T3 B7 Hurley Predator Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Memo- Photos (for Reference- Fair Use)- 1 Withdrawal Notice

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Hurley's Predator File DOCUMENT DATE: 04/02/2004

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FROM: Albion TO: Zelikow/Front Office SUBJECT:

Op-ed on Predator and...

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Cc:

Subject:

Philip Zelikow Friday, April 02, 2004 6:55 PM Front Office Team 2; Team 3 Op-ed on Predator and Maher

Alexis -I'm not so sanguine that this account can be reconciled with the testimony of Jumper and Gration. But Rosenwasser is not a primary source for this information. My original question to you sought to learn the identities of these primary sources so that we could talk with them directly, rather than relying on Rosenwasser's account of their views -- which do seem inconsistent with those of the program manager. On another subject, I'd like to press the point of arranging an interview with John Maher, who can shed light on this and many other subjects. I've reviewed the CIA IG interview material. We heard him on a couple of topics. Maher apparently has a remarkable memory on other subjects too. He is a Tier B witness, and we need to schedule him soon. Stephanie, will you get Dan L.'s help to assist Alexis and Bonnie in getting this set up? Philip Original Message From: Alexis Albion Sent: Friday, April 02, 2004 6:46 PM To: Philip Zelikow; Chris Kojm; Dan Marcus Cc: Team 2; Team 3 Subject: RE: Op-ed on Predator Philip, Chris and Dan: I just met with Gordon's acquaintance, Jon Rosenwasser, who is writing his dissertation on the military's development of UAVs. Jon's research has of necessity been open sources, including the trade press. He has also interviewed a number of those people involved in development of the armed UAV including, for example, contract support. Jon's findings are not necessarily incompatible with our own, but he does add some texture to the Air Force side of the story. As we know, AF testing was going on through the spring of 2001. At the same time, the Air Combat Command was developing formal doctrine documents, which included a formal concept of operations for Predator that incorporated new missions, including that of the armed hunter-killer and use as forward air controller. A draft was completed at about the same time as tests ended, at the beginning of June—but the final version was not agreed upon, and signed by Gen. Jumper, until the beginning of August. During this 2 month period, Jon sees the armed UAV as having been technologically ready to fly. This is the opinion coming out of Big Safari, the acquisition office the AF used for special mission aircraft. But the CONOPS was held up from June to August because of doctrinal disagreement between the ACC and the USAF's Aeronautical System Command. The ASC's perspective was that Predator should be reserved for recon purposes. According to Jon, Big Safari operators did not need a formal CONOPS document to fly armed Predator effectively once the tests were completed in the spring. I think what we have here is a story that is not incompatible with what we've already heard. In fact, it reflects quite nicely the sort of institutional tensions that we've seen within the CIA toward this UAV project. At the working level of Big Safari, the operators felt they were ready to go in the summer of 2001. Perhaps there were some remaining technical issues (as Jumper told us). But it is Big Safari's job to make rapid reaction changes to programs to meet immediate user needs — that' s why it has special acquisition techniques at its disposal. From the operators' point of view, it was: just

tell us what you want, and we'll make it happen. Jumper was, understandably, more cautious, but he had been pushing the program from the get-go--he was an enabler in this story. Where we see resistance is at the mid-management, corporate level. Within the Aeronautical System Command there may well have been cultural resistance to adapting a recon asset for combat missions--to adjusting to a new paradigm. There seems to have been a similar resistance at the DDO level within CIA. Is it worth pursuing the Big Safari part of this story? Jumper may have been putting a bit of his own spin on the technical difficulties going on during the summer of 2001, accentuating the positive and playing down some of the institutional problems. Gration only spoke of logistical issues that needed to be settled, not technical. The texture that Jon's research adds to this story may give a little more weight to the question: could the Predator have flown a couple of months earlier if, at the policy level, there had been the urgency and the willingness to take risks during the summer of 2001? I'll be reading through some of the materials Jon gave me this weekend. you want to do anything more with this. --Alexis

Let me know if

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8/11/03 Information on the Predator In early Summer 2000, there were a number of military options floating around. One that captured the attention of Clarke was the use of the forty-nine-foot unmanned flying drone, the Predator, armed with precision video and infrared cameras, to locate bin Laden. (B&J, 321). The Predator was one, the use of a proxy force into the field against UBL was the second and arming the Northern Alliance forces was the third. There were different objections to this idea: 1. Pentagon folks did not like the idea of the new battlefield surveillance system being adapted for an intelligence mission. 2. DO of CIA concerned because it is paramilitary and would "screw up my relationship with the host government." (B&S, p. 321) 3. Some in intelligence believed it intriguing and backed the idea. In the summer of 2000, first round of tests conducted in the US to acquaint the 1C with the Predator's capabilities. 1. flight tests over Afghanistan began in September 2. the drone failed to take off properly in first test 3. another was sent afloat and Clarke later shown a videotape of Arabs and someone likely to be UBL. A CD of this tape was shown to Clinton and Berger The Predator flew twelve times over Afghanistan 1. one flight was aborted 2. most of the missions dedicated to viewing sites UBL believed to frequent 3. three times believed they spotted UBL, twice on film shot by the drone and once in real time as he emerged from his house outside Kandahar 4. hi DC, a debate began over if that was UBL 5. Later, Taliban radar tracked the drone and MiG fighters were sent to intercept it. These failed and fly right past the drone 6. The tests ended in October as winter arrived in Afghanistan and a battle began in DC over the future of the program Money issues 1. After the first drone crashed, there was a bill to pay 2. CIA had not budgeted for this and did not want to compensate the Pentagon 3. Program was suspended: who would cover further costs - satellite time for relaying pictures for example - was unclear 4. Price tag approximately $200,000. 5. hi December 2000, Secretary of the Air Force, Whit Peters, found the money but the future of the program was not assured. [B&S, p. 322-323] Clarke remained interested in the Predator 1. the program was not yet back on track, despite successes 2. CIA and DOD continued to argue after AF paid for the damage to earlier one

BJenkins

8/11/03 3. The two argued as to who would pay for lost craft in the future - CIA did not want to pay. [B&S, p. 336 4. CIA was still unsure, but backed the idea of trying to arm the drone (see below) Nature of the program 1. the nature or the program changed 2. discussions began about adding a weapon on the Predator 3. Why: if can see UBL in real time and fire a missile, that would take seconds to strike 4. Problem: launching cruise missiles and not knowing if the target would remain in place for hours would disappear Weaponizing the Predator 1. Air Force began experimenting with mounting a Hellfire C missile - a laser guide, hundred-pound air-to-surface missile- on the craft 2. however, now, the Predator would not fly over Afghanistan in the spring, as planned, and so could not provide the possible second thread of intelligence indicating UBL's whereabouts 3. not enough drones or technicians to handle them do to reconnaissance and testing at once 4. the submarines had been taken off station in the Arabian Sea 5. Any near term chance of striking terrorists with CM was foreclosed. 6. The armed predator idea was originally slated for 3 years of testing and modifications before it was deployed 7. Clarke and Cressey worked on the AF to compress the program and complete in 3 months (Cressey also wanted to get the Predator into action) 8. Tests for the drone were conducted in late spring and early summer 9. Cressey watched the Predator test in Nevada and thought the outcome excellent (watched the Predator fire from thousands o feet at a replica of UBLs house outside Kandahar Hold-ups 1. Test not enough to get the Predator deployed to Afghanistan 2. raised a host of issues discussed for months following 3. Whose finger on the trigger when the Predator went after UBL - the AF or CIA? If the Predator's control unit was in another country, would that country's permission be required to fire the missile? What was the chain of command for such an operation? Who would issue the decision to fire - the CIA? White House? IF the White House, who in the White House? Did there have to be a list of approved targets if the President was not readily available? [B&S, p. 338] Change in CIA's position 1. The Agency's position on the Predator had changed by the Summer of 2001 2. its enthusiasm for the Predator had waned

BJenkins

_

8/11/03 3. individuals at Langely did not want responsibility for the program, despite strong advocacy of prominent people in the 1C for the program 4. Record of the debate in incomplete 5. CIA obstacles a. Objected that the Hellfire missile had not done enough damage t the mock UBL house b. A bigger drone was needed to ensure sufficient destruction c. DO argued it wanted to use the money to push harder for human sources d. WH responded that it thought the DO had enough money for that purpose e. Argued it was not appropriate for CIA to operate the Predator. The responsibility belonged to the Air Force, which deployed aircraft that carried ordinance f. DO heard to say if used with lethal force and responsibility for this laid at the CIA's doorstep, it would endanger the lives of CIA operatives around the world g. the AF responded that if it had the mission, it would use B-52s and not "some spindly drone." h. The generals raised other issues: where could UBL be targeted? Could he be hit in a mosque? What about the issue of the placement of the control unit in a foreign country? i. "Predator was a hornet's nest." [B&S, p. 344] First Principles Meeting to discuss As-Qaeda, September 4, 2001 1. Rice asked, who is going to run it? Would it do the job? 2. raised at the meeting the Hellfire missile was not a penetrator and there was concern it would hit the roof of a structure and not destroy the target 3. Monitors the SF used scored the test at somehow below the 85% kill probability that was desirable 4. AF wanted more testing. The first shot was the best the US would get. 5. Who would operate the Predator? a. Tenet: it would be a mistake for CIA to operate and fire a weapon. "Over his dead body." b. WH responded - that decision is for the President c. Meyers: if we do it, we'll do it with CM. If it is CA, it belongs to the 1C. d. "Any possibility of agreement was slipping away." 6. What about an operation for reconnaissance only and not an armed Predator a. Tenet: more palatable, but CIA still needs to review the matter 7. Test another weapon besides the Hellfire? a. Who would fire an armed Predator was deferred. "The meeting ended. There was no decision on Predator and no strategy to forward to the President." [B&S, p. 346]

BJenkins

8/11/03 November 2001 1. The armed Predator flew over Afghanistan 2. it identified a house where a large al-Qaeda meeting was taking place 3. Navy F/A-18 fighter were alerted and bombed the house 4. Predator fired two Hellfire missiles when the inhabitants emerged 5. Milled Muhammad Atef, al-Qaeda's military chief for nearly a decade. [B&S, p. 349]

BJenkins

Mike Hurlev From: Sent: To: Subject:

Gordon Lederman Thursday, March 25, 2004 2:14 PM Team 3; Team 2 Op-ed on Predator /9/11 Personal Privacy

Rosenwasser 'redator 3-25-04.d..

Good afternoon.

FYI below, from an acquaintance doing his PhD on DoD's development of UAVs. He evidently watched the hearings over the last couple days and called me this morning, as he thought that the staff might be interested in his draft op-ed. Best regards to all, and congratulations to T3 on the hearings. -Original MessageFrom: Jon Rosenwasser [mailto:|_ Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2004 1:14 PM To: Gordon Lederman Subject: Predator UAV Availability? Gordon -In response to some of the testimony I've read, here's a draft oped (attached and below) re: assertions by Bush officials that an armed Predator was unavailable pre-9/11. The basic point is that the technology was ready to go by late spring 2001 (NLT June), but interagency squabbling over C2 and doctrine delayed fielding. Any "technical issues" that officials cite as obstacles were not related to technology, but bureaucratic disagreements over employment practices. We'll see if I can get this piece placed anywhere...

V/R, Jon

Why Armed Drones Sat on the Ground By Jon J. Rosenwasser As the 9/11 Commission receives testimony over what could have been done to prevent the al Qaeda attacks, the availability of one specific capability has received much attention: the armed Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The Predator has been a darling of the global war on terrorism with its ability to perch over enemy targets and launch precisionguided missiles. Top Bush administration officials emphatically state that the lethal drone was not ready for deployment before the fall of 2001 because of "technical challenges." Richard A. Clarke, the top counterterrorism official under three presidents, instead accuses the white House of ill-advised delay. In fact, the system was ready months before 9/11. However, the delayed deployment was a product of wide-ranging bureaucratic infighting among the White House, Pentagon and CIA, not the actions of any one individual. This reality points to a broader mandate for the 9/11 Commission: rethink the rigid institutional arrangements created in the 1947 National Security Act. UAVs have a long history, but sat on the U.S. military's margins for decades. Since the 1910s, the military experimented with them to collect intelligence and even drop bombs. They experienced a renaissance in the late 1980s to reduce the risk to pilots, and by the mid-1990s, the Predator was providing theater-level commanders with critical intelligence

data. Officials began pushing to arm Predator with missiles in 1999. Gen. John Jumper (currently the Air Force's chief of staff) stiff-armed resistance from pilots who felt threatened by UAVs and overruled war planners who preferred to use Predator only for reconnaissance purposes. The Air Force began experiments in early 2000. President Clinton's team - fixated on al Qaeda after the bombings of our embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, a foiled millennium attack against Los Angeles International Airport, and the bombing of the USS Cole - ordered testing be completed by the end of the year. However, the process snagged for several months in fall 2000 as officials debated the applicability of a Cold War relic, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Signed by President Reagan in 1987, the treaty banned certain unmanned weapon-delivery vehicles, including armed UAVs. With the Soviet Union gone, the state of UAV technologies far improved, and the specter of terrorism intensifying, the Clinton administration deemed an armed Predator compliant with the treaty in December 2000. The subsequent technical issues proved minimal. The Air Force's Big Safari office, known for its innovative acquisition techniques, worked closely with Predator's manufacturer, General Atomics, which was conveniently located in the district of Cong. John Lewis (RCA), head of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. The Army integrated its light-weight Hellfire missile into the Predator's airframe in a matter of weeks. In tests in early 2001, the armed Predator had a kill-ratio exceeding 75 percent. With such success, it was central to a plan developed by White House staff to go after al Qaeda. If the order had been given, a few armed Predators could probably have been sent to monitor and attack terrorist targets in Afghanistan by late spring 2001, to what effect we'11 never know. However, while the technology was ready, interagency squabbling between the Air Force and CIA over organizational control and operational doctrine delayed action. The Air Force was wary of engaging in a clandestine operation with an unproven asset, while the CIA conceived the challenge as one of human intelligence, not technical means. A series of operational questions also arose: Whose personnel would fly the system, choose the flight pattern and select the targets? Who would pull the trigger, from what location, under whose authorization? Would the CIA reimburse the Air Force if a Predator crashed? For ideological and bureaucratic reasons, the Bush administration deferred a meeting among its top officials to resolve these and other elements of a new counterterrorism strategy until Sept. 4, one week before the fateful Sept. 11 attacks. Even then, the NSC failed to broker the Air Force-CIA divide. In fact, it was only many weeks into the armed Predator's subsequent deployment to Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom that such issues were resolved. This tortured history is one illustration of the need to imbue the national security establishment with greater flexibility so that bureaucratic jockeying does not swallow up needed innovations. Institutional inertia was tolerable during the stable, albeit tense, Cold War era, but is inappropriate for this new dynamic threat environment. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has begun to shake up the system, but more durable changes to underlying relationships are needed, for example, forging ties among CIA operatives, entrepreneurial weapon acquisition professionals and un-doctrinaire war planners. These are the kind of changes that should top the 9/11 Commission's agenda, not the finger-pointing that may dominate during this campaign season. Jon J. Rosenwasser is a Research Fellow at The Brookings Institution and was a professional staff member for national security affairs on the U.S. Senate Budget Committee from 1995 to 1999. He is author of the doctoral dissertation, "Governance Structure and Weapon Innovation: the Case of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" (2004) . Contact Information:

Jon J. Rosenwasser 9/11 Personal Privacy

Research Fellow Thp Institution

9/11 Personal Privacy