T3 B7 Comments On Draft Final Report Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Notes- 3 Withdrawal Notices- 1 Photo Altered As Joke (for Reference- Fair Use) 112

The Book

Page 1 of 2

Mike Hurley From:

Stephanie Kaplan

Sent:

Friday, July 09, 2004 6:37 PM

To:

Team Leaders

Subject: FW: The Book

STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN

9-11 COMMISSION 1(202)331-1125 F (202) 296-5545 www.9-11commission.gov

—Original Message— From: Slade Gorton Sent: Friday, July 09, 2004 6:21 PM To: Front Office Subject: The Book

Chapter 1, page 57, note 91: ??? Page 57, note 94: perhaps it is in this note that we should recognize the 1974 attempted suicide hijacking I mentioned (I think to Chris) about which I was asked on a local NPR interview last week; also note that there are several redundant "94"s in the body of note 94. Page 62, note 141: the first sentence of the note is identical to a sentence in the text on page 25 one sentence before note 141. Page 63, note 147: no content. Page 33, second paragraph: "As a consequence": I don't believe that the inadequate notices to NORAD were a consequence of improvisation, in fact, they might have been worse if protocol had prevailed. A better leadin would be " In the event".

Chapter 2, pages 1-8, require significant changes if Chapter 11 is modified to include the materials I read on Wednesday. At the least, the dismissive adjectives I criticized must go and you should consider the general tone of these pages. Page 3, line 15: 1924, not 1922. Page 10, line 16: "Sudan in". Page 14, line 27: "Afghanistan" Page 16, line 24: should the term be Islamic or Islamist? Page 16, Last paragraph, line 3: strike "the", insert "its". Chapter 3, page 4, line 12: strike "ceded", insert" granted". Page 21, second full paragraph, first sentence: name the three cultures (again?). Page 34, first paragraph under 3.7: the founders created a strong executive, notoriously absent under the Articles of Confederation but, of course, limited those powers. Page 35, third paragraph, last line: strike "where1, insert "in which". Next to last line: strike "all", insert "many".

7/9/2004

The Book

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Page 36, second paragraph, line 5: "for"; spell out SSCI. Fourth paragraph, last line: strike "the", add an s. Page 37, first full paragraph, line 4: strike "had", insert "undertook". Page 38. Add a description of the systematic but totally secret oversight performed by Senator Stevens and Inouye as per my report to Chris yesterday.

More later. Slade

7/9/2004

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003

FOLDER: 0004

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 1

DOC ID: 31205832

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Comments on Draft Final Report DOCUMENT DATE: 07/08/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Note/Notes

FROM: JSG

TO: SUBJECT:

JSG Chapter-By-Chapter Review

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003

FOLDER: 0004

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 2

DOC ID: 31205833

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_ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Comments on Draft Final Report DOCUMENT DATE: 07/01/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Chapter Six - Subject to Classification Review

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 11/18/2008

BOX: 00003

FOLDER: 0004

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 3

DOC ID: 31205834

8

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Comments on Draft Final Report DOCUMENT DATE:

DOCUMENT TYPE: Draft

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Factual Errors and Mischaracterizations in the Draft Report

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Subject:

Dan Marcus Monday, July 12, 2004 9:01 AM Team Leaders; Barbara Grewe FW: NAMES OF CIA EMPLOYEES

Original Message From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Monday, July 12, 2004 7:46 AM To: Dan Marcus; Stephanie Kaplan; Steve Dunne; Chris Kojm; Philip Zelikow Cc: [email protected] Subject: NAMES OF CIA EMPLOYEES CIA feels strongly that for all undercover employees instead of first name and last initial the cite should be to an alias. They are happy to have you choose whatever alias you want. Thanks.

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To:

Dan Marcus Wednesday, July 07, 2004 12:14 PM Team 3; Team 6

Subject:

FW: SELECTED SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON CHAPTERS 6, 8 AND 10

Original Message From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2004 8:00 AM To: Philip Zelikow; Chris Kojm; Steve Dunne; Stephanie Kaplan; Dan Marcus Cc: [email protected] Subject: SELECTED SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS ON CHAPTERS 6, 8 AND 10 Justice will have significant additional substantive comments on chapters 6 possibly 10), but here are a few:

and 8 (and

Chapter 6 - page 8-9: we believe describing implementation of the Millennium After Action report as some proposals moved forward and others did not is misleading. We believe very little progress was made implementing any of the proposals and the overhwelming majority were not even begun let alone implemented before September 11. Moreover, there were far more significant proposals than a centralized translation unit that were not implemented including disrupting the al Qaeda network and terrorist presence here using immigration violations, minor criminal infractions and tougher visa and border controls; precisely the kinds of steps taken after September 11. The discussion minimizes the fact that significant proposals in this document were not acted upon. endnote 196 refers to possibility of a CTC briefing of the Attorney General on March 9, 2001. We do not know the basis for this suggestion, but the Attorney General's calendar shows no such briefing (and we have not seen any other evidence that such a briefing occurred). The sentence should be deleted. S\ Chapter 8 - page 2, fifth paragraph: as is noted for the July 5 briefing (page 5), it should note that the May 15 briefing of the Attorney General by the CIA "only addressed threats outside the United States" /\sR /K-v6(v~<x/ Chapter 10 - Page 3: third paragraph, sentence beginning "New regulations" - in fact no new regulations were needed for that purpose. The ability to detain illegal aliens until cleared by the FBI existed under existing regulations. A i /• T 'AiM

Thanks

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27: 3d foil par ... also present. By the accounts of both, President Bush asked searching questions of DCI Tenet and often prodded him to analyze the action implications of intelligence.(175) Last par ... previous administration. In response to her request that all... 28: par 3 Omit "One of... first budget." Par 4 Like Berger, her predecessor, Rice saw reasons for not moving precipitately to aid the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. She recognized that Masoud could be a useful ally against the Taliban but recognized also his liabilities—a reputation for brutality and inefficiency, support primarily from one ethnic minority, and involvement in narcotics trade. Rice noted at the time ... Afghanistan.(190) [par on fly-swatting to be moved: see below. Continue as follows] Like Berger, Rice could also see strong reasons for not insisting too hard that Pakistan press the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin. President Musharraf had a tenous hold on power in Islamabad. If he were toppled, the successor regime might be a Pakistani version of the Taliban, armed with nuclear weapons. The precarious truce between Pakistan and India could collapse. The review of the Cole incident had made apparent the scarcity of readily available military options for action against Bin Ladin and al Qaeda. General Shelton and the Joint Chiefs had been forced by Clinton and Berger to come up with a possible menu of options other than cruise missile strikes. Though some staff work had been done on inand-out helicopter or special forces operations and an air campaign against the Taliban, Shelton had always stressed the costs and risks of any use of military force for counterterrorism, and he does not seem to have volunteered to the new administration information about any option other than that of firing expensive cruise missiles against inexpensive training camp tents. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told us that, in his review of existing military plans, he saw nothing that seemed appropriate for countering an asymmetric threat like that from al Qaeda. Having been a member of the BremerSonnenberg Commission on Terrorism, created by Congress in 1998, he had a more upto-date understanding of the problem than did most others in the new administration, but he was preoccupied, for the time being, he told us, with simply trying to start broad transformation of a military establishment that, in his view, was still designed to fight the Cold War.

In these circumstances, Rice and Hadley concluded that a wide-angle review of U.S. interests and policies in South Asia ought to precede any decisions on the specific action proposals advanced by Clarke. President Bush was impatient with this procedure. Rice and others recalled the President saying ... mesh with one another. (193 renumbered) Hadley convened an ... confirmed. The group reviewed possibilities on the table, including Clarke's proposal for renewing Predator missions over Afghanistan even before the Predator was armed with a missile of its own. Though no decisions were made on any specific item, Hadley apparently concluded that.... (n. 194 becomes 193) P. 29, last par "Except for a few ... organizations.'" OMIT

P. 30, first full par, last sentence ... task force was just getting organized when .... 3d full par: Encouraged by DCI Tenet to consider what might be done if there were no budgetary constraints, the CTC had in December 2000 converted "The Plan" of 1999 into a "Blue Sky Memo." In discussing the draft authorities .... Next par, last sentence: ... quickly enough. (205, now something else) Rice directed Clarke and Black to develop a range .... Last full par (In May ... told us.) OMIT here; point to come later. P. 31 First full par. ... Armitage told us. "For the government," Hadley said .... 3d full par. ... Khalilzad, opposed giving aid ... had been suggested.(216, renumbered) [Omit sentence about Clarke)

P. 32 2d par under Pakistan ... to review U.S. objectives. As during the Clinton administration, Clarke pressed for ignoring the wider framework in South Asia and proceeding to demand that Pakistan move vigorously against terrorism—to push the Pakistanis to do before an al Qaeda attack what Washington might demand that they do after. (224, renumbered) He had not succeeded in getting President Clinton and Berger to disregard the danger of destabilizing the regime in Pakistan, and he had no more success with Rice and Hadley. On August 4, President Bush did write President Musharraf ... P. 36, 1st full par ... of dispute. Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afghanistan as soon as weather permitted, hoping that the Predator's cameras might locate Bin Ladin surely enough to permit a cruise missile attack. Back in the autumn of 200, the Afghans had spotted a Predator and scrambled their antiquated MiGs. The particular Predator escaped, but, since its ground speed was only 70 miles per hour, it was hard to count on having such luck again. Berger had expressed doubt about the wisdom of any further reconnaissance flights, (repeat note 124) When Clarke revived the issue after the transition to the new administration, the CIA and the Pentagon both opposed him. The CTC chief, Black, argued ... shared this conern.(247, renumbered) Rice and Hadley ... was ready.(248, renumbered, with insertion of "After the deputies ... been made." from the preceding par. P. 38, 1st par The Principals Committee had its first meeting on al Qaeda on September 4. The committee had had 33 earlier meetings on other subjects, most of which had not involved trying to assess trade offs among major threats—in this case, Islamist terrorism on the one hand and a nuclear-armed Islamist state on the other. On the day of the meeting, Clarke sent Rice a note. He had already notified her that he wanted to change portfolios and concentrate on cybersecurity. He told us that he was frustrated with an administration that he considered "not serious about al Qaeda," but Rice said that he had never indicated to her frustration except with the bureaucracies which they were both trying to push into line.(former note 210) Clarke's note of September 4 supports what Rice said, for it is almost entirely a jeremiad directed against the principals and their departments, particularly Defense and the CIA. It assailed them for what they had not done during the Clinton administration as well as

since the transition, and it offered neither explicit nor implicit criticism of either President Bush or his staff. The "real question," Clarke wrote ... in order.[.]"(258 renumbered) Rice told us that she read Clarke's memo as an attack on bureaucratic inertia. We think it should also be read as an angry admission of failure. After nine years ... could support. Ironically, moreover, Clarke delivered this note—and prepared to step away from counterterrorism—at just the moment when the top level of the government was ready at last to do the things that he had argued for doing almost since being named counterterrorism coordinator in the spring of 1998. Meanwhile, another ...

P. 39, last par ... by the principals. Except for risking Predators in reconnaissance missions, the directive called for carrying out the recommendations that Clarke had developed late in the Clinton administration and presented to Rice five days after the transition. While exercising care not to put President Musharraf in an untenable position, the State Department was to lean hard on him to use his influence with the Taliban. The CIA was to embark on an ambitious program of covert action, extending aid not only to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks but to other groups in Afghanistan, including, if possible, dissident elements within the Taliban. The directive was to have a military annex, not yet drafted, but almost certainly to include options such as those that had been developed for President Clinton then quietly shelved after the transition, among them, probably, a retaliatory air campaign against the Taliban in the event of a new attack traceable to Bin Ladin. Like the program in Clarke's various memoranda, this was still more a menu of action than a strategy committing the resources necessary to achieve the goal of eliminating the threat from al Qaeda, and it envisioned a campaign of approximately three years. But, if adopted, it would have represented the strongest programmatic commitment thus far to that goal, and a requirement that the National Security Adviser periodically give the President a formal update on progress suggested that the commitment might become stronger with time. On September 9 ....

Chanter 1 Page 45, last paragraph: Add: It appears that at the time of our report, nearly three years after the September 11 attacks, NORAD and the FAA have still not fully remedied these serious deficiencies. On June 9, 2004, in response to an unidentified plane flying near the U.S. Capitol with a broken transponder, the Capitol Building was evacuated and NORAD was reportedly prepared to order the shootdown of the plane. Fortunately, this turned out to be a false alarm. The plane was carrying the Governor of Kentucky to President Reagan's funeral. The FAA was aware at the time of the malfunctioning transponder and the nature of the flight, but had failed to communicate this information to NORAD. hi addition, in late May 2004 the FAA detected an unidentified aircraft approaching New York City. The FAA and NORAD were in communication about the situation, but there was confusion about how to respond and even as to each agency's respective authorities. [See June 9, 2004 Public Hearing Testimony.] Chapter 3 Page 10, paragraph 3: Move first two sentences of fh. 44 to text after "The wall". Chapter 6 Page 40. The way the report is now organized, the administration's CT policy initiatives are completely divorced from the U.S. government's responses in the summer of threat. We should add several sentences at the very end of Chapter 6 tying these two chapters together: As discussed at greater length in Chapter 8, during the time period that the administration was working to develop this counterterrorism strategy, Intelligence Community officials grew increasingly concerned about the possibility of an imminent, large-scale attack by al Qaeda against U.S. interests. At the same time, al Qaeda operatives made their final preparations for the September 11 attacks, and the news of upcoming attacks spread through the camps in Afghanistan. The policy making efforts failed to keep pace with developments in the real world, even though key aspects of those developments, described in detail in Chapter 8, were widely known by responsible officials within the U.S. Intelligence Community.

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Chapter 8 Page 7: Paragraph 2: We had decided to reflect both the CIA e-mail and Tenet letter in accurately describing the genesis of the PDB in the second sentence. It is inaccurate to say that the PDB was the "result" of the President's occasional questions. Paragraph 3: After "President told us" substitute "he had learned of for "there was only" After "it was heartening that 70 investigations were underway" add: In her testimony before the Commission on April 8, 2004, however, Dr. Rice stated that "[t]here was nothing reassuring" in the PDB and "there were some frightening things" in the PDB. It does not appear that any action was taken by either the President or Dr. Rice to obtain additional information regarding domestic intelligence between August 7 and September 11. Page 7 (right before the PDB text box) We should add a few sentences after the discussion of the PDB. We should point out that in the several weeks after the PDB was delivered, the Intelligence Community developed significant additional information indicating the possibility of an attack within the U.S. This included: the detention of Moussaoui, the presence of Hazmi and Mihdhar in the U.S, and the foreign service reporting in the last paragraph on page 7. We can then note that none of this information was relayed to President Bush prior to 9/11. Regarding the SEIB, we should change the tone of this paragraph. Even without some of those specifics, the document should still have raised a level of consciousness about the possibility of the predicted attack occurring in the U.S., given the topic. We should also add that the CIA's Deputy Director asserted in testimony before the Commission that the FBI information in the PDB was omitted from the SEIB for several reasons. These included the fact that the SEIB was a new product for which they were still establishing ground rules, concern about protecting ongoing investigations, and that the CIA had only received the FBI information orally and not in writing. [See McLaughlin April 14 Public Hearing testimony.] Page 7: Insert after 5th paragraph: Director Tenet met with President Bush on August 18, 2001 in Crawford, Texas. He could not recall any discussion of a domestic threat at that meeting. DCI Tenet met with President Bush on additional occasions between August 18 and September 11. He

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did not recall the substance of any of those meetings, or whether the subject of a domestic threat was raised. Fn* DCI Tenet told us on July 2, 2004, that he had not had time to review his records to refresh his recollection regarding these meetings despite the fact that on the Commission had asked him to do so and had repeated that request thereafter. Page 17: I think that this paragraph understates the importance of the Phoenix EC. Although it's probably accurate that a nationwide canvass of flight schools would not have turned up the hijackers at that stage, this is not the entire story. As the Joint Inquiry found, one of the individuals named in the EC was an associate of Hani Hanjour. A calculation of whether the Phoenix EC could have resulted in the disruption of the plot should not ignore this fact. Moreover, such a canvassing may have created a greater awareness and sensitivity within the FAA and the FBI itself to the threat of attack using civil or commercial aviation. Page 22, footnote #3: The Commission's access to PDBs was limited by restrictions imposed by the White House. Not all PDBs were made available to the Commission. The Commission was only permitted to review those PDBs that the White House had preselected and determined, without input or oversight by the Commission, were relevant to the Commission's work. Over the Commission's objections, only four representatives from the Commission and its staff were permitted to review those select PDBs. Finally, the Commission representatives were not able to take verbatim notes on the contents of the PDBs and review those notes with colleagues on the Commission. The titles of the PDBs were not to be disclosed, and only a summary of the PDBs' contents, which had been reviewed and approved by the White House, was shared with the full Commission. Footnote #39 Our discussion of the Yemeni "tourist" matter is too dismissive. The bottom line is still that the two (who were not "tourists") took photographs of federal buildings in New York City, because their friend in Indiana supposedly wanted to see what New York City looked like. The portion of the footnote relating to the 70 full field investigations is misleading in terms of its relevance to the 9/11 story. The way it's written now, it makes it appear that the investigations on the individuals in contact with the hijackers are less significant because they weren't included in the 70. We should add the following clarifying language: The Congressional Joint Inquiry found, and we have confirmed, that the hijackers were in contact with a number of individuals in the U.S. who were or had been the subjects of

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FBI counterterrorism investigations. The hijackers' contacts with these individuals did not bring them to the attention of the FBI, however. We should also note that the author of the PDB was prescient in identifying the threat of a terrorist hijacking by al Qaeda inside the United States.

Footnote #73: Strike "the Wall"

Footnote #85: Strike "whatever he merits or demerits it" and "They" Chapter 10 Page 10: Regarding Laurie Mylroie, we should say either in the text of in footnote #83 that we have found no credible evidence to support her theory. Page 11, footnote #1: The following new language, shown in bold, should be added to this footnote: Notes from the morning indicate that Vice President Cheney informed President Bush that an anonymous threat had been phoned into the White House which was being viewed as credible. The Secret Service's Intelligence Division tracked down the origin of this supposed threat... During the afternoon of September 11 the leadership of the Secret Service was satisfied that the reported threat to "Angel" was unfounded—there had been no anonymous threat received by the White House. Indeed, Fleischer had conferred with Vice President Cheney and Karen Hughes before the briefing, and they had decided to let people know about the threat, all of them

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believing it was true. This version of events was repeated by others high level White House officials, such as Condoleezza Rice and Karl Rove in the days and weeks following September 11. Delete the sentence "We have not found any evidence that contradicts his account." If it were in dispute we would say so - as we do throughout this Report.

Chapter 13 Page 16 on the future role of the FBI: As written, this presents the current state of the FBI's reform efforts as farther along than I understand our staff found those efforts to be. We should add more detail on what we found during our investigation about the status of the FBI's reform efforts. The section also does not make clear that it will take the FBI years to fully implement these reforms; we make it sound like they are well on their way to success. Page 16, last paragraph: New insert: The concern with the FBI is that it has been primarily a law enforcement agency, imbued with the culture of law enforcement, and that this culture is different from and in some ways incompatible with intelligence collection. Another concern is whether domestic intelligence collection can ever truly be a top priority in a large agency with other vital responsibilities that necessarily will compete for managerial attention and resources. These are reasonable concerns. The FBI has taken steps to address these concerns and to ensure that counterterrorism intelligence collection is now the agency's top priority. It remains to be seen whether these efforts will succeed; reforming a large bureaucracy takes enormous effort and considerable time, and past efforts to reform the FBI's intelligence operations, prior to the 9/11 attacks when priorities were different, were not successful. The FBI - through Director Mueller personally - has assured the Commission that the reforms currently underway at the agency will address these concerns. P. 20. Insert new paragraph on FISA: The Patriot Act has been the subject of great controversy and public attention. The President and the Attorney General have urged Congress and the public to support making permanent those provisions of the Act that "sunset" in 2005 if Congress does not act. Throughout our investigation both senior government officials and field investigators consistently stated that the most important provisions of the Patriot Act are those that remove the so-called "wall" between criminal investigations and intelligence investigations. Those provisions are consistent with the decision of the FISA Court of Review in 2002 that permitted greater sharing of information between criminal and

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intelligence investigators. Those provisions have been credited as a significant enhancement of the government's power to prevent terrorist attacks. Public perception of the Patriot Act is mixed. Much of the public unease about the act appears to arise out of Executive Branch actions since the 9/11 attacks, many of which were under assertions of authority from sources other than the Patriot Act. These actions include the detention of hundreds of Middle Eastern men for months after the 9/11 attacks without charges (under immigration authorities); the use of the material witness statute to hold people without charges; the indefinite and incommunicado detention of two U.S. citizens as "enemy combatants" in military brigs without criminal charges; the blanket closing of deportation hearings; and the grant of authority to FBI agents to enter churches and mosques and to attend political rallies. The Supreme Court's recent decisions rejecting Executive Branch claims of authority with respect to unlawful enemy combatants, both foreign and U.S. citizens, demonstrate that this public unease over broad assertions of Executive Branch power is consistent with important Constitutional principles regarding civil liberties and separation of powers. Certain provisions of the Patriot Act have engendered substantial criticism. The importance to the Government's counterterrorism capabilities should be weighed carefully against their impact on civil liberties. These include the "Roving Wiretaps" provision (Section 206) that does not require the government to confirm that the target is actually using the particular communications device that will be monitored; the "Sneak and Peak" search warrant provision (Section 213) that, as presently written, applies to any federal crime and not just to terrorism-related activities; and, perhaps most important, the very controversial "library records" provision (Section 215) that allows a secret FISA court order to obtain a broad range of business and personal records if the FBI (with no effective judicial review or oversight) deems those records "relevant" to a counterterrorism investigation. New Language on Civil Liberties - Insert at p. 21: At our first public hearing on March 31,2003, we noted that among the greatest challenges we face is the need for balance as our government responds to the real and ongoing threat of terrorist attacks. While our focus on protection of our homeland is paramount, we must be ever mindful of the collateral consequences of measures that may threaten our vital personal and civil liberties. There is no question we must factor into the equation of proper balance the capacity of our adversaries to exploit the protections afforded by our Constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and due process of law to advance their nefarious objectives. This balancing will be no easy task—but it is imperative that we get it right. The importance of our Government recognizing the particular need to maintain our personal freedoms and civil liberties in times of unprecedented threats to the security of our civilian population is well recognized. [Footnote: In 1995, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor warned: "It can never be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis." Veronica School District v. Acton

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(1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In 1989, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned: "History teaches us that grave threats to liberty often comes in times of urgency when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocation-camp cases and the Red scare and McCarthy-era internal subversion cases are only the most extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it." (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass 'n (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).] The recent United States Supreme Court decisions imposing limitations on assertions of Executive Branch authority over unlawful enemy combatants illustrate the importance of meaningful checks and balances on exercises of governmental power. That guiding principle should inform the implementation of our recommendations, congressional consideration of the sunset provisions of the Patriot Act, and future grants of governmental authority to combat terrorism. Insert on Oversight and Judicial Review - Insert at p. 21: It is unavoidable that legitimate government efforts to combat terrorism will raise concerns about civil liberties. Some civil liberties advocates have expressed those concerns in harsh terms, criticizing the government actions since 9/11 on a number of fronts. Those criticisms are a legitimate element in our national debate on the appropriate response to the ongoing threat of terrorist attacks, but when prominent government officials question the motives of those concerned about civil liberties, as was done shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the public's trust in government suffers. It is not enough for the government to say "trust us" - indeed, that admonition is anathema to our American tradition. There is, however, a sensible middle ground that allows for the authority government legitimately needs as well as the safeguards that Americans deserve and demand. The middle ground is transparent government authority that is subject to the checks and balances of meaningful review by the courts and congress. Such reporting and oversight can serve as a powerful and effective guard against abuse of government power. Moreover, adding judicial or congressional scrutiny to the deliberate use of investigative authorities should not have a detrimental effect on the government's ability to prevent terrorism. As Congress and the Executive Branch grapple with how best to maximize security and liberty, policymakers should recognize that balancing authority with oversight and transparency helps ensure public support and cooperation in the war against terrorism. Page 17, second bullet: We should consider recommending a new office in the Justice Department with responsibility for ensuring compliance with privacy and civil liberties requirements. Such an office would be responsible for, among other things: 1) receiving and investigating complaints on matters relating to privacy and civil liberties; 2) referring to the Attorney General evidence of violations of in the course of the counterterrorism activities of the FBI; and 3) ensuring compliance with the Privacy Act and other applicable privacy laws and regulations. Such an office would serve as an important

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counterbalance to offset the new legal authorities that the FBI now has at its disposal under the Patriot Act and other post-9/11 enhancements to its authority. Page 18, for insertion after paragraph containing "these are major challenges." [The following proposed language is based largely on Staff Statement #12] These efforts are still underway, but during our investigation we found a significant gap between the announced reforms at FBI headquarters and the reality in the field. Despite the clear message that counter-terrorism is now the FBI's top priority, the FBI's field office structure still appears to be the driving management force within the agency. For example, the Field Intelligence Groups are structured differently at each field office, and FBI personnel continue to be diverted from counterterrorism to work major criminal investigations. Moreover, some field agents we spoke with resisted the centralization of counterterrorism investigations at FBI headquarters, asserting that these cases should be directed by the field offices. We also question whether the qualifications, status, and role of most intelligence analysts in the field have changed in response to acknowledged past deficiencies in these areas, and there appears to be no process for evaluating and reassigning unqualified analysts. Finally, information sharing within the FBI still appears dependent largely on personal relationships. While the FBI has made progress, we are aware that prior similar efforts at reforming the FBI's intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities, as well as all-important efforts to upgrade the FBI's woefully inadequate information technology systems, have failed to effect the necessary institutional and cultural change organization-wide.

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Roemer Edits to 9/11 Commission Report Chapter 1: p.l, first para: Add: "Others went to Arlington, Virginia to the Pentagon." "Across the Potomac River, in our nation's capital, the United States Congress was back in session." "A few blocks away at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, people would begin to line up for a White House tour." "A light breeze brushed through the fields outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania." p. 46, last para: Cut word "primitive" and replace with: one of the poorest and most remote countries. Chapter 4: p. 10, para 6: Which officials told us that August 1998 reaction was something they thought about when considering future military responses? We should list them in footnotes, if we still have them! p. 12, para 3: Cut first sentence on abbreviating decision-making process. This is interpretive, not factual. p. 13, para 1: Need to cut "actually more a set of goals" sentence; could also cut previous sentence, "Clarke called Delenda a plan..." This thing is labeled a plan at top of page. We look silly and small getting into semantics like this. Delenda is not a "set of goals." We list its goal a few sentences earlier. This is a bad way to get into the Rice against Clarke debate. Feel very strongly about this. Chapter 6: p.25, somewhere: We need to at least have a line about President Bush's public statements on terrorism before 9/11. We look partisan if we do this for Clinton but not for Bush. It's fine to add, as Rice did, that he would have given a big speech once the NSPD was done. We comment extensively on President Clinton's speeches and content. p.25, last para: Was Rice's decision to hold over Clarke, period, or hold him over just for now? We're saying he was permanently. Is that right? If not, change this. p.26, last para: First sentence is talking about agenda Clarke was pushing "at the end of the previous administration. Current sentence implies Clinton did nothing on Clarke's agenda. Clarke is pushing on the Cole, Northern Alliance, Uzbecks, Predator. These are all issues from late 2000.

p.30, para 6: we've lost an important line from Staff Statement 8. We should add it: Clarke and his staff regarded the new approach as essentially similar to the proposal they had developed in December 2000 and had put forward to the new administration in January 2001." Not fair to cite Hadley and Rice talking about how great the new strategy is and not have a line from the other side. p. 36, para 2: last line makes it sound like Clarke only wanted to kill Osama with Predator once it could be armed. But he wanted to kill bin Laden with Predator from the beginning, just with cruise missiles, not missiles from Predator itself. Fix last sentence of the para. p. 38, para 3: After first sentence- tagged on. Leaving it a "hollow shell" that the president would be better off not signing. This is included in both the Public Affairs book and the staff statement (in staff statement in hearing.) p. 38, para 3: After second sentence insert: "Clarke also accused senior CIA officials of trying to block the Predator Program." (This was included in the staff statement) p.38, para 4: Insert last sentence: "Fixing these entrenched problems would in fact require the highest level of leadership and action." p.40, last para: Makes it sound like we were way too close. Proxies still no good. The best commander in Afghanistan had just been killed. The Taliban were awful. Pakistanis still not helping enough. This is too rosy. Change to: After "remained unclear" add "Massoud, the best commander and best hope for internal military opposition, was dead." Also add "But the pieces were coming together for an integrated policy document dealing with al Qaeda, the Taliban and Pakistan." Chapter 7: Follow-up Comments on Ch. 7 As I stated last week the staff did a good job incorporating most of my earlier comments. I think the chapter now much better reflects the challenges faced by domestic intelligence in the future. In view of the significance of our assessment of the FBI's ability to fulfill that function, this part of the 9/11 story is especially relevant. Also, since we are working with the background of the Joint Inquiry report, I think it is particularly important for us not to lose the detail in this part of the narrative. While a lot of the detail is kept in the footnotes, as I commented earlier e-mail today, it is essential that it be included. I have a few additional comments I would like to see incorporated:

There was a press article (UPI?) a while back reporting that KSM had denied knowing Bayoumi. Is this true? If so, we should include this in a footnote somewhere.

Footnote 14 The Benomrane story is interesting. I think the staff has done great work in trying to run down the identity of the two Saudis he assisted. It seems to me, however, that the most significant part of this footnote is his ambiguous identification of Hazmi and Mihdhar even if it is unlikely that the two Saudis were them, there remains the possibility that he assisted the two hijackers in view of his connection to Thumairy and willingness to help him with visitors. Did we interview the agent responsible for Benomrane? If so, what did he think about the ID (since we did not talk to Benomrane ourselves, we should say what the only person who interviewed him thinks)? Is there any other info connecting Benomrane to the two hijackers or their associates? I think when I was briefed by Dieter and his team a few weeks ago, I was told that Benomrane had relevant ties in San Diego. If we are worried about space, I'm not sure we need to spell out in such detail the process of our investigation, but simply the conclusion - namely, that we have not found info to substantiate the hypothesis that the two Saudis were the hijackers (in other words, I think we could cut the last couple of sentences as the footnote stands now). Footnote 15 Have we (or the FBI) identified the Saudi consular employee with whom Bayoumi met? If so, has that employee been interviewed by us (or the FBI)? If not, we should say that this consular employee remains unidentified (despite the efforts of the Commission staff) - it seems to me that if this were a totally innocent encounter, either the Saudi consulate should tell us who it was or this person should have come forward by now. Page 3. 5th para Bayoumi didn't come forward voluntarily to the authorities, did he? If not, remove the statement in the last sentence that he "volunteered" the information about the meeting. Page 3. 6th para Delete the last sentence. It is evident from the rest of the text that both we and the FBI have investigated and interviewed Bayoumi and is reflected in the footnotes. Page 4. 1st para I am still uncomfortable with the language that we use to conclude about Bayoumi. I suggested language in my earlier comments, and I would like to see something closer to that language. Specifically, I think it is most important that we explicitly acknowledge that open questions remain about his role. If I recall correctly, during the Joint Inquiry there was even a split within the FBI about Bayoumi. While agents at Headquarters thought that Bayoumi was completely innocent, agents in San Diego were far more skeptical. There is also one important fact about Bayoumi which is left out here. In the declassified Joint Inquiry report, we mentioned that Bayoumi told someone that he was going up to Los Angeles to pick up visitors. This obviously is an important fact to

consider in determining whether the initial meeting between Bayoumi and the hijackers were accidental or by design. Page 4. 4th para The sentence about the stories being inconsistent (these stories attributed...") is unnecessary - the point is obvious from the text. Delete. To clarify, just start the next paragraph with "Another inmate, however ..." Page 4. 6th para Delete the last part of the second sentence ("despite ...") - it is unnecessary (maybe put it in a footnote) and does not seem very convincing since we state two paragraphs earlier that Abdullah did not say when he drove the hijackers from LA to San Diego. Page?. 1st para The fist part of the last sentence is too cryptic, and the second part is repetitive. What do we mean when we say that we have not "obtained adequate insights" into the relationship between Aulaqi and the hijackers? As for our efforts to interview him, that is sufficiently covered in another footnote (footnote 36?) Delete the sentence, incorporate the first sentence into the earlier paragraph.

Chapter 8: p. 3 Add: "However, Tenet only briefed President Bush twice in August, once on August 17th in Texas and on August 31st in Washington, DC. The Commission attempted to learn more about the nature of the August 17th meeting between the President and Director Tenet from both the CIA and White House sources. We were unable to gather any more additional information to this important question. Chapter 10: p. 9, para 3: What's the exact wording of the memo? I thought it was tougher than "not a compelling case." Chapter 11: p.9, last para: Bush review was another chance to mobilize for major action, too.

Chapter 12: Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction

The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the world's most dangerous weapons. As early as 1994 in Sudan, al Qaeda sought to acquire materials to make a nuclear weapon, though they ended up purchasing faulty material. Again in July of 1998, NSC counterterrorism staff were talking worriedly about Bin Ladin associates' description of their leader as intent on carrying out a "Hiroshima." Moreover, it is impossible to make the case that the history-making bloodshed and impact of 9/11 has satisfied al Qaeda's thirst for spectacular attacks. Indeed, if terrorist groups as RAND's Bruce Hoffman puts it are like sharks that need to constantly swim forward to stay alive, al Qaeda is likely to strike again. In congressional testimony on February 24, 2004, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet underscored the threat by noting that Usama Bin Ladin had decreed the acquisition of WMD to be a "religious obligation" and warning that al Qaeda "continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining nuclear capability." Bin Ladin's spokesman, Sulayman Abu Ghaith, brags that al Qaeda wants to kill 4 million American, including 1 million children." Nor can we safely assume that the threat of nuclear terrorism is necessarily limited to al Qaeda; Tenet testified that "more than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing CBRN materials." The problem is not limited to Russia, Pakistan and North Korea; policymakers must also focus on other states supplied by the Soviet Union and the United States with reactors large enough to produce the highly enriched uranium needed for a bomb, including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ghana. Another key concern is the fact that a nuclear bomb might be built with a relatively small amount of nuclear materials. According to a special Department of Energy Task Force on Russia chaired by Lloyd Cutler and Senator Howard Baker, a 15-kiloton nuclear bomb-strong enough to kill 250,000 people if detonated in lower Manhattan-could be built with just 20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 4 kilograms of plutonium. U.S. efforts must keep pace with the enormity of the threat. Both resources and coordination are needed. Therefore, material and coalition strategies targeted against radical Islamist terrorist must be combined with national and coalition strategies to present and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. What we can do is to recommend that an effective counter proliferation strategy is a vital and urgent part of all governments' efforts to prevent a catastrophic terrorist attack. We recommend several initiatives in this area: Strengthen Counter Proliferation efforts- Efforts to shut down Libya's illegal nuclear program have been generally successful. Pakistan's illicit trade and Pakistani scientist, A.Q. Khan's nuclear smuggling networks have revealed that the spread of nuclear weapons is a problem of global dimensions. Efforts to deal with Iran's nuclear program are still underway. Therefore, the United States should work with the international

community to develop laws and an international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction and prosecution by any state in the world where they do not disclose their activities. Expand Proliferation Security Initiative- In May of 2003 the Bush Administration announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), nations who formed a willing partnership to combine national capabilities to use military, economic, and diplomatic tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile related technology. The PSI can be more operationally effective by using the existing network of intelligence sharing, interoperable equipment and joint planning structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The U.S. should encourage every NATO state to sign onto the PSI. Moreover, PSI membership should be open to non-NATO countries and Russia and China should be encouraged to participate. U.S. Commitment to Nuclear Security- Outside experts are deeply worried about the government's commitment and organization for securing the weapons and highly dangerous materials still scattered in Russia and other countries of the Soviet Union. The government's programs in this area, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (usually referred to as "Nunn-Lugar" for the senators who sponsored the legislation in 1991) is now in need of expansion, improvement, and resources. While the U.S. government has recently redoubled international commitments to support this program, we recommend tripling current spending on Nunn-Lugar as an expensive but wise investment, especially when compared to the catastrophic cost America would face if such weapons found their way to the terrorists who are extremely anxious to acquire them. Our report shows that al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make weapons of mass destruction for at least ten years. There is no doubt the U.S. would be a prime target. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort. New Recommendation for Commissioners' Consideration Military, intelligence, and law enforcement actions are attempting to address the immediate threat of terrorism. That fight will go on for years. But those measures do not get at the root causes of terrorism. One of these root causes is the intolerance that continues to be taught to young children in schools in the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, and other troubled regions. Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations find such schools and the youths whose minds are being poisoned in them fertile grounds for recruiting new sympathizers. Terrorists are thus being produced at a rate faster than we can attempt to bring them to justice. A longer-term strategy is needed. The United States and its allies must act quickly to change the conditions and circumstances that contribute to breeding new terrorists, and thereby attempt to drain the pool of potential jihadists. Education that teaches tolerance, the dignity and value of each individual, and respect for different beliefs is a key element in any global strategy to eliminate radical Islamist Terrorism.

We recommend: That the U.S. government, with Congress and the executive branch working closely together, should organize an international donor's conference, and pledge a total of $250 million each year for four years—to be matched with similar contributions from the European Union, Japan, Canada, and the Gulf States—for an International Youth Opportunity Fund. Funds will be spent directly for building and operating primary and secondary schools in Muslim states that commit to doubling their investment in public education over the course of the next four years. This program should include funding and training for teachers, the provision of textbooks, as well as funding for generators and classroom computers that can link remote student populations to the broader world.

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A runner was cornered during the running of the bulls in Pamplona, Spain. The San Fermin festival, known for its daily bull runs and all-night parties, was made famous in author Ernest Hemingway's 1926 novel "The Sun Also Rises."

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Chapter 8

p. 2 par 2 The next week, Rice received reports on the ....

Par 4 The interagency . . . (CSG) discussed the ....

p. 3 1st par under High Probability... ... in Genoa. On June 22, the CIA . . . few days. ("U.S. target" was a frequently used term, taken, as a rule, to mean an embassy or military installation or perhaps a hotel or tourist site frequented by Americans.) . . . worldwide public warning.(15)

p. 4 Go from 2d full par to the 5th: . . . continuing. (20) Disruption operations ....

p. 5 Go from the top par to the first full par on p. 6 . . . G-8 sumrnit.(23) In addition to individual . . . Arabian Peninsula,(29) [OMIT here the next par, going to] In mid- July . . . their concerns.(33) [OMIT "The Calm before the Storm"} On July 27 ...

... paid to security planning. (3 5) On August 3 ... planned attacks. (36) During August, the State Department... [from p. 7] or consulate. [I would omit this paragraph, but, if it has to stay, this is where I would put it.] Late in August... provided. Most of the intelligence ... [from top of p. 8] ... other operation. A Threat at Home? Because our report centers on the attacks of 9/11, we have a duty to notice and include here all the signals received during this summer of threat that might have been read as indicating that al Qaeda planned to strike within the United States. We cannot emphasize strongly enough, however, that these signals were scattered among an overwhelming number of much stronger signals pointing to possible attacks abroad. They were not quite needles in a haystack, but the metaphor is not wholly inappropriate. On June 12, the CIA assembled biographical information on several terrorist leaders. Regarding Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, it said that he was recruiting people to travel to the United States to meet persons already present, to conduct terrorist attacks on Bin Ladin's behalf.(repeat from note 15) This, of course, could have been a significant item of intelligence had it been followed up, but it was neither emphasized in this particular report nor mentioned again later. On July 2, the FBI... [from p. 4] ... suspicious activities. During early July, the CSG arranged ... [from pp. 5 and 6] ... screening checkpoints. Acting FBI Director ... [from p. 6] ... any such plots.(30, renumbered) In an August 1 advisory to field offices, FBI headquarters repeated that, while the majority of threat reporting [from p. 6] be discounted.(35, renumbered) During the spring ... [from p. 7] ... of this report. Government Response ...

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Philip Zelikow Friday, July 09, 2004 3:09 PM Front Office Team 3; Barbara Grewe FW: Question

Chapter 6 Chapter 8 jgestions_ERM_070jgestions_ERM_070

In reading some of the draft report as a whole, Ernest had some concerns about chapters 6 and 8. I'm forwarding his message suggesting what might be done. I have not read this material. Philip Original Message From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, July 09, 2004 10:21 AM To: Philip Zelikow Subject: Re: Question I decided that I should go ahead and be specific even if I thought there was only a small chance of the changes making their way through the gamut. So, some proposed changes are attached. Someone will have to key them in.