PANEL 1: (CHRIS' NAME) MAIN QUESTIONS (See Workplan): 1. Prior to September 11, 2001, what did the U.S. aviation security systems know about terrorist threat to civil aviation? How did the different elements of the system respond to any such information in their possession? 2. What aviation security policies and procedures were in effect as of September 11, 2001? How did these measures comply with relevant laws and regulations? What was known of the effectiveness of this system, and how was this measured? 3. What were the major policy and budgetary priorities for civil aviation security prior to 0/11/01? How was security prioritized among other aviation policy considerations? What risk management techniques were used in making aviation security determinations? How did financing of the aviation security system impact the system?
QUESTIONS BY WITNESS: Jane Garvey (Former FAA Administrator) 1) When you came to the FAA as administrator what was your assessment of the Aviation Security System and its effectiveness? By what means and what criteria was effectiveness measured? What did you see as the security system's biggest shortcomings? 2) Did you establish a formal agenda for improving the security system? Did this agenda include formal goals, benchmarks and timelines? What were your priorities and why? 3) How did you stay up-to-date with respect to both the general effectiveness of the aviation security system and specific terrorist threats to aviation security? What was the process by which you received aviation security information, alerts and updates? From what agencies and internal personnel did you receive this information? 4) When you received security system warnings or improvement recommendations either from the Inspector General, the GAO or other sources, what was the process for responding to the alert and considering the recommendations? What criteria were used in determining whether to implement the suggestions?
5) How specifically did FAA weigh security in relation to competing agendas relative to its mission, including security vs. cost containment? What was the organizational attitude in the FAA with respect to security vis a vis other priorities when you arrived? What was your philosophy and how was that implemented? 6) What was the role of the industry in decision-making about security matters? 7) What exactly did you know about the nature and timing of terrorist threats prior to September 11, 2001? What actions did you take in response to this information? 8) Where were you when the incident occurred and what did you do? 9) Were your actions and responses following the incident guided by any prepared protocol, or did you have to react spontaneously using your best judgment? 10) After 9/11, what steps did the FAA take to ascertain the facts about how precisely the aviation security system functioned with respect to the hijackings? What analytical, corrective and disciplinary actions were taken in response? 11) There are reports that an executive summary exists describing activity in the FAA Command Center on 9/11 and suggestions that the report includes indications there was a gun on one of the planes. What do you know about this report? Kenneth Mead (Inspector General, Department of Transportation) 1) At a Congressional hearing on September 25, 2001 you said the following: The Department of Transportation Inspector General and the GAO "have issued numerous reports identifying weaknesses in the aviation security system and recommending corrective action. Many of these weaknesses are still present and need to be addressed without delay." What were the biggest weaknesses you identified in the Aviation Security System prior to 9/11? 2) Why were problems in the system so persistent? 3) Over the 12 years you audited aviation security under the auspices of the GAO and as Inspector General how would you describe the Department of Transportation and the FAA's responsiveness to your aviation security audits, alerts and recommendations?
4) To what extent does the statement you made at the September 25, 2001 hearing still apply? 5) What was the Department's formal process for addressing problems you raised and for considering the corrective actions you recommended? 6) In your view, were there any recommendations you made as Inspector General that the FAA did not implement or insufficiently implemented, that if adopted would likely have stopped the hijackings from occurring?