategic Studies of recent defence funding.
Chart 1 Vietnam’s Defence Funding, 2001‐2007 (in billion U.S. dollars)
Source: Defence Intelligence Organisation, Defence Economic Trends in the Asia‐Pacific, (2008), and International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance (2001‐02 to 2007‐08). Increasing the defence budget by 100 million dong would not add appreciably to defence’s coffers. In 2007, Vietnam’s defence budget was around 60 trillion dong.