T3 B5 Congressional Involvement Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Memos- Notes- Withdrawal Notices- Toensing Article (for Reference- Fair Use) 020

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Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Friday, June 25, 2004 9:24 AM

To:

Caroline Barnes

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: RE: HELP w/Congress portion of report

This is sort of a strange passage—and not terribly accurate. I don't know how you'd source—nor whether it's right. The list in the first sentence is seriously off; it omits Kosovo (remember, we fought a war there...), Somalia (another significant U.S. intervention), and Iraq (Desert Storm was fought in the decade before 9/11, after all), to say nothing of democratization in the former Soviet sphere, international financial crises, major trade deals including NAFTA, globalization, and serious Indo-Pakistani tensions that almost reached nuclear war. Moreover, the second sentence is inaccurate. It's fine to say terrorism infrequently took center stage; it's wrong to say it was always raised in the context of the CBRN threat. I'd rather do something empirical. Why not say something about how terrorism was handled in the parties' platforms, or in the 2000 campaign? At a minimum, we should be fixing this passage up a bit. Original Message From: Caroline Barnes Sent: Thursday, June 24, 2004 10:14 PM To: Warren Bass Subject: HELP w/Congress portion of report I think the below is pretty much common knowledge, but any thoughts on sources? Need anything you've got by 10 am tomorrow (Friday) - THX.

In the decade before 9/11 other issues—Haiti, Bosnia, Russia, China, Kosovo, NATO enlargement, the Middle East peace process, missile defense—were the leading issues for Presidential discussion and Congressional and public attention on foreign affairs and national security. Terrorism infrequently took center stage, and when it did, it was in the context of the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat.

6/25/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Caroline Barnes

Sent:

Thursday, June 24, 2004 12:55 PM

To:

Team 5; Team 7; Team 3

Subject:

Help w/sources

Importance: High

Hi, all -1 need you to point me in the right direction (today, if possible b/c this chapter needs to get to commissioners tomorrow) to sources for the following paragraph re: Congress. - I'm hoping there are a couple of MFRs (or testimony before the commission) we could cite. The MFRs mentioned in the footnote appear to support only the last sentence of the paragraph. Thanks!!! "Fifth, on certain issues actions, or inaction, pointed Congress in a direction that was unhelpful in meeting threats as they emerged after 9/11. Committees with oversight responsibility for aviation focused overwhelmingly on airport congestion and economic health of the airlines, not aviation security. [need source from Team 7] Committees with responsibility for INS and the Border Patrol focused on the southwest border, not on terrorists, [need source from Team 5] Committees responsible for South Asia spent the decade of the 1990s imposing sanctions on Pakistan, leaving Presidents with little leverage to alter Pakistan's policies before 9/11. [Team 3?] Committees with responsibility for the Defense Department did not focus on developing military responses to terrorism. [Team 3] All Committees found themselves swamped in the minutiae of the budget process, with little time for consideration of longer-term questions, or what many Members past and present told us was the proper

m

conduct of oversight.

"

[il

Hamilton, p. 112; Nunn, Rockefeller memoranda

6/24/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Monday, June 14, 2004 1:05 PM

To:

Front Office

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: Please Check your classified email for Team 3's contribution to Congress's role on CT policy

To: Front Office Please check your classified email. Team 3 has forwarded to you, attached to a classified email, a memo/compilation of what we've learned about Congress's involvement with CT policy, in particular how Congress responded to the al Qaeda threat. Mike

6/14/2004

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3, 9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002

FOLDER: 0001

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 42

DOC ID: 31207930

6

ACCESS RESTjaCI^)_ The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Congressional Involvement in CT Policy & ... DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Briefing Paper

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Congressional Involvement in CT Policy

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Monday, June 14, 2004 1:47 PM

To:

FrontJDffice; Team 3

Subject: Team 3 Memo on Congressional Involvement with CT Policy

Chris, At the attachment, please find Team 3's contribution to the Final Report section you're drafting on Congress's role in responding to the al Qaeda threat. We drew these points from our interviews of NSC, DoD, and State officials, as well as directly from documents. Mike

6/14/2004

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002

FOLDER: 0001

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 43

DOC ID: 31207931

1

RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Congressional Involvement in CT Policy & ... DOCUMENT DATE: 01/01/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Briefing Paper

FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

NSC Roadmap Items: Congressional Oversight

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

MEMORAMDUM TO:

Mike Hurley

FROM:

Bonnie D. Jenkins

DATE:

June 14, 2004

RE:

References to Congress

Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen told the commission during both his interview and at the hearings, that there was never a moment in his entire four years as SecDef that he saw any indication that the President let his personal problems interfere with his decision-making. Immediately after Operation Desert Fox was launched in Iraq on December 15th and 16th 1998, he received a call from Congressman Newt Gingrich who said the hill was "on fire" and he made reference to "wag the dog." Cohen went to a joint session of the House and Senate that was closed to the press. Shelton and Tenet were there as well. Cohen spoke for three hours and he said there was no political factor involved in the decision to conduct Desert Fox, and that he would put his entire reputation on the line in support of that position. The action was based on a previous threat made to Saddam Hussein that if he did not comply with the inspections of his WMD facilities, the U.S. would conduct strikes.1 Former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre told the Commission during his interview that approximately 90 minutes before the missiles were to be launched on August 20, 1998, he received a call from Secretary Cohen informing him of the imminent strikes. Hamre had one hour to place calls to the Majority and Minority leaders in the House and Senate, and to the Speaker of the House. Hamre relayed the message to Congressional members. He was able to place calls to Senators Lott and Daschle, and Congressman Gingrich. However, Congressman Gephart would not take the call (no reason was given by Hamre).2 The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict led a pro gram of training first responders. This program was developed from the 1996 NunnLugar Amendment, titled the "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction." This was an effort by Senators Nunn during his last 18 months in office to bring the burgeoning WMD domestic threat to the attention to the government, the press, and the people of the United States. It was a tremendous drive. The 120 cities initiative was instrumental in kicking off the U.S. domestic preparedness efforts.3

Commission interview with William S. Cohen, Washington, DC, February 5, 2004. Commission interview with John Hamre, Washington, DC, December 9, 2003. 3 Commission interview with Henry Allen Holmes, Washington DC, November 10, 2003; Commission interview with Tom Kuster, Washington, DC, December 9, 2001. 1

2

After the attack of the USS Cole, General Anthony Zinni (retired) was called by Senator John Warner, who said he wanted Zinni to testify at the Senate Arms Services Committee on the incident, and that Warner had asked both Cohen and Franks to also testify, but they would not. Warner told Zinni the American people needed to hear what he had to say and it had to be done immediately, but that he would be testifying alone and it would be tough. Zinni said, "Fine, I'll do it."4

4

Commission interview with Anthony Zinni, Washington, DC, January 29, 2004.

Commission Sensitive

Congress and Pakistan Policy Congress' negative attitudes towards Islamabad, from the spring of 1998 until 9/11, complicated both the Clinton and Bush administrations' efforts to coerce Pakistan into pressuring the Taliban. Congress, during that time, was more concerned with more immediate issues, such as Pakistani nuclear proliferation, than Bin Ladin's presence in Afghanistan. Congressional sanctions limited the ability of the White House to reward the Pakistanis for cooperation on a number of issues, including pressuring the Taliban. "No administration should ever find itself in a situation where it has no leverage over a country, as was the case with Pakistan [before 9/11]" said one Bush administration official.1 The key pieces of legislation punishing Pakistan for its nuclear arms program were the Symington, Glenn, and Pressler amendments.2 All were in place after the May 1998 Pakistani nuclear tests and severely restricted U.S. aid and assistance to Islamabad. They were so prohibitive that a former congressional staffer told us that during the summer of 1998, "we couldn't even sell them wheat."3 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott complained to us that Congress had essentially "hijacked" the executive branch's ability to formulate Pakistan policy through its sanctions.4 He argued that the Pressler amendment became a weapon not only against the Pakistanis, but against the executive branch.5 There were a number of reasons for congressional concern. First, Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests and Washington's fears about the proliferation of Pakistani nuclear material sharpened Congress' view of the country. According to former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth, Congressmen concerned with nonproliferation issues took a very tough line on the issue.6 Additionally, as Secretary of State Colin Powell told us, the 1999 coup in which General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif s democratically elected government added to the negative image.7 Finally, an active pro-India lobby in the United States pressed Congress to take a critical stance towards New Delhi's arch-rival Pakistan.8 Talbott noted that it was convenient for Congress to favor India vis-a-vis Pakistan because of the former's democratic government and growing economy.9 1 Rocca interview (January 29, 2004). Christina Rocca was a former foreign policy aide to Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) before becoming Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs in the spring of 2001. 2 For more on the sanctions see Robert Hathaway Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests, Arms Control Today (January/February 2000). 3 Rocca interview (January 29, 2004). 4 Talbott interview (January 15,2004). 5 Talbott interview (January 15,2004). 6 Inderfurth interview (February 18, 2004). 7 Powell interview (January 21,2004). 8 Talbott interview (January 15,2004). 9 Talbott interview (January 15,2004).

Commission Sensitive

1

Commission Sensitive

Due to the harshness of the sanctions, Congress decided to grant the White House the ability to request waivers for some of the restrictions in hopes of providing relief for Pakistan policy.10 Inderfurth agreed that the Clinton administration now could have requested a waiver of certain provisions of the sanctions.11 But with nuclear weapons at issue, it would have been an arduous task, Inderfurth said, to approach a pro-India Congress to lift Pakistani sanctions.12 [CK-Let's discuss waiver provisions. There are some inconsistencies and I'm interested in your opinion.-SHA] The Bush State Department faced the same obstacle. Both Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, said that to approach Congress on alleviating sanctions, the Pakistanis would have had to take steps on a number of issues, including pressing the Taliban on Bin Ladin, and that the Pakistanis had not done so before 9/11.13 Congress and the Northern Alliance Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Christina Rocca, then a congressional foreign policy staffer, said that in 2000 and into early 2001, certain members of Congress and their staffers informally debated providing money to the Northern Alliance, but decided fairly quickly not to. The consensus was that the group's leader, Ahmad Shah Masoud, was a horrible person involved in drug trafficking and human rights violations, and he was not capable of governing the country. 14

10 Rocca interview (January 29, 2004). Two pieces of legislation, known and Brownback I and II were passed following the nuclear tests giving the President the authority to waive parts of the Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendments. 1' Inderfurth interview (February 18, 2004). 12 Inderfurth interview (February 18, 2004). 13 Powell Interview (January 21,2004). Armitage interview (January 12, 2004). 14 Rocca interview (January 29,2004).

Commission Sensitive

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Sunday, June 13, 20044:11 PM

To:

Team 3

Subject: Congressional Oversight

Teammies: Just a reminder: On Monday (June 14) we need to meet to pool what we have on how Congress played into the CT policy story. We promised Chris K. that we'd send him our comments by Monday afternoon. Please review your materials (MFRs, documents, etc.) for anything that could shed some light on this. The info we send to Chris should be sourced/footnoted. Thanks, Mike

6/13/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Friday, June 11, 2004 1:55 PM

To:

Team 3

Subject: FW: Congressional Oversight

Teammies: One last word on this. If you have a paragraph or two to write up, i.e., if you have some information (document, MFR, etc.) that sheds some light on this, please do so, and include a footnote or two. We'll pool everything that Team 3 has. That should be of some assistance to Chris. Mike Original Message From: Mike Hurley Sent: Friday, June 11, 2004 1:51 PM To: Team 3 Subject: FW: Congressional Oversight

Teammies: Chris just told me that we could give him what we have on congressional oversight/involvement on our issues by Monday. He asked that we meet the Monday deadline though. He does not want to let it slip any further because he has to start drafting something on this very soon. Let's meet Monday morning, pool what we know, and then send in a page or so. Thanks, Mike Original Message From: Mike Hurley Sent: Friday, June 11, 2004 1:33 PM To: Team 3

6/11/2004

Victoria Toensing

Oversee? More Like Overlook "We want to underthree threats facing the United States," stand what went wrong," and had briefed the intelligence comclaims Sept. 11 commismittees on that threat in detail in closed sion Vice Chairman Lee sessions. Congress did not take the isH. Hamilton. Really? sue to the next step, for example, deThen why, after conductmanding to know whether bin Laden ing numerous open hearcould attack in the United States, and if ings at which its members so, how. subjected the FBI, the "Reform" also jeopardized effective CIA, the State, Justice oversight. In an effort to prevent memand Defense departbers from remaining too long on the ments, and even the fortwo intelligence committees and thus SEPT. 11 COMMISSIONERS HEAR TESTIMONY MAY 19/BY RICHARD DREW-ASSOCIATED PRESS mer mayor of New York becoming tools of the intelligence comand his lieutenants to public interroga- vaults containing crucial information munity, Congress put in place eighttions of what each could have done about intelligence gathering. year term limits. Just when a lawmaker to prevent the attacks, has the commisFunding for the intelligence commu- mastered the tough learning curve resion failed to call a single member of nity was neglected during the 1990s; its quired by intelligence committee work, Congress to answer those questions in budget was cut every year from 1990 to he or she was booted out. But Congress public? 1995, then remained flat. Twenty-five did not limit what it should have: the I know the good and the bad of con- percent of the CIA's personnel were cut, number of other committees that ingressional oversight for the intelligence and foreign stations were closed as Con- telligence oversight members could community-I was chief counsel for the gress spent the "peace dividend" on serve on, so they could have time to Senate Select Committee on Intelli- projects, which unlike classified spend- spend on the varied and intricate issues. gence under Chairman Barry Goldwa- ing, could be publicly touted to constituEven one of the Sept. 11 commister (R-Ariz.). I have also, as a lawyer in ents. As CIA Director George Tenet sion's own members is aware of Conprivate practice, attempted to get the told the Sept. 11 commission, "[W]e gress's failure. Commissioner Timothy intelligence committees to address were not hiring new analysts, emphasiz- Roemer, a former House member, has problems. In general, Congress has per- ing the importance of expertise or giv- admitted that congressional oversight formed poorly. ing analysts the tools they needed." "has almost gone away." He attributed When I was chief counsel, I was privy On Sept. 11,2001, the FBI's comput- this lack to Congress being too busy to the fact that some of the senators er system used 1980s technology. The with the "budget and keeping up with who complained the loudest about exec- National Security Administration, the daily events." Four of the 10 commisutive branch conduct were the ones spying agency that is supposed to be sioners have served in Congress. They who had not come to the briefings or high-tech because its mission is should not use that relationship to bothered to read the materials. There to "listen in" on private communica- shield former colleagues. If the commiswas a docket sheet. We knew who had tions worldwide, could not communi- sion sincerely wants to find out "what entered the secure space to review doc- cate efficiently with its own employees. went wrong," Congress must be a part uments. Times have not changed. The It had 68 separate e-mail systems. of that inquiry. The commission has Post reports that when Congress debat- Where was congressional oversight for proclaimed that it is not a congressional ed the Iraq war, a 92-page assessment of these agencies? body, it should prove the validity of that the "alleged weapons of mass destrucA major problem is that congression- statement. .Bring members of Contion" was "available to any member who al intelligence oversight tends to be pas- gress's oversight bodies before a public showed up" in the vault. "[0]nly a few sive. The committees hear what the hearing and ask what they could have ever did." Forty-six senators forced the agencies tell them. Rarely do they act done to prevent Sept. 11. CIA to declassify a section of a House- aggressively on this volunteered inSenate report regarding Saudi Arabia's formation. According to The Post, each The writer, a founding partner of possible ties to the events of Sept. 11, year since he became director of central diGenova & Toensing, is a senior but most did not read it. The klieg lights intelligence in 1997, Tenet had listed felloivfor the Foundation for Defense of TV cameras feel cozier than the dark Osama bin Laden as one of the "top of Democracies.

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Mike Hurley From:

Chris Kojm

Sent:

Thursday, June 10, 2004 6:49 PM

To:

Team Leaders

Cc:

Front Office; Kevin Scheid; Gordon Lederman

Subject: Congressional Oversight

Team Leaders I look forward to your short pieces on Congressional oversight within your area of responsibility. I welcome your contributions on Congressional activity in the pre-1998 period, after the 1998 Embassy bombings, in the Millenium/Cole bombing period, and then the 2001 Summer of Threat. This can be a couple of pages, or even a few paragraphs are welcome. Please try and get me your contributions NLT Sunday June 13th.

• • • • •

hearings, including the balance between CT-related and non-CT issues, other ways in which oversight was conducted, major legislation passed, major legislation considered, your views on the quality of work produced.

6/11/2004

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