Pape - Dying To Win (2005) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: August 15, 2005, 7:00 p.m. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005). Précis of Dying to Win INTRODUCTION Ch. 1: The Growing Threat.. Author has compiled world’s first “database of every suicide bombing and attack around the globe from 1980 through 2003 ― 315 attacks in all” (3). “The data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions. . . . Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland” (4). Important that Americans understand this growing phenomenon (4-7). Ch. 2: Explaining Suicide Terrorism. Caveat: these conclusions do not hold for terrorism in general (8-9). Terms: demonstrative terrorism seeks publicity, destructive terrorism seeks coercion through threat of injury and death and mobilize support, suicide terrorism distinguished by attacker’s actually killing himself or herself along with others, generally as part of a campaign (9-11). Ancient Jewish Zealots (1112; see also 33-34). 11th-12th c. Ismaili Assassins (12-13; see also 34-35). Japanese kamikazes (13). No suicide terrorism 19451980 (13-14; see also 35-37). Modern suicide terrorism began in Lebanon in the 1980s (14). Tamil Tigers (July 1990), Israel (1994), Persian Gulf (1995), Turkey (1996), Chechnya (2000), Kashmir (2000), U.S. (2001) (14-15). Five campaigns ongoing in early 2004 (15-16). Traditional explanations focus on individual motives, but fail to explain the specificity of suicide terrorism (16-17). Economic explanation “poor” (1719). Explanation as a form of competition between radical groups dubious (19-20). Alternative explanation of the “causal logic of suicide terrorism”: at the strategic level, suicide terrorism exerts coercive power against democratic states to cease occupation of territory terrorists consider homeland, at the social level it depends on mass support, and at the individual level it is

motivated by altruism (20-23). “The bottom line, then, is that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation” (23, emphasis added). PART I: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM Ch. 3: A Strategy for Weak Actors. The willingness of an attacker to die has strategic value (27-29). As a weapon of weak groups incapable of “denial” as a “coercive strategy,” suicide terrorism relies on punishment and, especially, “the expectation of future damage” for coercive leverage (2933). Ch. 4: Targeting Democracies. Pape’s is the first complete analysis of suicide terrorism, and as such reveals that not religion but “to compel democracies to withdraw military forces from the terrorists’ national homeland” is its key (38). Patterns of timing (39-41), nationalist goals (42-44), and the targeting of democracies (44-45) reveal its logical, not irrational, nature. “At bottom, suicide terrorism is a strategy for national liberation from foreign military occupation by a democratic state” (45). Foreign occupation defined (46). Target selection suggests nationalist, not religious, aims (46-47). Hamas (47-51). Al-Qaeda (5158). Harshness of occupation does not strongly correlate with suicide terrorism (5860). Ch. 5: Learning Terrorism Pays. Terrorists are predisposed to attribute success to the technique whenever plausible (62-64). “[R]ecent suicide terrorist campaigns . . . are associated with gains for the terrorists’ political causes about half the time” (64-65). Hamas’s success is difficult to evaluate, but Hamas believes in their own success (65-73). Terrorists learn from each other; thus the spread of the method is neither irrational nor surprising (73-75). But suicide terrorism has failed “to compel target democracies to abandon goals central to national wealth or security” (75-76).

PART II: THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM Ch. 6: Occupation and Religious Difference. “the taproot of suicide terrorism is nationalism” not religion (79). It is “an extreme strategy for national liberation” (80, emphasis added). This explains how the local community can be persuaded to re-define acts of suicide and murder as acts of martyrdom on behalf of the community (81-83). A nationalist theory of suicide terrorism, seen from the point of view of terrorists: occupation (83-84), homeland (84-85), identity (85-87), religious difference as a contributor to a sense of “alien” occupation (87-88), foreign occupation reverses the relative importance of religion and language (88-92), a widespread perception of “last resort” (9294). Statistical demonstration of a “linear” rather than “self-reinforcing spiral” explanation of suicide terrorism is best (94100). However, different future developments are very possible, and more study of the role of religion is needed (101). Ch. 7: Demystifying al-Qaeda. With increasing knowledge of al-Qaeda, we see that “the presence of American military forces for combat operations on the homeland territory of the suicide terrorists is stronger than Islamic fundamentalism in predicting whether individuals from that country will become al-Qaeda suicide terrorists” (103). “Al-Qaeda is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues . . . than a cross-national military alliance of national liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat” (104). The complex nature of Salafism, a Sunni form of Islamic fundamentalism (105-07). Statistical analysis fails to corroborate Salafismterrorism connection, but does corroborate connection to U.S. military policies in the Persian Gulf (107-17). Al-Qaeda propaganda emphasizes “Crusader” theme, which is inherently related to occupation (117-24). Concludes that “the core features of alQaeda” are captured by the theory (125). Ch. 8: Suicide Terrorist Organizations around the Globe. Examination of other campaigns to see if the “dynamics that make religious difference important” are present in other terrorist campaigns; difficulty of inquiry

acknowledged (126-29). Lebanon (129-39). Sri Lanka (139-54). Sikhs in Punjab (154-62). Kurdish PKK in Turkey (162-66). Conclusion: “Religion plays a role in suicide terrorism, but mainly in the context of national resistance” and not Islam per se but “the dynamics of religious difference” are what matter (16667). PART III: THE INDIVIDUAL LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM Ch. 9: Altruism and Terrorism. Durkheimian analysis of suicide (173-79). “Many acts of suicide terrorism are a murderous form of what Durkheim calls altruistic suicide” (179). Analytical difficulties (180-81). Suicide rates in general (181-84). Team suicide, frequent in suicide terrorism, is an indicator of altruistic suicide (185-87). Altruistic suicide is socially constructed (187-88): e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon (188-91), Hamas (191-93), Tamil Tigers (193-95); al-Qaeda (195-96). The altruistic nature of suicide terrorism suggests the number of potential terrorists is large, that it can grow in attractiveness, and that profiling will miss a substantial number (19798). Ch. 10: The Demographic Profile of Suicide Terrorists. “In general, suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically insane, or economically destitute individuals, but are most often educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people who could be expected to have a good future” (200). Data-gathering (201-02). 462 individuals in “universe” (203). Hezbollah suicide bombers 1982-1986 71% Christian, 21% Communist/Socialist, 8% Islamist (204-07). Mostly in early 20s (20708). Females fewer in Islamist groups: “Islamist fundamentalism may actually reduce the number of suicide terrorists by discouraging certain categories of individuals” (208-09). Female suicide terrorists tend to be older than male (20910). There is no documented mental illness in any case of suicide terrorism, but 16 cases of personal trauma (loss of loved one) (21011). Of Arab suicide terrorists, they are better educated than average and from working or middle classes (211-16). “[T]hey resemble the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots

movement more than they do wayward adolescents or religious fanatics” (216).

Appendix I: Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980-2003. 18 campaigns.

Ch. 11: Portraits of Three Suicide Terrorists. Earlier work has tended to emphasize suicide terrorists’ irrationality, but this fit 1980s data better than more recent data (217-20). Mohammed Atta (220-26). Dhanu, a young woman from Jaffa, “the most famous Tamil Tiger suicide bomber” (22630). Saeed Hotari, Hamas (231-34).

Appendix II: Occupations by Democratic States, 1980-2003. 58 listed (265-67).

CONCLUSION Ch. 12: A New Strategy for Victory. Though “we” cannot leave the Middle East altogether, a “strategy for victory” is available (237-38). U.S. should define victory as the separate objectives of “defeating the current pool of terrorists” and preventing a new generation from arising (238-39). Rejects Frum-Perle view that the problem is in Islam (241-44). “Rather, the taproot is American military policy” (244, emphasis added). Islamic fundamentalism as bent on world domination is “pure fantasy” (244-45). An attempt to transform Muslim societies “is likely to dramatically increase the threat we face” (245). Calls for “‘off-shore’ balancing”: alliances with capacity for rapid deployment (247-50). Acknowledgments. Chaim Kaufmann, Ken Feldman, John Mearsheimer.

Appendix III: Salafism in Major Sunni Muslim Majority Countries. 34 countries with Sunni majority populations of 1m or more. Salafism defined as “the belief that society should be organized according to the Quran and Sunna only” (269). Sunni Countries with Salafi-Influenced Populations: Afghanistan (10m Pushtuns); Algeria (19m/31m Sunni Muslims); Bangladesh (14m/114m); Egypt (23m/62m); Indonesia (26m/185m); Jordan (2m/6m); Nigeria (37m/68m); Oman (2m/2m); Pakistan (43m/149m); Saudi Arabia (18m/18m); Somalia (5m/10m); Sudan (21m/21m); Tunisia (5m/10m); Yemen (8m/11m) (27074). Non-Salafi Sunni Countries: Albania, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan (274-77). Notes. 38 pp. Index. 19 pp. About the Author. Associate prof. of political science at Univ. of Chicago; director of the Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism. Writes “on coercive airpower, economic sanctions, international moral action, and the politics of unipolarity” (337). Has taught at Dartmouth & the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies.