T7 B18 Team 7 Org Fdr- Workplan Team 7 W Notes 560

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES TEAM #7 WORKPLAN COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Team Members: Sam Brinkley William Johnstone John Raidt

Item 1

Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2

Suggested Readings and Briefings

Item 3

Document Requests

Item 4

Interview Candidates

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TEAM #7 Item 1: Key Questions 1. Prior to September 11, 2001, what did the U.S. aviation security system know about terrorist threats to civil aviation? How did the different elements of the system respond to any such information in their possession? 2. What aviation security policies and procedures were in effect as of September 11, 2001? How did these measures comply with relevant laws and regulations? What was known of the effectiveness of this system, and how was this measured? 3. What tactics and weapons did the 9/11 hijackers use to defeat the aviation security system and procedures in place on September 11, 2001? What was the cause of the security failure or failures on that date: flaws in the design of the procedures; in the transmittal (including dissemination and training); in the implementation; some combination; or some other factor or factors? 4. What were the major policy and budgetary priorities for civil aviation security prior to 9/11/01? How was security prioritized among other aviation policy considerations? What risk management techniques were used in making aviation security determinations? How did the financing of the aviation security system impact that system? 5. What has changed with respect to civil aviation security policies and procedures since 9/11/01? What further improvements are needed (including consideration of arming commercial aviation and other pilots; "trusted traveler" and "trusted shipper" programs; CAPPS II and other individual profiling systems; background checks on transportation employees; missile defense for civilian aircraft; and regulation of flight schools)? 6. Considering all transportation modes, what risk management process (or processes) is (or are) utilized by federal agencies in determining the priority of security vulnerabilities and the allocation of resources? What are the current transportation security budget and policy priorities, and how does this compare with the results of the risk management process? What should be the priorities across all transportation modes?

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TEAM #7 Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefings Congressional Research Service, Terrorism Briefing Book Summary on "Aviation Security." March 2003, 7 pages. r, ^JL V^

General Accounting Office, testimony before Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, "Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and LongTerm Challenges, " July 25, 2002, 28 pages. National Academy of Sciences, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism. June 2002. See especially, "Chapter 7: Transportation Systems," (pp. 210-237). Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing on "WeakLinks: How Should the Federal Government Manage Airline Passenger and Baggage Screening?" September 25, 2001, 165 pages. See especially prepared testimony of FAA (pp. 65-73); DOT Inspector General (pp. 74-86); GAO (pp. 87-104); Robert Baker, American Airlines (pp. 105-108); Paul Busick (pp. 109-114); and Leonard Griggs, Director of Airports for St. Louis (pp. 115-124). Timeline for 9/11/01 hijackers prepared by Miles Kara. (For more details see http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/ which includes hyperlinks to relevant media accounts). Final Report of White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("Gore Commission"), 1997. See especially "Chapter Three: Improving Security for Travelers" and "Appendix I: Commissioner Cummock Dissent Letter." Also, DOT Status Report on White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("One Year Later"), February 1998, 11 pages. BRIEFERS FOR

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Secretary Norman Mineta, DOT (public briefing) Admiral James Loy, TSA (public briefing) Kenneth Mead, DOT Inspector General (public briefing) Ray Kelly, Customs Service and Gore Commission member (public or private briefing) Gerald Dillingham, GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues (public or private briefing) Robert Baker, American Airlines and Mineta Task Force member (public or private briefing) Carol Hallett, former President, ATA (public or private briefing) Stephen Flynn, Project Director for Hart-Rudman II (2002) (public or private briefing)

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TEAM #7 Item 3: Document Requests 1. Airport and Air Carrier Security Plans for Dulles, Logan and Newark airports, and representative sample of others, pre- and post- 9/11 (TSA, FAA, relevant airport authorities and airlines) 2. "After action" reports on 9/11 hijackings and immediate agency response (FAA, TSA, other DOT, DOD, White House) 3. Flight recorder transcripts for 9/11/01 hijacked flights (FAA, TSA, NTSB); Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) reports on 9/11/01 communications between FAA and DOD (FAA, TSA); Flight Controller records on tracking of and communications with hijacked planes (FAA); transcripts and other records of cockpit communications from hijacked planes (FAA, TSA); transcripts and other records of 9/11/01 phone calls from Flight 11 attendants Ong and Sweeney (American Airlines); transcripts and other records of any other 9/11/01 phone calls or other communications from passengers or crew on hijacked planes (FAA, TSA, American Airlines, United Airlines); videotapes and any other material (including logs, records and incident reports) about hijackers from airport and airline security systems (FAA, TSA, American Airlines, United Airlines, security chiefs from Dulles, Logan and Newark Airports; 9/11/01 screening companies for Dulles, Logan and Newark) 4. Relevant TSA, FAA and DOT civil aviation security rules and regulations, preand post- 9/11 (DOT, TSA, FAA) 5. Civil aviation security procedural and training materials for passenger and baggage screening, access to aircraft and secure areas of airports, and airplane hijackings, 2001-present (FAA, TSA) 6. Modal administrations' circulars and other communications on terrorist threats, 1995-present (FAA, TSA, FTA, Coast Guard, etc.) 7. Executive Orders on transportation security, 1985-present (White House) 8. "Gore Commission" Final Report, and latest update (White House, DOT, TSA) 9. Administration requests and Congressional actions on aviation security program budgets, 1995-present (OMB, CBO) 10. Threat and vulnerability assessments for airports (FAA, TSA), ports (Coast Guard) and mass transit systems (Federal Transit Administration) 11. Evaluations and other reports on major proposed transportation security initiatives, including CAPPS II, "trusted traveler," and "known shipper" proposals (TSA, GAO) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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TEAM #7 Item 4: Interview Candidates Kenneth Mead, DOT IG (federal response to transportation security threats pre- and post-9/11) Lt. Gen. Mike Canavan, former Assoc. Admin., Civil Aviation Security (lead-up and aftermath of 9/11) MGen. O.K. Steele, former Assoc. Admin, Civil Aviation Security (evolution of aviation security system) RAdm. Paul Busick, former Dir. Intell and Security for DOT (evolution of transportation security system) Adm. James Loy, TSA Administrator (same as for Mead) Airline and Airport Security Officials for Dulles, Logan and Newark (9/11 events vs. current system) Flight Controllers who tracked hijacked 9/11/01 flights FBI agents who interviewed 9/11 on-duty screeners and security personnel at Dulles, Logan and Newark. Representative of Air Traffic Services Cell (re 9/11/01 communications between FAA and NORAD) 9/11 Victims/Family representatives Key stakeholder representatives (airports, pilots, flight attendants, etc.) Congressional staff for Appropriations, Senate Commerce and House Transportation Committees Stephen Flynn, Project Director for Hart-Rudman II (2002) (transportation security priorities) Steve Elson, former FAA "Red Team" member (agency shortcomings) Bruce Butterworth, former Dir. of FAA Plans and Operations (agency risk management) Lee Longmire, former Dir. of FAA Operations (agency security implementation process) RAdm. Cathal "Irish" Flynn, former FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security Claudio Mano, Dir. of Intelligence for FAA Civil Aviation Security (same as for Mead) Asa Hutchinson, DHS Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security (same as for Mead) Bob Stephan, DHS Undersecretary (Acting) (same as for Mead) Secretary Norm Mineta, DOT (same as for Mead) Gerald Dillingham, GAO (same as for Mead) OMB Associate Director responsible for transportation security (transportation security budgeting) Jane Garvey, former head of FAA (aviation security system response to pre- and post9/1 1 threats) Jim Hall, former NTSB and Gore Commission (work and implementation of Gore Commission) Bartholomew Elias, CRS Specialist on Aviation Security (current aviation security issues and options) Cathleen Berrick, GAO Dir. Homeland Security (current transportation security issues and options) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

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Bogdan Dzakovic, FAA/TSA whistleblower (agency administrative shortcomings) Lynne Osmus, former Dir. FAA Civil Aviation Security (evolution of transportation security system) Joe Lawless, MA Ports Authority and former head of security for Logan (airport perspective) Brian Jenkins, Kroll Associates (aviation security/terrorism expert) John Hamre, former DOD and now head of CSIS (DOD preparation for 9/11-type scenarios) Mary Schiavo, former DOT IG and now attorney for 9/11 families (shortcomings in fed. Security efforts) John Fritelli, CRS Specialist on Maritime Security (current port security issues and options) Trixie Johnson, Research Dir. Mineta Transportation Institute (transit and rail security issues)

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