Keddie - Modern Iran, Rev. Ed. (2003) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: May 22, 2006, 7:00 p.m. Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003). With a section by Yann Richard. Revised, updated ed. of Roots of Revolution (1981). List of Illustrations. Preface. New edition contains “three new chapters covering events since 1979, correction of a few points . . ., and a new conclusion, preface, and revised bibliography and footnotes” (xi). “I try for balance but make no secret of my dislike of clerical rule but also of any plan for outside intervention to overthrow it. I have confidence in the Iranian people’s abilities to manage their own affairs in the long run” (xii). Preface to the [March] 1981 edition of Roots of Revolution. Graduate assistants; publisher; fellowships; Ch. 1: Religion and Society to 1800. —Background. Geographic, ethnic, religious (1-3). —Islam and Society. Origins of Shi’ism (3-6). Three lines: “Fivers,” “Seveners,” and “Twelvers” (7). The “doctrine of occultation” (7-8). Development of mujtahids, scholars trained to make judgments (9). The Safavid dynasty, which “largely created” the antagonism between Sunnism & Twelver Shi’ism (1014). The role of ulama (clergy) (15-17). A “virtually uninterrupted philosophical tradition” (17-18). Economic & agricultural decline in 18th c. accompanies growth of religious influence (19-20). Rich cultural tradition (21). Ch. 2: Foundations of NineteenthCentury Iran. Western trade (22). Qajars; incursions of Turkish tribes (2324). Titles purchased, not inherited (25). Bureaucracy & taxes (26). Military (2728). The Shi’i ulama, with strong ties to the bazaaris (28-30). Position of women

(30-33). Religious minorities (33). Growing influence of foreigners (34-36). Ch. 3: Continuity and Change under the Qajars: 1796-1890. The Zands preceded the Qajars (37). Napoleonic wars lead to British & French alliances; Qajars want Georgia (38). Qanats (3940). Qa’em Maqam’s linguistic simplification (40). Failure of army modernization (40-41). Russo-Iranian Treaty of Turkomanchai, 1828 (41-42). Killing of Griboyedov & his mission shows anti-foreign passions (42-43). Death of Abbas Mirza in 1833; foreign influence grows (42-45). Babi movement (45-47). Azalis and Baha’is (48). Amir Kabir, reforming minister (49). Economic changes (50-53). European drive for concessions, esp. in 1872 to “the British subject Baron Julius de Reuter” for RRs, minerals, irrigation works, a national bank, and industrial & agricultural projects (54-57). Ch. 4: Protest and Revolution: 18901914. Ulama emerges as effective opposition to foreign exploitation (58-60). Revolutionary movement, 1891-92, forces cancellation of tobacco concession to a Briton, Wolff (61-62). Opposition to shah grows (63-67). Constitutional revolution, 1906-11 (67-71). Oil concession to William Knox D’Arcy (72). Ch. 5: War and Reza Shah: 19141941. —1914-1921. Russians dominate north, British the south, giving impetus to nationalism (73-75). Iranian demands ignored at Versailles Peace Conference (76). British act as if unratified AngloPersian Treaty of 1919 in force (77-78). Iran appeals to U.S. for backing and aid (79).

—1921-1925. Sepahdar govt. overthrown; Russo-Iranian Treaty of 1921 signed (80-81). Reza Khan, Cossack leader, emerges as strong man (82-83). U.S./Standard Oil influence (83-84). Reza Khan overthrows Qajar dynasty (85-87). —1925-1941. Authoritarian modernization & reform, but no agrarian reform (88-99). Force unveiling of women, 1936 (100). Continued British influence; growing German influence, and Reza Shah “not averse” to Nazis (101). Modern bourgeoisie created (102). Presiding ethos: “a militant form of secular nationalism” (103-04). Ch. 6: World War II and Mosaddeq: 1941-1953. —World War II, 1941-1945. Allies force Reza Shah to cede kingdom to son, Mohammad Reza (105). U.S. expands influence (106-09). Oil (109-10). Period of ferment (110). —Postwar Socioeconomic Problems. Radical movements grow in north: the Tudeh (‘masses’) party, opposed by antiCommunism (111-14). Taxes; social injustice (114-17). Economic backwardness (118-19). Intelligentsia (119). Dissatisfied social groups (11920). The Seven Year Plan (121-23). —The Oil Crisis and Mosaddeq. Renegotiations with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; emergence of Mossadeq, who nationalizes oil (123-26). Failed attempt to dismiss Mossadeq (126-27). MI6- & CIA-engineered coup; U.S. seen not only as an enemy but as a betrayer (128-31). Ch. 7: Royal Dictatorship: 19531977. —General Character of the Period. U.S. power grows, but Iranians’ faith in U.S. declines (132-33). Shah grow more dictatorial and more of a modernizer (133-34). SAVAK set up in 1957 (134). Growing gap between masses and the elite (135). —1954-1960. Opposition persecuted (135-36). Int’l oil consortium agrees to share profits 50-50 (136-37). Economic

development (137-39). Pseudo-two-party system (140). —1960-1963. Fraudulent elections; political problems; U.S. pressures for reform (141-45). Ayatollah Khomeini & the 1963 riots; developing religious opposition neither entirely reactionary nor entirely progressive (146-48). —Reform, Boom, and Bust: 1963-1977. “Building up of a predominant state capitalism, undermining of semifeudal forms of landownership . . . and encouragement and subsidy to private capitalists” (148-61). Changes in wealth distribution; oil grows in importance (161-63; 165). Shah made “policeman of the Gulf” (163-64). Social developments (166-69). [24 photographs.] Ch. 8: Modern Iranian Political Thought. —Intellectual and Literary Trends to 1960 (N. Keddie). Pahlavi period produced “two-cultures” (elite/mass) phenomenon (170). Ta’ziyeh, or “passion plays” (17072). Poetry (172). Iran has always had reformist thinking (172-73). Cultural influence of travelers (174). Secularism within the religious tradition (175-77). Idealization of past as nationalist theme (177-78). And Westernization (178-79). Anti-Western ulama (179-80). Constitutionalism (180-81). Left thought (181). Literature as a vehicle for social & political thought (182-84). Political philosophy (185-87). “Thus we arrive at the perhaps startling conclusion that the main lines of Iran’s literature and political thought in the past century have been radically different from the culture most visible after 1979” (187). —Contemporary Shi’i Thought (Yann Richard). Denunciation of “Westoxication” by Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) (189-90). Khomeini (19193). Ayatollah Shariatmadari, a moderate constitutionalist (193-95). Progressive tendencies in Mahmud Taleqani (d. 1979) (195-98). Lay thinkers: Mehdi Bazargan (198-200); books by Ali Shariati, regarding Western

democracy as rotten in practice (money) and in principle (false promise of equality), sold by hundreds of thousands (200-08); Abolhasan Bani Sadr (208-12). —Conclusion (N. Keddie). Themes frequently reappearing in Iranian political thought: anti-imperialism, a simplistic tendency, secularism and anticlericalism in tension with Islamic thought (212-13). Ch. 9: The Revolution. —Secular and Guerilla Opposition Forces. Open opposition emerges, 1977 (21417). Students (218-19). Guerrilla groups (219-22). —The “Religious Opposition” and the Revolution. Analysis of events and actors in the Iranian Revolution (222-39). Ch. 10: Politics and Economics under Khomeini: 1979-1989. Domination of institutions by Khomeinists, 1979-1983 (241-50). War; social & political developments; “[i]ncreasingly in the postrevolution period, political and economic power was concentrated n the hands of the Khomeinist clergy and the bazaar bourgeoisie” (251-56). Women (257). Foreign policy (258-60). Khomeini dismisses designated successor Montazeri, acts to strengthen state, revising constitution in 1989 to increase the political and decrease the religious nature of the faqih (260-61). Khomeini died June 3, 1989 (261). Khamenei’s succession (261-62). Ch. 11: Politics and Economics in Post-Khomeini Iran. Rafsanjani, a pragmatist (263-67). Khatami and the reform movement (268-76). Reaction (277-81). Reformist movement “in transition”; uncertain future (281-82). (U.S. hostility (282-83). Ch. 12: Society, Gender, Culture, and Intellectual Life. Record of success in education and public health (285-90). Repressive puritanism (290). Young people: frustrations (291).

Women’s rights show all the contradictions of the revolution (292-97). Arts have excelled especially in cinema: Kiarostami, Makhmalbaf, etc. (297-301). Intellectual life dominated by critique of status quo (302-04). Abdolkarim Soroush, eclectic thinker (b. 1945) (30506). Mohammad Shabestari (b. 1936), stresses interpretation (307). Mohsen Kadivar criticizes velayat-e faqih (30809). Criticism of clerical rule now common even among clerics, at every level (310-11). Minorities (311-15). Conclusion: Iran exemplifies the phenomenon of unintended consequences: “Secular ideas are probably stronger in Iran than anywhere else in the Muslim world” (316). Conclusion. Modernization began in the 19th century and continued more rapidly in the 20th, including under the Islamic Republic, in a country that first found “relative unity” in the 16th century under the Safavid dynasty (317-18). The rise of Islamism “was largely in reaction to the failures of nationalism and communism as foci of opposition” (319). Iran’s strategic position and oil wealth have made “outside powers” a crucial theme of modern history (320). Attitudes toward heir role, and the development of thought about political Islam, will be crucial for future events (320-21). “It seems probable that secularism . . . is more popular than it appears under current limits on free speech . . . The largely negative experience of clerical government summarized in this book has created a change, or even reversal, of former attitudes among many Iranians” (321). “While political predictions are usually wrong and the current Iranian situation is so complex both internally and externally that very little can be predicted with confidence, past Iranian experience indicates that Iranians are unlikely in the long run either to tolerate a vastly unpopular government or to let foreigners control Iran’s destiny. Iran’s history of increasing modernization,

comprising industrialization, urbanization, the great spread of modern education and health systems and of awareness of a variety of ideas, and new independence for girls and women despite external controls, along with Iran’s extraordinary modern history of effective popular movements, give reason to hope that better government is in Iran’s future. U.S. intervention would risk tainting internal processes that should be given time to play out” (322).

Notes. 31 pp. Select Bibliography. General (31 books); Iran: 1400-1796 (13); The Qajar Period: 1796-1925 (37); The Pahlavi Period: 1925-1979 (77); Intellectual Trends: Political, Religious, and Literary (30); 1979-2003 (55); Supplement (3). Index. 13 pp.