T7 B6 Tsa Materials Re Joint Inquiry Fdr- Memo- Response To Joint Inquiry 365

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community's Programs in Light of the Events of September 11th, 2001. The Department of Transportation welcomes and supports this inquiry and is happy to provide all relevant information and witnesses to support it. It is important, however, from the onset to note that the Department of Transportation is not part of the Intelligence Community, per se and that neither the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) prior to November 18th 2001, nor the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which has been responsible for aviation security since that date, have any intelligence collection program and that those activities which might be characterized as "dissemination" and analysis, have been quite specialized, of limited scope and have related specifically to the administration of aviation security programs. Both FAA and, now, the TSA have been customers of the Intelligence Community (1C). They have received both finished intelligence products and current reporting and used that information in the formation of aviation security policy and the management of aviation security programs to deter, prevent, and respond to threats to the flying public by criminal elements, to include terrorists. In the past the FAA, and more recently the TSA, made distribution of 1C approved releases of information for use by subordinate elements or regulated parties based upon intelligence reporting. The majority of such releases were at the unclassified level although there was some protection of such information as "Sensitive Security Information" the distribution of which was on an operational, aviation security, need to know basis, hi a limited number of occasions the FAA Office of Intelligence made approved distributions of sanitized, but still classified, information to properly cleared representatives of U.S. airlines or airports. Likewise with analysis, the activity has involved both specialized analysis of the intelligence received, but also analysis of security information and programs. The Transportation Security Administration has assumed the functions of aviation security, to include responsibility for the receipt and use of intelligence information in the protection of all modes of transportation. Furthermore as TSA assumes direct federal responsibility for airline passenger, baggage and cargo screening in the United States proper and establishes a federal law enforcement presence at the nation's airports, it will become involved in the both the generation and use of law enforcement information at a local level which will be substantially beyond the prior involvement of the FAA. In responding to specific questions and requests, the abbreviation ACI is used for the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence. TSIS is used for its successor organization, The Transportation Security Intelligence Service.

QUESTIONS AND REQUESTS Did your agency have any information prior to September 11, 2001, to suggest that international terrorists planned an imminent attack on a target or targets in the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

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Answer: No. ACI was in receipt of general information concerning the activities ofUsama bin Laden, al-Qaida and other reporting of various types from the 1C on terrorist activity around the •world. However, ACIhad no information that suggested an imminent attack was planned by international terrorists in the United States, and certainly not against aviation. 2.

Did your agency have information prior to September 11,2001, to suggest that international terrorist cells were operating within the United States? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

Answer: Yes. ACI received 1C products that address the transnational threat in the United States prior to September 11, 2001. Based on this information ACI produced various products for internal use and also obtained approved releases of sanitized information which was used to inform regulated parties of the threat situation. Examples of ACI use of such information include the threat portion of Security Directives and a variety of other products. One product of special note was a domestic threat assessment that was produced following the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. This assessment was fully coordinated with both the FBI and CIA, was geared toward the needs of aviation security elements and served as a baseline guide in evaluating the threat to domestic commercial aviation. All of this information will be made available to the Joint Inquiry Staff, upon request and passage of appropriate clearances to include documentation of exemption from Third Agency and Originator Control restrictions.

3.

Did your agency have any information on the hijackers1 involved in the attacks before September 11, 2001? If so, please set this information aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

Answer: On September 4, 2001, ACI received a cable from the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding the detention on immigration charges and the initial investigation ofZacharias Moussaoui. The cable does not indicate Moussaoui was involved in terrorist operational planning in the United States. After September 11th, , the agency learned that six of the 19 hijackers, held airmen or medical certificates, and/ or had attended aviation training. 4.

Please set aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry any information your agency has obtained since September 11, 2001 about the hijackers (e.g. their backgrounds, their prior involvement in terrorist activities, their admittance into the U.S., their activities while in the U.S.).

Answer: TSIS Files on the hijackers will be provided for review upon request. These files are active working files and therefore will not be set aside. Please include Zacharias Moussaoui whenever information is requested herein for information on the "hijackers." 1

Copies of the airman certification and similar information on Moussaoui and the hijackers who came to our attention after the fact have been furnished to the FBI and Department of Justice as part of the ongoing investigation and the prosecution ofZacharias Moussaoui. If DoJ interposes no objection, copies may also be made available to the JIS. a.

Does any of this information, in the view of your agency, suggest actions that should have been taken either by your agency or other agencies vis-a-vis the hijackers and/or their accomplices prior to September 11, 2001 but were not? If so, please describe them.

Answer: No. b.

Does any of this information, in the view of your agency, indicate systemic problems or deficiencies that should be remedied to increase the likelihood that the U.S. Government would in the future learn of terrorist cells operating within the United States? If so, please describe them.

Answer: No. 5. Did your agency perform a "post-mortem" or "lessons learned" evaluation as a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks? If so, please provide a copy. Answer: DoT and FAA conducted various reviews with respect to air traffic, regulation of flight schools, hardening cockpits, air marshal programs, restrictions on short blade weapons and various other 9/11 related matters and also participated in both open and closed hearings before various committees of Congress. Within the context of intelligence analysis: ACI conducted an informal internal review ofal-Qaida targeting and methodology following September 11. The results of this review were outlined in assessments, Security Directives and Information Circulars provided to the FAA regions and the aviation industry. . An ACI assessment dated October 3, 2001 addressed known al-Qaida methodology, targeting, threat scenarios, and operating environment A copy of this and other documents created by ACI/TSIS will be made available upon receipt of JIS clearances, as previously noted. 6. Has your agency prepared any finished intelligence reports (e.g. analyses, summaries) since September 11, 2001 concerning the hijackers involved in the attacks, e.g. their background, the circumstances of their admission into the United States, their activities while in the United States? If so, please identify these reports by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry.

Answer: AC!prepared certain classified and unclassified intelligence products specific to the background and activities of the September 11 hijackers for aviation security use. This information has been incorporated into the FAA/TSA agent training program. Also an incident summary, including details on the 19 hijackers identification data, was submitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization. 1. Please provide a list of the offices within your agency that are principally responsible for counter-terrorism activities on a day-to-day basis and identify the heads and deputy heads of these offices and their dates of service from 1995 to the present. (Note: we are not asking for everyone in the supervisory chain of such officials.) If the individuals occupying these positions are current employees of your agency, please indicate this. ANSWER: See attached list.

8. What does your agency consider its "marching orders," both past (since 1985) and present, in terms of its responsibilities in the counter- terrorism area, i.e. what documents establish your requirements and priorities? Please identify these by title and set them aside for review by the staff of the joint inquiry. Answer: The FAA Act of 1958 as amended. PL 107-71 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act FAA Order 1100.2D of 1997 NSDD 180 of 7/19/85, "Civil Aviation Anti-Terrorism Program " NSDD 207 of 01/20/86, "The National Program for Combating Terrorism " Report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism of8/4/89 Public Law 101-604 "Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 " PDD/NSC-39 "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism" of 6/21/95 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security of 2/12/97 FDD 62 "Combating Terrorism " 9. Please provide the overall funding levels for, and personnel dedicated to, the counter-terrorism activities of your agency for FY 2002. Please provide any augmentations to these levels that have occurred since September 11, 2001, and the levels of such funding and personnel requested for FY 2003. ANSWER: As noted elsewhere, FAA had no intelligence collection program and only specialized and limited resources for the analysis and dissemination of 1C products and information for aviation security users. None of the assets used for such purposes were solely for counterterrorism, although the aviation security intelligence program contributed to the national effort to combat terrorism.

Other FAA/TSA resources and programs, which contribute to the national program to combat terrorism are not part of the national intelligence program and are subject to oversight by other committees of the Congress. The staffing and budget for the ACI/TSIS to include support of the Federal Air Marshal program is as follows: Fy 2001 37 personnel

$4,319k (actual obligations for all ACI activities)

Fy 2002 Influx, supplemental appropriation pending for all of ISA.. Staffing and corresponding budget are being increased to provide intelligence support of expanded Air Marshal program and other program enhancements. Fy2003 165 personnel, budget TBD

10. Apart from enhanced funding and personnel levels, has your agency made any significant organizational or operational changes since the September 11, 2001 attacks in order to position itself better to warn of, or prevent, terrorist attacks against the United States in the future? If so, please describe them. ANSWER: 1) Following September 11, the criteria used in the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) was changed to take into account the modus operandi used in the attacks. Additional details on the way CAPPS functions are sensitive security information but can be provided to the JIS in an appropriate forum. An effort is now under way to develop an enhanced system, known as CAPPS-II to exploit data sources not available to CAPPS. 2. Organizationally, as of April 2002, ACI was incorporated into the new Transportation Security Intelligence Service (TSIS), which is an office within the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). TSIS will support the TSA in safeguarding all modes of transportation. When fully staffed, TSIS is projected to have 165 employees with enhanced resources and capabilities for the receipt, analysis and dissemination of intelligence far beyond what previously existed in the Department of Transportation. With the increasing numbers of security personnel being deployed by TSA, we anticipate that the additional scrutiny brought to bear on the protected assets will identify suspicious individuals and situations requiring analysis for threat indications and warning. TSIS will act as a clearinghouse for this information by coordinating investigations, searching databases, analyzing intelligence and providing threat indications and warning as necessary. 3) Prior to September 11, 2001, the FAA Office of Intelligence had intelligence analysts assigned in a liaison capacity stationed at the CIA, FBI and the State Department. These liaison officers expedited sanitization requests of classified, time-sensitive threat information and serve as an

advocate for transportation interests. TSIS is now in the process of increasing this liaison program. NSA has agreed to accept an analyst, and a second analyst for the FBI has been approved. DIA will be approached to accept one analyst and the CIA and State Department will be asked to accept one more each. 11. Are there specific things that are not being done by your agency in the counter-terrorism area for lack of funding and/or skilled personnel, which your agency believes would be important to its ability to warn of terrorist attacks against the United States? If so, what are they? Answer: We are now increasing the TSIS staff to execute our expanded responsibilities. Many of the new hires had active TS/SCI clearances in the agencies they left the week before they reported to duty at TSIS. Most of these individuals have been denied access to TS/SCI at TSIS until a readjudication process takes place at the CIA Office of Security. In many cases this has taken months, and has significantly affected our ability to fully utilize/integrate these people operationally. This bureaucratic impediment needs to be addressed. We suggest that the same principle of reciprocity that exists for the passing of clearances between agencies for ad hoc discussions be applied in this situation. If the new hire had an active TS/SCI clearance in the agency that he/she just left, it should be immediately reinstated at TSIS, and only suspended/revoked for cause uncovered during the re-adjudication process.

12. Insofar as your agency is concerned, what proportion of the information you obtain about known or suspected terrorists operating in the United States or against U.S. interests abroad comes from your own unilateral collection efforts, from other U.S. agencies, and from your agency's liaison with foreign counterparts? On the average (taking at least a month's sample), how many such reports would your agency receive in a given day? What do you do with the information that you receive from your unilateral collection efforts, from other U.S. agencies, and from your agency's liaison with foreign counterparts? Answer: ACI/TSIS is not involved in intelligence collection activities and it rarely receives threat information from foreign counterparts. Rather, ACI/TSIS is a consumer of all-source intelligence [classified and unclassified] from U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies. ACI/TSIS receives between 2,500-3,000 messages electronically every day. These largely deal with the stability/instability in countries or regions where U.S. transportation operates. A large number of these messages identify internal unrest/insurgencies/terrorism directed against the host government, but has the potential to impact U.S. transportation operations. For example, if the unrest/terrorism is directed at host country transportation facilities it could result in the inadvertent targeting of a U.S. air carrier or ship. And all of these reports must be evaluated. Of the messages dealing with terrorism/unrest approximately 25 messages per day deal with threats to U.S. interests although most do not provide specific information concerning a direct threat to U.S. transportation.

13. Are there laws, regulations, or policies in effect that restrict or hamper your ability to collect or disseminate information about terrorists operating in the United States or against U.S. interests abroad? If so, what are they, and does your agency believe they should be changed?

ANSWER: No

Key Staff with Counter-Terrorism Resvonsiblities* Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security David Morrell (2002) now at TSA Paul Busick (2002) in private life Lynne Osmus (2002), at FAA Michael Canavan (2000-2001) in private life CathalL. Flynn (1993 -2000) in private life Deputy Associate Administrator

Lynne Osmus (2001-2002) at FAA Bill Davis (1999-2001) at FAA Jerry Franklin (1996-1997) at FTA in Atlanta Director Civil Aviation Security Intelligence

Claudio Manno (2001-2002) at TSA Patrick McDonnell(l993-2001), now on contract at TSA. Deputy Director Civil Aviation Security Intelligence

Patricia Durgin (2001-2002) Claudio Manno (1997-2001) Director Civil Aviation Security Operations

Willie Gripper (2002) Currently at TSA Ross Hamory (2001-2002) Currently at FAA Lee Longmire (1999-2001) Currently at TSA Bruce Butterworth (1995-1999) at U.S. Holocaust Museum Lynne Osmus (1992-1995) Currently at FAA Deputy Director Civil Aviation Security Operations

Willie Gripper (2001-2002) at TSA Lee Longmire (1995-1999) at TSA Mike Morse, Acting (1999) at TSA Ross Hamory, (1992-1995) at FAA

Director Civil Aviation Security Policy

Lee Longmire (2001-2002) at TSA Jan Brecht-Clark (2000-2001) now at Homeland Security Anthony Fainberg (1996-2000) at TSA Ross Hamory (1995-1996) at FAA Bruce Butterworth, (1991-1995) now at Holocaust Museum Deputy Director Civil Aviation Security Policy

Robin C. Burke (2002) now at TSA Max Payne, Acting (late 2001 in TSA at Dallas Quentin Johnson (1996-2001) at TSA Lee Longmire (1993-1996) at TSA