T3 B6 Staff Statements March Hearings Fdr- Entire Contents- Withdrawal Notices- Emails- Draft Staff Statements- Notes 073

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Saturday, March 20, 2004 8:22 PM

To:

Front Office; Stephanie Kaplan; Team 3

Subject: Where you can find the Staff Statements 5 6 7 8

The diplomacy, military, Intel, and nsc approved final staff statements (#'s 5, 6, 7, & 8) are now all on the unclassified drive. You can find them in: Unclass drive/shared/Team 3/Approved Final Staff Statements/ Diplomacy Staff Statement (032004).doc Military staff statement 032004 final.doc Intel staff statement 032004 final.doc NSC staff statement 032004 final.doc

Thanks,

Mike

3/20/2004

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject:

Bonnie Jenkins Friday, March 12, 2004 12:15 PM Philip Zelikow Team 3 FW: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO)

FYI:

Bonnie Original Message From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 11:52 AM To: Bonnie Jenkins; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne; Graham Giusti Cc: Deitz, Robert, Mr, DoD OGC; Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC; Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; '[email protected]'; '[email protected]; Dalton, William, Mr, DoD OGC; Sweatt, Susan, COL, OSD-USDI; Eaves, Jennifer, LCDR, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI Subject: RE: Schultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Dan, Steve, Bonnie, I regret to inform you that we are deferring a decision to allow loan arrangements for our restricted-read-access documents, such as for the Schultz document, as below. As you probably know by now, we have identified what appears to be sensitive and highly classified information in Staff Statements #6 and #7. This situation causes us concern. I am hopeful that through the DoJ we can agree on appropriate security arrangements to ensure adequate protection of classified information. Once that is done, hopefully in short order, we would be happy to reconsider any loan arrangements you desire. Pat Original Message From: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 3:01 PM To: 'Bonnie Jenkins'; '[email protected]'; '[email protected]; 'mhurley® 9-llcommission.gov' Cc: Aly, Stewart, Mr, DoD OGC; Gainor, Sharon, CPO, DoD OGC; Lehner, Johnathan, Mr, DoD OGC; Jones, Dawn T, LtCol, OSD-USDI; Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI; '[email protected]' Subject: RE: Shultz Report - Terms of Loan Arrangement (FOUO) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Bonnie, Yes, the Shultz report will be included in the Friday delivery. The Schultz document is being provided to you on a loan basis for up to 30 days. The same groundrules apply to this document that apply to other restricted-read-access documents. That is, any notes taken based on the document should not quote portions of the document verbatim; notes should be properly classified; and no copies of the document, in whole or in part, should be made. Please call me if you have any questions. Pat Original Message From: Bonnie Jenkins [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 2:15 PM To: Downs, Pat, Ms, OSD-USDI Subject: RE: Unintended Delivery of Read-Access DoD Documents (FOUO)

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ACCESS RESTRICTED^ The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings DOCUMENT DATE: 03/09/2004

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FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Draft of staff statement 7

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j^^ESSRESTRICTEDJ The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings DOCUMENT DATE: 03/09/2004

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Diplomacy, Staff Statement No. 5

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Mike Hurley From:

Stephanie Kaplan

Sent:

Tuesday, March 09, 2004 5:48 PM

To:

Front Office; Team 3; Team 1; Kevin Scheid

Subject: Staff Statement No. 5

Okay, folks. Please find attached the version of Staff Statement No. 5 that will go to pre-pub review. I received a significant number of changes at the end (for which I am grateful!), but they caused a major crunch, and I don't have time to review the draft again. I also did not have time to incorporate most of Scott Allan's changes, but I did include the most substantial ones. Please let me know if I missed anything, but I think this passes the test for pre-pub review. Thanks, Stephanie STEPHANIE L. KAPLAN

9-11 COMMISSION 7(202)331-1125 F (202) 296-5545 www.9-11commission.gov

3/9/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Scott Allan

Sent:

Tuesday, March 09, 2004 3:57 PM

To:

Front Office

Cc:

Team 3; Yoel Tobin; Tom Dowling

Subject: Draft Conclusion for the Diplomacy Statement

• Though its success varied, diplomacy was an important part of America's counterterrorism policy before [and immediately after] 9-11.

From the fall of 1998 through the middle of September 2001, the USG, through a variety of diplomatic means including warnings, threats, and sanctions, tried to persuade the Taliban to render Bin Ladin to a country where he could face justice.

• Sanctions and pressing the Taliban continued until right after 9/11. But with the Taliban's resilience to sanctions and Mullah Omar's increasingly close connection with Bin Ladin, international alienation was not enough to drive a wedge between the Taliban and Bin Ladin.

• U.S. efforts to force Pakistan to press the Taliban also proved challenging. Islamabad was the Taliban's most ardent supporter and never seriously pushed the Taliban to move against Bin Ladin and his network.

• Saudi Arabia was a complicated friend [ally/partner] in our diplomatic approach to the Bin Ladin problem. Its intelligence chief twice traveled to Afghanistan to seek a deal on Bin Ladin only to be rebuffed by the Taliban. On the other hand, Riyadh's cooperation with Washington on intelligence sharing and disrupting al Qaeda finances ranged from inconsistent to poor [Roth?].

3/9/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Chris Kojm

Sent:

Monday, March 08, 2004 9:30 AM

To:

Alexis Albion; Bonnie Jenkins

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: Intel,military staff statements Alexis - I talked a little more to Philip. He wants the bulk of the 3 sightings story in the military piece; I am working on them there. You should, however, work on a concluding paragraph or two for the intel statement, summarizing the key findings. Bonnie - I have made good progress on the military piece. I think I will be done with my edits this afternoon. It would be exceedingly helpful if you can hook up with Allen Holmes and run down the rest of this story about the Kuster memo, as I know you intend to do. The story gets stranger and stranger.

3/8/2004

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FROM: Byman TO: Allan SUBJECT:

Comments on newest diplomacy staff statement

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FROM: Kaplan TO: Kojm, et al SUBJECT:

RE: Intel Staff statement

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Wednesday, March 03, 2004 8:50 AM

To:

Scott Allan

Cc:

Team 3

Subject: Tasking from Philip Yesterday

Scott: Philip is re-working our staff statements. With respect to the State staff statement, he asked for the following from you: A compendium of all MemCons or executive summaries of interaction with foreign leaders on our subjects (CT, Taliban, Pak, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, etc.) during our period of interest (1998 - September 20, 2001) that involves the President, National Security Advisor, Secretary of State, or DCI. • He's interested in what our principals said or wrote (so this would include letters principals sent) to foreign leaders. He'd like a clear, annotated chronology of these communications. When did the meeting occur? Who was involved? Brief points on the message delivered. Where are the MemCons or summaries held? • Alexis, Dan Byman, and Warren may all be able to contribute something on this. So, please call on them for help. • Philip will also be looking at notes that he took and that I took (that are held at the NEOB) on Presidents Clinton and Bush's communications (letters/conversations) with foreign leaders. Philip is likely to insert those points in the chronology you put together. Philip would like you to make this tasking a priority. Thanks, Mike

3/3/2004

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ACCESS The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings DOCUMENT DATE: 03/01/2004

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Handwritten Notes

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings DOCUMENT DATE: 02/25/2004

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FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

Draft Staff Statement Intelligence as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Wednesday, February 25, 2004 2:55 PM

To:

Team 3

Subject: Request on Staff Statements

TeamSsters: To assist with the editing process of the staff statements, I'd appreciate if you would: 1) double space the text of the hard copy you submit; 2) include a header with the following information: FROM: Your initials

TO: Initials of teammates separated by commas

Info on which draft it is, e.g., Second draft, incorporating MH/WB edits Feb. 25 3) when marking up a colleague's text you're reviewing, please do everything possible to make your edits clear and readable, so that we'll know exactly what changes you wish to make. Thanks, Mike

2/25/2004

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings DOCUMENT DATE: 02/24/2004

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National Policy Coordination Staff Statement Draft

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Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Tuesday, February 24, 2004 5:28 PM

To:

Dan Byman

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: NSC piece

Thanks for your message, man. I've worked your points in, but I'd actually love to sit down with you and have another kick at this can (or mix of this metaphor). I've added a blunt (and not terribly good) graf on analysis, but I'd be curious for your take on how much we can/should try to get away with. My main concern is having this in good enough shape that we can start a process with Philip, who I presume has some very strong views on what he wants said. So I'd just like to make sure we've got the underlying narrative right, and to make sure that you, me, and Mike are all on the same analytical page when and if we have to fight for our judgments. I'm around all week—lemme know when's good for you. Warren

2/24/2004

Regarding staff statements, • Important to use a "light touch" • Byman, Hawley, and I can roll with anything, even a TLAM in the chest • You are particularly interested in CT policy, and are strong in it • You have had access to materials we haven't seen • Need a constructive, positive approach • This is a new genre • People see things in different ways, have different ideas • I have to worry about morale, which has been generally good • First, don't demoralize • We've done some heavy lifting, there's more to do

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Team3Mates

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

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FROM: Byman TO: Hurley SUBJECT:

RE: Some Ideas for your Staff Statements

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RE: Some Ideas for your Staff Statements

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the wp story is stunning, what a bureaucratic clusterf—k!

"CIA officers working from Islamabad, led by station chief Gary Schroen, assumed in early 1998 that if their agents captured bin Laden in southern Afghanistan, a U.S. grand jury would quickly indict him." grand juries!! what were these people thinking? my personal opinion was that bill clinton (like most demos) was (is) absolutely terrified of physical violence or confrontation, no matter how warranted (or abstracted), so he sends in the cops when someone just needs to take a head shot, bottom line is that clinton punked out.

Posted by mike at February 21, 2004 05:57 PM

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Friday, February 20, 2004 12:00 PM

To:

Team 3

Subject: Comments from Philip on DoD

Philip called from Charlottesville this morning and during our conversation he described his conceptual approach to DoD's response to the aQ threat. Essentially, he sees 4 phases: I. II. III. IV.

August '98 through fall '98: The TLAM strikes, Infinite Resolve planning, including AC-130 and other options; December '98 through May 99: Planning and readiness for TLAM strikes on bin Laden if locational intelligence is provided; Post-millennium threat: stepped up military planning; Post-Cole attack: Clarke pressing for military options, but not much happening

Philip acknowledged that in spring/summer 2001 policy papers were wrestling with the idea of DoD doing more but that pre9/11 the military hadn't actually initiated any new planning. Armed Predator was what General Myers cited as the military's offensive involvement in that period. Warren/Alexis/Bonnie: Per Philip, EOP 5 documents have some interesting detail on collateral damage and related issues; this information sheds light on why certain options weren't selected. We'll need to have a good understanding of why we didn't move forward on these military options. He also spoke of 4 schools of thought that he sees in the Clinton administration on use of force: Clarke—who emphasizes a series of strikes at times and places of our choosing, keep enemy off balance, show we're serious, hurt infrastructure, go after Taliban; Zinni—in favor of a policy of bolstering front line states to deal with the problem, against TLAMS due to collateral damage, likelihood that missiles wouldn't get bin Laden in any event, and fact they would inflame Muslims against US soldiers/sailors throughout his AOR; Schoomaker—CT wasn't really DoD's mission, SOCOM was a supporting command, not decision maker, but should have had lead, though relevant PDDs, etc. made clear CT was a LE and Intel problem, in any event, SOCOM could only supply trained SOFs and SOF equipment to CENTCOM; and what Philip calls the "Principals' School of Thought (Berger, Tenet, Cohen, Albright to some extent)—they're deeply concerned about the problem, they're in a box trying to find a way out. They reject the Clarke bombing series option but never accept the Zinni alternative. I pass this along to you, not because I agree with each point, but to let you know what he's thinking. Mike

2/20/2004

OUTLINE MARCH 2004 DIPLOMACY STAFF STATEMENT 1.

Counterterrorism in USG Foreign Policy a. Counterterrorism in the late 1980's i) Preemption ii) Sanctions b. Counterterrorism in the early 1990' s, i) Competing priorities ii) Focusing on state sponsors iii) Focusing on the middle east c. Approaching 1998 i) WTC 1 ii) Khobar iii) Instruments d. "Hitting Home", Almost i) Transborder groups ii) Increasing priorities iii) Increasing focus on South Asia e. 1998-2001 i) Millennium threats ii) Cole iii) Approaching 9-11 f. 9-11 and Beyond i) New priorities and strategies ii) More muscular approach iii) Areas for concern A) Current and future sanctuaries B) US Image overseas C) Working with others D) Madrassahs

2.

Multilateral Efforts to Combat Terrorism a. Approach during the early to mid 1990's i) State Sponsors/middle east ii) Sanctions iii) Working with Allies: Gulf states, Europeans b. Efforts after i) ii) iii)

the Embassy Bombings UN Sanctions Pressuring the Taliban Going after the money

c. "With Us or Against Us" - Multilateral approaches after 9-11 i) Enlisting Support on short notice ii) Staying focused 3.

US Policy Towards Afghanistan a. The Last battle of the Cold War- US goals for Afghanistan in the 1980' s i) Working with the Mujahedeen- voices of support and concern ii) The network grows and the west celebrates b. Walking Away. US Policy towards Afghanistan from 1990-1997 i) Urgency elsewhere ii) Limited resources c. 1997-1998 Understanding the Taliban i) Early interactions with the Taliban Movement ii) The ongoing civil war iii) Concerns about human rights and drugs iv) American Economic interests v) Increasing the pressure on the terrorism issue d. US Policy towards Afghanistan after the 1998 bombings i) TLAMs and Talks ii) New focus on the region iii) Getting by with little/no help from our friends iv) Demarching the Taliban (being held responsible) v) Imposing sanctions (State Sponsor/FTO listing) vi) Limited Success - Taliban's canned response vii) All in the family—the UBL-Omar Relationship viii) Reassessing the strategy A) Approaching the NA B) Trading UBL for recognition

C) ix)

e.

4.

Toppling the Taliban... what fills the void?

Texans and Talibs—The New Administrations Approach to Afghanistan. A) No changes coming into the summer of threat B) Continued pressure and demarches C) Increasing concerns/revisiting approaches (working with the NA, Toppling Taliban, military action)

Afghanistan in the post 9-11 world i) One last chance. Calls for Omars to turn over UBL ii) Enlisting others including the NA iii) Consolidating our gains

US Policy Towards Pakistan a. A valued Cold War ally- US-Pakistan relations during the 1980's b. Problems/Priorities with Pakistan during the 1990's (through 1997) i) ii) iii) iv)

Nuke ambition -Pre 1998 sanctions Indo-Relations Democratization Afghan Policy A) Strategic Depth B) Supporting the Taliban C) ISID

c. Another summer of threat; May 1998-Aug.l998 i) Nuke focused strategy ii) CT not on the backburner iii) Ability to achieve goals with sanctions in place d. Pak. Policy post Embassy bombings: i) More calls for Afghan cooperation ii) Limited instruments, limited success iii) State Sponsor list (Kashmiris) iv) Oct. 1999 coup—stepping forwards or stepping back v) Increasing engagement- high profile trips in the winter/spring 2000 vi) Bush Administrations Pakistan Policy. New hopes for engagement. DCs and Summer meetings with Pak diplomats

e. Pakistan after 9-11 i) Mahmoud in US ii) Armitage contacts Musharraf; symbolic of the new relationship iii) Not yet there... areas for improvement A) FATA/Karachi as havens B) Madrassahs C) Kashmir 5.

US Policy Towards Saudi Arabia

6.

Sudan as a Terrorist Sanctuary a. Radical tradition b. Sudan as a safe haven i) ii) iii) iv) v)

number of groups open borders state support conferences 1993 State Sponsors list

c. 1995 Isolation Policy set i) basis/aid workers/Mubarak attempt ii) support for this policy iii) Mubarak attempt d. Out of Africa—UBL leaves for Afghanistan i) UBL presence in Afghanistan ii) AQ infrastructure remains despite Sudan claims iii) Why didn't we take him- March-May 1996 meetings with USG representatives e. Sudan policy in the late 1990's and its bearing on USG CT policy i) Closing the embassy and failure to reopen ii) Criticism vs. intelligence. iii) Willing to listen but not giving carrots. iv) Change in the air v) Missed opportunities? vi) Working with the Sudanese on CT in 2000 vii) Still on the list

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Staff Statements: March Public Hearings DOCUMENT DATE: 02/18/2004

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FROM: Hurley TO: Bass SUBJECT:

Some Thoughts for the NSC Staff Statement

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Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Monday, February 16, 2004 1:15 PM

To:

Christine Healey; Mike Jacobson; Peter Rundlet

Cc:

Mike Hurley; Len Hawley

Subject: Say, is this true? Just came across this in Time—is it right? Heeding the pleas from the FBI's New York City office, where Mawn and O'Neill were desperate for new linguists and analysts, acting FBI director Pickard asked the Justice Department for some $ 50 million for the bureau's counterterrorism program. He was turned down. In August, a bureau source says, he appealed to Attorney General Ashcroft. The reply was a flat no. Pickard got Ashcroft's letter on Sept. 10.

Source is: Copyright 2002 Time Inc. Time Magazine August 12, 2002 SECTION: SPECIAL REPORT: THE SECRET HISTORY; Pg. 28 LENGTH: 10452 words HEADLINE: They Had A Plan; Long before 9/11, the White House debated taking the fight to al-Qaeda. By the time they decided, it was too late. The saga of a lost chance BYLINE: Michael Elliott, Reported by Massimo Calabresi, John F. Dickerson, Elaine Shannon, Mark Thompson, Douglas Waller and Michael Weisskopf/Washington; Hannah Bloch and Tim McGirk/Islamabad; Cathy Booth Thomas/Dallas; Wendy Cole and Marguerite Michaels/Chicago; Bruce Crumley/Paris; James Graff/Brussels; David Schwartz/Phoenix; and Michael Ware/Kabul

2/16/2004

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Friday, February 13, 2004 10:16 AM

To:

Warren Bass

Cc:

Alexis Albion; Mike Hurley

Subject: Staff Statements

Warren: Alexis and I had a conceptual breakthrough on the staff statements this morning. It almost rivals the Hurley Predator as missile insight in its intellectual virtuosity. We'll share this with you this afternoon, after your return from NEOB and mine from the Townsend interview. FYI, I'm "breaking bread" with Roger the dodger at 11:30 this morning. I'll of course be using my case officer powers to get "gouge" from him.

Mike

2/13/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Thursday, February 12, 2004 6:24 PM

To:

'[email protected]'

Cc:

Mike Hurley; Warren Bass

Subject: Proposed Outline for DoD Staff Statement

Hi Bonnie: Please see attached. Hope this helps. Regards, Mike

2/12/2004

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Subject:

[email protected] Thursday, February 12, 2004 6:44 PM Mike Hurley Re: Proposed Outline for DoD Staff Statement

Mike, Thanks. I will look at this in more detail in the next few days. I should note that we are limited in what we can say about Infinite R because that is all focal point material. That is the problem with that. No one discussed that information in as much detail as we saw in the documents themselves. We can discuss this next week. I will work on the letters to Cohen and Rumsfeld this weekend. I asked Scott and Alexis to send me the drafts of their letters so I can use them as examples. Best, Bonnie

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Mike Hurley

Sent:

Thursday, February 12, 2004 4:26 PM

To:

Warren Bass; Daniel Byman

Cc:

Mike Hurley

Subject: Points for Bonnie's Staff Statement

Warren and Dan: •

I took an initial stab at suggesting points for Bonnie's staff statement.

•

Warren, you can find it on the unclass computer, shared drive, team 3 folder: DoD and Military Staff Statement for Bonnie.doc

•

Dan, see the attachment and make additions.

•

Please make it better.

•

I'd like to email it to Bonnie on Friday.

Mike

2/12/2004

To:

Bonnie Jenkins

From:

Mike Hurley

Subject: Suggested Key Points/Structure for DoD/Military Staff Statement Date:

February 12, 2004

Bonnie, •

As you know, Team 3 met with Philip yesterday for guidance on the 4 staff statements we're on the hook to produce for the late March public hearings. I forwarded our deadlines for the staff statements via separate email.

•

I paid close attention to Philip's suggestions and wanted to pass them along to you, along with my own ideas for how your staff statement might be structured. I'm engaging with our Team 3 colleagues similarly on their staff statements.

•

You should aim for your staff statement not to exceed 10 pages single space. Keep it concise and tight.

•

The statement should "tee-up," or frame the most important issues as context for commissioners' questions of the officials (in your case Cohen and Rumsfeld).

•

The emphasis should be on "high policy" before 9/11, and in the case of Rumsfeld after 9/11.

•

Statements should be factual and not judgmental.

•

The public hearings on DoD/Military will only involve Cohen and Rumsfeld, who will make separate appearances, one right after the other.

Specific points/structure for your DoD/Military staff statement follow: 1. The relationship of counterterrorism to the broader story of American defense policy. -What was the military doing around the world? -What other engagements were we involved in (Iraq, Balkans) ? -We had been in a Cold War posture, and we were moving toward a post-Cold War posture. How did CT fit into this? 2. CT as a military challenge

-To what extent was this a military challenge (as opposed to law enforcement or other USG instruments)? —Were we really at war with al Qaeda? -Cite the Kuster memo here as an example of differences of opinion in DoD 3. How does the question of whether UBL and al Qaeda are a problem for the military work itself out? -Describe Zinni's critique —What other military choices are being considered? How did the military work through them? —Are military options being considered as part of a broader national policy? What military options were prepared for going after al-Qa'ida before 9-11? Was there a planned follow-up for the response to the Embassy attacks? (i.e. what plans were done, Infinite Resolve, etc.)? When told there was not enough intelligence, did the military try to gather it on its own? How did it handle the problem of actionable intelligence? Did the military see Afghanistan as a problem for it in any way? Did it understand the scope of the danger that was gathering there? Did it plan in any way for this? Did it torpedo requests by political leaders? What were the plans, if any, for the response to the attack on the Cole? [See Hadley MFR.] Given that the Cole was a military target, was this seen as a direct threat to the US military presence? 4. How does the military role change at the transition, if at all? -Is there more continuity than change? 5. How are things now? How is the military performing in the war on terrorism?

i: NSC hearing and problems

Page 1 of 3

Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Monday, February 09, 2004 5:54 PM

To:

Mike Hurley

Subject:

Staff statement on NSC

Importance: High

Note the confusions about the scope of the staff statement on NSC here. I suspect we'll need both FO and commissioner guidance on the statements if we don't want to get caught in yet another intramural pissing match. Original Message From: Philip Zelikow Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 10:35 PM To: Timothy Roemer Subject: RE: NSC hearing and problems

Tim-For what it's worth, the staff recommendation is to handle the NSC issues in one day. This seems sufficient and proportionate in relation to the time we also should devote to CIA, DOD, State, and Justice/FBI. We still stick to our view of the scope of an appropriate staff statement, but I understand that you have a different view. I believe the meeting with the Judge is set to occur on Thursday. And thank you for your help and good questions in the interview today with Secretary Albright Original Message From: Timothy Roemer Sent: Wed 1/7/2004 2:24 PM To: Philip Zelikow Cc: Subject: RE: NSC hearing and problems PhilipMy point is that we need more than a day to tell the story of counterterrorism policy leading up to the events of 9/11. As you have seen in the interviews, this is new information that the Joint Inquiry did not have access to and therefore did not present. We should not only tell the story with a specific staff presentation on the NSC role in counterterrorism policy, but make it a highlight of our public hearings and our report. I recommend that we task Mike and Warren with writing up this statement that will subsequently be presented to the public before the witnesses testify. The J.I. did this very effectively, and Lee has often mentioned his interest in this type of format. Are you opposed to this approach? On another note, what progress have we made since our meeting in asking for an extension on our deadline? Has Lee met with the Judge yet? What did the White House say in response to our request? This must be a higher priority for us to move on and resolve. And please send me a copy of the draft to Director Tenet regarding the access issue. When will this be delivered and what deadline will be attached? Thank you for your timely response.

2/9/2004

i: NSC hearing and problems

Tim Original Message From: Philip Zelikow [mailto:pzelikow@9-l lcommission.gov] Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2004 10:06 AM To: Timothy Roemer Subject: RE: NSC hearing and problems Tim — We are working now to schedule the private interviews with Rice and Hadley, and hope these will be scheduled to occur soon, later this month or in the beginning of February. Their appearance at a public hearing would be in March and April, respectively, if they accept our invitations. If they do not, the Commission will need to decide how to proceed, as we discussed. In part as a response to your well-founded interest in this topic, we do currently plan to set aside a day of hearings in March to explore national management of counterterrorism policy by the NSC, to include the participation of the responsible officials from the Clinton and Bush administrations. Although we are likely to have a staff statement of some kind about the course of counterterrorism policy, we are not sure whether the NSC role should be separated in such a staff statement from the broader policy story that includes the performance of other agencies. Philip

Original Message From: Timothy Roemer Sent: Tue 1/6/2004 4:24 PM To: Philip Zelikow Cc: Subject: NSC hearing and problems

Philip-1 continue to be very concerned about the inability to confirm our witnesses(Dr. Rice and Stete Hadley) and specifically outline the format for our N.S.C. hearing. As you have seen in our extensive interviews with Steinberg and Clarke, this is a very interesting story and it takes time to tell it. We have not yet interviewed enough people to tell the Bush Administration story, yet the documents seem to present a curious and revealing 9 months. I would like you and Mike Hurley, with Warren Bass assisting, to provide me (and the Commission)with an outline of how we are organizing this hearing; public/closed hearings, confirmed and invited witnesses, format, short synopsis of a staff statement read before the hearing, etc...Can you get this for me by January 26th? I will talk to Mike and Warren as well. Thanks. Tim Original Message From: Philip Zelikow [mailto:pzelikQW@9-llcommission._goy] Sent: Friday, January 02, 2004 5:20 PM To: Commissioners Cc: [email protected] Subject: Additional Agenda Items for Commission Meeting on Monday,

2/9/2004

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A£: NSC hearing and problems Jan 5 Commissioners — Commissioner Ben-Veniste has asked that two further items be placed on the agenda for discussion at our Monday meeting. These would be: -- Interim Report from the PDB Review Team — Commission Policy on Recusals Philip

2/9/2004

Page 3 of 3

t'

Page 1 of 1

Mike Hurley From:

Warren Bass

Sent:

Thursday, February 05, 2004 7:47 PM

To:

Team 3

Subject: Hearings: The Zelikow Proposal

Dayi Staff statement: Diplomatic responses to the terrorist threat (incl. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, others) Albright (and Pickering, if desired) Powell Staff statement: Military responses to the terrorist threat Cohen (and Shelton, if desired) Rumsfeld (and Myers, if desired) Days Staff statement: Intelligence responses to the terrorist threat Tenet Staff statement: NSC Clarke Berger Rice

2/6/2004

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