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Government Executive Magazine - 10/1/98 Scapegoats and Survivors

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October 1,1998

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Scapegoats and Survivors By Dick Kirschten A-76 & Outsourcing

BIOGI Chris S Michae

•n the theater of Washington, the classic Punch-and-Judy ritual of politician thwacking bureaucrat is always an audience favorite. When federal agencies come under attack, the script frequently includes howls for the scalps of highly placed executives. But the behind-the-scenes secret—shared by the entire cast-is that the stoic civil servant who takes a high-visibility beating is usually simply paying the price for an unpopular policy gone awry. Top government managers know the drill. They run federal agencies during difficult intervals between appointments of political stewards. And, as top operational deputies, they often sign orders implementing controversial decisions made by elected leaders. Hardly the "faceless bureaucrats" of pejorative myth, these ambitious public leaders savor the challenges of their jobs and do not shun the limelight when controversy descends on their agencies. And at agencies that enforce controversial laws, firestorms of criticism are not infrequent. When the Senate held hearings last September to rail against purported abuses by federal tax collectors, Michael P. Dolan, then acting commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, was featured on television news reports as the man in the hot seat. The Washington Post identified Dolan as "the necessary whipping boy" whose departure would clear the way for a fresh start by a new IRS commissioner. Similarly, Chris Sale,former acting commissioner and deputy commissioner at the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was tabbed as "the designated sacrificial lamb" by Washington Times sources when she announced in June 1997

http://www.govexec.com/features/1098/1098s5.htm

11/3/2003

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Thomas H. Kean CHAIR Lee H. Hamilton VICE CHAIR Richard Ben-Veniste Max Cleland Frederick F. Fielding

October 17, 2003 Ms. Chris Sales Inter-American Development Bank 1350 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 Dear Ms. Sales:

Jamie S. Gorelick Slade Gorton John F. Lehman Timothy J. Roemer James R. Thompson

Philip D. Zelikow EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States is directed by statute to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including the nation's preparedness for, and immediate response to, those attacks, as well as to evaluate the lessons learned from those attacks and to make recommendations for preventing future attacks. As part of its investigation, the Commission hereby requests to interview you on issues relating to your position as INS Deputy Commissioner. We would also like to discuss your views on the current role of immigration and border control policy in combating terrorism. You may wish to review notes and other materials you may have to refresh your recollection during your employment at INS. Janice Kephart-Roberts, a member of the Commission's professional staff, will make the arrangements for your interview. The Commission would like to conduct your interview at your office on October 21 at 3:00 p.m. At least two members of the Commission's staff will attend your interview, and the general policy of the Commission is to tape record interviews. Please call Joanne Accolla at 202.401.1774 as soon as possible if you have any questions about the time and place of your interview. Please call Janice Kephart-Roberts at 202.401.1705 to raise any other questions you may have. Thank you very much in advance for your time and for your cooperation with the Commission and its staff in this important matter. Yours sincerely,

0

Philip Zelikow Executive Director

301 7'1' Street SW, Room 5125 Washington, DC 20407 T 202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545 wvvw.9-11 commission.tjov

Commission Sensitive MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Event: Interview of Christina Sale Executive Associate Commissioner Management 1991 Acting Commissioner INS Jan. 20th, 1993- Nov. '93 Deputy Commissioner INS Nov. '93-summer '97 Date: Tuesday, October 20, 2003 Special Access Issues: [none] Prepared by: Janice Kephart-Roberts on Oct. 20, 2003 Team Number: 5 (Border Security) Location: InterAmerican Development Bank office (Ms. Sale's office) Participants - Non-Commission:

Chris Sale

Participants - Commission: Janice Kephart-Roberts Tom Eldridge Note: no classification required Documents received: none Documents requested at interview under pending document request: none Recording: none NOTES: Background. 1970. BA Boston University psychology 1980. Masters Business Administration American 1972 began federal service INS Executive Associate Commissioner Management 1991 (all SES positions) INS Acting Commissioner INS Jan. 20th, 1993- Nov. '93 INS Deputy Commissioner INS Nov. '93-summer '97 2001 FDIC-CFO retired Relationship with DOJ. Meissner met weekly with AG and DAG. CS broadly attended staff meetings where AG support and INS support would be available. Persons in attendance would depend on topic being discussed. What were meetings contents? AG would go on travel and take copious notes and come back and ask about matters large as program delivery and budget matters and as small as

a software need for an admin person in Dallas. INS found in short time you had to totally follow through on everything, 100%, to get that item taken off the get-back list. Work as Deputy Commissioner. CS held Commissioner's meetings in order to allow line managers articulate vexing programs. Ended up with 56 agenda items that translated into 5 or 6 recommendations: • Asylum • Detention • hiterior enforcement (RICO statute, stronger D&D, strengthened statutory authorities, more equivalent authorities with the FBI) • Technology and infrastructure. These recommendations ended up in a binder delivered to Meissner upon her confirmation. To this, Meissner brought her own agenda of the naturalization concern. Meissner (DM) liked the recommendations, CS thinks. This binder led to the a lot of strategic plan initiatives (including a draft 1995 CT plan shown CS by team 5) that never got approved by the Commissioner. In the fall of 1993 during negotiation of the crime bill, DM and CS argued vigorously that INS should get a piece of the bill and budget. There were "buckets" of money in the bill and INS wasn't on the agenda. On 9/24/93, OMB called and asked: what would INS do with $30 million? We had tremendous pressures on us, no one ever saw investigations as our key role, so we never got the resources, even though DM and I asked. Even after the WTC bombing, INS got $0 in CT and DOS got the MRV fees. Simultaneously, working through proposals on dealing with asylum, technology, SW border, and citizenship issues. • On asylum, huge backlogs and huge fraud (not involving terrorism per se; generally to acquire economic benefits and crime not a significant issue). People could claim asylum and then basically stay forever b/c of the back logs. We needed a change in the statue and a change in the benefit. • On citizenship, the '87 amnesty aliens were approaching ability to acquire citizenship, and DM wanted a lot of PR to go out. Eventually, citizenship took 3 yrs to become an issue and another year for the backlogs to become a big issue. • On the SW border, it was all about hiring, training, deploying mostly in re to Border Patrol, and much less given to interior enforcement. This didn't make sense to Sale to not have the support on the interior. Would argue with DOT, OMB and the Hill about it. Even worked with Customs to make a parallel presentation (mike Kane and Sam Banks) on giving necessary resources to investigations/interior enforcement. • As a result, there was a significant lack of investigation and detention resources, disproportionate to the increases that Border Patrol saw. • During this time too, California was dealing with Proposition 93 (an immigration whipping post typical of a recession).

• •

The AG was worried the recession and peso devaluation would result in a surge of migration from the SW, and she insisted on numerous contingency plans. Immigration management was a priority because, not just b/c of millions being arrested but there was a sense of no control in the SW. I can remember being very frustrated that 99% of money was going to the SW and we had a backdoor problem on the northern border that no one was looking at regarding Asian criminal elements and drug smugglers. Remembers sitting with the US Attorney in Seattle who was very concerned about the criminal flow, and Sale couldn't help her.

Intelligence Briefings. Were sporadic and varied. As Acting Comrn'r, did receive briefings on WTCI and Kansi shooting, and at one point there was a concern about Nigerian crime. These briefings, tended to be more on organized crime than ever on CT. So CS had people working interagency on Russian mafia and drug cartels and working lookouts. "I never got heavily involved in case specific briefings" because I didn't feel like I could make a big difference on those, whereas I could with budget and programs etc. Doesn't recall whether attended a 1995 CIA briefing on radical fundamentalist provided by the CIA. Only met with FBI on JTTF detailees and|

|

INS Role in CT. We were never in the lead. Only palled in when our records were needed or another agency needed the cover of the INA to get results. Otherwise, we were excluded. I'd get involved when my agents, felt like they were being bullied. CS would complain to Seth Waxman and carry her agents' water on issues. Most of these requests came from Jack Shaw. Doesn't recall any GT strategy ever getting approved. What the problem was with the INS. We just didn't have good management in place. We had a lot of good operations guvs with a high school education vet not cut out for management. |

We were the dumping ground for all the "failed" DOJ employees. In addition, absent the litigators who would on INS cases, there was no counterpart at DOJ knowledgeable in INS affairs: no policy, no program, no deputy DAG 9/11 Personal Privacy 9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive

responsible for INS. It was all these bright young lawyers, like Gerri Ratliffe, who would stay for 18 months and then move on. "We were trying to do a dozen things at once when probably had only done one thing at once and maybe that not done correctly." I felt like I was always so busy fight fires I never had the opportunity to look at things systemically the way I needed to. On paper, Bob Bach reported to me, as did everyone. In reality, he reported to DM. Bach would only come to Sale on personnel, logistics, or money issues. Bach worked a lot with Dave Martin and Alienikoff in the general counsel's office (Martin a professor at UVa and has written definitive immigration law texts.) Ask Martin or Alienikoff about FDD work. Talk to Joe Greene or Scott Blackman (Pearson's deputy) about senior CT docs. Doesn't think they exist except maybe from Pearson's office. White House meetings. As deputy, would go if DM could not. Doesn't recall any meetings on CT. Recalls mtgs on Haitian/Cuban immigration issues and arguments with Dick Clarke about that. On issues of White House concern, like citizenship, there was enormous WH pressure. Julianne Bender and Pam Barry in Public Affairs took the brunt of that pressure. Congressional interest. Sen. Abraham was cool and okay to work with, but on the House side, Lamar Smith, Hal Rogers and Elton Gallagley were difficult and demanding. During this time too there was an incredible time vacuum on border patrol matters, as the AG had hope to make the Hill happy by letting the Hill (this was an oral agreement, not in approps statute) actually determine how many border patrol agents went to what sectors. No other agency was so micro-managed. We'd spend 4 or 5 months trying to figure out where 700 agents would go, and then we'd be asked why we hadn't hired them yet. "It was a sick environment for a whole host of reasons." Student tracking. CS supported it. On admin projects (I was the budget analyst and DM and Bach would do policy while I made the machine work). I got engaged in what we could and couldn't do from a data management system. I went after money for it and by the time we got it I'd really moved on to other things. The concerns were (1) privacy, ie how the universities and ACLU would react and (2) technology, ie whether we could

actually get the thing done. We often had a bigger appetite than we could actually implement. At this time, we were also trying to: • Tie IDENT to case mgmt • Develop a records management system • In process of installing a MRV greencard, and the machines for these were a nightmare Student tracking arrived in the middle, with a very ambitious agenda and real visions. But saying it and doing it were received with some skepticism from DM. But CS was willing to support CIPRIS and let them try even though she wasn't sure it could be delivered.

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Series: Team 5 Files Folder: Sale, Christina Date: 10/20/2003 Pages: 8 Description: Notes of interview with Christina Sale

Reason for withdrawal: national security classified

Box 4 Withdrawn by: kw, 12/23/2008

October 16, 2003

Ms. Chris Sales Inter-American Development Bank 1350 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC Dear Ms. Sales: The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States is directed by statute to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including the nation's preparedness for, and immediate response to, those attacks, as well as to evaluate the lessons learned from those attacks and to make recommendations for preventing future attacks. As part of its investigation, the Commission hereby requests to interview you on issues relating to your position as INS Deputy Commissioner. We would also like to discuss your views on the current role of immigration and border control policy in combatting terrorism. You are encouraged to review any notes you may have from your employment at INS prior to the interview, in an effort to refresh your recollection of dates and events. Janice Kephart-Roberts, a member of the Commission's professional staff, will make the arrangements for your interview. The Commission would like to conduct your interview at your office on October 21 at 3:00 p.m. At least two members of the Commission's staff will attend your interview, and the general policy of the Commission is to tape record interviews. Please call Joanne Accolla at 202.401.1774 as soon as possible to discuss the time and location of your interview. Please call Janice KephartRoberts at 202.401.1705 to raise any other questions you may have. Thank you very much in advance for your time and for your cooperation with the Commission and its staff in this important matter. Yours sincerely,

Philip Zelikow Executive Director

Page 1 of 1 Joanne Accolla From:

Joanne Accolla [email protected]]

Sent:

Thursday, October 16, 2003 2:39 PM

To:

'[email protected]'

Cc:

'Janice Kephart-Roberts'

Subject: DHS interview Request - Chris Sales Steve, attached is the interview request letter for Chris Sales, former INS Deputy Commissioner. The interview has been set up for October 21. POC - Janice Kephart-Roberts - thanks. Joanne M. Accolla Staff Assistant National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

202.401.1774 [email protected]

10/16/2003