T3 B6 Nsc Interviews Fdr- Notes On Age Of Sacred Terror (chapters 6-8) 046

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The Age of Sacred Terror Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002). 6: A Paradigm Lost -after WTC 1993, some White House, CIA, and other officials start learning curve -old paradigm on terrorism: • fight terrorists to strengthen deterrence; let no one think U.S. will just take it • work with other states to disrupt • use force when sensible • no concessions, pay-offs, appeasement (unlike Europeans and the one deviation, Reagan's calamitous arms sales to Iran) • no major int'l terrorist group had U.S. as its primary target • most groups are state-sponsored or national-liberation fronts • a second- or third-tier nuisance, not a strategic threat p. 220 -average annual fatalities were 26 -less likely than lightning strikes, bathtub drownings, or poisonous bites p. 220 -didn't threaten either U.S. power or large numbers of citizens -Jan. 25/93: Mir Aimal Kansi, lone Pakistani gunman, shoots AK-47 into cars outside CIA HQ in McLean, killing two -Feb. 26/93: Ramzi Yousef attacks WTC in worst foreign terror attack on U.S. soil -June 26/93: U.S. launches 23 Tomahawks at Baghdad's mukhabarat HQ after April 1993 plot to kill former President Bush with car bomb on Kuwait visit -first U.S. reprisal in 7 years, since Reagan's 1986 raid on Tripoli -1994: 30+ killed in Israel by Hamas and PIJ in rage over Oslo -July 1994: Hizballah bombs Buenos Aires Jewish center, killing almost 100 -CT aides see state sponsors as greatest threat -after Pan Am 103, Bush tries U.N. sanctions and int'l pressure to get out of cycle

-Scowcroft: Pan Am 103 might've been Libya's answer to 1986 raid p. 223 -most menacing state sponsor is Iran, by a long shot (Beirut, Argentina, Rushdie) -by 1993, Hizballah has stopped direct attacks on Americans -after Desert Storm, Khameini seeks to cow Gulfies to become hegemon -June 25/90 Khobar Towers attack, killing 19 U.S. troops in Dhahran -biggest truck bomb FBI had ever seen -early intell points to Saudi Hizballah, backed by Iran -Saudis uncooperative -Bandar badgers NSC aides about whether they'll attack Iran and how they'll use any intell that Saudis hand over -even FBI Director Freeh flies to Saudi to increase pressure -Feb. 95: Omnibus Counterterrorism Act introduced; languishes -March 20/95: Aum Shinrikyo attack on Tokyo subway -April 19/95: Oklahoma City -renamed Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 • bans fundraising for groups backing FTOs, which had been legal (!) • tags chemical markers to plastic and other explosives to trace them • gun lobby and right-wing gets stuff removed • civil liberterians join conservatives to block multipoint wiretaps -in 1997, Lugar, Nunn, and Domenici start $50 million/year program to prepare big-city first responders for WMD, amid snickers -June 21/95: Clinton signs PDD-39, starts centralizing CT policy in White House -first major policy document tackling asymmetric warfare -cuts through confusion re CT, consequence management -PDD-39 is handiwork of Richard Clarke, chair of CSG (originally Coordinating Subgroup, later Counterterrorism and Security Group) founded in 1980s -CIA and FBI hate each other

-FBI hates CIA unwillingness to let its evidence be used in court -CIA hates FBI legal attachA©s (legatts) in embassies -FBI assumed Ramzi Yousef was a one-off freelancer; doesn't probe network -Muhammad Salameh returns for the deposit on Ryder truck in WTC 93 -FBI assumes anyone that dumb can't be part of a serious threat p. 238 -June 98: using CIA intell, U.S. Atty Mary Jo White files sealed indictment of UBL -two weeks before embassy bombings; focuses on Somalia -but indictment's kept locked down, so NSC can't use it -in first term, CIA's a mess; Jim Woolsey's a failure til sacked over bungling Aldrich Ames case, then rudderless (briefly John Deutch, then Tony Lake withdraws, then finally George Tenet) -Lake on UBL psycho-profile: "Oh, yes, it's the fiftieth-child syndrome." p. 243 -1996: CIA's CTC sets up "virtual station" to focus on UBL -Feb. 1996: embassy staff in Khartoum pulled out of Sudan, fearing attack -as U.S. leaves, Sudanese try to be more tractable -in DC meetings, senior Sudanese official offers to expel UBL to Saudi -deliberate; know that UBL's family's too prominent to jail him in Saudi -no senior U.S. official knows of any Sudanese offer to give UBL to U.S. -CSG didn't want UBL w/o indictment, when he could vanish -U.S. tells Sudan that Saudis refused to take UBL, and Sudan kicks him out p. 247 -U.S. wants UBL away from Sudanese bases, passport printers, cash, etc. -from 1996 on, terrorism funding rises, using TWA 800 accident as a goad -spend $5.7 billion in 1996; doubles to $11.3 billion in 2001 p. 248 -for 1996 Olympics, Clarke fears big bomb, WMD, hijacked plane -CIA also steps up "renditions," extralegal transfers of criminal suspects -April 1998: Clinton RT on bioweapons increases his personal concern -July 1998: secret Blair House mtg of response agencies on WMD attack 7: The Unknown War

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-Feb. 1998: UBL fatwa "Jihad against Jews and Crusaders" in al-Quds al-Arabi -summer 1998: CIA briefs NSC on intell that al-Qaeda may be preparing VX attack, with soil sample from al-Shifa plant with precursor chemical to VX p. 259 -Aug. 7/98: East Africa bombings kill 224, wound 5,000 p. 258 -reprisal targets: six al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and al-Shifa in Khartoum -launch strikes Aug. 20; intell shows UBL and others at Khost camp -result is "a nightmare": allegations of "wag the dog," idiot WashTimes leak about UBL using satellite phones drives him off them, flood of warnings -after 1998, Clarke mafia sure it's obvious that U.S. itself could be hit p. 262 -start Sxweek NSC "threats mtg" evaluating credible info; flood of info to CSG -after Beirut, posts abroad had slowly ignored Inrnan comm. standards -crash survey of embassies; Congress gets $1.5 billion for upgrades -at least one embassy closed; many had plate glass, not shatterproof -Clinton and Berger interested in hearing of "takedowns" of cells w. foreign help -U.S. has little leverage to get Taliban to surrender UBL -Taliban want to beat Northern Alliance, get world recognition -best U.S. can offer: won't block Taliban entry into world community if get UBL -Sept. 1998: Turki al-Faisal, Saudi intell chief, to Kandahar to meet Mullah Omar -Turki had been UBL's patron in 1980s during Afghan war -Turki says he has screaming match over UBL w. Omar -Saudis downgrade ties: withdraw Kabul amb., expel Talib rep in Riyadh -ASS SAsia Rick Inderfurth meets Taliban reps at least 20 times, 1998-2001 p. 273 -often has SC/T Michael Sheehan along; meet at UN or in Islamabad -Feb. 1999: Inderfurth warns Taliban US will hold Taliban responsible for terror from their turf if they don't hand UBL over to a country where he'll face justice -U.S. can respond "after the fact or preemptively" p. 273 -Taliban try transparent dodges: UBL's a guest, try him in sharia court, etc. -pack of village clerics with no IR experience

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UAE and Pakistanis (only other countries w. ties) to tell Kabul UBL must go

-parade of officials to urge on Pakistanis: Inderfurth, SC/Ts Philip Wilcox and Mike Sheehan, Ambs. Thomas Simons and William Milam, DepSec Talbott, CentCom CINC Zinni, even several Clinton calls to PM Nawaz Sharif -incompetent, corrupt Sharif doesn't deliver -U.S. has few carrots, w. sanctions from nukes -Congress freezes 1980s deal of $658 million for 28 F-16s; keep P's $s & jets -has no control over Pakistani military -U.S.-Pak relations dominated after 1998 nuke tests by Kargil war fears -Kargil may be Pak way to get int'l mediation—cry for help -July 4/99: Sharif in DC for talks w. Clinton -Clinton browbeats Sharif into cease-fire, return to LOG -also lights into Sharif over failure to deliver UBL, ISI working w. Taliban -Pakistanis focus on item #1 on U.S. agenda, nukes, and neglect #2, terror -Oct. 99: Sharif tries to fire army COS Musharraf and is deposed in army coup -Musharraf is an unknown, w. black mark as the architect of Kargil folly -NSC gears up for hits on UBL three times 1999-2001, spins cruise missiles twice -deploys Los Angeles-class subs off Pakistani coast -UBL rarely spends more than one night in same place -but intell is too vague; hunting party turns out to be rich UAE citizens, possible fix on UBL in eastern Afgh. too vague to risk 100s of civilians -Berger's "Small Group": top reps of State, DOD, CIA, NSC on al-Qaeda options -by Nov. 1998, asking Pentagon for more options for future strikes -Clarke wants to bomb broad range, incl. terror camps and Taliban targets -but few good targets; State leery of more bombing after Kosovo, Desert Fox -extensive covert ops in Afgh., incl. working w. militias to catch/kill UBL and CIA operatives in Afgh. before 9/11 -OMB Dir Jack Lew: CIA had all the resources it needed p. 286

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-by 1999, intell ops are rolling up cells; $1.1 billion upgrade of embassy security underway; Treasury/NSC pressing Saudis and UAE on terror financing -Saudis wary on terror funding; see Hamas' Dawa as legit, no oversight of charities' funds, didn't know size of UBL's inheritance, freak out when asked about wealthy Saudis who might be funding al-Qaeda p. 288 -July 4/99: Clinton exec order slaps sanctions on Taliban, freezes assets -symbolic; real imports are only dried fruit and rugs -keeps Taliban away from Afghanistan's $220 million gold reserves in Fed -seized assets of Ariana, Afghan nat'l airline, for flying terrorists -cuts air ties to Gulf, where Afghan drugs were shipped p. 289 -Oct. 99: UNSCR 1267 puts on same sanctions as U.S. already has, 15-0 vote -Clinton, Sheehan, Pickering, and Tenet all get magnitude of the threat -but others don't State -sluggish on NSC order to give threatened embassies WMD response gear -Albright cuts embassy defense funds be. State's so strapped p. 293 -Lew blows up at an undersec and asst sec, gets funds restored p. 293 -Amb. Prudence Bushnell warned earlier that Nairobi embassy wasn't safe -Adm. Crowe's review of the bombings is scathing to State security -State CT bureau had less pull than big regional bureaus -SC/T Sheehan can't get field posts to warn hosts about Islamist NGOs Pentagon -after 1998, NSC sees Tomahawks as too slow -Clinton asks Pentagon for "boots on ground" options to get UBL in Afgh. p. 294 -JCS Chair Hugh Shelton briefs Small Group in Berger's office p. 294 -get memo -offers only "usual two-division, $2 billion option," just like Bosnia -Berger: "They didn't want to do it." -JCS continue to be risk-averse, suspicious of admin, leaders

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-Shelton feels he's being asked to fix intell/diplomacy problem w. military -"We knew this would be mistaken for resistance and that drove us up the wall. We'd love to get that frigging guy." p. 295 -Pickering: Pentagon doesn't see CT as its mission; leave it to FBI, dips, civilians -others in DOD suggest smaller package, since big deployment loses surprise and is tough to sell politically -Shelton is open, but adds a large force protection package -but CentCom CINC Zinni bucks, warning that going into Afgh. could rock Pak. -so no formal planning done for mission to grap al-Qaeda leadership p. 296 FBI -PDD orders FBI to track and surveill terrorists in US, but lax on Islamists -special agents in charge (SACs) want to keep old focus on jailing criminals -FBI doesn't see itself as part of national security apparatus p. 298 -Nixon's Watergate abuses of FBI leave FBI fearing that close ties to national leadership can taint it, so becomes unresponsive to White House concerns p. 299 -Freeh's a bad manager who can't rein in 56 independent field offices -"From the inside, the FBI was a disorganized jumble of competing and unruly power centers; from the outside, it was a surly colossus." p. 300 -worse, Freeh hates Clinton scandals and won't respond to AG Reno -Freeh highly involved in Khobar Towers investigation -stalls fast be. Saudis won't give FBI access to the suspects -Freeh bitter when Clinton encourages Khatami's reformers, fearing that undercuts FBI's quest for the Iranians who Freeh's sure were to blame -Saudis fan Freeh's irritation, esp. Bandar, while barring access -when Saudis let FBI watch via one-way mirror as Saudis ask the suspects the FBI's questions, Freeh credits a call from Bush 41, not Clinton -Freeh can't be fired by Clinton while prez is being investigated -FBI screw-ups: Waco, Richard Jewell, Wen Ho Lee, Hanssen

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-FBI won't give intell on al-Qaeda to NSC, sometimes citing Rule 6E -great exception: John O'Neill, FBI's CSG rep, who dies in 9/11 -replaced in DC by Dale Watson, competent manager (?) -FBI also too PC on investigating Arab-Muslim communities INS -it's "nearly oblivious" p. 307; easy for terrorists to get student visas -Deputy AG Gorelick orders INS to study and fix, but it's gutted -early fall 1999: Tenet briefs White House on possible millenium attacks -Customs catches Ahmed Ressam off ferry in Washington State -for three weeks, daily SitRoom mtgs w. Berger, Tenet, Watson, Reno -Jordanian plot disrupted, galvanizing Mideast govts to crack jihadist cells -Clarke warns that immigration failures were letting people like Ressam's Montreal-based Algerian network get into the country -jeremiad: FBI has too few wiretaps and translators; DOJ not prosecuting terror financing cases; JTTFs not bring prosecutions out of PC fears -after millenium scare, Watson holds Tampa mtg for Clarke and FBI's SACs p313 -Berger: FBI HQ says al-Qaeda has no active US cells, and its sleepers are covered -March 2000: Clinton introduces bill to expand US authority to ban US residents and firms from using banks in countries that aren't stopping money laundering -sails past House, derailed in Senate by Banking Cmtee Chair Phil Graham -Euros doubt size of al-Qaeda threat, see al-Shifa bombing as blunder -suspect weird US desire to create new threat to replace Soviets p. 315 -by early 2000, Taliban hunkering down from sanctions, still backed by Pakistan -S/CT Mike Sheehan urges crackdown on Pakistan: either help us get UBL and close terrorist camps in Afgh., or we get IMF to cut its aid -but US can't drop nukes issue or deliberately bankrupt Pakistan -April 2000: Clinton visit to India, but reluctant to reward Pakistan with stopover -Secret Service digs heels in, fearing jihadist attack on him in Pakistan

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-finally goes to Islamabad in small CIA-run G-5 jet, using API as decoy -raises terror w. Musharraf in small one-on-one mtg p. 317 -Clinton to Shelton: "You know, it would scare the shit out of al-Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of helicopters into the middle of then- camp." p. 318; Shelton blanches -NSC asks for small new military package, but told by JCS it'd be Desert One -Cohen & Shelton's deputy Richard Myers brief Berger & his deputy Don Kerrick -don't want to use Special Forces on risky missions rather than support -underlying problem: Shelton and JCS don't trust Clinton as CINC -on Sunday in 2000, subs spin their cruise missiles for possible UBL strike, but Tenet calls Berger to say, "We don't have it." p. 320 -spring/summer 2000: threat level rises; al-Qaeda more active in Mideast -JCS wants to back off on subs, convinced they'll never get the intell -Clarke, to DOD's surprise, agrees and asks for other options -in particular, he likes DOD suggestion of using Predator flying drone to get UBL -many at DOD dislike using new surveillance tool for intell mission -Clinton eggs Clarke to "do better," so Predator idea gains ground p. 322 -Predator flew 12 times over Afgh.; spotted UBL three times, CIA thinks -Taliban radar tracks Predator, sending MiGs to attack, who zip on by -program suspended over cost wrangles, esp. after one drone crashes -Air Force Sec. Whit Peters steps in to reinstate -Oct. 12,2000: skiff hits U.S.S. Cole in Aden, killing 17 and almost sinking it -audacious; sophisticated "shaped charge" bomb to blast in one direction -1997 NSC memo had warned Pentagon of risks to US ships in port p. 323 -Navy disregarded this, as well as threat from terrorist-infested Yemen -even CINC Zinni thinks it's OK to refuel in Yemen, despite intell on al-Qaeda -strong intuition: it's jihadists & prob. al-Qaeda, but no real intell leading to Afgh. -not enough to saddle new prez w.big strike on Afgh in last days of Clinton term

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8: The Shock of the New -realist Rice in FA: focus on great power threats, tend to terrorism insofar as it's used by rogue states p. 327 Transition -when TNT briefs Rice on UBL, Berger unexpectedly shows up: "I'm here because I want to underscore how important this issue is." p. 328 -Berger tells Rice: "You're going to spend more time during your four years on terrorism generally and al-Qaeda specifically than any issue." p. 328 -Clarke briefs VP Cheney and Deputy NSA Hadley -Brian Sheridan, outgoing ASD-SOLIC, underscores al-Qaeda as "really big thing" in CSG briefing for incoming SecState Powell -tells Rice she needs Clarke; offers to brief; never taken up on it p. 329 -lots of energy for NMD and China, little for CT -Bush's top priority: NMD (incl. scrapping ABM Treaty) -next comes China (incl. multibillion arms sale to Taiwan, EP-3 spyplane crash) -anti-Clinton syndrome; even softer Bushie tone on Iran, to Freeh's horror -OEOB buzz: Rice chews out Freeh for meddling in FP after New Yorker piece -June 22/01: DOJ announces indictment of 13 Saudis, 1 Lebanese for Khobar -mentions unnamed Iranian officials who helped Saudi Hezbollah -Ashcroft promises to go after Iranians -despite Freeh's hatred of Clinton, Bush adopts similar Iran stance -takes six months to confirm an ass't secstate for South Asia p. 332 -took forever to get a new ASD-SOLIC; Rumsfeld fires many career DASes -but both Tenet and Clarke survive the transition, to much surprise -Clarke pushes, but Rice is skeptical of his little bureaucratic empire -NSC reorg, dumping Clarke from Principals Cmtee seat on terror issues -Shelton: Bushies put terrorism "to the back burner," despite Clarke p. 335 -JCS still see al-Qaeda as intell problem but irked CIA can't sow dissent in Taliban

-JCS proposes disinformation op in Afgh., but Rumsfeld & Wolfowitz kill it p. 335 -don't see it as a real military mission; focused on NMD, restructuring -Kerrick, Berger's deputy, stays on for four months in OEOB and sends memo to NSC: "We are going to be struck again." Never hears back p. 336 -Feb. 9/01: intell briefers tell Cheney CIA's concluded al-Qaeda bombed the Cole -Rice asks Clarke to lead interagency review of policy on al-Qaeda~GET THIS -Clarke again pushes three options, all in his Oct. 2000 options paper 1. Predator -Clarke champing, but new NSC wants full assessment -CIA/DOD bickering over who pays for it -Roger Cressey oversees crash program to arm it w. Hellfire missiles -testing time costs chance to fly Predator over Afgh. in spring 2001 -in Nevada, Cressey watches Predator fry replica of UBL Kandahar home -whose finger on trigger, CIA or USAF? what chain of command to fire? 2. field proxy force to fight UBL -Uzbekistan volunteers, but CIA wary of getting in bed w. dictator -Clarke hopes Bushies will go for it 3. arm Ahmad Shah Massoud's Northern Alliance -hadn't happened under Clinton; Russia and Iran sent plenty of arms, cash -Clintonites thought NA too small, Tajik, corrupt, despite heroic Massoud -also wary of getting dragged into outright war in Asia -until '98 bombings, even Clarke buys this, but then he shifts -most Clinton aides still turn down Clarke requests for guns and $ -at Treasury, O'Neill doesn't fund tracking center for terror funding -at DOJ, Ashcroft asks OMB to ask Congress to boost funding for 68 programs—but doesn't ask for more terrorism funding -suggests cutting $65 million from grants to help buy first-response gear

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-doesn't endorse FBI request for $58 million for 400 CT agents p. 340 -little threat reporting in first months of Bush admin. -late spring 2001: surge in activity among known al-Qaeda operatives p. 340 -May: CTC head Gofer Black says Abu Zubaydah helping plan attacks p. 341 -CIA suspects overseas targets: Israel, Saudi, Rome, US bases in Turkey -CSG warns of a pending "spectacular" qualitatively unlike any earlier attack -Tenet briefs Rice and Hadley at White House in high alarm p. 341 -in Gulf, U.S. troops' threat condition raised to Delta, highest level: lock & load -June: Fifth Fleet put to sea from its harbor in Bahrain -all domestic law enforcement agencies warned re chance of attack -July 4/01: FBI, Customs, FAA, Coast Guard, Secret Service emergency briefing -FBI asked again to better surveill al-Qaeda linked people -FBI tells 18,000 state/local law enf. agencies of credible, unspecific threat -FAA alerts every airline and airport p. 342 -in July, reduce Gulf troops' threat level, after more than a month -Mubarak: Egypt intell says al-Qaeda plans to attack Bush at July G-7 in Genoa -plane laden w. explosives would crash; airspace closed, AA guns poised -after Genoa, intell flows slows, although TNT and CIA still warn of threat -Aug. 4/01: Bush leaves for month's vacation in Crawford -Clarke's review is ready for Principals, but to give time and get Powell there, decide to take it up shortly after Labor Day p. 343 -hope is to win a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD, Bushies' FDD) -Deputies Cmtee agrees: goal isn't "rolling back" al-Qaeda but "eliminating" 343 -CIA now warmer on Uzbeks, still opposed to NAlliance, cooling on Predator (still incomplete record, but CIA worries: saps $ for human sources, Hellfires not deadly enough, rather have USAF fire it lest CIA agents' lives be endangered) -USAF: if we're bombing UBL, we'd use B-52s, not some lame drone... -Sept 4/01: first Principals mtg on al-Qaeda (all there, ex. Wolfowitz for Rumsfeld and OMB Deputy

Dir. Sean O'Keefe for Mitch Daniels) -OMB and CIA asked to figure out more help for Uzbeks, NAlliance -Tenet urges activism on al-Qaeda but don't have DCI order Predator fire -White House aides: decision to fire is president's, not DCI's -JCS Chair Myers: we'd use cruise missiles; if it's a covert op, give to 1C -meeting ends with no decision on armed Predator, no strategy to Bush -German intell and law enf. hadn't taken US fears of al-Qaeda seriously p. 346 -didn't do any follow-up, let suspects wire money to 9/11 terrorists -old INS system missed chances to flag files of WTC pilots Atta and al-Shehhi -FBI assigns most new personnel hired to do CT tohandle cybersecurity p. 349 -July 2001: FBI Agent Kenneth Williams of Phoenix office asks HQ to investigate Islamists training at U.S. flight schools, warns of Abu Zubaydah link p. 347 -Aug. 16/01: Moussaoui arrested outside St. Paul -FBI HQ blocks field request for FISA warrant to check his laptop -FBI never tells White House or CSG about the arrest -Aug. 21/01: CIA tells INS that two hijackers should be on terrorist watch list -both IDed on surveillance tape meeting al-Qaeda operative in Malaysia -INS tells FBI and CIA both al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi are in U.S. -FBI claims did its best to find them, but never tells NSC or CSG p. 347 -Nov. 2001: armed Predator kills military chief Muhammad Atef