Takeyh - Hidden Iran (2006) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper XXXIX: December 3, 2007, 7:00 p.m. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2006). Introduction: Getting Iran Wrong. The representation of Iran as part of an “axis of evil” is wrong (1-2). The Islamic Republic is not and never has been an authoritarian state, but rather “a fiercely competitive political culture,” one whose structure has perplexed Western understanding (2). Iran is currently “in search of an identity” (3). The best way to understand Iran is to consider “three competing elements―Islamic ideology, national interests, and factional politics―constantly at battle” (4-6). “Iran has not undergone the typical experience of a revolutionary state” because ideological and factional drives remain strong (6). The clerical regime (“the hidden Iran”) must be demystified if the West is to find an effective approach to the Islamic Republic (7). Ch. 1: Khomeini’s Legacy. Ahmadinejad’s election in June 2005 was a testimony to Khomeini’s enduring legacy (9-10). Khomeini’s “imaginative and effective” innovativeness as a political thinker: he regarded politics as part of the essence of Islam (10-15). Khomeini considered the West perennially hostile to Islamic civilization (15-18). His ambitions always transcended Iran (18-20). In 19791981, “Iran’s defining moment,” Khomeini and his followers imposed their vision despite great secular opposition by being “more ardent in their faith, more manipulative in their conduct, and more merciless in their retaliations” (21 & 23; 20-24). The U.S. embassy hostage crisis helped Khomeini resist Westernization at a key period when the constitution was being written (24-26). Iraq’s invasion of Iran on Sept. 22, 1980, was a “blessing” for the fundamentalists, as Khomeini said; it enabled him to force out President BaniSadr, persecute clergy who embraced traditional Shiite quietism, and terrorize the secular opposition, many of whom were executed (26; 26-28). But Khomeini

did not succeed completely in imposing Shiite Islam as the dogma of the state―partly, paradoxically, because of the pluralistic, independent-minded traditions of Shiism (28-30). Ch. 2: Conservatives, Pragmatists, and Reformers. A struggle for power after Khomeini’s death on Jun. 6, 1989 (3132). Hardliners, who prevailed, with the militantly conservative Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as Supreme Leader, and the 125,000 Revolutionary Guards; Ahmadinejad is of this faction (32-36). Their economic attitudes are backward (3639). The pragmatists, under Rafsanjani, who was president 1989-1997, emphasize economic performance and cultural freedom (39-44). The reformers, whose most important voice has been Khatami, president (winning 69% of the vote) from 1997 to 2005, advocate the rule of law and individual sovereignty (44-46). Most effectively articulated by Abdol Karim Soroush, a professor at Tehran University, who elaborated a theory of collective rationality as the basis for a “religious state” (as opposed to a “religious jurisprudence state” (46-48). Mohsen Kadivar also produced a religious critique of Khomeini’s vision and emphasized republican elections as the source of legitimacy (48-51). Hardliners were shocked by reformers’ victory; they then counterattacked “cynically” (52). U.S. and post-2001 situation contributed to reformers’ defeat by hardliners, ever the only beneficiaries of U.S. calls for more democracy in Iran (52-54). The future is murky; “the only pathway out of the Islamic Republic’s current impasse is the restoration of the original draft of the Islamic Republic’s constitution, which pledged separation of powers, a strong presidency, and a clear demarcation of responsibilities for the elected institutions” (56; 54-57).

Ch. 3: Iran’s Place in the Greater Middle East. History, culture, ideology, demography, and religion are at play in Iran in multiple spheres (Persian Gulf, Arab East, Eurasia) (59-60). Iran’s self-concept as natural hegemon is based on history (61-63). In the Persian Gulf it has moved from radicalism to a “good neighbor” policy (63-70). In the Arab East, opposition to Israel and hostility to Egypt have been enduring (70-76). Its strategy in the Eurasian region is dictated by pragmatic national interests (82). Ch. 4: Turning Points in U.S.-Iranian Relations. An account of the U.S. overthrow of Mossadeq that mitigates U.S. culpability (85-95). Account of the hostage crisis emphasizes that it violated Shiite principles as well as international law (95103). Iran-Contra (103-10). The U.S. failed to respond to Khatami’s 1998 “Dialogue of Civilizations” initiative (110-16). Ch. 5: Under the Shadow of September 11. In the aftermath of 9/11, Iran readjusted its policy toward the U.S. (118-24). But in the U.S. hardliners took the position that Iran was beyond the pale, which was “nearly inevitable,” given the situation (124-30). But the younger generation of conservatives in Iran does not share their elders’ preoccupation with the U.S. (131-34). Ch. 6: Along the Nuclear Precipice. Takeyh begins his discussion by asking “Why does Iran want the bomb?” (135, also 140, in caps as section heading; this assumes Iran is lying in its denials, which Takeyh doesn’t bother to report. So his use of the expression “nuclear ambitions” will be read by most as referring to weapons as opposed to its civilian nuclear program. Takeyh believes Iran is committed to seeking the bomb and he doesn’t bother trying to demonstrate why―you learn little from him about Iran’s nuclear program. His sources are press accounts and a few out-of-date books. He contents himself with this assertion: “it is customary to suggest that Iran is determined to manufacture the bomb” (140), and speaks

without qualification of “Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons (140); cf. “For many of the Islamic Republic’s reactionary leaders, the only way to safeguard Iran’s interests is to develop an independent nuclear deterrent” (149)). Early program (135-40). The rationality of Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons (140-46). Internal debate in Iran (146-54). Iranian public opinion supports the nuclear program (154-58). Iran is at a crossroads; Takeyh calls for “a realistic engagement strategy” on the part of the U.S., and does not discuss at all the possibility of a military attack on Iran (15860). Ch. 7: Iran’s New Iraq. Paradoxically, Iran and the U.S. now have convergent interests in Iraq (161-63). Iran-Iraq relations before the Revolution (163-67). The Iran-Iraq war; Takeyh suggests that it was the shooting down of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes in July 1988 that let Iran to end the war (174; 167-77). Iran’s attitude toward Iraq is principally strategic and pragmatic (177-87). Ch. 8: Israel and the Politics of Terrorism. “It is Iran’s opposition to the State of Israel that has entangled it in the unsavory world of terrorism” (190; 189-91). Early on Israel engaged Iran, stimulating opposition within in Iran as well as antiSemitism (191-95). Khomeini’s animosity became Iranian policy and its incendiary nature produced terrorism (195-202). Islamic Jihad (202-04); Hezbollah (written before the outcome of the Lebanon war was clear) (204-06). Khatami’s presidency raised the hope that Iran would renounce terrorism (207-15). Conclusion: Getting Iran Right. Complex history since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (217-19). Iran is “a state that is neither revolutionary nor fully pragmatic” (219). Regime is a “chimera” that must be set aside (220). U.S. policies of containment and “linkage” have failed (220-21). Argues for a “paradigm shift” and a comprehensive approach (221-22). Three-track negotiating strategy recommended: nuclear program,

terrorism, Iraq (222-24). Improving IsraelIran relations depends on this (224-25). History shows that Iran can be influenced by “diplomatic pressure and economic incentives” (224-26). The Islamic Republic is a “problem to be managed,” not solved; the best approach is “a subtle policy of selective engagement” (226). Notes. 18 pp. Acknowledgments. Colleagues at the Council on Foreign Relations; Iran scholars; literary agent, Larry Weissman, and editor, Paul Golob, who reorganized the book. Wife Suzanne, newborn son Alex. Index. 13 pp. [On the Author. Born in Iran in 1966. Ph.D. from Oxford. In late 1990s taught history at Eastern Illinois Univ., but has suppressed this from his biography, which mentions only the National War College, the National Defense University, Yale, and U.C. Berkeley. Senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, under whose auspices this book is published. Has worked at Martin Indyk’s Wash. Inst. for Near East Policy. Has often appeared

before congressional committees. Writes for the mainstream media; lives in Washington, D.C. Is presently on the faculty of M.I.T. (Center for International Studies, “Seminar XXI”). Has also written The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The U.S., Britain, and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953-1957 (St. Martin’s Press, 2000) and The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam (Praeger, 2004). Working on a book to be entitled The Guardians of the Revolution: Iran’s Approach to the World. NOTE: A superficial reading of Takeyh’s career suggests that he left academia to enlist in (or was recruited to) the stable of intellectuals serving the U.S. national security state; therein, he is a voice in favor of an approach involving diplomatic pressure and economic incentives, and opposing direct U.S. intervention or even the promotion of democracy. He has many insights to offer on Iran and the notes to his book are useful, but his account of U.S.Iran relations would seem invariably to comfort U.S. positions and neglect or downplay American hegemonic policies, interventionism, etc., particularly in ch. 48.]