Dm B8 Team 7 Fdr- Workplan Team 7- Various Drafts 499

9/11/2001 What happened? State of the security system on 9/11. Precisely what happened & what went wrong?

TOMORROW What should we do;

What have we done? Specifically, how have we altered the security system since 9/11?

How should we reform the system to maximize security?

MAKEUP AND QUALITY OF THE AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM

What were they? Were they followed? Were they deficient?

Laws, Regulations, Policies, Priorities (Goals & Intentions)

* What were they? * Hid they comply with law? •Were they followed? * How and why were they defeated?

System, Processes and Procedures (to implement the laws, regs, policies and priorities) (Methods)

* WhaLwere the $'s? * What were the processes and mechanisms of budgeting and financing of the aviation security system? *.Were they deficient?

Budget and Financing Systems to implement programs. (Ways & Means).

* What was the nature and quality of leadership, management & oversight? * Was it deficient?

Executive and Congressional Governance to establish the laws, regulations, policies and priorities. (Administration)

* How should laws, regs, policies and priorities be reformed to maximize security?

* How should systems, processes and procedures be reformed tc best implement the law and maximize security?

Ho-v should we reform the budget and financing system for aviation security to maximize security?

How should executive and Congressional leadership, management and oversight be reformed to maximize security?

Applying these facts, findings and standards to other modes of transportation, what measures can and should we take to maximize security across modes?

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION

SECURITY)

PROPOSED TIMELINE

Based on the currently planned May 22 public hearing on commercial aviation security, we propose the following preliminary work schedule. 1. On May 1, 2003 brief the Commissioners on work plan, provide essential background information and receive commissioner's guidance on the future direction of the inquiry, including plans for the May 22 hearing. Hearing preparation (including securing of location, invitation of witnesses and media plan) should commence immediately upon Commission approval 2. By May 15, 2003 complete briefing book for May 22 hearing, including background information on subject matter and witnesses, as well as key questions. 3. On May 22, 2003 staff public hearing on commercial aviation security with an emphasis on Work Plan Key Questions #1, #2, #3 (What happened?) and #5 (What's changed & Where do we go?). 4. Between June and November, 2003 perform the main phase of the research with a preliminary 6-month deadline. Work will include examination of resource material, interviews, consultations, and investigation with respect to the issues central to answering the Work Plan Key Questions. 5. Between July and September, 2003 provide quarterly update to Commissioners on work of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry. 6. Between November 2003 and January 2004 provide quarterly update to Commissioners on work of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry. This would include a proposed second round of public hearings on transportation security: two days of hearings (presumably in Washington, DC) in late January 2004 focusing on Work Plan Key Questions #5 and #6, and the application of risk management to transportation security issues across modes. 7. By end of December, 2003 present a preliminary report to the Commissioners on commercial Aviation and other transportation security. 8. In January 2004 staff public hearings on transportation security with an emphasis on Work Plan Key Questions #5 and #6 (Policies; priorities; budget & financing across modes 9-11, today and tomorrow?). 9. Between February and March, 2004 provide final quarterly update to Commissioners on work of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry. 10. Between February and May, 2004 carry out additional investigation as directed by the Commission, and assist Commissioners in preparation of the Final Report.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES TEAM #7 WORKPLAN COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

Team Members: SamBrmkley William Johnstone John Raidt

Item 1

Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2

Suggested Readings and Briefings

Item 3

Document Requests

Item 4

Interview Candidates

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #7 Item 1: Key Questions 1. Prior to September 11,2001, what did the U.S. aviation security system know about terrorist threats to civil aviation? How did the different elements of the system respond to any such information in their possession? 2. What aviation security policies and procedures were in effect as of September 11, 2001? How did these measures comply with relevant laws and regulations? What was known of the effectiveness of this system, and how was this measured? 3. What tactics and weapons did the 9/11 hijackers use to defeat the aviation security system and procedures in place on September 11,2001? What was the cause of the security failure or failures on that date: flaws in the design of the procedures; in the transmittal (including dissemination and training); in the implementation; some combination; or some other factor or factors? 4. What were the major policy and budgetary priorities for civil aviation security prior to 9/11/01? How was security prioritized among other aviation policy considerations? What risk management techniques were used in making aviation security determinations? How did the financing of the aviation security system impact that system? 5. What has changed with respect to civil aviation security policies and procedures since 9/11/01? What further improvements are needed (including consideration of arming commercial aviation and other pilots; "trusted traveler" and "trusted shipper" programs; CAPPS II and other individual profiling systems; background checks on transportation employees; missile defense for civilian aircraft; and regulation of flight schools)? 6. Considering all transportation modes, what risk management process (or processes) is (or are) utilized by federal agencies in determining the priority of security vulnerabilities and the allocation of resources? What are the current transportation security budget and policy priorities, and how does this compare with the results of the risk management process? What should be the priorities across all transportation modes?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #7 Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefings Congressional Research Service, Terrorism Briefing Book Summary on "Aviation Security" March 2003,7 pages. General Accounting Office, testimony before Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, "Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and LongTerm Challenges," July 25, 2002, 28 pages. National Academy of Sciences, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism. June 2002. See especially, "Chapter 7: Transportation Systems," (pp. 210-237). Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing on "Weak Links: How Should the Federal Government Manage Airline Passenger and Baggage Screening!" September 25, 2001, 165 pages. See especially prepared testimony of FAA (pp. 65-73); DOT Inspector General (pp. 74-86); GAO (pp. 87-104); Robert Baker, American Airlines (pp. 105-108); Paul Busick (pp. 109-114); and Leonard Griggs, Director of Airports for St. Louis (pp. 115-124). Timeline for 9/11/01 hijackers prepared by Miles Kara. (For more details see http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/ which includes hyperlinks to relevant media accounts). Final Report of White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("Gore Commission"), 1997. See especially "Chapter Three: Improving Security for Travelers" and "Appendix I: Commissioner Cummock Dissent Letter." Also, DOT Status Report on White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("One Year Later"), February 1998, 11 pages. BRIEFERS FOR COMMISSIONERS Secretary Norman Mineta, DOT (public briefing) Admiral James Loy, TSA (public briefing) Kenneth Mead, DOT Inspector General (public briefing) Ray Kelly, Customs Service and Gore Commission member (public or private briefing) Gerald Dillingham, GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues (public or private briefing) Robert Baker, American Airlines and Mineta Task Force member (public or private briefing) Carol Hallett, former President, ATA (public or private briefing) Stephen Flynn, Project Director for Hart-Rudman n (2002) (public or private briefing)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #7 Item 3: Document Requests 1. Airport and Air Carrier Security Plans for Dulles, Logan and Newark airports, and representative sample of others, pre- and post- 9/11 (TSA, FAA, relevant airport authorities and airlines) 2. "After action" reports on 9/11 hijackings and immediate agency response (FAA, TSA, other DOT, DOD, White House) 3. Flight recorder transcripts for 9/11/01 hijacked flights (FAA, TSA, NTSB); Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) reports on 9/11/01 communications between FAA and DOD (FAA, TSA); Flight Controller records on tracking of and communications with hijacked planes (FAA); transcripts and other records of cockpit communications from hijacked planes (FAA, TSA); transcripts and other records of 9/11/01 phone calls from Flight 11 attendants Ong and Sweeney (American Airlines); transcripts and other records of any other 9/11/01 phone calls or other communications from passengers or crew on hijacked planes (FAA, TSA, American Airlines, United Airlines); videotapes and any other material (including logs, records and incident reports) about hijackers from airport and airline security systems (FAA, TSA, American Airlines, United Airlines, security chiefs from Dulles, Logan and Newark Airports; 9/11/01 screening companies for Dulles, Logan and Newark) 4. Relevant TSA, FAA and DOT civil aviation security rules and regulations, preand post- 9/11 (DOT, TSA, FAA) 5. Civil aviation security procedural and training materials for passenger and baggage screening, access to aircraft and secure areas of airports, and airplane hijackings, 2001-present (FAA, TSA) 6. Modal administrations' circulars and other communications on terrorist threats, 1995-present (FAA, TSA, FT A, Coast Guard, etc.) 7. Executive Orders on transportation security, 1985-present (White House) 8. "Gore Commission" Final Report, and latest update (White House, DOT, TSA) 9. Administration requests and Congressional actions on aviation security program budgets, 1995-present (OMB, CBO) 10. Threat and vulnerability assessments for airports (FAA, TSA), ports (Coast Guard) and mass transit systems (Federal Transit Administration) 11. Evaluations and other reports on major proposed transportation security initiatives, including CAPPS II, "trusted traveler," and "known shipper" proposals (TSA, GAO) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM #7 Item 4: Interview Candidates Kenneth Mead, DOT IG (federal response to transportation security threats pre- and post-9/11) Lt. Gen. Mike Canavan, former Assoc. Admin., Civil Aviation Security (lead-up and aftermath of 9/11) MGen. O.K. Steele, former Assoc. Admin, Civil Aviation Security (evolution of aviation security system) RAdm. Paul Busick, former Dir. Intell and Security for DOT (evolution of transportation security system) Adm. James Loy, TS A Administrator (same as for Mead) Airline and Airport Security Officials for Dulles, Logan and Newark (9/11 events vs. current system) Flight Controllers who tracked hijacked 9/11/01 flights FBI agents who interviewed 9/11 on-duty screeners and security personnel at Dulles, Logan and Newark. Representative of Air Traffic Services Cell (re 9/11/01 communications between FA A andNORAD) 9/11 Victims/Family representatives Key stakeholder representatives (airports, pilots, flight attendants, etc.) Congressional staff for Appropriations, Senate Commerce and House Transportation Committees Stephen Flynn, Project Director for Hart-Rudman n (2002) (transportation security priorities) Steve Elson, former FAA "Red Team" member (agency shortcomings) Bruce Butterworth, former Dir. of FAA Plans and Operations (agency risk management) Lee Longmire, former Dir. of FAA Operations (agency security implementation process) RAdm. Cathal "Irish" Flynn, former FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security Claudio Mano, Dir. of Intelligence for FAA Civil Aviation Security (same as for Mead) Asa Hutchinson, DHS Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security (same as for Mead) Bob Stephan, DHS Undersecretary (Acting) (same as for Mead) Secretary Norm Mineta, DOT (same as for Mead) Gerald Dillingham, GAO (same as for Mead) OMB Associate Director responsible for transportation security (transportation security budgeting) Jane Garvey, former head of FAA (aviation security system response to pre- and post9/1 1 threats) Jim Hall, former NTSB and Gore Commission (work and implementation of Gore Commission) Bartholomew Elias, CRS Specialist on Aviation Security (current aviation security issues and options) Cathleen Berrick, GAO Dir. Homeland Security (current transportation security issues and options) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Bogdan Dzakovic, FAA/TSA whistleblower (agency administrative shortcomings) Lynne Osmus, former Dir. FAA Civil Aviation Security (evolution of transportation security system) Joe Lawless, MA Ports Authority and former head of security for Logan (airport perspective) Brian Jenkins, Kroll Associates (aviation security/terrorism expert) John Hamre, former DOD and now head of CSIS (DOD preparation for 9/11-type scenarios) Mary Schiavo, former DOT IG and now attorney for 9/11 families (shortcomings in fed. Security efforts) John Fritelli, CRS Specialist on Maritime Security (current port security issues and options) Trixie Johnson, Research Dir. Mineta Transportation Institute (transit and rail security issues)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION SENSITIVE

TEAM 7 WORK PLAN

9/11/2001 What happened? State of the security system on 9/11. Precisely what happened & what went wrong?

TODAY

TOMORROW What should we do?

What have we dome? Specifically, how have we altered the security system since 9/11?

How should we reform the system to mammi-re security?

MAKE-UP AND QUALITY OF THE AVIATION SECURITY SYSTEM

* What were they? •Were they followed? * Were they deficient?

Laws, Regulations, Policies, Priorities (Goab

* What were they? * Did they comply with law? * Were they followed? * How and why were they defeated?

System, Processes and Procedures (to implement the laws, regs, policies and priorities) (Methods)

•What were the $'s? •What were the processes and mechanisms of budgeting and financing of the aviation security system? * Were they deficient?

Budget and Financing Systems to implement programs. (WayiS. Means).

• What was the nature and quality of leadership, management & oversight? * Was it deficient?

Governance to establish the laws, regulations, policies and

* How should laws, regs, policies and priorities be reformed to maximize security?

* How should systems, processes and procedures be reformed to best implement the law and maximize security?

* How should we reform the budget and financing system for aviation security to maximize security?

* How should executive and Congressional leadership, management and oversight be reformed to maximize security?

Applying these facts, findings and standards to other modes of transportation, what measures can and should we take to maximize security across modes?

WORK PLAN QUESTIONS

Page 1 of 4

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY) WORK PLAN PART ONE: KEY QUESTIONS 1 . Between June 22, 200 1 (date of a relevant FAA security circular) and September 1 1 , 200 1 , what did the FAA know about: a) security threats to civil aviation; b) threats from al-Qaeda; and c) information on the 9/1 1 hijackers? What did the airports and airlines know from the FAA, and other sources, about these subjects? How did the FAA, airports and airlines respond to the information in their possession? 2. What civil aviation security procedures were in effect in the period between the enrollment of the 9/1 1 hijackers in flight schools and me grounding of civil aviation on September 11, 2001 at Dulles, Logan and Newark airports; American and United airlines; and flights AA 1 1, AA 77, UA 93 and UA 175? What relevant policies and procedures were in effect within the Department of Defense during the same period? Did all of the above policies and procedures comply with relevant aviation security laws and regulations? 3 . What tactics and weapons did the 9/1 1 hijackers use to defeat the aviation security system and procedures in place on September 1 1, 2001? What was the cause of the security failure or failures on that date: flaws in the design of the procedures; in the transmittal (including dissemination and training); in the implementation; some combination; or some other factor or factors? How was the civil aviation security system in place on 9/1 1/01 financed, and how did that impact the governance, design, efficacy and operation of the system? What has changed since then with respect to system financing and governance and what have been the results? What further changes, if any, should be considered? With respect to budgets and policy focus, what were the major priorities for civil aviation security prior to 9/1 1/01 : of the Congress; of the Executive Branch; of tile airports; and of the airlines? How was security prioritized among other aviation policy considerations? What about since 9/1 1/01? Are these the right priorities? 6. What has changed with respect to civil aviation security procedures since September 11, 2001? What further improvements are needed? / 7. Looking at the entire field of aviation security, how does the security of civil aviation compare to General Aviation and Air Cargo? How do you measure this, and how should it be measured? Is the current budget and policy focus for all aviation security the optimal one? If not, how should \__ these priorities be reordered? 8. With respect to transportation modes other than civil aviation, how was the security system in place on 9/1 1/01 financed, and how did that impact the governance, design, efficacy and operation of the system? What has changed since then with respect to system financing and governance and what have been the results? What further changes, if any, should be considered? 9. Considering all transportation modes, what are our greatest security vulnerabilities in priority order? Is the current budget and policy focus for security measures among the various modes the optimal one? If not, how should transportation security priorities be re-ordered? 10. What are the status, costs and benefits of various transportation security measures that are being implemented or considered, including: arming commercial aviation and other pilots; "trusted traveler" and "trusted shipper" programs for various transportation modes; CAPPS n and other \l profiling systems; transportation security research and development; background http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmaiyimp/view.php?mismailbox=INBOX&index=:45&id=.. . 4/1 8/2003

WORK PLAN QUESTIONS

Page 2 of 4

checks on transportation employees; remote inspection of cargo; and missile defense for civilian aircraft? PART TWO: BRIEFING PLAN COMMISSIONERS READING LIST 9/11/01 Airport and Air Carrier Security Plans for Dulles International, Boston Logan and Newark International airports (to be obtained). Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, 2002. See especially Bojinka conspiracy (pp. 20-26); Clinton Administration response on aviation security (pp. 247-250); FBI awareness of threats to aviation (pp. 298-299). Congressional Research Service, Selected Aviation Security Legislation in the Aftermath of the September 11 Attack,"November 11, 2001,29 pages. See especially Table 1: Side-by-side Comparison of Selected Provisions from Aviation Security Legislation" (pp. 10-29). Congressional Research Service, Port and Maritime Security: Background and Issues for Congress, February 5, 2003, 27 pages. Congressional Research Service, Terrorism Briefing Book Summary on "Aviation Security" March 2003, 7 pages. General Accounting Office, testimony before Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, "Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Lang-Term Challenges,"My 25, 2002, 28 pages. General Accounting Office, Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System, December 2002. (on order). Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing on " Weak Links: How Should the Federal Government Manage Airttne Passenger and Baggage Screening?" September 25,2001,165 pages. See especially prepared testimony of FAA (pp. 65-73); DOT Inspector General (pp. 74-86); GAO (pp. 87-104); Robert Baker, American Airlines (pp. 105-108); Paul Busick (pp. 109-114); and Leonard Griggs, Director of Airports for St. Louis (pp. 115-124). Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Hearing on "Riding the Rails: How Secure Is Our Passenger and Transit Infrastructure?" December 13,2001,136 pages. See especially prepared testimony of Federal Transit Administration (pp. 52-59); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (pp. 60-74); and Amtrak (pp. 81-85). Final Report of White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("Gore Commission"), 1997. Chapter Three: Improving Security for Travelers. Also, DOT Status Report on White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("One Year Later"), February 1998,11 pages. Timelines for 9/11 Flights at http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/ BRIEFERS FOR COMMISSIONERS Secretary Norman Mineta, DOT (public briefing) Admiral James Loy, TSA (public briefing) http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/view.php?tlusmailbox=INBOX&index:::^5&id=... 4/18/2003

WORK PLAN QUESTIONS

Page 3 of4

Kenneth Mead, DOT Inspector General (public briefing) Ray Kelly, Customs Service and Gore Commission member (public or private briefing) Gerald Dillingham, GAO Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues (public or private briefing) Robert Baker, American Airlines and Mineta Task Force member (public or private briefing) Carol Hallett, former President, ATA (public or private briefing) Stephen Flynn, Coast Guard and Council on Foreign Relations fellow (public or private briefing) PART THREE: KEY AGENCY DOCUMENT CATEGORIES 1. Airport and Air Carrier Security Plans for Dulles, Logan and Newark airports, and representative sample of others, pre- and post- 9/11 (TSA, FAA) 2. Relevant TSA, FAA and DOT rules and regulations, pre- and post- 9/11 (DOT, TSA, FAA) 3. Agency reports, intenrtal menios and other materials on 9/11 hijackings and immediate agency response (FAA, TSA, other DOT, DOD, White House) 4. Transportation security agencies' procedural and training materials, 1995-present (DOT, DHS and relevant components thereof) 5. Transportation security budget information, 1995-present (OMB, DOT, DHS, CBO) 6. Flight recorder transcripts for 9/11 hijacked flights (FAA, TSA, NTSB) 7. Modal administrations' circulars and other communications on terrorist threats, 1995-present (FAA, TSA, FTA, Coast Guard, etc.) ri^l985^pfesent (White! 3rt(CoH^ressiona1>IiitellJKence Conir 10. "Gore Commission" Final Report, and latest update (DOT, TSA) 11. Relevant GAO Reports and Testimony (GAO) 12. Relevant DOT IG Reports and Testimony (DOT IG) 13. Relevant CRS Reports and other documents (CRS) 14. Relevant Public Laws, with legislative history (CRS) 15. Relevant hearings by Senate Committees on Commerce and Governmental Affairs, and House Committee on Transportation j 16. Relevant judicial records (including U.S. v. Ratnzi Ahmed Yousef, et at) (CRS) PART FOUR: PROPOSED STAFF INTERVIEWS htlp://ldnesis.swishmail.coni/webmail/imp/view.php?mismailbox=INBOX&index:=45&id=r... 4/18/2003

WORK PLAN QUESTIONS

Page 4 of 4

Secretary Norm Mineta, DOT (federal response to transportation security threats pre- and post- 9/11) Adm. James Loy, TSA Administrator (same as for Mineta) Kenneth Mead, DOT IG (same as for Mineta) Gerald Dillingham, GAO (same as for Mineta) OMB Associate Director responsible for transportation security (transportation security budgeting) Jane Garvey, former head of FAA (aviation security system response to pre- and post- 9/11 threats) Mike Canavan, former Assoc. Admin., Civil Aviation Security (immediate lead-up and aftermath of 9/11) O.K. Steele, former Assoc. Admin., Civil Aviation Security (evolution of aviation security system) RAdm. Paul Busick, former Dir. Intell and Security for DOT (evolution of transportation security system) Jim Hall, former NTSB and Gore Commission (work and implementation of Gore Commission) Congressional staff for Appropriations, Senate Commerce and House Transportation Committees Bartholomew Elias, CRS Specialist on Aviation Security (current aviation security issues and options) John Fritelli, CRS Specialist on Maritime Security (current port security issues and options) Cathleen Berrick, GAO Dir. Homeland Security (current transportation security issues and options) Trixie Johnson, Research Dir. Mineta Transportation Institute (transit and rail security issues) Airline and Airport Security Officials for Dulles, Logan and Newark (9/11 events vs. current system) Bogdan Dzakovic, FAA/TSA whistieblower (agency administrative shortcomings) Lynn Osmus, former Dir. FAA Civil Aviation Security (evolution of transportation security system) Joe Lawless, MA Ports Authority and former head of security for Logan (airport perspective) Brian Jenkins, Kroll Associates (aviation security/terrorism expert) John Hamre, former DOD and now head of CSIS (DOD preparation for 9/11-type scenarios) Mary Schiavo, former DOT IG and now attorney for 9/11 families (shortcomings in fed. Security efforts) 9/11 Victims/Family representatives Key stakeholder representatives (airports, pilots, flight attendants, shippers, etc.)

htrp://ldnesis.swishmail.cx)m/webmail/imp/view.php?tUsmailbox=INBOX&index==45&id=... 4/18/2003

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY)

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION

Page 1 of 2

SECURITY)

PROPOSED TIMELINE APRIL 22, 2003 Based on the currently planned May 22 public hearing on commercial aviation security, we propose the following preliminary schedule. 1. By April 28, 2003 provide a brief, written overview of the proposed May 22 hearing, including major themes and questions, and proposed witnesses. 2. On May 1, 2003 be prepared to brief the Commissioners on the preceding overview. This would provide essential information to the Commissioners as expeditiously as possible, and afford an early opportunity for the Commissioners to offer guidance on the future direction of this inquiry, including plans for the May 22 hearing. Hearing preparation (including securing of location, invitation of witnesses and media plan) should commence immediately upon Commission approval 3. By May IS, 2003 complete briefing book for May 22 hearing, including background information on subject matter and witnesses, as well as key questions. 4. On May 22, 2003 staff public hearing on commercial aviation security. 5. Between June and November, 2003 perform the main phase of the research, with a preliminary 6month deadline. The proposed order of work is as follows: a. Commercial Aviation Security b. Cargo and General Aviation Security c. Port Security d. Rail Security e. Highway Security f. Other Transportation/Relevant Infrastructure Security g. Summary of Findings h. Recommendations 6. Between July and September, 2003 provide quarterly update to Commissioners on work of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry. 7. Between November 2003 and January 2004 provide quarterly update to Commissioners on work of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry. This would include a proposed second round of public hearings on transportation security: two days of hearings (presumably in Washington, DC) in late January 2004 covering all transportation modes other than commercial aviation (day one) and transportation security priorities and policy alternatives (day two).

ifl—

4/22/2003

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY)

Page 2 of 2

8. By end of December, 2003 present a preliminary report to the Commissioners on Commercial Aviation and Other Transportation Security. 9. In January 2004 staff public hearings on transportation security. 10. Between February and March, 2004 provide final quarterly update to Commissioners on work of the Team and receive guidance on future directions of inquiry. 11. Between February and May, 2004 carry out additional investigation as directed by the Commission, and assist Commissioners in preparation of the Final Report.

x=S2#.id=... 4/22/2003

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY)

TEAM 7 (COMMERCIAL AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION

Page 1 of 1

SECURITY)

RESEARCH NEEDS APRIL 22, 2003 In order to meet the proposed timeline, Team 7 members make the following requests (hi descending order of priority): • Authorization for contacts with DHS/TSA and DOT/FAA. In terms of the investigative part of our effort, access to individuals and documents hi these two clusters is absolutely essential. The May 22 hearing date makes this an urgent priority for us. • Access to all relevant information currently in possession of the Commission. We are aware of the necessary limitations on our access until we have received security clearances and/or officially joined the staff, but it would be helpful if we could, at an early date, get copies of any nonclassified information on transportation security received by the Commission to date. • Authorization for contacts with 9/11 families. We are aware of plans for a staff liaison to handle such contacts but, again with the approach of the May 22 hearing, which will certainly be of great interest to this constituency, we ask for authorization to initiate such contacts as soon as possible. • Interns or volunteers to assist with clerical work. As soon as we all are settled in our new workspace, we will have an immediate (and probably ongoing) need for some form of clerical assistance. A large initial task will simply be to make multiple copies of the large number of materials we have acquired individually (to share with each other, staff leadership and Commissioners). Being aware of the budgetary constraints facing the Commission and the uncertainties of what support we can anticipate from GSA, if we are authorized to do so, we believe we can identify a small group of interns or volunteers to assist us.