T5 B59 Dos Misc 2 Of 2 Fdr- Entire Contents- Memos- Cables- 7 Withdrawal Notices- Visa Law Info (1st Pgs For Ref)

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0005

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 1

DOC ID: 31199439

14

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 09/05/2003

DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

FROM: TO: Daniel Marcus SUBJECT:

Transmittal memo and index of documents responsive to document requests

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED FACTORS INFLUENCING THE VISA PROCESS

Beginning with the influx of post-World War n refugees and peoples into the United States, visa processing has become the largest function of most American consular sections abroad, one that requires significant resources, both human and material. The focus of concern was consistently on illegal immigration; that is, on screening applicants to determine whether they intended to work or reside illegally in the United States Pressures to emigrate to the United States have been depicted as the "push" factors of economic hardship and political and social unrest abroad coupled with the "pull" factor of American prosperity. Consequently, staffing, training and procedures have all been directed at determining whether visitor visa applicants were intending immigrants, a determination specifically required by the law. It should also be apparent that promoting travel and the free movement of people of all nationalities to America serves our interests culturally, socially, and economically; foreign tourists annually provide billions of dollars to our economy ($82 billion in 2000). Numerous factors impacted on the Department of State's (Department) visa process and policies in effect during the period leading to the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks. That period extended from November 1997 to June 2001 when 21 visitor visas were issued to the 19 hijackers. • Visa demand rose significantly more sharply than did the number of trained staff available to perform the function. This shortfall was exacerbated during the 1990s when budget cuis for Foreign Service personnel compelled the Department to "do more with less,"' Ai the same time, applications for visas increased worldwide from about seven and a half million in 1998 to about ten and a half million in 2001. In 1998 GAO reported that serious staffing shortages resulted in visa processing backlogs.' Consular sections also experienced "extended personnel shortages," particularly during summer months, when few qualified officers were available to adjudicate visas. Resource shortfalls for adequate officer staffing extended to the Foreign Service national staff that supports visa operations with basic data processing. Missions were obliged to work existing staff long hours, which led to adjudicator fatigue and morale problems. In short, sufficient resources to permit thorough personal interviews of every visa applicant were never obtained. • Inadequate funding also resulted in unsuitable workspace at most missions that was neither secure nor conducive to carry out interviews, and insufficient to store all visa files. A desire to establish uniform consular file maintenance procedures as well as a lack of space at many missions prompted the Department to establish visa documentation destruction schedules. This meant that all supporting documents for visitor visas were returned to the applicants and virtually all applications were routinely destroyed annually.2 • CA gave all visa issuing missions broad discretion in processing visas and streamlining their visa operations, encouraging them to promote travel to the United States by 1 General Accounting Office, State Department: Tourist Visa Processing Backlogs Persist at United States Consulates, GAO/NSIAD-98-69, March 1998. 2 Except in cases involving permanent ineligibility such as criminal convictions.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED giving their applicants every reasonable opportunity to establish eligibility for visas. Adding to the complexity of managing visa operations worldwide are the vast resource disparities among those missions which range from one part-time consular officer to more than 30 full-time officers, and from missions with very low visa refusal rates to those with very high rates. • Inadequate resources prompted CA to advocate introducing every efficiency possible. Consular sections were constantly exhorted to "do more with less," to employ "best practices," ~ innovations that had proven successful at other missions, and to "work around" U. S. staff who had inadequate or no language or interview techniques training by the Department or were simply unavailable. Consular section chiefs constantly faced hard decisions about where to put their limited resources. • Many visa officers maintained that they regularly faced pressures from host country officials, other sections and agencies, and senior management at their missions, and from interested parties in the United States, including Congress, to issue visas — but rarely, if ever, to refuse applicants. • Beginning in 1994, in response to a congressional mandate, CA deployed modern computer-based processing designed to improve the security of the visa system. While providing tools that enhanced the security of visas and their adjudication, these developments both slowed the process and required more human resources. • Earlier, in 1986, Congress authorized the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, allowing citizens of participant countries to visit the United States for up to 90 days without obtaining a visitor visa, completing a visa application, or being subject to an interview by a consular officer. The criteria for a country's participation in the program include a very low rate of visitor visa refusals and reciprocal treatment of U. S. citizens. Twenty-eight countries currently participate and, in 2000,17.6 million of their citizens visited the United States.4 • Rapidly increasing volume of applications coupled with staffing shortages led to CA policy decisions designed to lessen officer involvement in much of the visa process. These preSeptember 11, 2001, workload and staffing realities prompted visa managers to "work smarter" and seek any efficiency possible in the visa process. Consequently, many missions followed Department guidance by routinely waiving personal appearances and interviews for large categories of visa applicants perceived to be "low risk." Low risk meant that the possibility of visa applicants overstaying the duration of their permitted visit or working in the United States was very unlikely. All of these steps occurred in an environment that sought to maximize legitimate travel to the United States while identifying intending immigrants and preventing them from entering the United States.

3 Although the two countries met the Visa Waiver Pilot Program requirement for very low refusal rates prior to September 11,2001, both failed a second criterion of declaring their willingness to provide reciprocal visa treatment for U. S. citizens visiting their countries. 4 General Accounting Office Report on Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, No. GAO-03-38, November 2002.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED • Despite the first attack on the World Trade Center in February 1993, terrorism and security were perceived primarily as threats against U. S. missions abroad. The 1998 bombings of the U. S. embassies in East Africa convinced diplomatic security officers that large crowds of visa applicants were a major problem. Crowds were perceived as both a threat from terrorists in their midst and a magnet attracting bombers. Security and consular officers worked together to limit and control access to consular sections. Their focus was on protecting Department personnel and property rather than screening out terrorist visa applicants. • Some missions found travel agents useful in assisting visa applicants to fill out their applications and verifying their financial ability to pay for a tour to the United States. Consular officers must adjudicate these applications, interview the applicants as appropriate, and must always check them in CLASS before issuing visas. Incidentally, with the Department's full endorsement, the so-called Visas Express program was established for the two Saudi missions in May 2001. Under the program, visa applicants were required to submit their applications through any often designated in-country travel agencies for subsequent adjudication by consular officers. Although four of the Saudi hijackers received their visas through the program after May 2001, Visas Express did not affect whether or not they were issued visas or subjected to an interview. • The primary tool for terrorist screening available to consular officers is CLASS. All visa applicants must be checked against this database before a visa can be issued. In determining whether visa applicants were suspected of being terrorists or posed security risks, consular officers relied essentially on CLASS. Absent a negative entry in CLASS or an actual admission of ineligibility, it is possible for a terrorist applicant to obtain a visa. None of the names of any of the September 11,2001 terrorists were in CLASS at the time they applied for visas. Procedurally, an era of inadequate staffing and support resources prompted the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) to encourage consular sections to carry out every possible efficiency, such as limiting consular officer participation in the visa process to those cases considered most difficult to adjudicate. The missions in Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. responded to these resource pressures by routinely waiving personal interviews for so-called good visa cases, that is, those of their host country nationals. Berlin was similarly strapped for staff. There were simply not enough visa officers available to interview more than a handful of applicants at any of the five consular sections.

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VISAS FOR CA/VO/F/S E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: CVIS,. CLOK SUBJECT: CLOK THE FOLLOWING NAMES ARE SUBMITTED FOR DELETION FROM THE AVLOS: 1.

KARAKRA, ADEL BADER

JORD 41

2.

AJAJ, MOHAMMAD AHMAD

JORD 41

3.

MALUL, GIORA

ISRL 41

4.

GOLA, YITZHAK

ISRL 41 9/11 Personal Privacy

5.

HUMAID, ANWAR SALEH

JORD 41

6.

HALABI, NASIR ELDIN AZMI

JORD 41

7.

DAJANI, IMAD

JORD 41

8.

ABU SIAM, HUSEIN MAKHLOUF AKA ABU SIYAM, HUSEIN

JORD 41

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02

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9. ABU AMSHA, MAHER

JORD 41 9/11 Personal Privacy

10. ABED RABO, MOHAMMAD MARZOUK Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

JORD 41 Page: 1

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0005

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 3

DOC ID: 31199441

2 RESTRICTED|_|

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 10/18/2002

DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Visa's Viper Submission

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0005

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 4

DOC ID: 31199442

5

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 10/02/2001

DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Homeland Security

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: SBU Document Number: 2002TOKYO05427

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P 090635Z AUG 02 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO HQ USINS WASHDC//HQDRO// PRIORITY SECSTATE WASHDC 1770 INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK AMEMBASSY JAKARTA AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 005427 USINS PASS TO INS WASHINGTON FOR TAET D. JOHNSON; BANGKOK FOR INS; SINGAPORE FOR INS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CR/CIL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC, CVIS^ SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR INS ESCORTS REF: 54180808 HQ USINS WASHDC CABLE OF 090256Z AUG 02 (NOTAL) UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 1.(U) EMBASSY GRANTS COUNTRY CLEARANCE AND WELCOMES THE VISIT OF RICHARD MORGAN AND TAB JOHNSON TO TOKYO ON AUGUST 17, 2002. JAPANESE AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE DETAILS OF THE USINS ESCORT OF ALIEN AGUS BUDIMAN. NOTE THAT AIRPORT POLICE DETECTIVE(S) AT NAGOYA MAY MEET DEPORTATION TRANSITS; IN ORDER TO FACILITATE RECOGNITION OF THE INS DETAIL, EMBASSY ADVISES THAT AGENTS SHOULD REQUEST AIRLINE GROUND SERVICE ASSISTANCE AT NAGOYA TO MEET THE POLICE, AND, AGENTS SHOULD DISPLAY DISTINCTIVE PHOTO ID OR PIN ON DEPARTURE FROM THE PLANE AT JAPAN. JAPANESE AUTHORITIES DO NOT REQUIRE A NOTIFICATION OF THEIR RETURN TRAVEL, AS THEY ARE NOT ESCORTING THE ALIEN ON THEIR WAY Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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BACK. ANY CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS IN THE ESCORT MANIFEST OR ALIEN ESCORTED MUST BE CONVEYED TO THE EMBASSY FOR COMMUNICATION TO JAPANESE AUTHORITIES. TWO WORKING DAYS ARE REQUIRED FOR ANY CHANGE TO BE COMMUNICATED. OTHERWISE, AN OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION IS REQUIRED BEFORE FIVE WORKING DAYS AND ANY CORRECTIONS, ADDITIONS OR DELETIONS IN THE ESCORT MANIFEST OR ALIEN ESCORTED MUST BE CONVEYED TO THE EMBASSY FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES. 2. (U) HOTEL INFORMATION: THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICE HAS NOT MADE RESERVATIONS FOR THE TRAVELERS. 3. (U) PLEASE NOTE THAT TRAVELERS TO JAPAN ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS WILL NEED A VISA. THEY SHOULD HAVE A COPY OF THEIR ORDERS AND OFFICIAL ID CARD WITH THEM AT THE TIME OF ENTRY. POST DOES NOT PROVIDE OFFICIAL TRANSPORTATION TO VISITORS ARRIVING AT NARITA. HOWEVER, AIRPORT UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z LIMOUSINE BUS SERVICE IS AVAILABLE DIRECTLY FROM THE TERMINAL TO THE ANA HOTEL. UPON EXITING CUSTOMS, LOOK FOR THE AIRPORT LIMOUSINE BUS COUNTER. THE ATTENDANTS SPEAK ENGLISH AND WILL ASSIST YOU WITH A BUS DIRECTLY TO THE ANA HOTEL. THE FARE IS 3,000 YEN. YOU CAN CHANGE MONEY DIRECTLY OUTSIDE CUSTOMS. 4.(U) THREAT ASSESSMENT: THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11 AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, THE PENTAGON AND SOMERSET, PENNSYLVANIA, SERVE AS A CRUEL REMINDER OF THE CONTINUING THREAT FROM TERRORISTS AND EXTREMIST GROUPS TO AMERICANS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS WORLDWIDE. THIS SITUATION REMAINS FLUID AND AMERICAN CITIZENS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL RISKS AND TAKE THESE INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN MAKING TRAVEL PLANS. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ABOUT POTENTIAL THREATS TO AMERICANS OVERSEAS AND TO SHARE CREDIBLE THREAT INFORMATION THROUGH ITS CONSULAR INFORMATION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNET AT THE BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS HOME PAGE HTTP://WWW.TRAVEL.STATE.GOV. 5. (SBU) THE GENERAL THREAT FROM CRIME IN TOKYO AND THROUGHOUT JAPAN IS LOW. CRIME IS AT LEVELS WELL BELOW THE U.S. NATIONAL AVERAGE. VIOLENT CRIME IS RARE, BUT DOES EXIST. THE JAPANESE NATIONAL POLICE REPORT CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH PICK POCKETING OF FOREIGNERS IN CROWDED SHOPPING AREAS OF TOKYO. ALTHOUGH STREET CRIME IS LOW/ '• COMMON SENSE SECURITY MEASURES ARE ADVISED FOR ALL AMERICAN

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CITIZENS TRAVELING IN JAPAN. UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 04 TOKYO 05427 01 OF 02 090644Z 6. (U) AS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS REPORTED IN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS, U.S. CITIZENS AND INTERESTS ABROAD MAY BE AT INCREASED RISK OF TERRORIST ACTIONS FROM EXTREMIST GROUPS. MOST RECENTLY, WE ADVISED THAT WE HAD UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS MAY BE TAKEN AGAINST U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES AND/OR ESTABLISHMENTS FREQUENTED BY U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN KOREA AND JAPAN. 7. (U) IN ADDITION, WE CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT INFORMATION WE RECEIVED IN MAY 2001 THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS MAY BE THE TARGET OF A TERRORIST THREAT FROM EXTREMIST GROUPS WITH LINKS TO USAMA BIN LADIN'S AL-QAIDA ORGANIZATION. IN THE PAST, SUCH INDIVIDUALS HAVE NOT DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN OFFICIAL AND CIVILIAN TARGETS. IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION, U.S. GOVERNMENT FACILITIES WORLDWIDE REMAIN AT A HEIGHTENED STATE OF ALERT. THE EMBASSY TAKES ALL THREATS SERIOUSLY. THE U.S. EMBASSY TOKYO CAN BE CONTACTED 24 HOURS A DAY AT 03-3224-5000 (LOCALLY) OR 81-3-3224-5000 (INTERNATIONALLY). 8.(SBU)

VISITORS ARE URGED TO MAINTAIN A HIGH LEVEL OF UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

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P 090635Z AUG 02 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO HQ USINS WASHDC//HQDRO// PRIORITY SECSTATE WASHDC 1771 INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK AMEMBASSY JAKARTA AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE UNCLAS SECTION--02- OF 02 TOKYO 005427 Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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US INS PASS TO INS WASHINGTON FOR TAET D. JOHNSON; BANGKOK FOR INS; SINGAPORE FOR INS STATE DEPARTMENT FOR DS/CR/CIL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC, CVIS SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR INS ESCORTS VIGILANCE AND TO INCREASE THEIR SECURITY AWARENESS. AMERICANS SHOULD MAINTAIN A LOW PROFILE, VARY ROUTES AND TIMES FOR ALL REQUIRED TRAVEL, AND TREAT MAIL AND PACKAGES UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 TOKYO 05427 02 OF 02 090644Z FROM UNFAMILIAR SOURCES WITH SUSPICION. VISITORS ARE ALSO URGED TO AVOID CONTACT WITH ANY SUSPICIOUS, UNFAMILIAR OBJECTS, AND TO REPORT THE PRESENCE OF SUCH OBJECTS TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES. VEHICLES SHOULD NOT BE LEFT UNATTENDED AND SHOULD BE KEPT LOCKED AT ALL TIMES. 9. (SBU) ALL TOY TRAVELERS ARE ENCOURAGED TO ATTEND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S SECURITY OVERSEAS SEMINAR SPONSORED BY THE OVERSEAS BRIEFING CENTER (OBC) AT NFATC. TO REGISTER, EMPLOYEES SHOULD ASK THEIR TRAINING OFFICER, ASSIGNMENTS OFFICER OR OFFICE DIRECTOR TO SEND A REQUEST FOR TRAINING FORM (DS-755) TO FSI. FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASES CONTACT OBC'S INFORMATION CENTER, 4000 ARLINGTON BOULEVARD, ROOM E2126, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22204 OR BY PHONE AT 733-3027277. 10. (U) POINT OF CONTACT IS INVESTIGATOR KEN WADA; OFFICE NUMBER IS 81-3-3224-5592, FAX 81-3-5572-8411 OR INTERNET E-MAIL [email protected]. THE RSO OFFICE MAY BE CONTACTED AT ANY TIME THROUGH TELEPHONE 81-3-3224-5000, FROM OUTSIDE JAPAN, OR 03-3224-5000 FROM WITHIN JAPAN. CHRISTENSON UNCLASSIFIED « END OF DOCUMENT »

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0005

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 5

DOC ID: 31199443

2

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 04/25/1995

DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Request for Evaluation fo Security Information

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1993STATE167180

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DRAFTED BY: L/LEI:MKBASSLE/DAWILSON APPROVED BY: L/LEI:RAKUSHEN DOJ/OIA:KJHARRIS (SUBS) NEA/ARN:HENSHER (SUBS) NEA/NGA:STINSLEY (INFO) NEA/NGA:MBERNIER-TOTH (SUBS) DESIRED DISTRIBUTION CA/VO/F/SL •C6A1D8 030552Z /38 0 030551Z JUN 93 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS INFO FBI WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7260 UNCLAS STATE 167180

FOR DCM AND CON E.O. 12356: N/A TAGS: CJAN. CVIS. JO, SY, IR, IZ (RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF) SUBJECT: RETURN OF ALIEN FUGITIVE RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF 1. AT THE INSTANCE OF THE U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, EMBASSIES ARE ASKED TO REQUEST THE EXTRADITION, EXPULSION OR DEPORTATION OF RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF. BASED UPON HIS PAST MOVEMENTS, U.S. PROSECUTORS BELIEVE THAT YOUSEF MAY TRAVEL UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 STATE 167180 030551Z TO JORDAN. SYRIA, IRAN OR IRAQ. IN THE CASES OF IRAN AND IRAQ, A DIPLOMATIC NOTE WILL BE SUBMITTED DIRECTLY TO THEIR RESPECTIVE INTEREST SECTIONS IN WASHINGTON D.C. 2. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY CURRENTLY IN FORCE WITH JORDAN OR SYRIA. ACCORDINGLY, THE USG REQUESTS THAT RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS DO WHATEVER POSSIBLE UNDER ITS LAWS TO EXPEL OR EXTRADITE YOUSEF TO THE U.S. 3. EMBASSIES ARE ALSO ASKED TO REQUEST THE SEIZURE OF ALL ARTICLES IN THE POSSESSION OF YOUSEF AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST WHICH MAY BE CONNECTED TO THE CRIMINAL CHARGES Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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AGAINST HIM IF/WHEN HE IS EXTRADITED/EXPELLED TO THE UNITED STATES. 4. YOUSEF IS CHARGED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK) WITH UNLAWFULLY1 WILLFULLY, KNOWINGLY AND MALICIOUSLY DAMAGING AND DESTROYING BY MEANS OF FIRE AND EXPLOSIVE. A BUILDING USED IN INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE. CAUSING DEATH BY MEANS OF AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, CONSPIRACY, RACKETEERING ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES AND ILLEGAL USE OF EXPLOSIVES, IN VIOLATION OF 18 USC 2, 33. 34, 371. 844 924 AND 952. THESE ARE FELONY OFFENSES AND THE MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT IS IMPRISONMENT. A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE ARREST WARRANT AND INDICTMENT WILL BE SUBMITTED THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. 5. THE FACTS OF THE CASE INDICATE THAT YOUSEF PARTICIPATED IN THE BOMBING O*F THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ON FEBRUARY 26, 1993, IN WHICH SIX PEOPLE WERE KILLED. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 STATE 167180 030551Z HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE WERE INJURED, AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE TOTALLED SEVERAL HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS. SPECIFICALLY, THESE FACTS SHOW THAT YOUSEF TRAVELED FROM PAKISTAN TO NEW YORK TOGETHER WITH DEFENDANT MOHAMMAD AHMAD AJAJ, THAT AJAJ WAS TRANSPORTING MANUALS CONTAINING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF BOMBS, THE ONE WHICH EXPLODED IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, AND THAT YOUSEF'S FINGERPRINTS WERE FOUND ON TWO OF THE MANUALS. MOREOVER. ON NOVEMBER 30, 1992 WITNESSES SAW YOUSEF ORDER CHEMICALS OF THE TYPE THEY USED IN THE BOMBING AND HAVE THEM DELIVERED TO A STORAGE SHED RENTED BY. ANOTHER CO-DEFENDANT. MOHAMMAD SALAMEH. OTHER WITNESSES OBSERVED SALAMEH SUBSEQUENTLY RENT THE VAN IN WHICH THE BOMB WAS DETONATED INSIDE THE WORLD TRADE CENTER, AND STILL OTHER WITNESSES SAW YOUSEF RIDING WITH SALAMEH INSIDE THE VAN THE DAY OF THE BOMBING. PROSECUTORS BELIEVE THAT YOUSEF FLED THE UNITED STATES SHORTLY AFTER THE BOMBING ON FEBRUARY 26, 1993. 6. RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF IS BELIEVED TO BE AN IRAQI NATIONAL. BORN ON MAY 20' 1967, IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. HE IS DESCRIBED AS 6. TALL, 180 LBS IN WEIGHT. WITH BROWN HAIR AND BROWN EYES. YOUSEF HOLDS ALIEN REGISTRATION NUMBER A72-054-519. A PHOTO OF YOUSE^ IS BEING SENT TO EMBASSIES BY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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7. IN MAKING ABOVE APPROACH ABOUT POSSIBLE YOUSEF TRANSFER, EMBASSIES.SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES WOULD APPRECIATE HOST COUNTRY'S ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE OF LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY U.S. LAW. WE WOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION TO GUARANTEE RECIPROCITY IN THE EVENT OF UNCLASSIFIED : PAGE 04

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HOST COUNTRY'S INTEREST IN OUR DEPORTING SOMEONE TO IT. 8. PLEASE ADVISE RESULTS OF ABOVE APPROACH SOONEST BY CABLE CAPTIONED L/LEI. CHRISTOPHER UNCLASSIFIED NNNN

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

Page: 3

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

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FOLDER: 0005

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 6

DOC ID: 31199444

2

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 08/04/1993

DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Fighting Terrorism

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

S/S 200400123 United States Department of State AC 2K20

January 5, 2004 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DANIEL MARCUS GENERAL COUNSEL NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

SUBJECT: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States Request for Documents (Document Request for 1C Components) This is in response to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States' request for Department of State documents. This memorandum and the attached documents convey information related to the Intelligence Community, as requested in a series of questions in a December 19, 2003 Justice Department memorandum on behalf of the Commission. We hope this information is useful to you. As always, please do not hesitate to contact us if you have further questions.

I(^fftrJL'T^il^^-^ a

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Karl Hofmarfn Hofmai Executive Secretary

Attachments: Tab 1 Tab 2

December 19, 2003 memorandum from Department of Justice. Answers to the questions posed in the December 19, 2003 Department of Justice memorandum .

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

J.IMK

December 19, 2003 MEMORANDUM sar Jx-c- I I . Hamilton VICKOIMR

Richard Bcn-Venistc

To:

Daniel Levin, Department of Justice

From: Daniel Marcus, General Counsel

Fred !•'. Fielding Jamie S. Gorclick Sladc Gorton Bob Kerrey John ].chman '1'imothyJ. Rocmer James R. Thompson

Subj: Questions for 1C components As we have discussed, the Commission is requesting written answers to the following questions from a variety of intelligence organizations that provide support to the nation's counterterrorist (CT) efforts. The Commission requests written answers to the following questions, no later than January 20, 2004, from DOE (INI), State (INK), Treasury (IS), DHS (IAIP), NRO, Army/INSCOM, Navy/NSGA, Air Force/AIA, all Combatant Commands/J2. Thank you for agreeing to coordinate this request on behalf of the Executive Branch.

Philip D. Zelikow Kxr-:<:uTivE DIRECTOR

For the following questions, please provide answers based on the most current information available. Where resources are involved, please provide those estimates included in the President's FY 2003 Budget. The term counterterrorism in these questions refers to both force protection and other CT activities; please differentiate between the two in the answers. 1 . Please describe your organization's role in supporting counterterrorism activities prior to September 11, 2001, and your agency's CT role today. 2. How do you decide between counterterrorism and other high priority intelligence collection and analysis activities? Who makes these decisions? How do you allocate resources in accordance with these priorities? 3. Which activities, if any, have been terminated in order to reallocate resources to CT efforts over the past five years? 4. How are your organization's priorities linked to guidance from the Secretary of Defense and/or the Director of Central Intelligence? Are your priorities solely directed by the cabinet secretary or agency head that leads your department or agency?

TEL (202) 331-4060 FAX (202) 296-5545 www.9-11 commission.gov

Memo to Daniel Levin December 19, 2003 Page 2 5. What is your office's strategy to meet its responsibilities regarding counterterrorism? 6. Please describe your agency's linkages to the following entities: Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC); CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC); DIA Joint Task Force for Counterterrorism; FBI Counterterrorism Division; DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP). 7. Please characterize relations on counterterrorism issues within the Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001, and today. How has information sharing on CT issues changed, if at all? 8. Please identify the responsible policy official for CT issues in the Intelligence Community from whom you take direction and guidance.

0/4 57V ^ SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED Answers to December 19,2003 Questions

1. Please describe your organization's role in supporting counter terrorism activities prior to September 11,2001, and your agency's CT role today. A. INR played an active CT role before September 11 and continues to do so. Working both independently and in cooperation with our colleagues in the rest of the 1C, ENR analysts track, monitor, and analyze all-source reporting on terrorism. Our primary customer is the Secretary of State. INR officers work with the 1C to ensure that State's counter terrorism needs are reflected in collection plans, future architecture and resource decisions, and that intelligence operations support U.S. diplomacy and combat terrorism. Our reporting and analysis for the Secretary and other Department officials supports the counterterrorism goals embodied in the DCI's Intelligence Imperatives for our Nation's Security: to win the war on terrorism, warn of impending threats, and protect America. Win the War on Terrorism - INR analysis seeks to improve the USG's understanding of foreign terrorist operations. Our focus is on areas of critical concern including terrorist support networks, access to weapons of mass destruction, terrorist financing and terrorist links to local groups in all regions. Our work directly contributes to the USG's efforts to identify, disrupt, and destroy terrorist infrastructures and activities. Warn of impending threats - Using all-source intelligence, INR continuously monitors issues, situations, and countries that could pose a threat to the national security of the U.S. and alerts policymakers so that threats can be mitigated through diplomacy. To reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction to the United States and our allies, INR supports the prevention or interdiction of transfers of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons related goods, as well as missiles and advanced conventional weapons to countries of concern. INR is a key player in the policy community's efforts to prepare and vet demarche language based on intelligence to combat proliferation of WMD, technologies, and arms. Protect America - INR regularly advises, drafts, and/or coordinates with the rest of the 1C on terrorist-related threat warnings. In addition, from 1987 through FY 2003, INR served as home to the TIPOFF program - an electronic database that tracks known or suspected terrorists and helps prevent their entry into the United States. In FY 2004, the majority of the TIPOFF staff and its activities were integrated with the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) - 6. The TIPOFF database is helping provide the foundation for a comprehensive national system for screening terrorists. These changes will consolidate the U.S. Government watchlist function and strengthen our national counter terrorism effort.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -22. How do you decide between counterterrorism and other high priority intelligence collection and analysis activities? Who makes these decisions? How do you allocate resources in accordance with these priorities? A. The Assistant Secretary of State for INR establishes our reporting and analysis priorities in order to best meet the intelligence needs of the Secretary of State. In addition, the bureau obtains general guidance from the following two US foreign policy documents: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America - Published in September 2002, Goal 3 of this document calls for the United States to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends. The FY 2004-2009 Strategic Plan of the US Department of State and US Agency for International Development - This plan includes the strategic counterterrorism goal of preventing attacks against the United States, our allies, and our friends, and strengthening alliances and international arrangements to defeat global terrorism. Counterterrorism goals are also reflected in strategic goals concerning homeland security, weapons of mass destruction, and the welfare of American citizens overseas. In allocating resources to meet our counterterrorism reporting and analysis priorities, INR draws upon the full range of its analytical resources. While the Office of Terrorism, Narcotics, and Crime Analysis (TNC) has INR's counterterrorism lead, TNC regularly consults with and draws upon the expertise of fellow analysts in INR's regional and functional offices. 3. Which activities, if any, have been terminated in order to reallocate resources to CT efforts over the past five years? A. None. INR's reporting and analysis must address political, economic, military, and terrorism developments in 193 countries in order to support the Secretary of State who bears responsibilities in all of them. INR has addressed the increased requirements for terrorism analysis through increased information and sharing of expertise among our various analytical offices; regional analysts increasingly engage in our reporting of terrorism developments. However, no non-terrorism reporting activities have been terminated. 4. How are your organizations' priorities linked to guidance from the Secretary of Defense and/or the Director of Central Intelligence? Are your priorities solely directed by the cabinet secretary or agency head that leads your department or agency? A. hi addition to priorities dictated by the intelligence requirements of the Secretary of State, INR takes general guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Direction regarding our reporting and analysis priorities is derived from the DCI's Intelligence Imperatives for Our Nation's Security, published in 2002. Also guiding INR's priorities is the state of priorities for the intelligence community embodied in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) - 26, issued in February 2003. 5. What is your office's strategy to meet its responsibilities regarding counterterrorism? A. INR analysis seeks to improve the USG's understanding of foreign terrorist operations. Our focus is on areas of critical concern including terrorist support networks, access to

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -3weapons of mass destruction, terrorist financing, and terrorist links to local groups in all regions. Our work directly contributes to the USG's efforts to identify, disrupt, and destroy terrorist infrastructures and activities. INR's overall strategy to meet its counterterrorism responsibilities is embodied in the Bureau Program Plan (BPP). A primary element in our strategy is the recognition that trained, experienced, and motivated officers and support staff are key to evaluating terrorism threats and supporting the Department's counterterrorism activities. INR seeks to provide an effective level of trained and motivated officers and staff for counterterrorism analysis. INR encourages officers and staff to take advantage of "in-service" training opportunities whenever possible. Also key to the strategy to meet INR's counterterrorism responsibilities is the ability to quickly access and disseminate counterterrorism reporting and analysis. Toward that end, INR also supports the E-Govemment initiative of the President's Management Agenda (PMA). This has included expanding the use of SIPIRNET in Washington and at overseas posts, launching a fourth website on Intelink, allowing Department officers in Washington and overseas to instantly access critical intelligence material. 6. Please describe your agency's linkages to the following entities: Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC); CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTQ; DIA Joint Task Force for Counterterrorism; FBI Counterterrorism Division; DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP). A. Officers in INR's Office of Analysis for Terrorism, Narcotics, and Crime (INR/TNC) maintain working relationships with their counterparts in the above-mentioned entities. INR/TNC officers regularly consult with their counterparts. INR is also an active participant in the National Terrorism Threat Warning System and is part of the core group of seven Intelligence Community (1C) entities that drafts and/or clears on 1C warnings and threat assessments. 7. Please characterize relations on counterterrorism issues within the Intelligence Community prior to September 11,2001, and today. How has information sharing on CT issues changed, if at all? A. Both prior to and after September 11, there have always been extensive working level contacts within the 1C. Such contact ran the gamut from general information sharing to analytical collaboration and healthy debate. Particularly since September 11, there has been a general acknowledgement of the value of such contact, with the result that the frequency and substance of 1C interaction is constantly improving. 8. Please identify the responsible policy official for CT issues in the Intelligence Community from whom you take direction and guidance. A. INR takes its primary direction and guidance for CT reporting and analysis from the Secretary of State. With regard to coordination and activities as a member of the 1C, INR also takes guidance on priorities from and consults with the DCI.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

.02/19/04

THU 10:41 FAX

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate Response to the 9/11 Commission's Questions for Intelligence Community Components 1. Please describe your organization's role in supporting counterterrorism activities prior to September 11,2001, and your agency's CT role today. The Department of Homeland Security was established on March 1,2003, and in it, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAD?) was set up to receive information and intelligence regarding terrorist threats to the homeland, map those threats against the nation's physical and cyber critical infrastructure and key assets, and issue timely warnings and preventive and protective measures to protect American lives and property. The IAIP combined the legacy capabilities of the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Assurance, the General Services Administration's Federal Computer Incident Reporting Center (FedCIRC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Infrastructure Protection Center, the Department of Commerce's Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, and the Department of Defense's National Communications System, with the mission requirement to leverage these existing capabilities, and to broaden and enhance them to provide information and services to the federal government, state and local officials, and the private sector. As an example of this broadening of legacy missions, IAIP maintains continual situational awareness of the nation and its borders through the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). HSOC currently houses 26 federal (both Intelligence and law enforcement) and local agencies, which provide a continual stream of information which is further analyzed or transmitted to the appropriate federal or local law enforcement agency for action. Today, IAIP is providing the full range of intelligence support to DHS leadership, mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against assessed vulnerabilities in order to protect against terrorist attacks, conducting independent analysis of terrorist threats to the homeland in the form of tailored, competitive and red team analysis, developing requirements for collection of intelligence and threat-related information, and coordinating information exchanges between the Department and state and local governments and the private sector. Please see attached Fact Sheet on IAIP, and its relationship to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. 2. How do you decide between counterterrorism and other high priority intelligence collection and analysis activities? Who makes these decisions? How do you allocate resources in accordance with these priorities? As outlined in the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security,

l£]002

THU 10:42 FAI

vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, to integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments in order to identify priorities for protective and support measures by the Department, other agencies of the Federal Government, State and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. IA3P disseminates, as appropriate, information collected and analyzed by elements of the Department within the Department, to other agencies of the Federal Government with responsibilities relating to homeland security, and to agencies of State and local governments and private sector entities with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, and response to, terrorist attacks against the United States. Through its analysts assigned to TTIC, the IA Directorate ensures that information gathered by DHS reaches TTIC and informs its work and that TTlC's work directly supports DHS' unique mission to protect the Homeland. IAIP consults with State and local governments and private sector entities to ensure appropriate exchanges of information, including law enforcement-related information, relating to threats of terrorism against the United States. To the extent that this question seeks information about non-terrorism-related intelligence collection and analysis and the relative priority of such activities vis-avis counterterrorism activities, given lAIP's overriding statutory mission, the question is largely inapplicable to IAIP. IAIP has allocated the resources it received from the passage of the Homeland Security Act after extensive consultation by the leadership team, though some flexibility will be required as DHS continues to mature and develop an operational history of its own in order to determine how best to allocate resources to better meet mission requirements. 3. Which activities, if any, have been terminated in order to reallocate resources to CT efforts over the past five years? The Department of Homeland Security was established on March 1,2003. lAIP's resources were reallocated from the legacy agencies identified above. There has been no further reallocation to date. 4, How are your organization's priorities linked to guidance from the Secretary of Defense and/or the Director of Central Intelligence? Are your priorities solely directed by the cabinet secretary or agency head that leads your department or agency? The priorities for IAIP are set forth in the Homeland Security Act and by applicable Presidential Directives, and are administered by the Secretary for Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, and the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure

1^)004

THU 10:43 FAX

6. Please describe your agency's linkages to the following entities: Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC); CIA Counterterrorist Center (CTC); DIA Joint Task Force for Counterterrorism; FBI Counterterrorism Division; DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP). As noted above, IAIP is a full partner in - in effect a "part owner of — TTIC; our officers work day-in-day-out at TTIC, participating in processing and analyzing terrorist threat-related information, shaping and disseminating TTIC products, assessing gaps in available information, and ensuring that TTIC products reach appropriate DHS Headquarters elements, as well as appropriate state, local and private sector officials. The CIA, DOD, and FBI, as well as others, also are full partners in the TTIC joint venture, and, as a result, IAIP is closely linked to them through its work at TTIC. Additionally, lAJP, as a full member of the Intelligence Community, shares intelligence information not only with its component entities, but with other 1C members, including, but not limited to, those listed in the question above. This sharing of information involves regular meetings and exchanges of information. For example, the Office of Information Analysis and the FBI Counterterrorism Division meet weekly, and the Homeland Security Information Summary (HSIS) is briefed and distributed electronically by IA daily to selected members of the intelligence community. 7. Please characterize relations on Counterterrorism issues within the Intelligence Community prior to September 11,2001, and today. How has information sharing on CT issues changed; if at all? IAIP, of course, did not exist until March 2003. From our perspective, however, information sharing on Counterterrorism issues has increased greatly even since IAIP came into being. Not only are members of the 1C communicating well, including through frequent face-to-face and electronic meetings, vastly enhanced dissemination of information throughout not just the traditional "1C," but with the broader law enforcement and homeland security communities. New ways of doing business, including IAP itself, as well as, of course, the TTIC, and the Terrorist Screening Center, are improving every day our ability not onlyto better develop a better threat picture but to act rapidly to reduce our vulnerabilities and to prevent threatened attacks against us. IAIP is currently assessing and analyzing threat information from all sources, including the 1C, and sharing the results at an unprecedented rate, at appropriate levels, with state and local homeland security officials and the private sector. 8. Please identify the responsible policy official for CT issues in the Intelligence Community from whom you take direction and guidance. Direction and guidance to IAIP are provided by the Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, and the Under Secretary for IAIP, Frank Libutti, themselves

1^006

THII 10:44 FAI

0008

FACT SHEET: DHS Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Summary The Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastmcture Protection ('TAIP") of the Department of Homeland Security* (DHS) is firmly committed to carrying out each of the 19 responsibilities assigned to it in Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act. As indicated in the Reorganization Plan, submitted to Congress on November 22,2002, and graphically represented in the attached table,; the Office of Information Analysis ('TA") will carry out 16 of the 19 responsibilities (working together with the Office of Infrastructure Protection ("IP") on sevlen of these). IP itself will carry out three of the 19. IA will carry out one of the 19 responsibilities ~ identifying, detecting, and assessing terrorist threats to the homeland - both through analysts at DHS Headquarters and through operating as one of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center ("TTIC") partners in collaboration with analysts from other-key agencies. Although only a few months old, IAIP is moving forward to increase its] staff to carry out these statutory responsibilities, and will have 86 full time analysts by September 2003, and 113 by March 2004, lAlP's first anniversary. Among the key missions o;f IA, which it is now carrying out and for which IA will continue to increase its Capability, are: Providing the full range of intelligence support to senior DHS leadership, as do intelligence components of other departments and agencies; i I-

With IP, mapping terrorist threats to the homeland against our assessed vulnerabilities in order to drive our efforts to protect against terrorist attacks; •

Conducting independent analysis of terrorist threats to the homeland based on DHS' robust access to information and intelligence, including competitive analysis, tailored analysis, and "red teaming;"

•

Supporting the work of all of DHS' components, including the Directorates of Border and Transportation Security, Science and Technology, and Emergency Preparedness and Response. This analytic support will also be provided to DHS' decisionmakers under pending Bioshield legislatioin, if enacted;

•

Analyzing terrorist threats to the homeland, both at DHS Headquarters, and through IA analysts physically located at TfTIC;

•

Developing requirements for the collection of intelligence and other information related to terrorist threats to the homeland for use by the Intelligence Community and U.S. law enforcement agencies; |

•

Coordinating exchanges of terrorist threat-related information with state and local governments and the private sector; and

i

THU 10:44 FAX

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:

i

intelligence gaps and communications failures. This linkage of information access and analysis on the one hand and vulnerabilities analysis and protective measures on the other is what is entirely new, and unduplicated elsewhere, about the President's vision for DHS. i h i Partnership with State and Local Governments and the Private Sector. Unlike other members of the Intelligence Community, including others represented at the TTIC, IA has both the authority and responsibility for providing Federally-collected and analyzed homeland security information to drst respbnders and other state and local officials and, as appropriate, security managers and other key private sector contacts. Likewise, only IA, in coordination with IP, is in the position effectively to manage the collection from state and local governments, jand private sector officials, of the crucial homeland security-related information that maybe, in the first instance, available only to those officials. DHS will work closely with pther U.S. Government agencies to coordinate relations with state, local, and private sector officials, including coordinating with FBI on contacts with state and local law enforcement. ;

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Beyond the unique IA-IP partnership] IA is al|so the central information nerve center of DHS' efforts to coordinate the protection of U.S. homeland security. IA will: |j ; i | j • Facilitate the creation of requirements; on behalf of the Secretary and DHS leadership, to other DHS components, and to the intelligence Community, and law enforcement, informed by the integration! of homeland-security-related intelligence from all sources with vulnerability and risk assessments for critical infrastructure prepared by IP; ,j •

•

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Provide the full-range of intelligence support - briefings, analytic products, including tailored analysis responding tp jspecific; inquiries, and other support - to the Secretary, DHS leadership, the Undersecretary for IAIP, and DHS3 operational components, as well as the rest of DHS; j • !

! i

:

•

Serve as the collection, processing, integration,! analytic, and dissemination manager for DHS' information cdllectioin and operational components (Coast Guard, Secret Service, Transportation SecjuritylAdministration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border; Protection), turning the voluminous threat information collected every day at lour borders, ports, and airports, into usable and, in many cases, actionable intelligence; : :

•

Ensure (in coordination with FBI &nd others) that homeland security-related intelligence information is shared with 'pthers who need it, in the Federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private jsector; and

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Support the Homeland Security Advispry System. lA's activities also will be in support of the Secretary's responsibility to administer the Homeland Security Advisory System, including independently analyzing information supporting decisions to raise or lower the national warning level.

THU 10:45 FAX

i!012

To carry out portions of its mission performed by IA analysts physically located at TTIC and those at DHS Headquarters, IA will have robust, comprehensive, and independent access, mandated by the President and in the law, to information relevant to homeland security, whether raw or processed. IA's access is not an "either" IA at TTIC "or" IA at DHS Headquarters issue. IA will have the;mandated access to, and the physical electronic means to receive information, independent of its participation in the TTIC. DHS' robust access to homeland security infobnation -- provided by the President, by Congress, and by written agreement between the Secretary, Director of Central Intelligence, and Attorney General — is in no way limited to those IA officers physically working at TTIC. A copy of the JMemoraridum of Understanding between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing,! dated March 4,2003 ("the MOU") is attached hereto. ; ! Leveraging Federal, State and Local Irifortdation,

andDHS/IP

hi carrying out their analysis, IA analysts at DfHS Headquarters not only will have access to all relevant information from U.S^ intelligence and law enforcement agencies and from officials in state and local governments and! the private sector, but they will be able to reach out, via the IA analysts located at TTICJ to leverage then1 expertise and direct contacts to the overall U.S. counterterrorism operational and analytic efforts colocated there. DHS/D? will rely upon the analysis produced by IA, to help determine priorities for protective and support measures apd provide them to federal, state, and local government agencies and authorities, and to private sjector entities. In support of its mission, DHS/IP will drive, through and with IA, requirements to the Intelligence Community, law enforcement, and other parts of DHS, to ensure that vulnerabilities and threats are correlated and appropriate protective actions are defined and implemented. IA 's Independent Analytic Work In addition to the critical role, outlined above of mapping infrastructure vulnerabilities against threats to the homeland, IA. also will conduct other analysis distinct from that hi which IA analysts participate at TTIC, including: •

Tailored Analysis. IA Headquarters-based analysts will routinely be tasked to take a different "cut" at a similar universe of information as that analyzed at TTIC. For example, TTIC may reach a conclusion, about a g jneral terrorist threat to the United States, while DHS Headquarters may want a moi s targeted and specific analysis directed at how such a threat might affect ajparticfular sector of the U.S. infrastructure, Such threat analysis would be differentthan that jerformed at TTIC, but crucial to the overall DHS mission and to our homeland security, Similar tailored analytic products are systematically used by the leaders of other Imellig<;ence Community member Departments and Agencies based on each agency s individual mission.

•

Competitive Analysis. IAIP analysts located at Headquarters will also conduct competitive terrorism threat analysis to that takir place at TTIC. For example, the

THU 10:46

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Statutory Function" Vulnerabilities Assessment

•

':

;

;'

•

:.

.:

'.'

Component Performed, in Part, at TTIC? IP NO IP NO IP NO IA/IP NO IA NO

National Plan to Secure Infrastructure : :' Recommend Infrastructure Protective Measures ' "Map" threats against vulnerabilities : ; Ensure timely and efficient access to DHS of all : homeland security information j • \'- \r the Homeland Security Advisory System IA NO IA Make recommendations for homeland siecurity : • . NO information sharing policies I ' ••• i i • Disseminate information analyzed by DHS to other \, state, IA and local government NO entities! and :the: private sector ,j ; j i;. i Consult with appropriate federal Intelligence : IA 1 Community and law enforcement officials to establis collection priorities and strategies and represent DH* in "requirements" processes ;; | • ' : • .; '. Consult with state and local governments and the; private sector to ensure appropriate exchanges of , terrorist threat-related information '! '.-. :• ' • Ensure that information received is protected from unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only i >r the performance of official duties 1 1 . • .'•. Request additional information from other federal, s rte, local govemroent agencies and the private sector : Establish and use secure information technology ] inftastructure ! .i ;; Ensure that information systems/databaises lire ; ; compatible with one another and other federal Stgenfc es and treat information in accordance with applicable! Federal privacy law j i: • •. Coordinate training and other support to D&S and 6 rer agencies to identify and share information ! '• ,.' : , Coordinate with 1C elements and federal, sjjiatej- arid local law enforcement agencies "as appropriate" ; Provide intelligence analysis and other support to tit rest of DHS j. ; ; i i Perfonn such other duties as the Secretary may pK>V de

NO

IA

NO

IA/IP

NO

IAIP

NO

IA/IP

NO

IA/IP

NO

IA/IP

NO

IA

NO

IA

NO

IAAP IA

NO YES

Identify, Detect, and Assess Terrorist T|hre&ts to ; : Homeland 1 . j i '•: \ ';!. i . :

' This chart is intended only to describe in general terms LMP' wiivision of ikl OT witti regard to functions assigned DHS by the Homeland Security Act. Other parts of DHS, as well as participants in|TTKt nd all other federal Departments and Agencies, remain responsible, with regard to their own work and informationfa)t&eir pojsessijn for many of these same functions, e.g., protecting informarion agninst unauthorized disclosure. :| : '. • \ '!; - j - i .

:!v |= i - i | • -|.-7i\J! I !iH .

:i'-

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

TAB: 7

FOLDER: 0005

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

DOC ID: 31199445

11

ACCESS The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 04/23/2002

DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Visas Viper Activities: 8/1993 through 12/2001

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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113143 SOURCE: KODAKB.010087 DRAFTED BY: CA/FPP : TWSMITH, DS/CR/VF WROOT TWS APPROVED BY: CA:MARYAN, DS:EBOSWELL CA: RADAVIS DS:GBUJAC CA : DHAMILTON DS/CR/VF :; CDECAMPLI CA/VO : DOPPER DS/ICI/CR :: GSJUE ( CA/EX : MBARNES DS/PI/I : PBERGEN CA/FPPrDESTADER CA/VO/F/P:BMCKENZIE CA/F PP :RATSUKAYAMA S/S-O:GOLSON DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: CA:DANDRUCH, CA/VO/F/P, L/CA, CA/OCS/ACS, M/SI/CONGEN, OIG 3 F6B7D 012024Z /20 R 010526Z JUN 96 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM ASMARA POUCH BANGUI POUCH MONROVIA POUCH SARAJEVO POUCH UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 STATE UNCLAS STATE 113143

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E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KFRD, CMGT, CVIS, ASEC SUBJECT: CONSULAR MANAGEMENT (INTERNAL CONTROLS) -REVIEW OF CY 94/95 MALFEASANCE/MISFEASANCE CASES FOR AMBASSADORS, PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, RSO'S AND CONSULAR MANAGERS FROM CA ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARY A RYAN AND DS Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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1 - THIS IS A JOINT CA AND DS CABLE. 2. SUMMARY: THE BUREAUS OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS AND DIPLOMATIC SECURITY HAVE A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT MALFEASANCE, MISFEASANCE AND FRAUD. THIS RESPONSIBILITY EXTENDS TO, AND IS EXERCISED BY PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS, CONSULAR MANAGEMENT AND STAFF. WE RECOGNIZE THAT EFFORTS TO MEET INCREASING DEMANDS IN AN ERA OF DECLINING MEANS SEVERELY CHALLENGES POSTS' RESOURCES, AND THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF FSO'S AND FSN'S LIVE UP TO THE HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL AND ETHICAL STANDARDS. NEVERTHELESS, CONSULAR MANAGERS MUST NOT DECREASE THEIR VIGILANCE AGAINST FRAUD PERPETRATORS, CORRUPT OFFICIALS, UNSCRUPULOUS VISA BROKERS, ETC., AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT EMBASSY/ CONSULATE EMPLOYEES COULD BECOME INVOLVED WITH THEM. END SUMMARY. 3. WORLDWIDE TURMOIL, STRIFE, ECONOMIC DISLOCATION AND OTHER PUSH FACTORS HAVE SWOLLEN THE NUMBERS OF MALA FIDE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 STATE 113143 012023Z TRAVELLERS. THE DEPARTMENT HAS OBSERVED AN INCREASE IN ORGANIZED ALIEN SMUGGLING AND ITS CORROSIVE EFFECT ON IMMIGRATION, POLICE AND OTHER PUBLIC OFFICIALS AROUND THE WORLD. INCREASINGLY, ALIEN SMUGGLING HAS EITHER ADOPTED THE METHODOLOGY AND STRATEGIES OF ORGANIZED CRIME, OR HAS BEEN TAKEN OVER BY PREVIOUSLY-EXISTING ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS AS THEY RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR RELATIVELY LOW-RISK PROFITS - - I N MANY COUNTRIES TRAFFICKING IN UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS IS NOT ILLEGAL. ORGANIZED ALIEN SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS HAVE IDENTIFIED NEW AND OFTEN INGENIOUS ROUTES AND METHODS FOR PLYING THEIR TRADE. MANY ILLEGAL MIGRANTS BYPASS U.S. VISA LINES ALTOGETHER, WHILE OTHERS ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN LEGITIMATE TRAVEL DOCUMENTATION BY FRAUD AND DECEIT. 4. CONSEQUENTLY, EVER-INCREASING PRESSURES ARE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON EMBASSY AND CONSULATE EMPLOYEES TO BECOME DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SCHEMES TO ASSIST MALA FIDE ALIENS TO REACH THE U.S. BY CIRCUMVENTING U.S. IMMIGRATION LAWS. THESE ATTEMPTS USUALLY ARE THWARTED. HOWEVER, LACK OF PROPER DILIGENCE IN THE APPLICATION OF Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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STRICT INTERNAL CONTROLS, INATTENTIVENESS BY CONSULAR EMPLOYEES, AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES HAVE RESULTED IN, AT "* LEAST, THE APPEARANCE OF MALFEASANCE OR MISFEASANCE. AS RECORDED IN THE CASE SUMMARIES PROVIDED BELOW, THERE HAVE BEEN, REGRETTABLY, DELIBERATE EFFORTS BY EMBASSY AND CONSULAR EMPLOYEES TO SUBVERT THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM TO AID AND ABET CERTAIN ALIENS TO OBTAIN VISAS BY AVOIDING NORMAL VISA APPLICATION PROCEDURES. 5. ALL CONSULAR SUPERVISORS MUST EXERCISE SCRUPULOUS UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 04 STATE 113143 012023Z OVERSIGHT OF CONSULAR ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNAL CONTROLS. IN ORDER TO AVOID.. EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF MALFEASANCE OR MISFEASANCE, MANAGERS SHOULD ENSURE: -- DAILY RECONCILIATION OF CONSULAR CASH RECEIPTS; -- CAREFUL CONTROL OF BLANK PPT AND ROB FORMS; -- CAREFUL CONTROL OF IMMIGRANT VISA FORMS; -- CAREFUL MONITORING OF FIELD INVESTIGATIONS; -- PROTECTION OF PASSWORDS NEEDED TO ACCESS DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS; -- DAILY RECONCILIATION OF MRV VISA FOILS; -- FREQUENT REVIEW OF IVACS AND NIVCAPS SYSTEMS TO IDENTIFY ANY UNAUTHORIZED ALTERATIONS OF COMPUTERIZED VISA RECORDS; -- DAILY RECONCILIATION OF THE NUMBER ON NIV MACHINES AND PLATES WITH NIV APPLICATION FORMS; -- WITH THE RSO, SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPAL OFFICER IN ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE VISA REFERRAL SYSTEM. 6. WHENEVER FRAUD IS SUSPECTED THE DEPARTMENT EXPECTS SECURITY OFFICERS TO WORK PROMPTLY AND ENERGETICALLY WITH CONSULAR OFFICERS TO THWART ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES. 7. A REVIEW OF CASES INVESTIGATED BY DIPLOMATIC SECURITY IN THE YEARS 1994 AND 1995 REVEALS THAT CORRUPTED PERSONNEL TOOK ADVANTAGE OF WEAK INTERNAL CONTROLS IN ENGAGING IN THEIR FRAUDULENT ACTIVITIES. THE CONTROL OF APPROVED MRV "BATCHES" APPEARS TO BE A PARTICULAR UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1996STATE113143

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PAGE 05 STATE 113143 012023Z VULNERABILITY AT HIGH-VOLUME MRV POSTS. IN AT LEAST ONE CASE? THE WEAK APPLICATION OF INTERNAL CONTROLS BY A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER WAS THE SUBJECT OF A REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL. 1994 CASES 8. IN 1994 FOURTEEN FSN'S WERE TERMINATED FOR COMMITTING VISA FRAUD. TWO OF THE FSN'S WERE PROSECUTED LOCALLY. IN ADDITION, ONE FSN RECEIVED A LETTER OF REPRIMAND. A) AT AN NBA POST A CONSULAR FSN WITH 31 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE FAILED TO REPORT HIS CONTACTS WITH A KNOWN VISA FIXER WHO HAD SPENT TIME IN PRISON IN THE U.S. THE FSN AGREED TO TRY TO EXPEDITE THREE IMMIGRANT VISAS FOR CLIENTS OF THE VISA FIXER. ANOTHER, ALERT FSN REPORTED KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONSPIRACY AND THE FSN WAS TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT. B) AT ANOTHER NEA POST A CONSULAR FSN RECEPTIONIST EXTORTED MONEY FROM VISA APPLICANTS BY MAKING THEM BELIEVE THAT FURTHER VISA SERVICES WERE CONTINGENT ON THIS PAYMENT. WHEN DISCOVERED, SHE WAS TERMINATED, PROSECUTED LOCALLY AND RECEIVED A THREE-MONTH SENTENCE. C) IN AN AF POST A CONSULAR FSN ACCEPTED MONEY FROM A LOCAL BUSINESSMAN IN RETURN FOR ASSISTANCE WITH THE ISSUANCE OF AN IV FOR A CLIENT OF THE BUSINESSMAN. WHEN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 06 STATE 113143 012023Z THE VISA WAS REFUSED, THE BUSINESSMAN VISITED THE CONSULAR SECTION AND COMPLAINED THAT HE WANTED HIS MONEY BACK. ALERT FSN'S REPORTED THE INCIDENT AND THE FIRST FSN WAS TERMINATED. D) IN AN ARA POST A PIT AMERICAN FAMILY MEMBER (AFM) EMPLOYEE WORKING IN THE CONSULAR SECTION CONDUCTED CLASS RECORDS CHECKS ON SEVERAL ROUTINE VISA CASES AND OBTAINED HITS. SHE REFERRED THE CASES TO A CONSULAR OFFICER WHO OBSERVED THAT HE HAD NOT ADJUDICATED THESE PARTICULAR CASES AND THAT HIS INITIALS ON THE VISA APPLICATIONS WERE FORGED. THE RESPONSIBLE FSN WAS CONFRONTED AND DISMISSED. INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THE FSN HAD PLACED THE COMPLETED, FORGED APPLICATIONS AND Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

Page: 4

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1996STATE113143 PASSPORTS INTO A REGULAR BATCH OF APPROVED APPLICATIONS TO BE ENTERED INTO THE MRV. AFTER THE VISAS WERE PRINTED, HE INTENDED TO RETRIEVE THE PASSPORTS AND DISTRIBUTE THEM TO HIS "CLIENTS.

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E) IN AN AF POST, AN FSN INVESTIGATOR WAS TERMINATED AFTER INVESTIGATION DETERMINED HE HAD FALSIFIED THE RESULTS OF FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS IN RETURN FOR PAYMENT. F) IN AN EUR POST A CONSULAR FSN ACCEPTED USD 5000 FROM VISA APPLICANTS IN RETURN FOR HIS CLAIMED INFLUENCE OVER THE ISSUANCE PROCESS. THE FSN WAS TERMINATED, AND FLED TO THE US BEFORE HIS NIV COULD BE CANCELLED. THE CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE INS. G) IN AN ARA POST, THE RSO CONDUCTED A JOINT INVESTIGATIVE OPERATION WITH LOCAL POLICE TARGETING -. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 07 STATE 113143 012023Z THREE LOCAL VISA BROKERS AND AN FSN CONSULAR EMPLOYEE. THE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THE FSN FORGED CONSULAR OFFICERS' INITIALS ON VISA APPLICATIONS AND PLACED THEM INTO BATCHES OF APPROVED APPLICATIONS TO BE ENTERED INTO THE MRV. AFTER MRV PRINTING SHE RETRIEVED THE PASSPORTS WITH THEIR PRINTED VISAS AND RETURNED THEM TO HER CLIENTS. SHE CONFESSED TO HAVE FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED EIGHT NIVS FOR A TOTAL OF USD 9600. SHE AND THE THREE BROKERS WERE ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY. H) IN AN AF POST, A CONSULAR FSN EMPLOYEE ACCEPTED PAYMENT FROM AT LEAST TWELVE APPLICANTS IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS HELP IN OBTAINING VISAS. THE FSN SOLD HIS INFLUENCE AS A CONSULAR SECTION EMPLOYEE, AND WAS TERMINATED. I) IN AN ARA POST, A CONSULAR SECTION FSN CREATED A BOGUS IV FILE FOR HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW SO THAT THE INS WOULD ACCEPT THE PETITION AND FORWARD IT DIRECTLY TO THE CONSULATE, BYPASSING THE NATIONAL VISA CENTER. THE BROTHER-IN-LAW'S EMPLOYER CONTACTED THE CONSULATE TO VERIFY HIS STORY THAT HE HAD MISSED A DAY'S WORK TO APPLY FOR A VISA. ALERT CONSULAR STAFF EXPOSED THE SCAM AND THE FSN WAS TERMINATED. J) IN ANOTHER ARA POST, TWO FSN CONSULAR EMPLOYEES OFFERED TO EXPEDITE AN APPLICANT'S IMMIGRANT VISA IN RETURN FOR USD 10,000. AN INFORMANT NOTIFIED EMBASSY

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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Current Class::UNCLASSIFIED Current'Handling: n/a Document Number: 1996STATE113143

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PERSONNEL AND THE FSN'S WERE TERMINATED. IN ADDITION, THE FSN SUPERVISOR OF THE PAIR WAS TERMINATED FOR * KNOWING ABOUT THE SCHEME AND NOT REPORTING IT TO EMBASSY OFFICIALS. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 08

STATE

113143

012023Z

K) IN AN ARA POST, A GSO MOTORPOOL DRIVER WAS TERMINATED FOR FALSIFYING TWO VISA REFERRALS FOR PAYMENT. INS STOPPED ONE OF THE VISA RECIPIENTS AT A U.S. PORT OF ENTRY; THE RECIPIENT ADMITTED HE PAID THE FSN USD 1500 FOR THE REFERRAL. L) IN AN AF POST, A CONSULAR FSN ENTERED INFORMATION .ON UNQUALIFIED, UNINTERVIEWED VISA APPLICANTS INTO MRV BATCHES WITHOUT A CONSULAR OFFICER'S APPROVAL, AND PRODUCED TWELVE NONIMMIGRANT VISAS. THE FSN ALLEGEDLY ACCEPTED USD 3000 PER VISA FROM HER CLIENTS. THE FSN, WHO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF A TDY CONSULAR OFFICER DURING THE ONE-MONTH PERIOD IN WHICH THE FRAUD OCCURRED, WAS TERMINATED. M) BACK IN ARA, A CONSULAR FSN HELPED A KNOWN ALIEN SMUGGLER PLACE MALA FIDE CLIENTS AT THE HEAD OF THE NIV LINE OVER A FOUR MONTH PERIOD. WHEN CONFRONTED, THE FSN DENIED ACCEPTING PAYMENT FOR THIS SERVICE. POST COUNSELLED THE FSN AND ISSUED A LETTER OF REPRIMAND. 1995 CASES 9. IN CY 1995 15 FSN AND 2 AMERICAN EMPLOYEES WERE TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT. 5 FSN'S WERE PROSECUTED LOCALLY, WHILE ONE FSN AND ONE AMERICAN WERE PROSECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 09 STATE 113143 012023Z A) IN AN EAP POST, AN FSN VISA CLERK HELPED A VISA APPLICANT OBTAIN A FRAUDULENT BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND HELPED HER COMPLETE A FRAUDULENT VISA APPLICATION IN RETURN FOR USD 300. THE FSN WAS TERMINATED. B) IN AN ARA POST, TWO CONSULAR FSN'S WERE TERMINATED

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1996STATE113143 AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY FOR ASSISTING APPLICANTS IN THE PREPARATION OF DOCUMENT PACKAGES, INCLUDING STOLEN PASSPORTS.

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C) IN AN EAP POST, AN FSN ATTEMPTED TO RESIGN FROM EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEARNING SHE WAS A SUSPECT IN AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THREE MRV. FOILS. RSO AND LOCAL POLICE INTERVIEWS DID NOT RESULT IN AN ADMISSION OF GUILT; POST SUBSEQUENTLY TERMINATED THE FSN'S EMPLOYMENT. D) IN AN ARA POST THE AMBASSADOR'S FSN DRIVER ACCEPTED USD 1000 IN RETURN FOR SUBMITTING A VISA REFERRAL FOR A WOMAN UNDER DEA INVESTIGATION FOR NARCOTICS SMUGGLING. THE FSN ADMITTED INVOLVEMENT AND WAS TERMINATED. E) IN ANOTHER ARA POST, A CONSULAR FSN FRAUDULENTLY .. ISSUED AT LEAST 100 NON IMMIGRANT VISAS TO A SYRIAN NATIONAL VISA BROKER AND WAS PAID USD 2000 FOR EACH VISA. HE WAS ARRESTED IN THE U.S. AND WAS CONVICTED OF VISA FRAUD AND BRIBERY. NEEDLESS TO SAY, HE WAS TERMINATED. F) IN AN AF POST A CONSULAR FSN EXTORTED USD 120 FROM VISA APPLICANTS IN RETURN FOR PROCESSING THEIR VISA UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 10 STATE 113143 012023Z APPLICATIONS. HE WAS TERMINATED AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY. G) IN AN EUR POST A CONSULAR FSN EXTORTED USD 1000 FROM TWO E VISA APPLICANTS IN RETURN FOR PROCESSING THE VISAS. UPON ENTERING THE U.S. THE APPLICANTS FILED A COMPLAINT. AN UNDERCOVER OPERATION RESULTED IN DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE FSN1S INVOLVEMENT. THE FSN WAS TERMINATED AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY. H) IN AN AF POST, AN AID FSN DRIVER FORGED AN "A VISA REFERRAL FORM AND SUBMITTED IT TO THE CONSULAR SECTION. ALTHOUGH THE VISA WAS REFUSED HE CHARGED USD 600 FOR THE SERVICE. HE WAS TERMINATED AND PROSECUTED LOCALLY. I) IN ANOTHER AF POST AN FSN GSO EMPLOYEE AGREED TO ACCEPT USD 2000 FROM A POLICE UNDERCOVER OFFICER IN EXCHANGE FOR A VISA. THE OPERATION WAS BASED ON AN INFORMANT'S ALLEGATION OF THE EMPLOYEE'S PARTICIPATION

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1996STATE113143

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IN VISA FRAUD. THE FSN NEVER DELIVERED THE VISA AND THE POLICE OPERATION WAS TERMINATED, THOUGH THE EVIDENCE WAS "" SUFFICIENT TO TERMINATE THE FSN. J) IN AN ARA POST, A CONSULAR FSN WAS FOUND TO BE TAKING USD 40 FOR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING AN IMMIGRANT VISA AND USD FIFTEEN FOR NONIMMIGRANT VISAS. HE WAS TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT. K) IN AN EAP POST, A U.S. CITIZEN PIT EMPLOYEE OF THE CONSULAR SECTION FORGED VISA APPLICATIONS AND CONSULAR OFFICERS' NOTES AND INITIALS THAT RESULTED IN THE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 11 STATE 113143 012023Z ISSUING OF OVER 200 NONIMMIGRANT VISAS. THE EMPLOYEE WAS TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT; THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION CONTINUES. L) IN AN ARA POST AN EMBASSY FSN DRIVER AGREED TO ACCEPT MONEY FROM A POLICE UNDERCOVER OFFICER IN A JOINT DS/LOCAL POLICE UNDERCOVER OPERATION. THE OPERATION WAS BASED ON AN INFORMANT'S INFORMATION THAT THE DRIVER ASSEMBLED FALSE DOCUMENT PACKAGES FOR USD 3000-4000. THE DRIVER NEVER COMPLETED THE PACKAGE AND THE OPERATION WAS TERMINATED; AGAIN, THE EVIDENCE WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO TERMINATE THE EMPLOYEE. M) IN AN NBA POST, A CONSULAR FSN EXPLOITED WEAK INTERNAL CONTROLS AND CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF AT LEAST 65 NONIMMIGRANT VISAS TO THE NATION'S LARGE THIRD-COUNTRY NATIONAL POPULATION. HE ACCEPTED USD 2000 FOR EACH VISA. HIS EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED AND HE WAS DEPORTED TO HIS HOME COUNTRY. N) IN AN EUR POST AN EMBASSY CONTRACT GUARD SOLD HIS PASSPORT WITH A VALID NONIMMIGRANT VISA FOR USD 2000 TO A LOCAL NATIONAL WHO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DETAINED AT A U.S. PORT OF ENTRY FOR ATTEMPTING ENTRY WITH THE PASSPORT. THE GUARD WAS TERMINATED. O) AT THE SAME EUR POST, AN FSN VISA SUPERVISOR CREATED BOGUS NAME CHECK CABLES AND SCHEDULED FRAUDULENT MEDICAL APPOINTMENTS FOR F-3 VISA APPLICANTS SO THEY COULD APPLY AS F-I'S IN ORDER TO AVOID THE WAITING PERIOD OF AN F-3 CANDIDATE. SHE ALSO HELPED OBTAIN A VISA FOR HER UNCLASSIFIED Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1996STATE113143

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UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 12 STATE 113143 012023Z SISTER'S BOYFRIEND BY PRESENTING HIM AS HER HUSBAND. IN ADDITION, SHE WAS INVOLVED IN CASHIER IRREGULARITIES. SHE WAS TERMINATED FROM EMPLOYMENT. P) IN AN ARA POST, A GS-10 VISA EXAMINER WAS ARRESTED IN THE U.S. AND CONVICTED OF ACCEPTING A BRIBE BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL AFTER ACCEPTING MONEY FROM A LOCAL VISA BROKER IN EXCHANGE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF NONIMMIGRANT VISAS. SHE CONFESSED TO THE CRIME WHEN CONFRONTED. 10. ALL CONSULAR MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORY CONSULAR OFFICERS SHOULD DISCUSS THIS CABLE WITH THEIR STAFFS. THE CONSULAR MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (PARTICULARLY CHAPTERS SIX AND SEVEN WHICH COVER INTERNAL CONTROLS IN DEPTH), AND ALL OTHER INTERNAL CONTROLS GUIDANCE AVAILABLE AT POST SHOULD BE REFERRED TO IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. AT HIGH FRAUD POSTS RSO'S SHOULD BE INVOLVED. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD BE REVIEWED WITH EVERY NEWLY ASSIGNED FSO (AND FSN AS APPROPRIATE) TO ENSURE FAMILIARITY WITH THE PROCEDURES AND THE PITFALLS S/HE SHOULD AVOID. 11. ASSISTANT SECRETARIES RYAN AND BOSWELL TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THOSE CONSULAR OFFICERS AND FSN'S, IN CONJUNCTION WITH POST RSO'S, WHO SUCCEEDED IN FRUSTRATING VISA FRAUD AND ALIEN SMUGGLING AROUND THE WORLD, WHILE THIS "LESSONS LEARNED" CABLE NECESSARILY DEALS WITH AN UNPLEASANT REALITY THAT COMES WITH THE PROVISION OF A SERVICE FOR WHICH DEMAND FAR OUTSTRIPS SUPPLY, AND THAT BY ITS NATURE IS UNAVAILABLE TO MANY WHO DESIRE ITS BENEFITS, THE DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES THE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 13 STATE 113143 012023Z HARD WORK AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS DEMONSTRATED BY CA AND DS EMPLOYEES IN 1994 AND 1995. FINALLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARIES RYAN AND BOSWELL RECOGNIZE AND APPRECIATE THE DEDICATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF FSO'S AND FSN'S WHO LIVE UP TO THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM AND HONESTY. 12. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED CHRISTOPHER Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1996STATE113143

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UNCLASSIFIED NNNN

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

Page: 10

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0005

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 8

DOC ID: 31199446

5

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [2 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 08/29/2002

DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Response to OIG Request for Information on Non-Immigrant Visa Issuance Policies

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Visa Law Group - Immigration Attorneys At Law

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=i VISA LAW GROW Attorneys at Law Company

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it Visas, Nonimmigrant Visas: an Overview True, Walsh & Miller, LLP - attorne... Page 1 of 10

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Visas: an Overview About Us Immigration Resources * General Information * Immigrant Visas « Nonimmigrant Visas 4 Foreign Medical Graduates

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Visas: an Overview • Nonimmigrant Visa Categories • I rn mjg [a n t Vj s a C a tego r i e s • TaxNotes A visa grants a foreign national permission to enter the United States. A "nonimmigrant visa" permits a foreign national to remain in the United States temporarily, usually to work, to visit relatives or to attend school. Most nonimmigrant visas are not subject to numerical caps. An "immigrant visa" (also known as a "green" card or permanent resident status) permits a foreign national to remain in the United States permanently. A permanent resident has the right to become a naturalized U.S. citizen after three to five years. Immigrant visas are numerically limited by country and by class, e.g. family relationship or job skills. To enter or to stay in the United States as a nonimmigrant or immigrant usually requires several steps. First, a foreign national or his or her employer or relative often files an application with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to be classified in one of the nonimmigrant or immigrant visa categories. If the INS approves the application, the foreign national may need to go to a U.S. embassy or consulate overseas to have a visa stamped in his or her passport. This stamp indicates the visa class and the date of issuance and expiration. At the border, an immigration inspector will review the visa stamp and issue an admission card (Form 1-94 for nonimmigrants). The inspector can authorize admission for any length of time, up to the expiration date on the visa stamp. The INS also issues permanent resident alien cards to immigrants in the United States. The following is a list of common nonimmigrant and immigrant visa categories.

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Nonimmigrant Visa Categories There are approximately 24 types of nonimmigrant visas, each authorizing a temporary stay in the United States. It is often possible to extend your stay and/or change from one nonimmigrant visa category to another.

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