T3 B6 Final Staff Statements Fdr- Entire Contents- Emails- Notes- Withdrawal Notices (1st Pg Only Of Staff Statement 7) 074

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Mike Hurley From:

Dan Marcus

Sent:

Monday, March 22, 2004 12:00 PM

To:

staff

Subject: IMPORTANT REMINDER: Guidelines re handling of staff statements

Now that we are finishing up work on one set of staff statements and preparing the next set, here's a reminder of the guidelines we need to follow in working with staff statements: (1) Drafts of staff statements (going forward) need to include footnotes indicating the source for information in the text, and each footnote needs to indicate the classification level of the source, e.g., (U), (S), (TS), etc. (2) Drafts of staff statements that rely on any information derived from classified sources (documents or interviews) must be marked "SUBJECT TO CLASSIFICATION REVIEW" at the top and bottom of each page. (3) Drafts of staff statements that rely on any information derived from classified sources must be handled as classified documents based on the highest classification of source documents or interviews. In particular: (a) Such staff statements must be drafted and edited only on classified computers. (b) Draft staff statements derived from materials up to the Secret level may be worked on in any Commission office; draft staff statements derived from TS/SCI material must be worked on at the K Street SCIF or another SCIF. (c) Such staff statements may only be transmitted by secure means, e.g., classified fax or lock bag. (d) Such staff statements must be stored and transported securely. (4) Such staff statements cannot be treated as unclassified documents until the relevant Executive Branch agencies have completed their classification review and the Commission has satisfied (through negotiation and/or modification of the statements) all of the classification issues raised by the relevant agencies. The Front Office will make the judgment about when this process is complete. If you have any questions, please talk to Graham, Chris, Steve, or me. Thanks for your attention to these important procedures.

3/22/2004

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'«-UNITS'*

Intelligence Policy Staff Statement No. 7

Members of the Commission, with your help, your staff has developed initial findings to present to the public on the use of our intelligence agencies hi countering terrorism. These findings may help frame some of the issues for these hearings and inform the development of your judgments and recommendations. Today we will focus on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency as an instrument of national policy. The issues related to the collection of intelligence, analysis and warning, and the management of the intelligence community will be taken up at the Commission's hearings next month. This report reflects the results of our work so far. We remain ready to revise our understanding of events as our investigation progresses. This staff statement represents the collective effort of a number of members of our staff. Alexis Albion, Michael Hurley, Dan Marcus, Lloyd Salvetti, and Steve Dunne did much of the investigative work reflected in this statement. For this area of our work we were fortunate in being able to build upon a great deal of excellent work already done by the Congressional Joint Inquiry. The Central Intelligence Agency has cooperated fully in making available both the documents and interviews that we have needed so far on this topic. Framing the Issue The CIA plays a dual role in counterterrorism. Like other members of the Intelligence Community, the CIA is an intelligence producer: it collects and analyzes foreign intelligence and provides this information to policymakers. When directed by the president, the CIA is also responsible for executing policy through the conduct of covert action. U.S. law defines a covert action as a U.S. government activity to influence conditions in another country, "where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." The law requires a formal presidential finding to authorize a covert action, which is also briefed to congressional leaders. Significant actions under a finding are often authorized in a separate Memorandum of Notification informing congressional leaders. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), from whom you will hear his morning, also has dual responsibilities. He is the president's senior intelligence adviser. He is also the head of an agency, the CIA, that executes policy. In speaking with the Commission, DCI Tenet was blunt: "I am not a policymaker." He presents intelligence and offers operational judgments, but he says

EMBARGOED UNTIL 8:30 AM ON MARCH 24, 2004

called off because of a lack of reliable intelligence on Bin Ladin's specific location, and in part because of concerns regarding the loss of life to innocent civilians. Finding Bin Ladin required human intelligence, which many Pentagon officials have said must be strengthened in the fight against terrorism. While military plans were modified to include different options for attacking al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets in Afghanistan, policymakers always fell back on the option of launching cruise missiles. However, the lack of actionable intelligence and concerns about collateral damage all but made this "default option" no option at all. That left the policymakers without any viable military tool to attack al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets after the August 20 strikes and before 9/11. Many things changed after the 9/11 attacks. The policy and military obstacles to a large scale invasion of Afghanistan dissolved. Most importantly, the requirement for intelligence before there could be military action was lowered. The military could finally bring the fight to al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin.

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Conclusion to the Military Staff Statement On August 20,1998, the United States military responded to the East Africa embassy bombings with missile strikes on al-Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin-linked targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. Following the August 20 response, the United States military developed plans for follow-on strikes against additional al Qaeda targets. However, from August 20,1998 until after the 9/11 attacks, the United States refrained from additional strikes in Afghanistan. This was despite the October 2000 attack of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen resulting in the deaths of 17 sailors. And while the new Bush administration was developing a comprehensive . strategy for going after al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin during the summer of 2001 that incorporated a military role, no steps were taken by the Pentagon to develop additional military plans to support that strategy. Obstacles were both military and policy in nature. The difficulty of the United States to garner support from states surrounding Afghanistan, particularly Pakistan, made it difficult to put boots on the ground or to use airborne platforms to launch a strike. Bases did not exist and legal impediments to overflight of neighboring country airspace posed problems for the use of airborne assets. There were many references in the interviews of Pentagon officials to "Desert One" and the "Somalia Syndrome," where in both cases special operations missions resulted in failure and negative United States reactions. America was not ready to insert Special Operations Forces into an environment where there was no actionable intelligence on Bin Ladin's location and no support from nearby nations. Policymakers concluded the risks of using Special Operations Forces in a mission against al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan were too high, and the chances of success were too low. Many senior policymakers also told us the public would not seriously support a large military campaign to invade Afghanistan that would topple the Taliban. As a result, there were no plans for large scale military action of the type that took place after the 9/11 attacks. Finally, the United States was hampered by the policy decision of avoiding casualties to innocent civilians. General Zinni, the military commander Prepared by: BJenkins

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in the region, was concerned about the high potential for unwelcome consequences to U.S. regional security interests. Many Pentagon civilians and military officials told us that the most significant limitation on military action was the need for actionable intelligence. Secretary Cohen put it best when he stated that while the Pentagon was always ready to capture or kill Bin Ladin and put its troops at extraordinary risks to do so, any operation would require actionable intelligence, which was always lacking. As Secretary Cohen explained, the goal of the August 20,1998 strikes in Afghanistan was to hit Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants that intelligence indicated were gathered at a meeting in a Bin Ladin training camp in southern Afghanistan. If no one was hit, the United States could still damage the camp and send a message that the United States would not tolerate terrorist activity against America. However, the public and congressional outcry after the strike of the alleged pharmaceutical plant with links to Bin Ladin in Sudan raised the level of the quality of intelligence that was necessary to strike a target. Now, Usama Bin Ladin himself was the predominant target, and a strike could not be conducted unless there was assurance Bin Ladin would be at a particular location at the time the strikes would hit the target. The standard for actionable intelligence after August 20 was extremely high, perhaps too high, particularly for a target that moved around a great deal and remained elusive. Nowhere is this illustrated more clearly than on the three occasions the military prepared to launch a missile strike only to have it called off because of a lack of reliable intelligence on Bin Ladin's specific location, and in part because of concerns regarding the loss of life to innocent civilians. The military did little to solve this problem until the Predator flew in fall 2000 and did not develop other options to gain adequate actionable intelligence. While military plans were modified to include different options for attacking al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets in Afghanistan, policymakers always fell back to the option of launching cruise missiles. However, the lack of actionable

intelligence and concerns about collateral damage all but made this "default option" no option at all. That left the policymakers without any viable military tool to attack al Qaeda and Usama Bin Ladin targets after the August 20 strikes and before 9/11.

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/18/2004

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FROM: TO:

SUBJECT:

NSC #8

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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ACCESS RESTJUCTEDJ The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/18/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

FROM: CIA TO: Zelikow, et al SUBJECT:

substantive comments on #8

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

Mike Hurley From: Sent: To: Subject:

Steve Dunne Thursday, March 18, 2004 5:45 PM Front Office; Team 3 FW: Staff Statements

fyi Original Message From: Dan.Leviniusdoj.gov [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, March 18, 2004 5:34 PM To: Philip Zelikow; Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne Subject: Staff Statements 1.

No CIA classification comments on statements #6 or #8.

2. Just faxed some additional substantive CIA comments on #6 and CIA substantive comments on #8 will probably come tomorrow. 3. Just faxed NSC comments on #7: they include one substantive comment (p. 5 - labeled as factual); the proposed redactions on pages 8-9 are contingent on resolution of the issue (i.e., those portions should be redacted but the remaining may be kept in if the resolution is reached; otherwise the entire section should be redacted); for last three sentences of first paragraph on page nine: redacte unless Berger for first two and Clarke for last one have said that publicly; if they only said in interviews with you then it should be redacted. 4.

Hope to have other NSC comments tonight or tomorrow

5.

Hope to have DOD comments tonight or tomorrow

Call fi you have any questions.

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/18/2004

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Supplemental

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Closed by Statute

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/17/2004

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FROM:

TO: SUBJECT:

Comments on 9/11 Commission Staff Statement nNumber 6

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Closed by Statute

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_ACCESS RESTRICTED The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE:

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FROM: TO:

SUBJECT:

CIA Comments on Staff Statements 5 & 7

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/17/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

FROM: Dunne TO: Hurley SUBJECT:

FW: Comments of statement #7

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

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Mike Hurley From:

Philip Zelikow

Sent:

Wednesday, March 17, 2004 1:11 PM

To:

Team 3; Doug MacEachin; Tom Dowling

Cc:

Front Office

Subject: Language for Staff Statement #5 Folks Having weighed the many excellent arguments, we'll change the last para on p. 9 as follows: In the first line, change "seemed to" to "may" Delete the last two sentences and replace them with: For a time, Bin Ladin was reportedly considering relocating away fromto other countries. We will report further on this topic at a later date. In any event, Bin Ladin stayed in Afghanistan. Philip

3/17/2004

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Mike Hurley From:

Philip Zelikow

Sent:

Wednesday, March 17, 2004 1:23 PM

To:

Team 3; Doug MacEachin; Tom Dowling

Cc:

Front Office

Subject: FW: Language for Staff Statement #5

Sorry, I pressed the button accidentally before this message was complete. The correct text is below: —Original Message— From: Philip Zelikow Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2004 1:11 PM To: Team 3; Doug MacEachin; Tom Dowling Cc: Front Office Subject: Language for Staff Statement #5 Folks Having weighed the many excellent arguments, we'll change the last para on p. 9 as follows: In the first line, change "seemed to" to "may" Delete the last two sentences and replace them with: For a time, Bin Ladin was reportedly considering relocating and may have authorized discussion of this possibility with representatives of other governments. We will report further on this topic at a later date. In any event, Bin Ladin stayed in Afghanistan. Philip

3/17/2004

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/17/2004

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FROM: Dunne TO: Front Office SUBJECT:

FW: Further comments on statement #6

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/16/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

FROM: Zelikow TO: Hurley, et al SUBJECT:

RE: Possible Insert on Diplomacy Statement

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

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ACCESS RESTRICTED j The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/16/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: E-Mail Printout/fProfs Notes)

FROM: Dunne TO: Team 3 SUBJECT:

FW: substantive comments on staff statements 5 &7

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/16/2004

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FROM: Marcus TO: Team 3 SUBJECT:

FW: Pre-Publication Review

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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FROM: Leopold TO: Front Office SUBJECT:

Rumsfeld and Tenet

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Closed by Statute

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/15/2004

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FROM: Dunne TO: Front Office SUBJECT:

FW: Initial responses to statements #5, #6. #7

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/12/2004

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FROM: Allan TO: Zelikow, et al SUBJECT:

RE: Amendment to my earlier message

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

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Dan Marcus From: Sent: To: Subject:

[email protected] Friday, March 12, 2004 7:21 PM Dan Marcus; Steve Dunne Draft letter Levin to Marcus re prepub review (12 Mar 04)bc.doc

Dear Mr. Marcus: We have received the first three staff statements for the Commission's hearing currently scheduled for March 23-24. We are committed to the expeditious review of materials you provide and to the maximum possible public disclosure of information consistent with national security and the important constitutional principles involved. As you know, at Secretary Card's direction, we have taken the extraordinary step of establishing a special high-level review group of senior officials at the relevant departments and agencies to help accomplish this. The Commission, however, also has a responsibility to ensure that this process works properly. As you know, the Commission has committed to providing us with materials prepared by the Commission for public disclosure with a reasonable time to review them so that we can: (i) verify that no classified information is contained in the materials and (ii) determine the extent to which the materials implicate interests protected by the constitutional doctrine of executive privilege (see, e.g., your letter to Thomas Monheim, dated July 29, 2003). Neither of these functions can be performed efficiently and effectively unless the Commission adequately sources and marks its material and provides sufficient time for the process to work. As you know, we discussed the timing issue with you following the review of the last round of staff statements. In particular, as we have previously advised you, it would greatly facilitate our review of these and any future staff statements or portions of your final report if you could: (i) provide a sourced version of the statement (or portion of the report), indicating the documents or other sources for the various statements made; (ii) mark as unclassified only that information the government has provided to you as unclassified; and (iii) mark as currently classified that information which was provided as classified but which you think either should be declassified or should not have been marked as classified when provided. Where you have specific arguments for declassification (or believe that something should not have been marked as classified), it would be helpful if you could provide those arguments when the statement (or portion of the report) is provided. We believe we have organized to efficiently and effectively review the materials you provide and that with your assistance we can achieve our mutual desire for an expeditious and appropriate pre-publication review. Any inability or unwillingness on your part to provide that assistance, however, will jeopardize that goal and significantly impede our ability to conduct an appropriate and timely review. Moreover, in addition to helping facilitate our pre-publication review of the materials, the Commission must properly mark materials derived from classified materials as part of its obligation to protect national security and comply with applicable security regulations. See, e.g., Executive Order 12,958 (as amended). In this regard, we hope that the Commission's Security Officer has reviewed the draft staff statements and approves of their marking and handling. Commissioners and staff, of course, have no classification or declassification authority and may only "derivatively" classify newly produced documents by marking portions derived from documents, interviews, or meetings, at the same level as the original information itself. As you know, we have previously expressed our concern about the Commission's ability and willingness to properly protect privileged, sensitive, and classified information from unauthorized disclosure and advised you that continued access to sensitive and privileged materials depended upon our ability to rely on Commission assurances that it will not disclose information made available by the Executive Branch. We continue to urge the Commission to make as one of its highest priorities the proper protection of such information. Given past incidents, which we have discussed with you, including the reading on

1

jievision of a list of names of U.S. Government intelligence officers, we also urge you co put into place and enforce procedures to ensure that public discussions of information derived from Executive Branch documents, Congressional documents containing classified information, or interviews or meetings with Executive Branch officials, are confined only to topics and particular information which have been provided to the Executive Branch for review and approved. We look forward to working with you to ensure that such safeguards are in place prior to the next round of public hearings. If you are able to provide sourced and marked versions for any of the staff statements for the March 23-24 hearings please do so as soon as possible. In any event, please provide any future staff statements or portions of the report with appropriate sourcing and marking. You should be aware that the provision of such portion marked materials in a timely fashion will be necessary to facilitate Executive Branch clearance both of future staff statements and the Commission's report in a timely fashion. Thank you.

cc:

Thomas Monheim, Associate Counsel to the President Bryan Cunningham, Deputy Legal Advisor to the National Security Council

Statement by the President

http7/www. whilehousc.gov/news/rcleiscs/2001/05/prinl/20010508. html

Click to Print this document President George W. Bush For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary May 8, 2001

Statement by the President Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Protecting America's homeland and citizens from the threat of weapons of mass destruction is one of our Nation's important national security challenges. Today, more nations possess chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons than ever before. Still others seek to join them. Most troubling of all, the list of these countries includes some of the world's least-responsible states — states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. Some non-state terrorist groups have also demonstrated an interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Against this backdrop, it is clear that the threat of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons being used against the United States — while not immediate — is very real. That is why our Nation actively seeks to deny chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to those seeking to acquire them. That is why, together with our allies, we seek to deter anyone who would contemplate their use. And that is also why we must ensure that our Nation is prepared to defend against the harm they can inflict. Should our efforts to reduce the threat to our country from weapons of mass destruction be less than fully successful, prudence dictates that the United States be fully prepared to deal effectively with the consequences of such a weapon being used here on our soil. Today, numerous Federal departments and agencies have programs to deal with the consequences of a potential use of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon in the United States. Many of these Federal programs offer training, planning, and assistance to state and local governments. But to maximize their effectiveness, these efforts need to be seamlessly integrated, harmonious, and comprehensive. Therefore, 1 have asked Vice President Cheney to oversee the development of a coordinated national effort so that we may do the very best possiDie job of protecting our people from catastropjilc~harm. I have also asked Joe Allbaugh, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, to create an Office of National Preparedness. This Office will be responsible for implementing the results of those parts of the national effort overseen by Vice President Cheney that deal with consequence management. Specifically it will coordinate all Federal programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction consequence management within tne Departments of DeYense,~iTealth and Human Services. Justice, and Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, ana otner federal agencies. The Office of National Preparedness will work closely with state and local governments to ensure their planning, training, and equipment needs are addressed. FEMA will also work closely with the Department of Justice, in its lead role for crisis management, to ensure that all facets of our response to the threat from weapons of mass destruction are coordinated and cohesive. I will periodically chair a meeting of the National Security Council to review these efforts. No governmental responsibility is more fundamental than protecting the physical safety of our Nation and its citizens. In today's world, this obligation includes protection against the use of weapons of mass destruction. I look forward to working closely with Congress so that together we can meet this challenge.

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/10/2004

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FROM: Bass TO: Albion, et al SUBJECT:

another Iraq note

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/01/2004

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FROM: TO:

SUBJECT:

WB draft - Preliminary Judgements

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/05/2004

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FROM: Albion TO: Hurley SUBJECT:

FW: cables

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/05/2004

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FROM: TO: SUBJECT:

handwritten notes

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information 9/11 Closed by Statute

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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j^^ESSRESTRICTEDj The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/02/2004

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FROM: Bass TO: Allan SUBJECT:

high-level diplomatic contacts

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE RG: 148 Exposition, Anniversary, and Memorial Commissions SERIES: Team 3,9/11 Commission NND PROJECT NUMBER:

52100

FOIA CASE NUMBER: 31107

WITHDRAWAL DATE: 12/03/2008

BOX: 00002

FOLDER: 0001

COPIES: 1 PAGES:

TAB: 90

DOC ID: 31207978

2

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file: FOLDER TITLE: Final Staff Statements DOCUMENT DATE: 03/01/2004

DOCUMENT TYPE: Memorandum

FROM: Hurley TO: Zelikow, et al SUBJECT:

Team 3's Staff Statements

This document has been withdrawn for the following reason(s): 9/11 Classified Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE