T5 B59 Dos Misc 1 Of 2 Fdr- Entire Contents- Memos- Cables- 19 Withdrawal Notices

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FQIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

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DOC ID: 31199244

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 07/10/2003

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FROM: Counterterrorism.. TO: Legat Berlin SUBJECT:

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

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1

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE:

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

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TAB: 5

DOC ID: 31199248

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

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TAB: 6

DOC ID: 31199249

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

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TAB: 8

DOC ID: 31199252

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

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DOC ID: 31199253

3

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

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DOC ID: 31199254

1

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

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DOC ID: 31199255

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

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TAB: 12

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

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FOLDER: 0004

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TAB: 13

DOC ID: 31199257

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 05/23/2003

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0004

TAB: 14

DOC ID: 31199258

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ACCESS RESTOICTCD The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE:

DOCUMENT TYPE: Report

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Document Forgery

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

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BOX: 00025

TAB: 15

DOC ID: 31199259

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 04/12/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

FROM: Zelikow and Jacobson TO: Commissioners SUBJECT:

Memorandum and two 2page attachments, PDB Article

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WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

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FOLDER: 0004

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TAB: 16

DOC ID: 31199260

8

_ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 01/13/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

FROM: Daniel Marcus TO: CIA, Litigation Division SUBJECT:

Document Responsive to Item Nos. 1 of CIA Question for the Records No. 1, Memorandum and Fax cover sheets.

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM S/ES UNCLASSIFIED

t

To:

The Secretary

From:

CA - George C. Lannon

Subject:

Press and Congressional Attention on the "Visa Express" Interview-by-Exception Program in Saudi Arabia

Since the September 11 attacks, the press has been focusing on visa procedures, most recently the interview-by-exception program known as "Visa Express" used by our Mission in Saudi Arabia (Tab 1). The program is almost certain to come under scrutiny by Congress, which will question how our posts can continue to waive interviews for visa applicants given the threat of issuance to terrorists. "Visa Express" is a variation of a Department-approved personal-appearance waiver program under which visa applications are reviewed without interviews unless the consular officer determines that such an interview is necessary. Interview-byexception is a common practice in countries with generally low refusal rates and a low incidence of fraud. In all cases, whether or not a personal interview is conducted, all applicant names are checked against our Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS). Under the "Visa Express" system, all KIV applications in Saudi Arabia are presented to our consular sections in Riyadh and Jeddah through ten authorized travel agencies. Our Consulate General in Dhahran does not process visas. Our Embassy in Saudi Arabia provided a detailed explanation of the program (Tab 2). Programs such as "Visa Express" -actually improve post security, workload management, and customer service. By eliminating long lines of non-immigrant visa (NIV) applicants and reducing the resources needed to screen and inspect visitors, the program enhances security at our posts and allows them to redirect resources to other security concerns. rsauc

prog.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 2

the attacks

•

in

strengthened (Tab 4)

T:

:::

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 3 Drafted:

CA/VO/F/P: John Tavenner, X3-1166

Cleared:

CA:Georgc Lannon CA:Wayne Griffith CA/P: Eloise ShouSe CA/P: Carolyn Huggins CA/VOiCatherine^Ba^-ry CA/VO/F:Linda Donahue CA/VO/F/P:Tim Smith MtERooney - ok D:KBue - in-fo" P:DGatto -'OK -

OK - OK - ok - OK OK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED ACTION CFPP-01 INFO

U7E4681

LOG -60 MFA-00 OS-OS : ~.£UR-00 L-00'u-rN£A-00

NP-00 OIGO-00 DCP-01 VO-03

AMAD-00 FBIE-00 NSAE-00 ASDS-01

CA-01 UTED-OC CAEX-01 DSCC-00

CIAE-OC FBO-00 PPT-01 NFAT-00

INI- 00 TEDE-00 IRM-CO SAS-OC

/009W •13E285

1913552 /38

R 1913452 AUG 01 FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5676 AMCONSUL JEDDAH DIR FSINFATC WASHDC INFO GCC COLLECTIVE 'JNCLAS

RIYADH 002326

DE?T FOR CA/EX, CA/VO, CA/FP?, NEA/EX, NEA/AR? NFATC FOR M/FSI/SPS/CONS £.0. 12958: N/A TAGS: CMGT, CVIS, KFRD, AFSI, ASEC, SA SUBJECT: U.S. VISA EXPRESS PROGRAM TRANSFORMS NIV SCENE IN SAUDI ARABIA

1. (U) Summary. Embassy Riyadh, in coordination with Consulates General in Jeddah and Dhahran, has launched a new, mandatory service for processing nonimmigrant visas. Naming the new program "U.S. Visa Express", Embassy Riyadh established the service to eliminate the long iir.es cf NIV applicants at the Embassy and Consulate General ir. Jedaan ar.d to reduce the number of public visitors enterir.g the posts. The program draws on CA best practices - travel agencies as NIV reception ager.ts, remote data entry, and interview by exception. As a result, tne workload on the Consular Sections' staff has been reduced and made manageable, customer service to NIV applicants has improved, and general post security has improved. The program .-.as transformed the U.S. consular scene throughout Saudi Arabia. End S ultima r y. An Outline of the Program 2. (U) Using CA "best practices" as its basis, the U.S. Visa Express program employs selected travel agencies and their nationwide networks as NIV application reception points. These firms review the applications for completeness, enter the data on diskettes using CA's Remote Data Service (RDS) software installed at each client company, receive the MRV and issuance fees, and deliver the applications, diskettes, and fees daily to Embassy Riyadh and Consulate General Jeddah for processing. The following working day, the agencies collect the passports of those applicants whose visas were issued without interview, arop

Data Si- -cm company, reca applications, a no. Consulate vork.in-5 day, _--pli cants wi-

off new applications, and return the visa-ed passports to their offices for applicants to collect at their convenience. 3. (U) Initially, the program, which was started in early Kay and was officially launched with countrywide media coverage the first of June, was mandatory only for Saudi applicants and for qualified non-Saudi resident TCNs. (Qualified resident TCNs were defined as persons who had traveled to the U.S. on a multiple er.try NIV within the previous two years). In late June, however, given the program's success and the hei.ghter.ed terrorist threat in the region, tne Embassy expanse;! it overnight to make it mandatory for all applicants in Saudi Arabia. A consular officer reviews all applications. The passports of those applicants whose submissions do not demonstrate clear visa eligibility are returned to the agencies witn a form letter indicating that the applicant must come to the Embassy or Consulate General for interview any work day from 8:00 to 10:00 AM and/or what additional documentation should be submitted. These applications are adjudicated ir. the NIV application as pending (INA Section 221g). Applicants who come fcr interview have already paid the MRV application fee and have prover. to be manageable in numbers. After an initial trial of having the TCNs pay the extra issuar.ee fees to the travel companies, Embassy Riyadh discontinued the collection of issuance fees from the agencies for resident TCN applicants on submission of their applications to the post. Instead, the agencies pay the issuar.ee fees at the time of passport collection for resident TCN applicants issued without interview. Resident TCN applicants issued after interview pay on their own. Steps in Setting Up the Progtan 4. (U) Setting up the new NIV service ir. a country the size of Saudi Arabia, where 9C.966 NIV applications were processed in FY-2000, and using ter. travel agencies companies, was a large-scale operation. It required that one conoff act as project's director and coordinate the establishment of the program in constant ccnr.unicatior. with all the other concffs in-country. In addition, the project manager had to keep the Embassy Front Cffice. tr.e Consuls General, other agencies, and Section Chiefs informed of our plan ar.d its implementation schedule. From the initial stage, when conoff began meeting with various companies to explore the possibilities and conferring with the Department to learn what legal options were available until launch date, establishing the program took place over A period of seven months. Having gone through the entire process and knowing the pitfalls, the project director ccr.off believes -h~ *c--'-s~ possible to establish a Visa Express program in a iruch ._ e/jjoYt'eT'period of time and certainly in nuch less time ir. &~t , c=r. , -..^ <-t g~, (y-y --The: project director conoff begar. by conducting a '••-'--- /J"s%^p"-'\"b5ibet:t'oir. review of how consular personnel process NIV-

applications at post.

At the sane tine, conoffs met with

leading travel agents to discuss the idea of such a visa service and to learn their suggestions. Some of them were already talcing in visa applications and submitting them to Embassy Riyadh, but they were not doing data entry, which rfeant they would tieed to transform ar.d expand their U.S. NIV operation. Embassy Riyadh Consul General and ccnoff met with the Embassy Country Team, post GSO, post Department of Commerce FCS, and post PAO staff to introduce the concept and to get feedback from a broad range of in-house sources months before the program_ was publicly launched. The Embassy Riyadh Consul General_and the project director cor.off traveled to the Consulate General in both Jeddah and Dhahran to introduce the concept to the consular staffs there. 6. (U! The Embassy Riyadh Consul General and the project director cor.off made presentations to the representatives of the travel agencies at meetings conducted at all three posts. They gave the agencies a three-week deadline for submitting proposals as to how they would handle the service. Cor.off analyzed submissions from seme twenty companies (later another twenty attempted to join en the bandwagon with even more proposals). She assessed the proposals according to a set of ten major criteria, including experience, computer capability, commitment to advertising, office security, geographic oreadth of branch networks, and general reputation nationally or regionally. Based on conoffs evaluation of the various proposals and the companies' strengths, she and the Consul General selected ten companies to launch the program over a test period, with the idea that the nunber might eventually be cut. 1. (L.'} The Mission then signed a Memorandum of Understanding (KOU) with the travel agencies that CA ar.d L had provided to Embassy Riyadh. The MOD includes all tr.e requirements the Embassy had stipulated in the initial presentations and had used to evaluate and select the companies. In addition, it sets a maximum fee which travel agencies can charge to be the agent for U.S. NIV applications. This fee is a ceiling but not a floor. Some participating travel agencies have opted not to charge customers for U.S. Visa Express service if they purchase their air tickets and vacation package/hotels through the travel agency. Following the selection ana the signing, the project director conoff kept in constant communication by telephone and e-mail with all the companies to remind them of their commitments. 8. (U) During the subsequent three weeks, between the MO'J "signing^ and the official press conference/media launching, the Embassy and the Consulate General in JedcJah actually^ / began to operate the new service informally as a way to tes'f : all _the "systems" before "final launch". . _ During, this --intense period; conoff organized installation and training-/

programs all over the country for the travel agencies to learn the RDS software. Fortunately, a CA Orkand refresher tear, was in Dhahran and post was able to obtain Department approval for a team raeirber to come to Riyadh to hold introductory training. Then-"eoRO,f fs and Consular NIV FSNs went on the road to the travel agencies' offices in Riyadh, Jeddah, and the Eastern Prov'wvde :cities of Al Khobar and Danunaro to survey their Visa Express operations and to train their staffs. At the sane tine, companies were encouraged to begin their advertising and to begin bringing in visa applications in order to get the public used to the new service before the formal June 1 launching. 9. (U) Throughout this period, the project director conoff also worked with the Embassy Riyadh PAO staff to prepare a nedia event to launch the prograrr. on June 1. Together, they nanaged to get some stories placed in rhe local press in advance. The Embassy Riyadh Consul General formally launched the Visa Express program with a full-scale media event with representatives of all the travel companies also in attendance. Ke emphasized that the new service would be advantageous to the traveling public as well as the Mission. For days after the Consul General's press conference, the Saudi media ran a variety of stories in both the Arabic and English press. Comments, Implications, and The Future

10. (0) The Visa Express prograrr directly advances several MP? goals. The achievement of Mission objectives under Travel and Migration is enhanced in that we can more effectively support the travel of those Saudis and resident TCNs who come to the U.S. for tourist, educational, and medical services. Effective nonimmigrant visa services also supports the exports of U.S. goods and services by facilitating business travel. By completely reorganising how the Mission provides NIV services to the public, tr.e key MPP goal of American Citizens is facilitated by freeing consular officers' tine from NIV services and allowing it to be reallocated to providing services to Amcits. Finally, the MPP goal of Diplomatic Readiness is advance by reducing the number of visitors to the Mission's posts, thus enhancing security and reducing the local guard force resources needed to screen and inspect visitors. 11. (U) In the Mission's experience, the Visa Express program has proven to be a winner all around. The Saudi public loves the convenience. The Saudi Government, which was initially hesitant, is now asking the Britisn and French Embassies in Riyadfi ^£6. implement the exact sair.e system. The travel agenciesrha*e^?fa5ine^lAp464a.ii-ty?and name recognition for their ^tEa\?«r-.*e*yig«PSj!Fhe=i&B*iilfar NIV staff says the new system has vasTt-f-ie'daeed sSress" on "-them,. ---±2: _4V) The U.S-Visa5Expr-e*r*pF<§3*S*n£s the' way of the

future and Embassy Riyadh, whose Consul General serves as RCO for the A'rabian Peninsula, has already begun encouraging other Mission's in the region to launch similar programs. Critical "topics success, however, is that the program must be made ma^"daicry; otherwise, NIV applicants will refuse to use it at jfji£sf£. Once in place and accepted by the traveling^pu^iic,.the Visa Express program will improve consular Efficiency and enhance Mission security throughout the region. BRAYSHAW NNNS

End Cable Text

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<**UNCLASSIFIED

UTE5868

ACTION NEA-00 INFO

LOG- 00 TEDE-00 DRL-02

CA-01 10-00 SAS-00

INL-00 LAB-01 /007W

WHA-00 NSAE-00 ^snai A

MEDE-00 IRM-00

EB-00 TEST- 00

niTsn1* 7 /•» a

R 0311522 OCX 01 FM AMCONSUL JEDDAH TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2626 INFO GCC COLLECTIVE USDOC WASHDC NSC WASHDC CIA WASHDC AMEMBASSY CAIRO UNCLAS

JEDDAH 000933

CENTCOM FOR POLAD LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR O'FRIEL USDOC FOR 3131/UAFCA/OIO/ANESA/RD/KBRENNAN AND 4502/IEP/AMESA/ONE/DGULUGLMI RIYADH ALSO FOR DHAHRAN SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A TAGS: CVIS, SOCI, PHUM, ELAB, SA SUBJECT: MUSLIMS NEED NOT APPLY: FEAR AND RUMORS LEAD HEJAZIS TO CANCEL U.S. TRAVEL

1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. distribution.

Not for Internet

Summary 2. (SBU) Many Saudi tourists, businessmen, and students in the Western Region are canceling plans to travel to the United States amid rumors that their visas have been summarily cancelled and fears they will be harassed or detained at ports of entry. Incidents of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim attacks in the U.S., while disturbing on their own merit, have been greatly exaggerated locally. Hejazis, who like the rest of their countrymen feel particularly vulnerable being Saudi, Arab and Muslim prefer to stay away from the U.S. for the time being. End summary. ,Applications Plummet

UTED-00 VO-03

3. (u) Saudis travel frequently to the United States, where some own vacation homes and other properties. During the summer rush, visa issuances here peaked at 4SO a day with Florida being the number-one destination. The demand for visas always falls considerably by late August when schools reopen. However, compared to this time last year, there has been a dramatic drop in the number of nan-immigrant visa applicants in Jeddah's consular district following the September 11 attack. 4. (U) For the last two weeks of September 2000, the Consulate issued an average of 45 visas a day to hostcountry nationals. From September 15 to 30 of 2001, we have averaged fewer than nine per day. Including third country nationals, our numbers are two-thirds of last September. Many more applicants state "business* as their primary reason for travel rather than •tourism," and there is a larger than normal proportion of travelers seeking medical treatment. These numbers support what we hear locally regarding Hejazi aversions to unnecessary travel westward. Truth is Cheap 5. (U) Although the Consulate is conducting business as usual, we have not been able to convince the local population that we have not clamped down on visas for Saudis. The widely-read English-language dailies Saudi Gazette and Arab News ran erroneous stories on October 1 that the U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia bad tightened visa conditions for Saudi citizens following the September 11 attack. This was reported despite the fact that Arab Mews contacted the Consulate in Jeddah and was informed that there has been no change in policy. 6. (U) In response to widespread rumors that the State Department has canceled the U.S. visas of all Saudi passport holders, the Consular Section continues to take calls from Saudis who believe their visas are no longer valid. One ConOff was approached several times by Saudis at a Chinese National Day celebration asking when the Consulate would resume issuing visas to Saudis. Me continue to waive interviews for the vast majority of Saudi applicants. Nevertheless, the Saudi Gazette reported that Saudis are now required to undergo a personal interview at the Embassy or Consulate and must bring reams of supporting documents. 7. (U) Both Saudi Gazette and Arab News, as well as the

Arabic-language Okaz ran articles October 2 in response to a press release from Embassy Riyadh stating that there has been no change in U.S. visa-policy for Saudis. Although the papers covered the salient points from our press release, the articles were,not retractions, as there was no mention of previous editions^'having printed exactly the opposite. --ust -1 •; Muslims Need Not Apply? 8. (U) On October 2, an Indian passport holder with a valid five-year visa issued in Mutnbai came to the Consulate requesting that his visa be "revalidated." A frequent traveler to the U.S. currently in Saudi Arabia to perform "umra" or the so-called minor pilgrimage, he planned to continue on to visit his sons studying in the U.S. He says he was told by the Egypt Air Office in Mecca that all Muslims must now appear at the Embassy or Consulate and have their visas "revalidated" before they can board a flight to the United States. While he graciously accepted the explanation that the United States would never summarily cancel the visas of an entire religion, he said, "1 know, but these rumors cntribute greatly to the misunderstandings about merica in the Muslim world." 9. (U) According to the supervisor of the Egypt Air Office in Mecca,the airline is following an Egypt Air directive ssued in Cairo. According to this telex, all paasort holders from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sr Lanka, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Russia, Somalia, North Korea, China and Congo/Brazzaville possessing a U.S. visa must have that visa revalidated at a U.S. mission before boarding an Egypt Air flight to the United States. The airline employee, who declined our request to fax the directive to the Consulate, stated his belief that the new requirement originated with the USG. Interestingly, contrary to the report of Mr. Saheb, the telex did not mention "Muslims.* 10. (U) On October 3, the Consulate received a call from one of the thousands of Saudis with the last name "AlGhamdi," a major Asir-based tribe, one or more members of which may have taken part in the September 11 attacks. The caller stated that he had a valid visa and planned to travel to the U.S. on October 4 or S but was told by an 5AA representative that no A],-Ghamdie are being allowed to board U.S.-bound flights.. We have not yet verified this story wi-th The Numbers Game

11. !U)-The Saudi Gazette reported a marked decrease in the number Of visas "granted* to Saudis over the last two weeks. '-This is absolutely correct, but the implication is not .---There has been a substantial decrease in the number of Saudis who are applying for visas to the U.S. but no change-in the rate of issuance. Since September 11, 104 Saudis have applied for NIVs in Jeddah. Of those, 102 were issued without interview. The remaining two applicants were asked to come in for routine reasons and visa were subsequently issued to them. This is actually a decrease in the percentage of Saudis interviewed from this time last year.

Fear of Reprisal

12. (U) Local travel agencies report a 70-80 percent cancellation rate nationwide of travel from the Kingdom to Europe and the United States following the terrorist attacks in the U.S. Discussions with local travel agency representatives confirm that the fear of reprisal attacks on Arabs and Muslims is the major reason. Others are not traveling for fear they will be humiliated, harassed, or detained by the INS, FBI, or other authorities at the port of entry. 13. (U) From the early days of this crisis, Saudis and expat Arabs in Jeddah have been extremely sensitive to the treatment of Arab visitors and Arab-Americans in the United States. They are understandably upset by reports of harassment and violence aimed at persons of Arab and Muslim origin. Everyday, local papers run stories about violence against Arabs and Muslims in the United States. Condemnation of these incidents is widely dismissed, while the potential risk to U.S.-bound Saudis is exaggerated.

Veteran Travelers Afraid to Enter U.S.

14. (SBU) Saudis who consider themselves practically American are now afraid to return to their "second home* due to fears they will be treated like criminals because of their-religion and nationality. A young Saudi holding a green card came into the Consulate in search of assurances -«.that he would not be arrested at the airport if he traveled - -ri- to Florida to close on the sale of a new home. Another legal permanent resident, an executive at Saudi Arabian i-une Airlines, planned to retire in the U.S. with his AmCit wife -•-->-= and^ctSildreA. He is now extremely worried about how he

. .^-.. ~ -irss

-o legal .Mr l anc- chi1

would be treated by hie long-time neighbors in New Jersey and has postponed his plans to move back to the States. He •xpressed concern that he would be treated poorly by officials at the airport in front of his children. It's Late September and I Really Should be Back in School 15. (U) Fear of violence and anti-Saudi sentiment has prompted many prominent Saudi families to withdraw their children mid-semester from American colleges and Universities. Saudi and'expat Arab parents alike express concern for their children'studying in the U.S. The Lebanese Broadcast Channel (LBC) reported last week that American University in Beirut, in response to widespread fear for the safety and well-being of Arab students in America, announced it was preparing to accept mid-semester transfer students. Saudi Arabian Airlines Grounded 16. (U) Despite repeated reports by the local media that SAA would resume flights to the United States "tomorrow", as of October 2, the national airline has yet to resume its U.S. schedule. According to contacts with the airline, SAA now plans to resume service to the U.S. on October 4. SAA and other airlines are canceling or cutting back on scheduled international flights for a variety of reasons. While the aviation insurance crisis and new FAA safety requirements are factors, a major reduction in demand should not be discounted as contributing to the reduction in flights to Europe and the U.S. Comment 17. (SBU) In a part of the world where rumors carry great weight and official statements do not, many Hejazia have difficulty believing that the Consulate continues to operate under its pre-September 11 policies. Although the USG has stated that unlawful acts against innocent Muslims and Arabs will be prosecuted, the reaction of the Jeddah streets is that American authorities will turn a blind eye and American juries will not convict. Arguments pertaining to civil rights and the rule of law in American do not go far amidst current tensions. End comment. - = ~ a l p:raaaer,r resi flAttimore

UTE4267 UNCLASSIFIED

UTE4267

ORIGIN CA-01 INFO

LOG-00 ASX-00 DIM-00 FBIE-00 INSE-00 DCP-01 SSO-00 SDBU-00

MFA-00 AS-01 ANHR-00 UTED-00 10-00 NSAE-00 SS-00 PMB-00

UP-00 A-00 WHA-00 FBO-00 MMP-00 01S-"03 TEST- 00 PRM-01

AF-00 ACQ-00 MEDE-00 VC-00 MOFM-05 CAEX-01 USIE-00 ALM-00

AIT-03 CIAE-00 EAP-00 FSI-00 M-00 PM-00 VO-03 SAS-00

AMAD-00 COME-00 EB-00 H-01 AC- 01 SCT-00 SA-00 PMA-00

174004 SOURCE: KODAKC.00403S DRAFTED BY: CA:EJRAMOTOWSKI -- 10/02/01 X77408 APPROVED BY: CA:MARYAN CA:GCLANNON CA/VO:CBARRY S/ES-O:ELMARTINE2 29EC88 0418132 /38 P 041806Z OCT 01 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS PRIORITY SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM POUCH AMEMBASSY BELGRADE POUCH FREETOWN POUCH DUSHANBE POUCH NDJAMENA POUCH PESHAWAR POUCH LAHORE POUCH JAKARTA POUCH SURABAYA UNCLAS STATE 174004 FOR CONSULAR CHIEFS FROM CA A/S MARY A. RYAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS, CMGT SUBJECT: VISA OPERATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS. SEVERAL POSTS HAVE CABLED THE DEPARTMENT WITH SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THEY CAN FURTHER INCREASE THE SECURITY OF THEIR VISA OPERATIONS. WE ARE CONTINUALLY MAKING THE POINT IN WASHINGTON THAT THE CLASS NAMECHECK SYSTEM IS A STATE OF THE ART TECHNOLOGY, BUT IN THE END IT IS ONLY AS GOOD AS THE INFORMATION IT CONTAINS. WHILE MOST OF THE INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL TERRORISTS CONTAINED IN CLASS COMES FROM OTHER AGENCIES. CONSULAR SECTIONS ALSO HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY. ;

AOP-00 CCOE-00 EUR-00 TEDE-00 NEA-00 IRM-00 FMP-00 /021R

2. ALL POSTS SHOULD TAKE A HARD LOOK AT THEIR CURRENT VISA OPERATIONS AND SEE IF THERE ARE ANY MEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO FURTHER STRENGHTHEN THE PROCESS. SOME QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER IN THE REVIEW: ARE APPLICATION PROCEDURES, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT WAIVE PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF THE APPLICANT, FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED? IS THE VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE ENGAGED AND ACTIVE? ARE ALL CONSULAR OFFICERS AT POST AWARE OF THE DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS ON MAINTAINING VISA RECORDS UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, AND ON HOW TO HANDLE VISA AND PASSPORT RECORD REQUESTS FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES? ARE POST'S CONTACTS WITH INS PORTS OF" ENTRY AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS UP TO DATE AND PRODUCTIVE? ARE POST'S CONSULAR SYSTEMS FUNCTIONING WELL. AND IF NOT, HAS THE CA/EX/CSD HELP DESK BEEN NOTIFIED? HAS POST CONDUCTED ANY VALIDATION STUDIES? HAVE CONOFFS DISCUSSED THE IMPACT OF RECENT POLITICAL. ECONOMIC. AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS? 3. THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE NOT MEANT TO BE EXHAUSTIVE. BUT TO PROVIDE A STARTING POINT FOR CONSULAR MANAGERS TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THEIR VISA OPERATIONS. MANY POSTS WILL CONCLUDE THAT NO CHANGES ARE NECESSARY. OTHERS MAY WANT TO MAKE SOME ALTERATIONS BASED ON LOCAL CONDITIONS AND TRENDS. ANY POSTS CONTEMPLATING A PROCEDURAL CHANGE SHOULD KEEP THE DEPARTMENT (CA/VC AND CA/EX) INFORMED. REGARDS. POWELL NNNN End Cabl* T«rt

i i t ^ i " - — " - —'

*E3~.

-_*O*- 3V

National Review Article on Visa Express^ ;, ,„ Myths & Facts ;| •'; ;;>

Myth: Most Saudi applicants never come into contact with a US citizen until stepping off the airplane onto U.S. soil Fact: Over the past year approximately 45% of visa applicants in Saudi Arabia have been personally interviewed. Not all applicants are required to come into the Consulate or Embassy for a personal interview, since many of the applicants-have no additional information beyond that contained in the application-and supporting documents to offer a consular officer. Examples would be: infants, or elderly people with previous travel to the US, business people working for major American corporations who travel frequently and have a long history of respecting US law while in the United States. Waiving an interview for these applicants allows consular officers to devote their limited time to those from whom useful information may be elicited by an interview and allows them to devote more time to screen those who may present a risk to the United States. Myth: Saudi Arabia is the only country in the world that enjoys third party document collection for visa processing. Fact: Programs making use of travel agencies and other third parties are good programs that stand up to security scrutiny and are employed in virtually every embassy throughout the world. Third parties often distribute visa application forms, collect the completed application along with supporting documents (including passport], and then send them to a US embassy or consulate for processing. The third parties, whether they are travel agents, courier services, or the national postal service. have no role whatsoever in the visa process beyonctdeiivering the application materials. They do not vouch for the accuracy of the information they transmit or for the applicants'eligibility for a visa. Myth: Consular Affairs is violating its own internal protocol by

?';:

Myth: If a Saudi travel agent is reasonably satisfied that the traveler has the means to buy a tour package there will be little further evaluation of the applicant's qualifications. Fact: Only an American consular officer may assess any applicant's qualification for a visa. An applicant's economic status has -nothing whatsoever to do with assessing his security risk to the United States. The visa applicant is first subjected to a comprehensive name-check to make sure that he or she is not ineligible for a visa on any one of a number of statutory grounds for refusal, including security and terrorism related grounds. Should the consular officer have any reason to question the applicant's motives, on security or any other grounds, for seeking entry to the US the applicant would likely be called in for an interview and his wealth would be irrelevant to any determination made. Only when the consular officer is satisfied that the applicant is not ineligible on any of the law's statutory grounds for refusal (which include security grounds) does the question of his or her ties to their home country come into play. It isn't simply a matter of money: applicants are presumed by the law to be "intending immigrants' until they establish to the satisfaction of the consular officer that they are not. They do so by demonstrating significant ties (usually of work, family, and property) to their home country that a consular officer couldn't believe they would reasonably abandon to remain in the United States. Pumping up a bank account is a common technique that some would-be illegal immigrants attempt in order to overcome that legal presumption and our consular officers are alert to it. ' Myth: Foreign Service Officers'Job performance reviews focus primarily on politeness and courtesy not on their ability to screen out terrorists. Fact: Courtesy to the public, including to visa applicants, is expected of any officer, but there is no conflict between courtesy and the exercise of proper judgment. Officers are expected to refuse visa applications as well as to issue them politely. Good judgment with respect to visa

Myth: Junior Foreign Service officers are typically young, often unmotivated and almost always under-trained and under-prepared. Fact: Junior Foreign Service Officers are among the US government's most talented and best-prepared employees. The average age of a junior officer is 30 years old with a large number starting second careers. In addition to the often-formidable academic and work experience they bring to their assignments, they are trained in basic consular work, foreign languages, and-area studies. They are supervised by experienced consular officers who themselves are rated on how well they train and supervise their staff. Myth: The Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), our name-checking system used to alert consular officers to ineligible applicants, is easily defeated by the applicant slightly varying the manner in which the name is written or changing the birth date to hide a match. . t i . ' . -i;!'..:.; i'

Fact: While no area of human endeavor is impervious to hun}itf};erh>r, our name-checking system is designed to make it tough for an applicant to disguise relevant information in our system or for a consular officer to overlook it. CLASS algorithms provide uniform and consistent transliterations of names in non-Roman alphabets, and the systems search parameters display a wide range of potential matches that a consular officer must review prior to issuing a visa. CLASS provides a consular officer with information that can be used to follow up directly with the applicant any inconsistencies that might have been discovered in the application process. It is also important to remember here that we have information other than that available from CLASS and the visa application: a passport, job letters, and other data are available for the consular officer to cross check. While it is of course possible for a consular officer to overlook a name based on the applicant's provision of a false birth date (an example given by the National Review article) the applicant would need to alter his passport and perhaps other supporting documents as well. No system is frsmri nroof. hut CLASS is a maior uoerade to our ability to detect

Drafted: BDecre 7-2140 Openet: H:DOCS/HouseStaff/NationaJ Review Article on Visa Express Cleared:

CA/P:EHVazquez CA: GLannon H: MPolt M: ERooney NEA:KSasahara PA: SMoridani P:AGordon

I nit«l Sia^s See

tor Management

U athitifUim. 1>. C.

i>t> L'O

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM S/Z3 UNCLASSIFIED

To:

°TAttQ ! IP

M -Under Secretary Green » ^

, g *

/

.-]/ < ., *

^^^

From:

CA - Mary A. Ryan £\•

Subject:

Meeting with Frank^Wolf to discuss the Visa repress Interview-by-Exception Program in Saudi Arabia

Congressman Wolf asked you to discuss Visa Express, Saudi Arabia's interview-by-exception visa application process, with him Tuesday afternoon. In a telephone call Monday with VO Managing Director Catherine Barry, Wolf stressed that Jn the post 9/11 environment, he wants all visa applicants interviewed. We think that programs such as Visa Express are gcod examples of risk management. They allow us to concentrate our assets on problematic cases and move good cases through quickly. Requiring interviews worldwide would have enormous political costs. State does not have the staffing, funding or building space to interview all applicants. We take the responsibility of securing US borders seriously i and interview every applicant who merits such scrutiny The only / sure way to deny a potential terrorist a US visa, however, is to . have him or her identified to us by intelligence or lav/ enforcement in advance and entered into our visa lookoufcjisiystem. Absent such prior identification, even the most scrup'&f.bus7 >.''' interviewer has little likelihood of discovering the applicant's hidden intent. '••••'

"r ;

UNCLASSIFIED Drafted:

CA/VO/F/P: Laurie Trost, X3-14

Cleared:

CA:GCLannon ok CA/VO:WGGriffith ok CA/VO/F:MRegan ok

Visa Express Timeline

Visa Express was launched in early May 2001. At first it was mandatory only for Saudi applicants and for qualified non-Sskttji;resident Third Country Nationals. In June 2001, given the heightened terrorist threat in the region, the program was made mandatory for all applicants in Saudi Arabia. Under the VJTBa'Express system, all NIV applications in Saudi Arabia are presented to our consular sections in Riyadh and Jeddah through ten authorized travel agenries. Our Consulate General in Dhahran does not process visas. Even before the events of September 11, the perrentage of applicants refused by our posts in Saudi Arabia had been increasing due to local economic conditions. In FYOD, almost 15% of all NIV applicants were refused. Post expects the trend to continue under the Visa Express program, with FY01 figures likely to show a refusal rate of over 20%. Since 9/11, Post has been calling in a far grea :er percentage of applicants for interview, including virtually all males between 16 and 45 years of age who are not well known to Embassy staff. Applicants have also been subjected to enhanced security measures, including requirements for additional security advisory bpiniois. In the aftermath of September, much attention aid criticism has been focused or. Visa Express by the pr»ss. The most recent critical article is the National Review Article. Congress has also scrutinized the process. CODEL Sensenbrenner visited Riyadh and Kuwait late this wiiter to examine the visa issuance process. According to Embissy Riyadh, upon looking into the program the visiting delegation felt that it did not constitute a security risk.

200120749

United States Department of State , D.C. 20520

<M 1 ll

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM S/ES

UNCLASSIFIED

To:

The Secretary ci-
From:

CA - Mary y A. RyaiAX

Subject:

CA Response to the September 11 Attacks

Consular Affairs has been active on several fronts in response to the terrorist attacks of last week, supporting law enforcement agencies and responding to the needs of American citizens. I provide below the highlights of these efforts. Identifying Visa Records of the Hijackers We believe we have located the visa records of sixteen of the nineteen hijackers. Since our memo to you on this subject (dated September 12}, we have also identified possible records for the remaining three (Tab 1). Working from incomplete lists coming from multiple sources, we have made the best matches possible between visa records and the hijackers and provided this information to relevant law enforcement agencies. Volume and Audience of Records Checks On September 12, we directed all visa-issuing posts to preserve all existing hard copies of visa records. The Visa Office is on-call twenty-four hours a day to handle requests for visa data from the Consolidated Consular Database. As of September 17, we had performed more than 450 checks of MRV data stored in the database. We have also pulled up records of all M-l visa cases (for vocational -- including pilot -- training), and copied that information for transmission to various task forces. = -••-"..--;•--

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

We have been attempting to impose discipline in the records-search process by routing all requests through a single point of contact in DS, as directed by Under Secretary Green. In addition, the Passport Office has reviewed more than 350 passport files as requested, by law enforcement agencies. Visa Revocations The Visa Office has revoked nine visas for individuals related to the case since September 11. Communicating with American Citizens A revised worldwide caution (public announcement) was issued September 12, reflecting the events of September 11 (Tab 2) . A revised travel warning for Pakistan was issued September 17 in conjunction with the approval of authorized departure for our posts in that country (Tab 3). Posts have been in almost daily contact with resident communities via warden messages. We have also provided around-the-clock service to posts aiding American citizens stranded outside the United States. Supporting Victim Assistance Efforts In addition to staffing the Department Task Force, the Office of Overseas Citizens Services has remained in close touch with an interagency group marshaling resources for victim assistance. Although there is currently no need for direct State participation, we are prepared to support the Department of Justice's Office of Victims of Crimes (OVC), which directs a nationwide call center. We have also offered assistance to the City of New York as it manages relations with foreign governments seeking information about their nationals. Briefing the Hill/Legislation There has been considerable interest on the Hill about the visa application process. A briefing for SFRC staffers is scheduled for September 19. We are also working on draft legislation in close coordination with H- and others in the Department, as well as the Justice Department. Attachments: Tab 1 - Master List of Visa Records of the Hijackers Tab 2Us - Worldwide Caution dated 9/12/01 Tab 3'- Travel Warning for Pakistan dated 9/17/01

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Drafted:

CA: Amber Baskette, X7-7948

Cleared:

CA/OCS:DMAndruch (ok) CA/P:CHuggins (ok) CA/VO:WGGriffith (ok) CA/PPT:GARogers (ok) CA:GCLannon (ok) M:ERooney (ok) D:KBue (info) P:DGatto .(ok)

UNCLASSIFIED

NAME

DOB

COB

ISSUING POST

DATE OF ISSUE

VISA TYPE

61rB2

ADJUDICATOR

AA11 28-May-79

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

ia-Jun-01

Al Shehri. Wail M.

31-Jul-73

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

24-Ocl-OO

81 '82

Al Shehri. Waleed A. B.

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

31-May-OO

M1 (pilot training)

Al Suqaml. Setam M. A.

3-Mar-76 28-Jun-76

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh

21-Nov-OO

B1/B2

Atta, Mohamed Mohamed Elamir

1-Sep-68

Egypt

Berlin

17-May-OO

B1/B2

9-AU9-76 2-Feb-61

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

3-Afx-99

B1/B2

Al Hazml. Salem M.

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

20-Jun-01

01/B2 , ,

AlmWhar, Kheltd M. A.

1fr-May-75

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

Harbour. Hani S H.

30-Aug-72

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

13-Jun-01 10-Sep-OO

81/B2

Moqed. Wajed M. Gh

16-Jun-77

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh

20 Nov-00

B1/B2

Al Omari. Abdul Aziz

AATT Al HaziKl. Nawal M. S.

B1/B2 • •

UA93 Al Hamawi. Ahmad Ibrahim A

11-Ocl-M

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

Al Nami. Ahmed A A.

7-Dec-77

Saudi Arabia

Jeddah

Alghamdi, Saeed A A t

21-Nov 79

Jeddah

12-Jun-0»

Jarrah. Ziad Samlr

11 -May 75

Saudi Arabia Lebanon

B1/B2 B1/B2

Bertm

25-May-OO

B1/B2

UA175 . Ahmed Mohamed Airier. Fay« • Al Ghamdl. Ahmed Saieh S '

31Oc«-71 2-Jul 79

Eflypl Saudi Arabia

Cairo Jeddah

B-Nov-99 3-S«p-00

B1/B2

A) Ghamdi. Hazma S. A

15-NOV-80

Saudi Arabia

Riyadh

UOct-00

81/82

Al Shehrt. Mohand M F .

7 May 79

Saudi Arabia

0-May ra

UAE

Riyadh Dubai

23-Ocl-OO 16-JarvOO

81/82 B1/B2

12-Nov-OO 2 3- Apr -01

' (denotes probable, not confirmed) * (denotes possible, not confirmed)

>

B1/82

J1

!

9/11 Working-level Employee

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0004

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 18

DOC ID: 31199262

7

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 05/08/1993

DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Visa Lookout System and International Terrorists

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0004

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 19

DOC ID: 31199263

20

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 09/17/2003

DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

FROM: TO: Daniel Marcus SUBJECT:

Transmittal memo and index of documents responsive to document requests

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: 9/11 Commission, Team 5 NND PROJECT NUMBER:

51630

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 30768

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 09/24/2008

BOX: 00025

FOLDER: 0004

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 20

DOC ID: 31199264

5

RESTRICTED\_\e item identified below has been withdr

FOLDER TITLE: DOS Miscellaneous [1 of 2] DOCUMENT DATE: 06/16/1995

DOCUMENT TYPE: Cable

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Extradition

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED current Handling: n/a Document Number: 2000STATE009483

Page: 1 -"7 /,~/Channel: n/a

UNCLASSIFIED

PTO8180

\E 0

ORIGIN VO-03 INFO

LOG-00 INSE-00 SAS-00

CA-02 ADS-00 /009R

CIAE-00 NSAE-00

DS-00 PPT-01

FBIE-00 ASDS-01

UTED-00 DSCC-00

TEDE-00 DRL-02

009483 SOURCE: KODAKA.015059 DRAFTED BY: INR/IC : EJURBAN -- 01/14/00:647-8963 APPROVED BY: INR/IC : JGARRIZA

CA/VO/L/C: BMALLEN (SUBS) DESIRED DISTRIBUTION: CA/VO/L/C ------------------ 26E3B3 R 150319Z JAN 00 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY FREETOWN CIA WASHDC 0000 DIRNSA FORT GEORGE G MEADE MD

150914Z /22

UNCLAS STATE 009483 E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, PTER, ASEC, PINR SUBJECT: VISAS VIPER PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE

REF: (A) 98 STATE 108969 (B) FREETOWN 00103 1. PER POST'S REQUEST (REF B) , THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF REF A, THE DEPARTMENT'S LATEST VISAS VIPER PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE : UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02

STATE

009483

150913Z

TO DCM/PO AND CONSULAR SECTION CHIEF FROM CA A/S RYAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, PTER, ASEC, CMGT, PINR, PREL, EAIR SUBJECT: FIGHTING TERRORISM: VISAS VIPER PROCEDURES REF: 96 STATE 134202

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

Page: 1

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 2000STATE009483

Page: 2 Channel: n/a

SUMMARY

1. THE DEPARTMENT HAS REVIEWED THE CURRENT VISAS VIPER PROGRAM (WP) GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTEL, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION CHANGES THAT HAVE EVOLVED SINCE REFTEL WAS ISSUED AS WELL AS POSTS' QUERIES AND REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION DURING THE ENSUING PERIOD. WE FOUND THAT FEW SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS WERE NEEDED AND THAT MOST OF THE REVISIONS MADE HAVE BEEN TO PROVIDE GREATER CLARITY OR EMPHASIS. THE REVISED VISAS VIPER PROCEDURES WHICH BEGIN AT PARAGRAPH 5 SUPERSEDE THE GUIDANCE FOUND IN REFTEL. THEY WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE NEXT REVISION OF 9 FAM 40. 32. 2. POSTS ARE ASKED TO ENSURE THAT ALL MISSION SECTIONS AND AGENCIES ARE MADE AWARE OF THIS REVISED GUIDANCE, TO EXAMINE THEIR MANAGEMENT OF THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF IT, AND TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NEEDED TO UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 STATE 009483 150913Z RESOLVE ANY INCONSISTENCIES. NO REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT IS REQUIRED ON THE RESULTS OF THIS INTERNAL REVIEW.

SIGNIFICANT CHANGES 3. POSTS SHOULD NOTE THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN VISAS VIPER PROCEDURES: --THE WP HAS BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE TIPPIX, A PROGRAM FOR SCANNING TERRORISTS' PHOTOGRAPHS, AND TUSCAN, A PROGRAM FOR SHARING TERRORISTS' NAMES WITH CANADA (PARAGRAPH 6); --THE DESIGNATION OF POST WP COORDINATORS IS ENCOURAGED AND THEIR GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES ARE OUTLINED (PARAGRAPH ID ; --THE NAME AND CONTACT NUMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR ARE PROVIDED (PARAGRAPH 13) ; --THE TIME FRAME FOR SUBMITTING MANDATORY WP QUARTERLY REPORTS HAS BEEN EXTENDED FROM 10 DAYS FOLLOWING THE END OF EACH QUARTER TO 15 DAYS (PARAGRAPH 15) ; -- THE "KVPR" TAG MUST BE USED ON ALL WP (PARAGRAPHS 15, 32, 34, AND 38); Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

REPORTING

Page: 2

Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 2000STATE009483

Page: 3 Channel: n/a

--WP REPORTING SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C (PARAGRAPHS 15, 32, AND 38); UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 04 STATE 009483 150913Z --POSTS SHOULD REPORT THE NAMES OF OTHER POSTS ON WHOSE BEHALF THEY SUBMIT WP QUARTERLY REPORTS (PARAGRAPH 16) ; --A SUBJECT'S GENDER SHOULD BE SPECIFIED IN CASES WHERE THE GIVEN NAME CAN BE EITHER MASCULINE OR FEMININE (PARAGRAPH 22) ; --THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING YEAR OF BIRTH INFORMATION ON NATIONALS OF VISA WAIVER COUNTRIES IS EMPHASIZED (PARAGRAPHS 24 AND 35) ; --POSTS' VISAS VIPER COMMITTEES HAVE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE WP CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET (PARAGRAPH 27) ; --THE NEED TO TRANSMIT DS REPORTING ON TERRORISTS THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL IS SPECIFIED (PARAGRAPH 28); --OTHER POSTS WITH POSSIBLE INTEREST IN THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER CABLES SHOULD BE INCLUDED AS INFO ADDRESSEES (PARAGRAPH 32) ; --THE BIOGRAPHIC DATA ELEMENTS THAT WILL BE ENTERED INTO CLASS AND IBIS SHOULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED (PARAGRAPH 33) ; --THE ROGER CHANNEL SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHEN SUBMITTING VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS (PARAGRAPH 33); AND --ANY PREVIOUS CLASS ENTRIES ON THE SUBJECTS OF REPORTING SHOULD BE FULLY CITED (PARAGRAPH 37).

WP

UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 05 STATE 009483 150913Z 4. REVISED PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE FOR THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM FOLLOWS.

THE "VISAS VIPER" TERRORIST REPORTING PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

5. THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM ORIGINATED IN RESPONSE TO THE Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

Page: 3

/

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1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING AND OTHER THREATS AND INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM INVOLVING FOREIGN NATIONALS. AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE WTC BOMBING REVEALED DEFICIENCIES IN THE WAY AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS WAS BEING SHARED AT OVERSEAS POSTS AND REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT. SPECIFICALLY FOUND LACKING WAS A MECHANISM FOR ROUTINELY AND CONSISTENTLY BRINGING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS TO THE CONSULAR SECTION'S ATTENTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENTERING THEIR NAMES INTO THE DEPARTMENT'S "CONSULAR LOOKOUT AND SUPPORT SYSTEM" (CLASS) AND THE INS/US CUSTOMS SERVICE'S "INTERAGENCY BORDER INSPECTION SYSTEM" (IBIS). THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM WAS CREATED TO ADDRESS THIS CONCERN. ITS MISSION IS TO: (1) UTILIZE THE COOPERATIVE RESOURCES OF ALL ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL TERRORISTS; (2) DEVELOP INFORMATION ON SUCH

INDIVIDUALS;

(3) PROVIDE A DIRECT CONSULAR CHANNEL FOR REPORTING THIS INFORMATION; AND UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 06

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(4) WATCHLIST THE SUBJECTS IN CLASS AND IBIS TO ENSURE THEY ARE APPROPRIATELY SCREENED SHOULD THEY LATER APPLY FOR VISAS OR FOR ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES.

RECENT EXPANSION OF THE WP

6. IN MAY 1997, THE TIPPIX PROGRAM WAS INITIATED TO SCAN THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTSS OBTAINED FROM FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS AND OTHER SOURCES, INTO THE TIPOFF/VIPER COUNTERTERRORISM DATABASE AND THE IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEM. IN APRIL 1998, THE DEPARTMENT BEGAN SHARING NAMES FROM THE DATABASE WITH THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER A PROGRAM CALLED TUSCAN. EACH PROGRAM HAS SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED U.S. BORDER SECURITY.

SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM: LIMITED TO NON-VISA APPLICANTS

7. THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS INTENDED SOLELY FOR

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REPORTING ON ALIENS WHO ARE NOT CURRENTLY APPLYING FOR U.S. VISAS. VISA APPLICANTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE VISAS DONKEY OR VISAS BEAR SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION REQUIREMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH 9 BELOW).

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8. THE VIPER CHANNEL IS FURTHER LIMITED TO ALIENS WHO ARE KNOWN OR POTENTIAL TERRORISTS '. IT SHOULD NOT BE USED TO REPORT ON NARCOTRAFFICKERS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS, OR OTHER MALEFACTORS UNLESS THEY ARE ALSO SUSPECTED OF FALLING WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF INA 212(A)(3)(B). (NB: AN ALIEN WHO IS NOT A CURRENT VISA APPLICANT, BUT WHOM A CONSULAR OFFICER SUSPECTS OF INVOLVEMENT IN EXCLUSIONARY CRIMINAL OR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY, MAY BE ENTERED DIRECTLY INTO CLASS BY THE CONSULAR POST USING THE APPROPRIATE QUASI REFUSAL CODE (SEE 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX D, EXHIBIT I)).

DISTINCTION BETWEEN "VISAS VIPER" AND "VISAS DONKEY/BEAR" 9. THE VISAS VIPER REPORTING PROGRAM COMPLEMENTS THE VISAS DONKEY AND VISAS BEAR SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION (SAO) PROCEDURES IN THAT VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS REPORT ON POSSIBLE TERRORISTS WHO ARE NOT CURRENT VISA APPLICANTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF WATCHLISTING THEM, WHILE VISAS DONKEY AND VISAS BEAR CABLES ARE USED TO REQUEST SAO'S ON SUCH INDIVIDUALS WHEN THEY APPLY FOR VISAS. POSTS MUST USE WHICHEVER PROCEDURE IS APPROPRIATE TO BRING ALL TERRORISTS ON WHOM THEY HAVE INFORMATION TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION.

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10. THE WP IS PRIMARILY ADMINISTERED AT OVERSEAS POSTS THROUGH A VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED AT EACH POST, CHAIRED BY THE DCM OR PRINCIPAL OFFICER AND COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM APPROPRIATE POST ENTITIES. ALL Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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SECTIONS AND AGENCIES INVOLVED IN SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE, AS SHOULD THOSE HAVING OFFICIAL AND/OR PUBLIC CONTACTS WHICH MAY PRODUCE TERRORISM-RELATED INFORMATION. THE VISAS VIPER COMMITTEES MEET AT LEAST QUARTERLY TO SHARE INFORMATION ON KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH INFORMATION MEETS THE CRITERIA FOR VISAS VIPER REPORTING (SEE PARAGRAPH 17 BELOW). A REPORT SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF THE COMMITTEE MEETING(S) HELD DURING EACH QUARTER IS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 14 THROUGH 16 BELOW. WHILE VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE MEETINGS ARE THE PRINCIPAL FORUMS FOR SHARING TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE AT POST, INFORMATION DEVELOPED ON AN AD HOC BASIS, PARTICULARLY THAT OF AN URGENT NATURE, MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR EXPEDITIOUS REPORTING THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL.

DESIGNATION OF POST WP COORDINATORS

11. POSTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO DESIGNATE A VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR, NORMALLY THE CONSULAR SECTION CHIEF OR AN OFFICER RESPONSIBLE TO HIM OR HER, WHO WOULD SERVE THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS: UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 09

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(1) LIAISON WITH OTHER SECTIONS AND AGENCIES (PROVIDE INFORMATION AND ADVICE ON WP POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, ENSURE THAT STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS USE THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL WHEN REPORTING ON TERRORISTS, AND PROMOTE AWARENESS AND UTILIZATION OF THE VIPER CHANNEL AMONG OTHER-AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES); (2) COORDINATION OF VIPER COMMITTEE MEETINGS (ASSIST THE DCM/PO IN SCHEDULING THE MANDATORY QUARTERLY MEETINGS AND ARRANGE APPROPRIATE STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER-AGENCY PARTICIPATION); (3) OVERSIGHT OF VISAS VIPER REPORTING (PREPARE REQUIRED QUARTERLY REPORTS ON POST'S WP ACTIVITIES AND MONITOR AD HOC REPORTING ON INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS); AND (4) LIAISON WITH THE DEPARTMENT (MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR, SEEK GUIDANCE ON QUESTIONS REGARDING WP ISSUES, AND RESPOND TO THE

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DEPARTMENT'S REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON VIPER CASES). WP ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT

12. IN THE DEPARTMENT, THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF "TIPOFF", A PROGRAM ADMINISTERED BY THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH (INR) THAT COORDINATES THE DEPARTMENT'S USE OF INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE FOR THE WATCHLISTING OF TERRORISTS. TIPOFF MAINTAINS A UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 10 STATE 009483 150913Z COUNTERTERRORISM DATABASE NOW NUMBERING OVER 43,000 NAMES, OF WHICH MORE THAN 9,000 WERE CONTRIBUTED THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL. THE TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF, IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE VISA OFFICE'S COORDINATION DIVISION (CA/VO/L/C), DEVELOPS VISAS VIPER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, CREATES AND UPDATES TIPOFF RECORDS, AND DETERMINES WHETHER THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUAL SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ARE ENTERED INTO CLASS AND IBIS AND SHARED WITH THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT. IT PROVIDES FEEDBACK AND GUIDANCE TO FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS ON VISAS VIPER REPORTING AND SERVES AS LIAISON WITH INTERESTED OFFICES IN THE DEPARTMENT AND WITH THE HEADQUARTERS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE PROGRAM. ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO INR/TIPOFF. DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR

13. THE DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR IS ELAYNE J. URBAN. MS. URBAN IS LOCATED AT INR/TIPOFF, ROOM 6510, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520. SHE CAN BE REACHED TELEPHONICALLY AT (202)647-8963 AND HER FAX NUMBER IS (202)647-8030. HER NAME IS ALSO IN THE DEPARTMENT'S EMAIL SYSTEM.

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14. POSTS ARE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT QUARTERLY REPORTS OUTLINING THEIR VISAS VIPER PROGRAM ACTIVITIES DURING EACH PERIOD. SUCH REPORTS SHOULD CONTAIN THE DATE(S) WP COMMITTEE MEETINGS WERE HELD, THE NUMBER OF VIPER TELEGRAMS SUBMITTED, AND A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS THE POST MAY HAVE REGARDING THE PROGRAM'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES. REPORTS MUST BE SUBMITTED EVEN IF NO INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS WAS DEVELOPED DURING THE QUARTER. THE QUARTERLY REPORT REQUIREMENT WAS INSTITUTED UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL TO IMPROVE THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS IN THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM. THE OIG'S CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE WP REFLECTS THE PROGRAM'S KEY ROLE IN THE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS. QUARTERLY REPORT PROCEDURES

15. WP QUARTERLY REPORTS ARE DUE NO LATER THAN 15 DAYS FOLLOWING THE END OF EACH QUARTER, I.E., BY THE 15TH OF JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, AND OCTOBER. THE QUARTER REPORTED UPON SHOULD BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED IN. THE SUBJECT LINE: E.G. "VISAS VIPER: FY-98 3RD QUARTER REPORT". THE REPORTS SHOULD BE SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C AND USE THE FOLLOWING TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, CMGT, PINR, PTER, ASEC. SUBMITTING QUARTERLY REPORTS FOR OTHER POSTS UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 12

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16. THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE THAT SOME POSTS ARE CONSULTING WITH AND SUBMITTING QUARTERLY REPORTS ON BEHALF OF CONSTITUENT AND/OR NON VISA-ISSUING POSTS WITHIN THEIR HOST COUNTRIES. IN SUCH CASES, THE REPORTING POSTS SHOULD BE CERTAIN TO INDICATE IN THEIR QUARTERLY REPORTS THE POSTS WITH WHICH THEY HAVE CONSULTED ON VISAS VIPER ACTIVITIES AND ON WHOSE BEHALF THEY ARE REPORTING.

VISAS VIPER REPORTING

CRITERIA

17. A VISAS VIPER CABLE MUST BE SUBMITTED IF: Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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(1) THERE IS REASON TO SUSPECT THAT AN INDIVIDUAL FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF INA 212(A)(3)(B); AND (2) THERE IS SUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT OF THE INFORMATION. 18. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS TO DEVELOP HIGH-QUALITY, USABLE RECORDS ON POSSIBLE TERRORISTS, NOT MERELY TO COLLECT IMPRESSIVE STATISTICS. A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM SHOULD THEREFORE ONLY BE SENT IF BOTH OF THE ABOVE CRITERIA ARE MET.

REASON TO SUSPECT TERRORIST ACTIVITY UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 13

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19. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS SUBJECT TO INA 212 (A) (3) (B) : I.E., THAT HE OR SHE: (1) HAS ENGAGED, IS ENGAGED, OR IS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AS DEFINED IN THAT SECTION; (2) HAS INCITED TERRORIST ACTIVITY WITH INTENT TO CAUSE DEATH OR BODILY HARM; OR (3) IS A KNOWING MEMBER OR A REPRESENTATIVE OF ONE OF THE 30 TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (SEE 9 FAM 40.32, NOTE 6.6(C) FOR A LIST OF THESE DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS). 20. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" CRITERION FOR SUBMITTING VISAS VIPER CABLES REPRESENTS A LESSER STANDARD THAN THE "REASON TO BELIEVE" STANDARD REQUIRED TO SUPPORT VISA DENIAL UNDER INA 212 (A) (3) (B) . THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" CRITERION TO BE MET IF THE DEROGATORY INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE WOULD WARRANT FURTHER DETAILED INQUIRY INTO THE SUBJECT'S BACKGROUND SHOULD HE OR SHE APPLY FOR A VISA. AN INDIVIDUAL'S ASSOCIATION WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST GROUPS ALSO MEETS THE CRITERION IF SUCH ASSOCIATION SUGGESTS A PROSCRIBED MEMBERSHIP OR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTS.

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21. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP AND REPORT ALL AVAILABLE IDENTIFYING DATA ON THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS. DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON A SUSPECTED TERRORIST, REGARDLESS OF ITS GRAVITY, IS OF LITTLE VALUE UNLESS IT CAN BE LINKED TO THAT INDIVIDUAL SHOULD HE OR SHE APPLY FOR A VISA OR FOR ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES. INSUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA IN A GIVEN CASE CAN RESULT IN A FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A SERIOUS THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY. IT CAN ALSO PRODUCE "FALSE HITS" WHICH COMPLICATE VISA ADJUDICATION, PLACE CONSULAR OFFICERS AT RISK OF SANCTIONS UNDER THE VISA LOOKOUT ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS, AND CAUSE UNWARRANTED INCONVENIENCE TO BONA FIDE VISA APPLICANTS. FOR THESE REASONS, THE DEPARTMENT CAREFULLY WEIGHS THE ADEQUACY OF BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER TO CREATE TIPOFF RECORDS AND CLASS/IBIS ENTRIES ON THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER REPORTING. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN WHEN CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES ARE NOT MADE BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA, TIPOFF RECORDS ARE OFTEN CREATED ON THE SUBJECT IN CASE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS LATER DEVELOPED. 22. VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS SHOULD IDEALLY PROVIDE FULL NAMES (INCLUDING ALIASES AND ALTERNATE SPELLINGS) AND DATES AND PLACES OF BIRTH. SINCE NAMING CONVENTIONS VARY 3Y COUNTRY AND REGION, THE SUBJECT'S SURNAME(S) MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED, EITHER BY LISTING IT/THEM FIRST, FOLLOWED BY A COMMA AND THE GIVEN NAME(S), OR BY PLACING UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 15 STATE 009483 150913Z THE SURNAME(S) IN PARENTHESES. IN CASES WHERE THE SUBJECT'S GIVEN NAME CAN BE EITHER MASCULINE OR FEMININE, THE SUBJECT'S GENDER SHOULD BE SPECIFIED. 23. IF AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXACT DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH ARE NOT AVAILABLE, A REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF HIS OR HER AGE AND THE KNOWN OR PROBABLE COUNTRY OF BIRTH SHOULD BE PROVIDED IF POSSIBLE. VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS MAY BE SUBMITTED WITHOUT BIRTH DATA IF THE SUBJECT'S NAME IS NOT A COMMON ONE, AND IF THE POST IS ABLE TO PROVIDE OTHER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION. PERSONAL DETAILS SUCH AS PASSPORT DATA, PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, EDUCATION, PROFESSION, Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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RESIDENTIAL AND EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, AND THE NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS ARE OFTEN USEFUL IN ESTABLISHING IDENTITY. A SUBJECT'S AFFILIATION WITH A TERRORIST GROUP, AND HIS OR HER POSITION THEREIN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE REPORTED AS THIS INFORMATION IS PARTICULARLY VALUABLE FOR BOTH IDENTIFICATION AND THREAT ASSESSMENT PURPOSES. 24. PLEASE NOTE THAT A YEAR OF BIRTH, AT A MINIMUM, IS REQUIRED TO ENTER A SUBJECT'S NAME INTO THE INS/U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE'S IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEM. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO KEEP THIS IN MIND WHEN REPORTING ON NATIONALS OF VISA WAIVER COUNTRIES SINCE THE ONLY SCREENING OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS IS THROUGH IBIS AT U.S. PORTS-OF-ENTRY.

PRIORITIZING AND EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION: PRIORITIES FOR TERRORIST REPORTING UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 16 STATE 009483 150913Z 25. WHILE ALL SUSPECTED TERRORISTS MEETING THE VISAS VIPER CRITERIA MUST BE REPORTED, POSTS SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIES WHEN GATHERING AND EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION. THESE PRIORITIES, RANKED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF THREAT, WERE DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES: (1) INDIVIDUALS WHO POSE OR KAY POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD; (2) INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT NOW KNOWN TO POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS, BUT WHO HAVE DONE SO WITHIN THE PAST 15 YEARS; AND (3) INDIVIDUALS WHO POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO NON-U.S. INTERESTS, OR WHO DID SO WITHIN THE PAST TEN YEARS.

EVALUATION OF TERRORIST INFORMATION

26. THE FOLLOWING ARE AMONG MANY FACTORS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED WHEN EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION AND/OR ASSESSING ITS URGENCY: (1) THE IMMEDIACY AND SEVERITY OF THE THREAT POSED;

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(2) THE RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION; (3) WHETHER THE SUBJECT IS CLEARLY IDENTIFIED; AND UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 17 STATE 009483 150913Z (4) WHETHER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COULD BE DEVELOPED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD TO FURTHER CLARIFY THE SITUATION OR BETTER IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT. 27. EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUBMITTING VISAS VIPER REPORTING REQUIRES FLEXIBILITY AND SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT FOR WHICH THERE ARE NOT ALWAYS CLEAR GUIDELINES. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT SUCH ASSESSMENTS ARE BEST MADE BY EACH POST'S VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE, WHICH HAS FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S TERRORIST THREAT SITUATION. IF THE POST BELIEVES THE REPORTING CRITERIA OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 17 ABOVE HAVE BEEN MET, A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM PROVIDING ALL KNOWN INFORMATION SHOULD BE SUBMITTED. THE DEPARTMENT ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION TAKEN ONCE INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL TERRORISTS IS REPORTED.

VISAS VIPER REPORTING CHANNEL

28. COUNTERTERRORISM REPORTING IS AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY FUNCTION REQUIRING THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORT OF ALL MEMBERS OF A POST'S COUNTRY TEAM. EXCEPT IN THE RARE INSTANCES WHERE THERE ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONAL CONCERNS, ALL STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTING ON TERRORISTS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC SECURITY (DS) REPORTING, MUST BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE.VISAS VIPER CHANNEL. OTHER-AGENCY TERRORIST REPORTING MAY USE THE VIPER CHANNEL OR BE SENT THROUGH THE AGENCY'S TRADITIONAL REPORTING CHANNEL. REGARDLESS OF THE MEANS OF TRANSMISSION CHOSEN, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 18

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THAT SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ARE SCREENED FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN THE CLASS AND IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEMS.

DEPARTMENTAL REPORTING

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29. THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL OFFERS A DIRECT CONSULAR CONDUIT FOR WATCHLISTING KNOWN AND SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND MUST BE USED FOR ALL DEPARTMENTAL REPORTING ON INDIVIDUALS WHO MEET THE VIPER PROGRAM'S SCOPE AND CRITERIA. INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS MAY ORIGINATE FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES INCLUDING CONSULAR INTERVIEWS, MEDIA REPORTING, AND THE CONTACTS OF THE SECURITY OFFICER AND OTHER POST SECTIONS AND AGENCIES. THE FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (FBIS) , IF AVAILABLE AT POST, IS A VALUABLE RESOURCE. TERRORIST INFORMATION MAY BE DEVELOPED AND SHARED THROUGH EITHER THE POST'S INTERAGENCY VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE OR ON AN AD HOC BASIS. WHILE THE CONSULAR SECTION HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING AND MONITORING VISAS VIPER REPORTING, OTHER DEPARTMENT SECTIONS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SHARING TERRORIST INFORMATION WITH THE CONSULAR SECTION, AND, IF DRAFTING REPORTS ON TERRORISTS, FOR ENSURING THAT SUCH REPORTING IS TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL. (FOR GUIDANCE ON PREPARING VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS, SEE PARAGRAPHS 31 THROUGH 34 BELOW). OTHER AGENCY REPORTING UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 19

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30. THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL IS INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT, RATHER THAN SUPPLANT, PREVIOUSLY EXISTING CHANNELS USED BY OTHER AGENCIES FOR REPORTING ON FOREIGN TERRORISTS. OTHER AGENCIES MAY SHARE TERRORIST INFORMATION WITH THE POST'S VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THE VIPER CHANNEL, OR MAY CHOOSE TO SEND IT DIRECTLY TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS. DATA TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE LATTER ROUTE IS USUALLY LATER PASSED TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR POSSIBLE CLASS AND IBIS ENTRY THROUGH THE TIPOFF PROGRAM. OTHER-AGENCY DRAFTERS CAN EXPEDITE TIPOFF'S RECEIPT OF THEIR TERRORIST REPORTING BY INCLUDING THE PHRASE "RECOMMENDED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM" IN THE TEXT OF THE OUTGOING MESSAGES. ORIGINATING AGENCIES MAY PREFER TO USE THEIR OWN REPORTING CHANNELS FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING THE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND ONGOING OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, ALL POST AGENCIES SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL AS A DIRECT AND MORE EXPEDITIOUS MEANS OF WATCHLISTING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS IN THE BORDER SECURITY LOOKOUT SYSTEMS (CLASS AND IBIS) AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO USE IT IN EMERGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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VISAS VIPER REPORTING PROCEDURES: REQUIREMENTS 31. THE DEPARTMENT'S OBJECTIVE IS TO FACILITATE VISAS VIPER REPORTING TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 20 STATE 009483 150913Z MEETING THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS: (1) THAT ALL AVAILABLE IDENTIFYING AND DEROGATORY INFORMATION BE PROVIDED; AND (2) THAT THE REPORTS RECEIVE THE DISTRIBUTION NECESSARY FOR ALERTING INTERESTED AGENCIES AND FOR WATCHLISTING THE SUBJECTS. PREPARING VIPER TELEGRAMS 32. VISAS VIPER CABLES SHOULD BE SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C AND MUST BE ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES: "SECSTATE WASHDC, DIRFBI//INTD/CTS//, INS/HQINT WASHDC, US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC/INTEL". OTHER POSTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT'S PLACE OF NATIONALITY OR RESIDENCE, OR OVER THE AREA IN WHICH THE SUBJECT, OR THE SUBJECT'S CnCUP, HAS BEEN ACTIVE SHOULD NORMALLY 3E INCLUDED AS INFO ADDRESSEES. THE VISAS VIPER CODE INDICATOR SHOULD APPEAR IN THE CAPTION LINE AND THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE TELEGRAM, AND THE FOLLOWING TAGS SHOULD BE USED: KVPR, PTER, CVIS, PINR, ASEC, (COUNTRY TAG). VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS SHOULD IDEALLY BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MODEL FORMAT PROVIDED IN 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX E, SECTION 302, ALTHOUGH FLEXIBILITY IS PERMITTED (SEE PARAGRAPH 34 BELOW). AT POSTS' DISCRETION, MULTIPLE NAMES MAY BE SUBMITTED IN A SINGLE TELEGRAM. THE CABLE SHOULD PROVIDE ALL IDENTIFYING DATA AVAILABLE REGARDING THE SUBJECT(S) AS WELL AS A DETAILED RECITATION OF THE UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 21 STATE 009483 150913Z DEROGATORY INFORMATION KNOWN TO POST, INCLUDING THE IDENTIFICATION OF ANY TERRORIST GROUPS WITH WHICH THE SUBJECT MAY BE AFFILIATED. FINALLY, VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS SHOULD INCLUDE AN EVALUATION OF THE CREDIBILITY AND APPLICABILITY OF THE INFORMATION SUBMITTED, A GENERAL Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOURCE'S RELIABILITY. CLASSIFICATION AND HANDLING 33. VISAS VIPER CABLES SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE CLASSIFIED AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND ASSIGNED APPROPRIATE TELEGRAPHIC PRECEDENCE. IN A CLASSIFIED VIPER TELEGRAM, THE PORTION CONTAINING THE SUBJECT'S NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, NATIONALITY, AND PASSPORT NUMBER SHOULD REMAIN UNCLASSIFIED SINCE THESE DATA ELEMENTS WILL LIKELY BE ENTERED INTO THE UNCLASSIFIED CLASS AND IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEMS. ALL OTHER INFORMATION PROVIDED IS MAINTAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT AND PROTECTED ACCORDING TO ITS CLASSIFICATION. THE USE OF THE ROGER CHANNEL SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHEN SENDING VISAS VIPER CABLES, SINCE TELEGRAMS SO TRANSMITTED REQUIRE SPECIAL HANDLING THAT DELAYS THEIR PROCESSING. DUAL PURPOSE REPORTING 34. THE DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THAT COUNTERTERRORISM UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 22 STATE 009483 150913Z REPORTING, PARTICULARLY THAT INITIATED BY OTHER SECTIONS OR AGENCIES, OFTEN HAS PURPOSES OTHER THAN, OR IN ADDITION TO, WATCHLISTING THE INDIVIDUAL IN QUESTION. FOR THIS REASON, AND TO OBVIATE THE NEED FOR DUPLICATE REPORTING, POSTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PRECISELY FOLLOW THE MODEL FORMAT SHOWN IN 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX E, SECTION 302. AS LONG AS THE TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE "KVPR" TAG AND THE "VISAS VIPER" CODE INDICATOR, INCLUDES THE ADDRESSEES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 32 ABOVE, AND PROVIDES COMPLETE INFORMATION REGARDING THE SUSPECTED TERRORIST'S IDENTITY AND ACTIVITIES, IT WILL RECEIVE APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION AND BE PROCESSED BY THE TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF. WATCHLISTING TERRORISTS 35. THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER REPORTING WHO MEET THE PROGRAM'S CRITERIA ARE ENTERED INTO TIPOFF'S COUNTERTERRORISM DATABASE AND THEIR NAMES ARE INCLUDED IN CLASS UNDER THE DPT-00 CODE. AS WITH ALL DPT-00 ENTRIES, Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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THE DEPARTMENT'S SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION IS REQUIRED SHOULD A SUBJECT LATER APPLY FOR A VISA, AND NO VISA MAY BE ISSUED UNTIL THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE SAO REQUEST IS RECEIVED. THE NAMES OF MOST INDIVIDUALS WHOSE DATES OF BIRTH ARE KNOWN ARE ALSO ENTERED INTO THE INS/U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE'S IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEM AND ARE SHARED WITH THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE TUSCAN PROGRAM. AS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 24 ABOVE, AT LEAST THE SUBJECT'S YEAR OF BIRTH IS NEEDED TO CREATE AN IBIS ENTRY, MAKING THE UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 23 STATE 009483 150913Z PROVISION OF THIS INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WHEN SUBMITTING VIPER CABLES ON NATIONALS OF VISA WAIVER COUNTRIES. CLASS ENTRY BY POSTS IN CERTAIN CASES 36. WHEN A CONSULAR OFFICER AT A POST ON-LINE WITH CLASS BELIEVES THAT A SUSPECTED TERRORIST SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN CLASS IMMEDIATELY, THE CONSULAR OFFICER SHOULD ENTER THE SUBJECT'S NAME DIRECTLY USING THE APPROPRIATE QUASI 212(A) (3) (B) REFUSAL CODE (SEE 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX D, EXHIBIT I). CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SUCH ACTION INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, A CREDIBLE IMMINENT THREAT TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS OR AN IMPENDING APPLICATION FOR A U.S. VISA BY THE SUBJECT. THE CONSULAR OFFICER MUST THEN EXPEDITIOUSLY SUBMIT A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM, IN WHICH THE POST'S CLASS ENTRY SHOULD BE REPORTED. CONDUCTING CLASS CHECKS 37. PRIOR TO SUBMITTING A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM ON A POTENTIAL TERRORIST, CONSULAR POSTS MUST CONDUCT A CLASS CHECK TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUBJECT WAS PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED AS A DPT-00 ENTRY OR UNDER ANOTHER CODE REQUIRING A SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION. THE VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM SHOULD BE SUBMITTED EVEN IF THE CLASS CHECK REVEALS A PREVIOUS ENTRY SINCE THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO POST IS UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 24 STATE 009483 150913Z LIKELY TO ADD TO THE SUBJECT'S EXISTING RECORD. THE RESULTS OF THE CLASS CHECK SHOULD BE REPORTED IN THE VIPER Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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CABLE. ANY CLASS ENTRIES MUST BE FULLY CITED SO THAT THE SUBJECT MAY BE ACCURATELY IDENTIFIED AND HIS/HER RECORD EXPEDITIOUSLY LOCATED.

REMOVING WP

CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES

38. RECOMMENDATIONS TO DELETE CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES WHICH WERE BASED UPON VISAS VIPER REPORTING SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C. THE CABLE SHOULD CONTAIN THE "VISAS VIPER" CODE INDICATOR AND THE "KVPR" TAG. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DELETION REQUEST MUST BE PROVIDED. CIRCUMSTANCES CREATING THE NEED FOR SUCH A RECOMMENDATION MIGHT INCLUDE THE SUBJECT'S DEMISE OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENCE THAT THE DEROGATORY INFORMATION AGAINST THE SUBJECT, PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED CREDIBLE, IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

DEPARTMENT FEEDBACK

39. THE DEPARTMENT WILL REPLY IN A TIMELY MANNER TO ALL VISAS VIPER COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ROUTINE QUARTERLY REPORTS. IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, THE DEPARTMENT WILL INFORM POSTS REGARDING THE WATCHLISTING OF THE SUBJECT(S) AND WILL ADVISE IF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED. POSTS' INQUIRIES REGARDING VISAS VIPER POLICIES UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 25 STATE 009483 150913Z AND PROCEDURES WILL ALSO RECEIVE THE DEPARTMENT'S PROMPT ATTENTION. THE DEPARTMENT WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDANCE AND FEEDBACK ON VISAS VIPER MATTERS AND TO FORM A TRUE PARTNERSHIP WITH FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS IN FULFILLING THIS CRUCIAL COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSIBILITY.

REQUEST FOR POST ACTION

40. THE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR VISAS VIPER PROGRAM COORDINATION IS ASKED TO REVIEW POST'S PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES IN LIGHT OF THESE REVISED INSTRUCTIONS AND MAKE ANY CHANGES NECESSARY TO BRING THEM INTO ACCORD. NO REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT ON THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW NEED BE SUBMITTED. THE WP COORDINATOR SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT ALL Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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SECTIONS AND AGENCIES AT POST ARE MADE AWARE OF THE NEW GUIDANCE. ANY COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS, OR QUESTIONS REGARDING THESE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO INR/TIPOFF. THE DEPARTMENT COMMENDS POSTS' CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS VITALLY IMPORTANT PROGRAM AND ENCOURAGES EVEN GREATER FUTURE PARTICIPATION. TALBOTT UNCLASSIFIED « END OF DOCUMENT »

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0 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9418 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 CAIRO 12494 FOR OIG/AUD/CI - GARY PETROVICH, CA, CA/VO, AND NEA/EGY E.G. 11652: N/A TAGS CVIS, AADP, CMGT, EG SUBJECT: OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS REF: PETROVICH FAX TRANSMITTED 7/14/93 1. THE REFERENCED FAX WAS RECEIVED AT POST AT CLOSE OF BUSINESS, WEDNESDAY, JULY 14. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE TEXT OF THE FAX AND RESPONSES PREPARED BY CONSUL GENERAL SWOPE IN RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN THAT FAX. 2. GENERAL COMMENT. THE QUESTIONS POSED IN THE REFERENCED FAX RAISE A NUMBER OF ISSUES OF A POLICY NATURE WHICH ARE BEST ADDRESSED TO THE DEPARTMENT. CAIRO STRONGLY SUPPORTS DEPARTMENT EFFORTS TO UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 01 OF 07 201519Z PREVENT THE ENTRY OF EXCLUDABLES AND OTHER UNDESIRABLES INTO THE U.S. SINCE 1991, WE HAVE EXPANDED OUR COORDINATION EFFORTS WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION AND NEARLY DOUBLED OUR OUTGOING CABLE TRAFFIC TO THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER POSTS. THE CONSULAR SECTION CONDUCTED (AND CONTINUES TO CONDUCT) EXTENSIVE REVIEWS OF ALL CONSULAR INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONTROLS INCLUDING NAME CHECKING PROCEDURES. SINCE 1991 POST HAS BEEN IN COMPLIANCE WITH DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS. YOU MAY WISH TO REVIEW OUR FY-94 AND FY-95 CONSULAR PACKAGE Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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SUBMISSIONS (CAIRO MEMORANDA OF MARCH 13, 1992 AND OF MARCH 15, 1993 WHICH WERE SENT TO OIG AMONG OTHER WASHINGTON ADDRESSEES). NONETHELESS, OUR INABILITY TO ACCESS CLASS ON SUNDAYS (A WORKDAY), INCONSISTENT DATA RETRIEVAL FROM CLASS WHICH APPEARS TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CLASS CENTRAL SYSTEM SEARCH SOFTWARE (AND WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED TO WASHINGTON UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 01 OF 07 201519Z REPEATEDLY DURING THE LAST TWO YEARS) WILL CONTINUE TO HAMPER OUR ABILITY TO RETRIEVE ENTRIES ALREADY MADE INTO CLASS. THE DEPARTMENT MUST SOLVE THESE MAJOR SYSTEMS PROBLEMS IF OVERSEAS POSTS ARE TO HAVE THE MINIMAL TOOLS NECESSARY TO SCREEN VISA APPLICANTS. 3. THE REFERENCED FAX, ADDRESSED TO CAIRO CG, HAS AS IT'S SUBJECT "QUESTIONS REGARDING CAIRO 21875, 12/11/92". INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH READS: QUOTE AS DISCUSSED IN OUR PHONE CONVERSATION, THIS IS A LIST OF QUESTIONS OUR OFFICE HAD ON THE ABOVE CABLE, WHICH WE FOUND WHILE REVIEWING EMBASSY CAIRO'S POLTICAL SECTION FILES IN MAY 1993. QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED WHETHER THE INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED IN UNCLASSIFIED NNNN UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 01 ACTION OIG-04

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FOR OIG/AUD/CI - GARY PETROVICH, CA, CA/VO, AND NEA/EGY E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS CVIS, AADP, CMGT, EG SUBJECT: OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS REF: PETROVICH FAX TRANSMITTED 7/14/93 THIS CABLE WOULD MERIT BEING PUT INTO CLASS AS QUASI-REFUSALS. THE CABLE WAS SENT TO WASHINGTON, BUT INFORMATIONAL COPIES WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, INCLUDING THE CONSULAR SECTION. WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO LEARN FROM THE EMBASSY'S CONSULAR SECTION IS THE FOLLOWING: QUESTION 1. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, DID THE CONSULAR SECTION IN FACT RECEIVE A COPY OF THE ABOVE CABLE? END QUOTE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02

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RESPONSE: YOUR TELEPHONE CALL ON 7/13/93 WAS THE FIRST TIME ANYONE HAD GIVEN THE CONSULAR SECTION THE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER OF THE CABLE IN QUESTION. NEVER .DURING THE COURSE OF THE AUDIT TEAM'S VISIT IN EARLY MAY, 1993, WAS I PROVIDED WITH THIS ESSENTIAL INFORMATION DESPITE MY REQUEST FOR SUCH INFORMATION. THE CONSULAR SECTION REGULARLY RECEIVES INFORMATIONAL COPIES OF A GREAT DEAL OF OUTGOING NON-CAPTIONED CABLES DRAFTED BY THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SECTIONS. HOWEVER, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE AND CLASSIFIED CABLES CANNOT BE. CIRCULATED, OPENLY ... WITHIN THE CONSULAR SECTION. THEY MUST REMAIN IN A SECURE CONTAINER IN A RESTRICTED AREA AVAILABLE FOR PERUSAL BY CLEARED AMERICAN STAFF AS THEY HAVE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 02 OF 07 201522Z TIME. THE DISTRIBUTION LINE OF CABLE INDICATES THAT THE CONSULAR SECTION RECEIVED AN INFORMATIONAL COPY Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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AS IT DOES OF MANY OTHER CABLES. WE DID NOT CLEAR THE CABLE, NOR WERE WE AWARE OF ITS CONTENTS PRIOR TO ITS DISPATCH. QUESTION 2 IN REVIEWING THE CABLE, WHAT 'IS YOUR JUDGEMENT (SIC), AS CHIEF OF THE CONSULAR SECTION, ON WHETHER ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED MERITED BEING PUT INTO THE CLASS SYSTEM AS QUASI-REFUSALS? --IF SO, WHICH NAMES? --WHAT WOULD BE THE BASES (SIC) FOR INCLUDING SOME NAMES FROM THIS LIST IN THE SYSTEM AND NOT OTHERS? RESPONSE: --BASED SOLELY ON THE INFORMATION IN CAIRO 21875, IT APPEARS THAT NONE OF THE NAMES MERIT ENTRY INTO CLASS AS EXCLUDABLES BECAUSE: A. THE INDIVIDUALS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE EXCLUDABLE/INELIGIBLE UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (INA) SECTION 212(A)(2)(A)(I)(I), CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE BECAUSE: 1. THE VERDICTS WERE SUSPENDED PENDING APPEAL (CABLE, PARAS 4,7, AND 8) AND 9 FAM 40.21(A)N. 3.7. 2.

MANY OF THE DEFENDANTS MENTIONED IN THE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 CAIRO 12494 02 OF 07 201522Z REFERENCED TELEGRAM, INCLUDING THOSE WHO ARE SUPPOSEDLY THE MOST "DANGEROUS," WERE TRIED IN ABSENTIA (CABLE, PARA 9 AND 9 FAM 40.21(A)N 3.4-2 WHICH STATES "A CONVICTION IN ABSENTIA DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONVICTION.") UNCLASSIFIED NNNN UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 01 ACTION OIG-04

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O 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9420 UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 07 CAIRO 12494 FOR OIG/AUD/CI - GARY PETROVICH, CA, CA/VO, AND NEA/EGY E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS CVIS, AADP, CMGT, EG SUBJECT: OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS REF: PETROVICH FAX TRANSMITTED 7/14/93 3. NO SPECIFIC CRIMINAL/TERRORIST ACTIONS ARE MENTIONED IN THE CABLE AS HAVING BEEN COMMITTED BY THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED IN THE CABLE. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PLO, A PERSON IS NOT GUILTY OF A CRIME MERELY BECAUSE THE GROUP OR GROUPS TO WHICH (S)HE BELONGS COMMIT(S) CRIMINAL ACTS. B. THE INDIVIDUALS DO NOT APPEAR INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS UNDER INA 212(A) (3) (A) (III) WHICH STATES "ANY ACTIVITY A PURPOSE OF WHICH IS THE OPPOSITION TO, OR UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 03 OF 07 201523Z THE CONTROL OR OVERTHROW OF,(SIC) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY FORCE, VIOLENCE, OR OTHER UNLAWFUL MEANS." THERE IS NOTHING WHATSOEVER IN THE REFERENCED CABLE TO INDICATE THAT THESE GROUPS FOCUS THEIR ACTIVITIES AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS. C. THE INDIVIDUALS DO NOT APPEAR, FROM THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE REFERENCED CABLE, TO BE INELIGIBLE UNDER INA SECTION 212(A)(3)(B) ENGAGING IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. 9 FAM 40.32 N 5.1 STIPULATES THAT MERE MEMBERSHIP IN OR AFFILIATION WITH A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THE PLO), DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A GROUND OF INELIGIBILITY. IN THE "AFGHAN" CASE, THE REFERENCED CABLE STATES THE INDIVIDUALS WERE CHARGED WITH "MEMBERSHIP" IN A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (PARA 2). Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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IN THE "JIHAD/HEZBOLLAH" CASE THEY WERE CHARGED WITH "ESTABLISHING A GROUP." SINCE THE PASSAGE OF IMMACT 90, NEITHER ESTABLISHING NOR BELONGING TO TERRORIST GROUPS IS A GROUND OF EXCLUSION. PUBLIC LAW 102-138 SECTION 128 ENJOINS THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM INCLUDING INFORMATION INTO THE AUTOMATED VISA LOOKOUT SYSTEM ABOUT INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT ACTUALLY EXCLUDABLE. THE POLITICAL OFFICERS WITH WHOM WE INTERACT ON THESE ISSUES ARE CONSTANTLY FRUSTRATED THAT THEIR REPORTING CABLES DO NOT PROVIDE LEGAL GROUNDS FOR US TO ENTER A NAME INTO CLASS. IT WOULD BE IMMENSELY EASIER FOR DRAFTERS OF CABLES UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 03 OF 07 201523Z SUCH AS 92 CAIRO 21875 IF THE DEPARTMENT WERE DEFINE SPECIFIC SUBGROUPS OF THE "ISLAMIC GROUPS" AS ORGANIZATIONS IN WHICH MEMBERSHIP IN AND OF ITSELF CONSTITUTES PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (SEE 9 FAM 40.32 N 5.2). BUT, IT HAS NOT DONE SO. QUESTION 3: WHAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WOULD YOU NEED BEFORE YOU COULD ENTER THE NAMES INTO THE CLASS SYSTEM? RESPONSE: IN ORDER TO ENTER THESE INDIVIDUALS INTO CLASS IN ANY RETRIEVABLE, MEANINGFUL WAY, THE CONSULAR SECTION REQUIRES: A. AN ALLEGATION OF (1) A SERIOUS CRIME HAVING BEEN COMMITTED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL (OR THE ADMISSION OF THE ESSENTIAL ACTS OF SUCH A CRIME), OR (2) "ANTI AMERICAN" CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (SECTION 212(A) (3) (A) (III)) EVEN OF A NON-SERIOUS NATURE COMMITTED BY EACH INDIVIDUAL, OR UNCLASSIFIED NNNN Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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0 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9421 UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 CAIRO 12494 FOR OIG/AUD/CI - GARY PETROVICH, CA, CA/VO, AND NEA/EGY E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS CVIS, AADP, CMGT, EG SUBJECT: OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS REF: PETROVICH FAX TRANSMITTED 7/14/93 (3) A SPECIFIC TERRORIST ACT, AS DEFINED BY THE INA, IN WHICH EACH INDIVIDUAL TOOK PART. B. PROOF THAT IT IS REASONABLE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ALLEGATION IS TRUE. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE: (1) A REPORT OF A PERMANENT CONVICTION OF A CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE, OR (2) A FINISHED INTELLIGENCE PROJECT WHICH STATES UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 04 OF 07 201524Z CATEGORICALLY THAT WE KNOW A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL HAS ENGAGED IN ANTI AMERICAN CRIMINAL ACTS OR SPECIFIC TERRORIST ACTIONS. C. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH. THE WAY WE DISTINGUISH ONE PERSON WITH THE SAME NAME FROM ANOTHER IS WITH THE DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH. PARTICULARLY IN MUSLIM ARAB COMMUNITIES WHERE THE SAME 20-30 NAMES ARE USED OVER AND OVER AGAIN (AS FORENAMES AND AS SURNAMES), IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KNOW THIS MINIMAL BIT OF BIOGRAPHIC DATA. Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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D. ALIASES. THERE IS NO POINT IN ENTERING A NAME IF THE INDIVIDUAL HAS AN ESTBLISHED AND COMMONLY-USED ALIAS OR NAME VARIATION WHICH HE WOULD LIKELY USE ON A PASSPORT OR PASSPORTS TO APPLY FOR A U.S. VISA. QUESTION 4. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, WAS THERE ANY FOLLOW-UP ACTION TAKEN ON THIS CABLE TOWARDS COLLECTING THE NECESSARY INFORMATION FOR INPUT INTO CLASS, EITHER ON YOUR PART OR BY THE POLITICAL SECTION? IF NOT, WHY NOT? RESPONSE: ON MAY 5, 1993, THE POLITICAL SECTION SENT US A LIST FIFTEEN NAMES OF SUPPOSEDLY "CONVICTED TERRORISTS." EIGHT OF THESE WERE LISTED IN 92 CAIRO 21875. HOWEVER, THE MAY 5 LIST FAILED TO REFER TO CAIRO 21875. WE WERE UNAWARE OF THE OVERLAP. THE MAY 5 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 04 OF 07 201524Z LIST DID NOT CONTAIN ALTERNATE SPELLINGS, DATES AND PLACES OF BIRTH, NOR ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION CONCERNING "TERRORIST" ACTIVITIES COMMITTED BY THOSE LISTED. WE DID EXPLAIN, AT LENGTH, TO THE THEN POST TERRORISM/POLITICAL OFFICER THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED. DESPITE OUR REQUESTS, TO DATE WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION. THE POLITICAL COUNSELOR' INFORMS ME THAT THE POLITICAL SECTION MADE INQUIRIES, BUT HAD NOT RECEIVED THE NEEDED INFORMATION. THIS SPRING WE REDOUBLED OUR EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT DEPARTMENT PROCEDURES CONCERNING ENTRY OF POSSIBLE EXCLUDABLES INTO CLASS/NIVCAPS BY ..HOLDING^A . . CLASSIFIED BRIEFING SESSION ON APRIL 297*^993 WHICH THE DCM CHAIRED. SOME OF OUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD ARE REPORTED IN CAIRO 11344 OF JULY 1, 1993 WHICH WAS SLUGGED FOR OIG AMONG OTHER DEPARTMENT OFFICES. UNCLASSIFIED NNNN UNCLASSIFIED Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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O 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9422 UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 CAIRO 12494 FOR OIG/AUD/CI - GARY PETROVICH, CA, CA/VO, AND NEA/EGY E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS CVIS, AADP, CMGT, EG SUBJECT: OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS REF: PETROVICH FAX TRANSMITTED 7/14/93 ONE OF THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF OUR EFFORTS WAS OUR JUNE 7 MEMO, APPROVED BY THE DCM, WHICH DEFINES A STANDARD REPORTING FORMAT FOR POTENTIAL NAMES OF THOSE INELIGIBLE OR EXCLUDABLE UNDER THE INA. THE MEMO WAS DISTRIBUTED TO THE DCM, POLITICAL, RSO, AND ORA SECTIONS, THOUGH TO DATE NONE OF THESE SECTIONS HAS USED IT TO CREATE A REPORT RECOMMENDING THAT A QUASI-REFUSAL BE MADE. TO FACILITATE THIS EFFORT, THE POST IS CREATING AN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 05 OF 07 201525Z INTER-ACTIVE WANG GLOSSARY WHICH GUIDES THE USER STEP-BY-STEP THROUGH WRITING A CABLE FOR POSSIBLE ENTRY INTO CLASS, EXPLAINING AT EACH POINT THE LEVEL OF DETAIL WHICH IS REQUIRED. WHEN THIS IS COMPLETED, WE WILL TRAIN OTHER SECTIONS ON ITS USE, AND SHARE IT WITH THE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER POSTS. QUESTION 5: HAS THERE BEEN ANY DEVELOPMENTS (SIC) REGARDING THESE INDIVIDUALS SINCE THE DECEMBER 1992 CABLE, THAT WOULD AFFECT WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE ADDED TO CLASS OR NOT? IF SO, WE WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN RELEVANT CABLE TRAFFIC THAT HAS BEEN GENERATED REGARDING THESE INDIVIDUALS. Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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RESPONSE: CONSULAR SECTIONS DO NOT MAINTAIN CASE FILES ON POSSIBLE TERRORISTS UNLESS THEY APPLY FOR VISAS. CONSULAR SECTIONS DO NOT HAVE THE LEGAL MANDATE, ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY, PERSONNEL RESOURCES, NOR THE SECURE DOCUMENT STORAGE FACILITIES TO DO SO. CABLE TRAFFIC ON SPECIFIC TERRORIST GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS ARE HELD IN S/CT, INR/TNA, DS/DSS/ITA, COUNTRY DESKS, AND AT COUNTERPART WASHINGTON INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. WE HAVE NOT BEEN INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE 48 SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS LISTED IN 92 CAIRO 21875. NONETHELESS, LEST ANYONE IMAGINE THAT THE CONSULAR SECTION NOT ENTERING THE NAMES IN QUESTION INTO CLASS HAS SOMEHOW FACILITATED THE INTERNATIONAL UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 05 OF 07 201525Z TRAVEL OF TERRORISTS, WE NOTE THAT AT LEAST SEVEN OF THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED IN 92 CAIRO 21875 WERE ENTERED AS "00" BY THE DEPARTMENT IN DECEMBER, 1992. SEVERAL OTHERS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN IN THE SYSTEM EVEN BEFORE THE CABLE WAS SENT. EVIDENTLY, THE RECIPIENTS OF THE CABLE READ IT, GATHERED WHATEVER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE THROUGH INTER-AGENCY LIAISON, CONSIDERED AND EVALUATED THE LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON, AND ENTERED THE NAMES INTO CLASS. THIS WAS ACHIEVED THE SAME MONTH THE CABLE WAS RECEIVED, SO IT APPEARS THAT THE DEPARTMENT DID ITS JOB WELL. THE FIVE QUESTIONS POSED TO US SEEM TO IMPLY THAT WE SHOULD BE REDUPLICATING THIS EFFORT, EVEN THOUGH THE CONSULAR MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK (CHAPTER 6, SECTION 4, PAGES 117-119) DOES NOT MENTION ANY SUCH REQUIREMENT IN DESCRIBING THE CONSULAR LOOKOUT AND SUPPORT SYSTEM (CLASS). CONSULAR SECTIONS DO, REPEAT DO, HAVE THE MANDATE TO ENTER THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS WHO SEEK VISAS AND TO ENSURE NAME CHECKS ARE PERFORMED FOR PERSONS TO WHOM A VISA IS CONTEMPLATED. (UNDER EXISTING DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES, NAMECHECKS ARE NOT DONE ON PERSONS TO WHOM VISAS ARE NOT ISSUED.) SEEKING OUT Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS AND ENTERING THEIR NAMES IN ADVANCE INTO THE WASHINGTON-BASED AUTOMATED VISA LOOKOUT SYSTEM IS NOT THE ROLE OF CONSULAR SECTIONS ABROAD. THIS IS WHY THE DEPARTMENT MUST CONTINUE TO UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 04 CAIRO 12494 05 OF 07 201525Z RELY ON ALL SOURCE REPORTING TO HEADQUARTERS UNCLASSIFIED NNNN UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 01 ACTION OIG-04 INFO

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UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 CAIRO 12494 06 OF 07 201526Z CARRIED TO OUR SHORES FROM ABROAD. CARRIERS OF T.B. ARE EXCLUDABLE UNDER THE INA. YET THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL DO NOT EXPECT CONSULAR OFFICERS TO GATHER INFORMATION ON KNOWN AND POTENTIAL CARRIERS OF T.B. IN ADVANCE OF THEIR POSSIBLE APPLICATION FOR A VISA. CONSIDER, ALSO, VIOLENT CRIMINALS. THEY ARE ALSO EXCLUDABLE. BUT, THE FBI AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES DO NOT EXPECT CONSULAR OFFICERS TO GENERATE COMPREHENSIVE LISTS OF EVERYONE WHO HAS COMMITTED A VIOLENT CRIME IN THE CONSULAR DISTRICT, JUST IN CASE SOME OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MAY APPLY FOR VISAS. WE NEITHER HAVE THE RESOURCES NOR THE MANDATE TO ACCOMPLISH THESE TASKS. SIMILARLY, WE DOUBT THAT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCIES EXPECT US TO ASSESS WHO IS AND WHO IS NOT A TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. AND TO CREATE A COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS. HOWEVER, IF WE RECEIVE A SPECIFIC REQUEST ACCOMPANIED BY SUFFICIENT INFORMATION (INCLUDING FULL NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH AND SUPPORTING DATA), WE ENTER NAMES INTO CLASS. THUS, IF THE REGIONAL MEDICAL OFFICER CAN DEMONSTRATE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL CARRIES TUBERCULOSIS, OR THE RSO GIVES ANALAGOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING CRIMINAL INELIGIBILITY, OR OTHER MISSION ELEMENTS DEMONSTRATED INELIGIBILITY UNDER THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM, THE NAMES ARE ENTERED. CONSULAR SECTIONS ARE NOT STRUCTURED TO INITIATE SUCH ENTRIES OF NAMES UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 CAIRO 12494 06 OF 07 201526Z OF PERSONS NOT APPLYING FOR VISAS. NOR DO WE HAVE THE MANDATE OR RESOURCES TO INVESTIGATE INDIVIDUALS WHEN THE INTIATING/REQUESTING OFFICE CANNOT SUBSTANTIATE ITS REQUEST. AS WE DISCUSSED DURING THE OIG VISIT TO CAIRO, ONLY WASHINGTON MAY MAKE THE ENTRY WHICH REQUIRES ANY ONE WHO HAS AN APPLICATION FROM THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL IN QUESTION TO REFER THE CASE TO WASHINGTON. THIS IS KNOWN AS THE DOUBLE ZERO (OO - DEPARTMENT) Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1993CAIRO12494

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ENTRY. INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE ENTERED INTO THE CLASS SYSTEM AS DOUBLE-ZERO ENTRIES ARE VETTED THROUGH THE INTER-AGENCY PROCESS. ONLY BY USING THE INTER-AGENCY PROCESS, WITH ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER INFORMATION NOT READILY AVAILABLE TO POSTS, CAN MEANINGFUL EVALUATION OF DATA OCCUR. IN FACT, UNCONTROLLED ENTRY OF LARGE NUMBERS OF NAMES WITHOUT SUFFICIENT SUPPORTING INFORMATION INTO THE UNCLASSIFIED NNNN UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 01 ACTION OIG-04

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0 201515Z JUL 93 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9424 UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 CAIRO 12494 FOR OIG/AUD/CI - GARY PETROVICH, CA, CA/VO, AND 'NEA/EGY E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS CVIS, AADP, CMGT, EG SUBJECT: OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS REF: PETROVICH FAX TRANSMITTED 7/14/93 CLASS DATABASE HAS BEEN A SERIOUS PROBLEM AND PRESUMABLY IS ONE OF THE REASONS THE DEPARTMENT OF' STATE HAS SEVERELY LIMITED POST'S ABILITY TO MAKE PERMANENT ENTRIES INTO THE WORLDWIDE CLASS DATABASE. FOR EXAMPLE, CLASS WILL NOT PHYSICALLY ALLOW AN OVERSEAS POST TO ENTER AN INDIVIDUAL AS "90" - POSSIBLE TERRORIST, UNLESS A BIRTHDATE IS PROVIDED. THE DEPARTMENT DISCOURAGES POSTS FROM USING THE CODE "45" - INFORMATION HELD AT POST, AS A CATCH-ALL TO ENTER NAMES OF TERRORISTS, FELONS, ETC. UNCLASSIFIED Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02

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WE REMAIN ALERT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORISTS APPLYING FOR VISAS EVEN IF THEIR NAMES DO NOT APPEAR AS A "HIT" IN CLASS. WE KNOW, TOO, THAT TERRORISTS MAY EASILY ASSUME A NEW ALIAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING A U.S. VISA. TO COUNTER THIS, WE FREQUENTLY CONSULT WITH OTHER MISSION ELEMENTS AND OCCASIONALY SUBMIT SECURITY ADVISORY OPINIONS EVEN IF THE NAMES DOES NOT APPEAR IN CLASS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE SUBMITTED SAO'S ON THE BROTHER OF IBRAHIM EL GABROWNY (SEE CAIRO 9953 OF 6/10/93) AND A SHEIK SEEKING TO TRAVEL TO NEW JERSEY (CAIRO 11213 OF 6/29/93, STATE 181704 OF 6/16/93, AND CAIRO 7290 OF 4/28/93) (SEE 9 FAM APP A). A COROLLARY DIFFICULTY WITH ARABIC NAMES WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH MEMBERS OF THE DIG TEAM DURING THEIR VISIT AS IS DOCUMENTED MOST RECENTLY IN CAIRO 7475 OF 4/27/93. THIS CABLE ALSO DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS AT THIS POST (AND OTHERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST) STEMMING FROM LACK OF ACCESS TO CLASS ON SUNDAYS, A NORMAL WORKDAY HERE. ## HULL UNCLASSIFIED NNNN

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Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1993STATE238926

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DRAFTED BY: DS/I/PII:RBRAND APPROVED BY: DS:ACEQUAINTON DS/DSS/I:RREAMS DS/DSS/ITA:SCOX S/CT:PTHEROS CA:DHOBBS DS/DSS/OP:DWILLIAMS M:HGEISEL DS/DSS/L:DWOODEN S/S-O:PPETRIHOS DFAAB8

060455Z /38

P 060455Z AUG 93 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO SECURITY OFFICER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY USLO MOGADISHU PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE PRIORITY UNCLAS STATE 238926 FOR RSO'S FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUAINTON E.G. 12356: N/A TAGS: ASEC, CMGT, CVIS, PTER SUBJECT: MORE ON FIGHTING TERRORISM UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02

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REF: STATE 228336 1. BY NOW YOU SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE REFERENCED MESSAGE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY ON FIGHTING TERRORISM. I WANT TO ENSURE THAT ALL REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS ARE REPRESENTED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE POST COMMITTEE TO REVIEW CONSULAR LOOKOUT LISTS AND TO ASSIST IN CONSULAR COUNTERTERRORISM OBJECTIVES. 2. THE BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY'S SPECIFIC STATUTORY Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS OF ILLEGAL PASSPORT OR VISA ISSUANCE AND USE, AND THE REWARDS PROGRAM FOR TERRORISM INFORMATION PROVIDE THE DEPARTMENT WITH VALUABLE TOOLS IN ITS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. 3. DS INITIATIVES IN INVESTIGATING VISA AND PASSPORT FRAUD COMMITTED BY SEVERAL OF THE PRINCIPAL SUSPECTS IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING, OUR SUBSEQUENT ; INVESTIGATION AND ARREST OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN THE FAILED PLOT TO BOMB THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED REWARDS PROGRAM CAMPAIGN FOR THE ARREST OF RAMZI YOUSEF AHMAD, REFLECT OUR IMPORTANT ROLE IN LOCATING AND PROSECUTING INDIVIDUALS WHO THREATEN THE WELFARE OF THE UNITED STATES. OUR STRONG PARTICIPATION AT THE DEPARTMENT LEVEL SHOULD BE REFLECTED AT POST IN THE RSO'S ROLE ON THE LOOKOUT COMMITTEE. THE UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 03 STATE 238926 060455Z RSO MUST BE AN ACTIVE PLAYER AND ASSIST POST CONSULAR OFFICIALS IN THIS IMPORTANT ENDEAVOR. 4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. WHARTON UNCLASSIFIED NNNN

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Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED Current Handling: n/a Document Number: 1995AMMAN10183 PTQ0505

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P 211357Z SEP 95 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3164 INFO FBI WASHDC//INTO/CTS// USINS WASHDC USCUSTOMS WASHDC//INTEL// UNCLAS AMMAN 010183 DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO/L/C AND INR/TNA E.G. 12356: N/A TAGS: CVIS PTER PINR ASEC JO XX (NAJIM, EYAD MAHMOUD ISMAEL) SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR EVALUATION OF SECURITY INFORMATION REF: 1.

94 STATE 242729

VISAS VIPER

2. NAJIM, EYAD MAHMOUD ISMAEL, AKA EYAD ISMAIL, AKA EYAD ISMOIL NATIONALITY: JORDANIAN PLACE OF BIRTH: KUWAIT DATE OF BIRTH: JUNE 7, 1971 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02 AMMAN 10183 211358Z PASSPORT DATA: JORDANIAN PPT NO. B795447 CURRENT RESIDENCE: U.S. CUSTODY CLASS HITS: NONE 3. SUBJECT WAS ARRESTED IN JORDAN ON AUGUST 2, 1995, AND IMMEDIATELY EXTRADITED TO THE U.S. TO FACE CHARGES FOR HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING IN FEBRUARY 1993. THE BOMBERS ARE AN ADHOC GROUP OF DIFFERENT MIDDLE EAST NATIONALITIES FROM DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS WHO USED Current Class: UNCLASSIFIED

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THE NAME "FIFTH BATTALION OF THE LIBERATION ARMY" TO CLAIM RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBING. 4. SOURCE: PROSECUTOR'S AFFIDAVIT, U.S. DISTRICT COURT, SOUTH NEW YORK. 5. POST BELIEVES THE INFORMATION ON EYAD NAJIM IS SUFFICIENT FOR A FINDING OF VISA INELIGIBILITY. POST IS BRINGING HIS CASE TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT THE SUBJECT BE ENTERED AS A CLASS HIT. EGAN UNCLASSIFIED NNNN

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