T2 B10 T3 Presentation To Commissioners Fdr- Power Point- Overview For March 04 Public Hearing 692

Overview

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U.S. Cou

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irbrisrh Policy

Team 3 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Briefing Intent Review hearing's purpose and agenda Explain the staff investigation — -

Clarify the big questions Highlight staff findings Explain the lines of inquiry Clarify "redlines"

Clarify desired outcomes Answer your questions COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Hearing Overview Purpose: Investigate the formulation and conduct of U.S. counterterrorism policy, with particular emphasis on the period from the August 7,1998 embassy bombings to 9/11. Issue: What options did senior officials consider and what choices did they make before 9/11? Importance: Understand how senior officials from the past two administrations handled the threat to the United States from terrorism, Bin La din, and al Qaeda. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Topics & Witnesses DIPLOMACY Madeleine Albright Colin Powell THE MILITARY William Cohen Donald Rumsfeld INTELLIGECE POLICY • George Tenet NATIONAL POLICY COORDINATION • Samuel Berger • Richard Clarke • Richard Armitage (White House witness) COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Diplomacy: The Big Questions What was the State Department's diplomatic strategy for ending the Afghan safe haven for al Qaeda before 9/11? When did key fpreign policy decisions arise, such as imposing sanctions on the Taliban? What factors influenced senior officials in making them? What challenges had to be overcome in leveraging influential states such as Pakistan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan in fighting al Qaeda? What diplomatic efforts were undertaken before 9/11? What lessons can we learn about the limits of diplomacy as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy? COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Diplomacy: Staff Findings U.S. officials used a range of measures to pressure the Taliban to cease harboring Bin Ladin. But the Taliban held firm, both before and after 9/11. U.S. officials pressed Pakistan to demand the Taliban hand over bin Ladin or, failing that, to cut off its support to the Taliban. But, Pakistan aid not alter its ties with the Taliban until after 9/11. The United States pressed the UAE to break ties with the Taliban and enforce Security Council sanctions. But these efforts achieved little before 9/11. Saudi Arabia worked closely with us to end the Afghan safe haven for Bin Ladin. But before 9/11 we could not get adequate cooperation on sharing intelligence and disrupting finances of al Qaeda. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Diplomacy: Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines Lines of Inquiry • • • • • • •

Strategy: How did the diplomatic strategy against al Oaeda change after the embassy bombings of August 7,1998? Kev Decisions: What factors influenced State Department thinking on key foreign policy decisions, such as containing the influence of the Taliban in the region? Taliban: How did we pressure the Taliban to hand over Bin Ladin? Pakistan: What efforts were taken to enlist Pakistan's support for pressuring the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin, or cutting its ties? Saudi Arabia: How well did Saudi Arabia cooperate with us in pressuring the Taliban or cutting off support for al Qaeda? Limits of Diplomacy: At what point was it clear that diplomacy alone could not close al Qaeda's safe haven in Afghanistan? Hindsight: What diplomatic steps, if any, were not taken before 9/11 that should have?

Red Lines •

Private sensitive discussions with friendly foreign officials COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The Military: The Big Questions What strategies and plans did senior officials ask the Pentagon to prepare to fight the al Qaeda threat before 9/11? When did key decisions arise? What factors influenced senior officials regarding the use of U.S. military force against al Qaeda and the Taliban? What military operations were conducted (or set aside) to defend the nation against the growing threat of al Qaeda before 9/11? What lessons can we learn about the U.S. military as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism policy?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The Military: Staff Findings • From the August 1998 cruise missile attacks until after 9/11, the U.S. military did not conduct operations against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. • The Pentagon prepared options to use force in Afghanistan, but operational and policy considerations led to reliance on the "default option" of cruise missile strikes. • Military officials were reluctant to conduct Special Operations in Afghanistan due to its difficult operational conditions. • Senior Clinton officials set aside cruise missile strikes against bin Ladin on at least three occasions due to lack of suitable intelligence, unacceptable collateral damage, and other unwelcome consequences for U.S. interests in the region. • The consensus of U.S. officials is that a large-scale military invasion of Afghanistan did not have the support of either the Congress or the American people before 9/11. • After the attack on the USS Co/ef neither administration ordered a military response against al Qaeda. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The Military: Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines Lines of Inquiry • • • • • •

Strategy: Did the Pentagon have a military strategy to defeat the al Qaeda terrorist threat before 9/11? Kev Decisions: What factors influenced senior officials on using force, including criticism of the cruise missile attacks of August 20,1998? Why was there no response following the Cole attack? Military Planning: What was the state of planning to conduct military operations in Afghanistan before 9/11? Actionable Intelligence: Why was this a recurring problem? What did the military do to get the intelligence needed for conducting a stand-off attack against Bin Ladin? Reluctance: Why was the Pentagon reluctant to use Special Forces against al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Support to Diplomacy: What efforts did the military take to strengthen the credibility of U.S. threats against the Taliban?

Red Lines • •

Specific capabilities and deployments of military forces Current intelligence and military operations against al Qaeda COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Intelligence Policy: The Big Questions •

How did the CIA implement U.S. counterterrorism policy through clandestine and covert action programs against Bin Ladin in Afghanistan before 9/11?

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What clandestine and covert action strateaies and plans to attack Bin Ladin and his lieutenants did the CIA develop before 9/11? Were they implemented, and if so, to what effect?

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Did the CIA have the authorities to attack Bin Ladin and al Qaeda effectively?

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Were the CIA's capabilities to attack Bin Ladin and al Qaeda adequate to accomplish the required tasks?

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What lessons can we learn about the DCI's role as a policy advisor and the effectiveness of covert action as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Intelligence Policy: Staff Findings Before 9/11 no agency did more to attack al Qaeda than the CIA. The CIA developed successive covert action programs using particular proxies to conduct operations against Bin Ladin and to provide intelligence on al Qaeda activities. Proxy operations were not fruitful before 9/11. Proxies proved problematic. They needed training and equipment to conduct operations. Their reliability was uncertain. Their intelligence reporting was questioned by CIA officials. CIA developed a plan to get better intelligence. But it never put its own personnel on the ground in Afghanistan to remedy intelligence shortfalls, in part due to the enormous dangers there. An inability to provide "actionable intelligence" hindered efforts to use the U.S. military effectively in Afghanistan. The recon Predator offered a new capability to help solve the actionable intelligence problem. However, after initial flights in fall 2000, the recon Predator did not fly in Afghanistan until after 9/11. The armed Predator was not technically ready for operations in Afghanistan until a few weeks after 9/11. Covert action had operational limitations and was not a "silver bullet." COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Intelligence Policy: Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines" Lines of Inquiry • • • • •

Strategy; How did CIA's covert action strategy for attacking Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in Afghanistan evolve before 9/11? Authorities: Did CIA have the authorities it needed and wanted in order to go after Bin Ladin and al Qaeda in Afghanistan? Capabilities: What were the practical limitations of relying on proxies in Afghanistan, and how were these conveyed higher? Missed Opportunities: Were there missed opportunities to get Bin Ladin? When and why? The Predator: Why did CIA officials resist resuming recon Predator flights before 9/11? Could senior Bush officials have gotten armed Predator flying before 9/11?

Red Lines • • •

Open discussion of capture vs. kill authorities Specific covert operations and their authorities Sources and methods COMMISSION SENSITIVE

National Policy Coordination: The Big Questions How well did the U.S. national security system adapt after the Cold War to address emerging national security threats, particularly terrorism? How the President organize his interagency policy formulation and coordination bodies to ensure effective national policy implementation in dealing with the al Qaeda threat? How serious a threat did senior officials think al Qaeda posed to the U.S. before 9/11? Did our leaders truly grasp the danger? What strategies did senior officials employ to fight the al Qaeda threat before 9/11? Were key departments ana agencies wellpostured and adequately resourced to carry out these strategies? How well intearated were the instruments of U.S. powerdiplomacy, military force, covert action, etc.-to achieve policy aims before 9/11? What mechanisms were used to coordinate agency actions? Were all the pistons firing? What were the key policy decisions before 9/11? How were they made? Were opportunities missed to disrupt al Qaeda? What lessons can we learn for the future? COMMISSION SENSITIVE

National Policy Coordination: Staff Findings The U.S. national security system was designed for the Cold War, not for the emerging threat of terrorism with global reach. Each administration organized interagency advisory bodies in layers with the NSC at the top led by the President. The Clinton administration relied on a "Small Group" of principals to make decisions on al Qaeda. The Bush administration relied on the Deputies Committee and Principals interaction before 9/11 to conduct a policy review of the al Qaeda threat. A common institutional criticism of the U.S. national security system was the lack of integration of law enforcement. The Millennium period was an exception to the rule that the FBI was not a full team player. A national strategy to fight al Qaeda needs to be comprehensive, integrating all instruments of national policy, including the military, and such a strategy needs to link to agency capabilities and resources. Agency priorities to fight terrorism were influenced by how senior agency officials grasped the danger of al Qaeda. Threat periods were handled by surging agency capabilities, but fundamental institutional improvements were slow.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

National Policy Coordination-Lines of Inquiry & "Red Lines" Lines of Inquiry • Threat Priorities: Did senior officials truly grasp the urgent gravity of the al Qaeda threat, relative to other pressing security issues? Al Qaeda was a priority; but was it high enough? • Strategy: How did each administration use major strategy documents to advance U.S. counterterrorism policy? Did senior officials match intentions to actions, ends to means, and resources to goals? • Key Decisions: How did senior officiate make decisions on fighting al Qaeda including covert action, military force, diplomatic coercion, the cole, the Predator, and so on? • Interaaencv Mechanisms: How were interagency mechanisms and practices used to integrate agency efforts? How effective were the national coordinator, the CSG, the Deputies Committee, and the Small Group? • Aaencv Capabilities: Were State, Defense, and the CIA capable of fighting the emerging threat of al Qaeda, or were these agencies still postured to deal with past threats?

Red Lines • Private advice to the President (for current officials) • Specific discussions of covert action (per guidelines) COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Desired Outcomes The American public is better informed about how senior officials from both administrations dealt with this emerging threat to our national security. Commissioners are able to: • Understand how U.S. counterterrorism policy was formed and implemented before 9/11. • Formulate recommendations for U.S. counterterrorism policy and strategy to make America safer and more secure. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

National Policy Coordination: The Big Questions •

How well did the U.S. national security system adapt after the Cold War to address emerging national security threats, particularly terrorism?

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How the President organize his interagency policy formulation and coordination bodies to ensure effective national policy implementation in dealing with the al Qaeda threat?

•

How serious a threat did senior officials think al Qaeda posed to the U.S. before 9/11? Did our leaders truly grasp the danger?

•

What strategies did senior officials employ to fight the al Qaeda threat before 9/11? Were key departments and agencies wellpostured and adequately resourced to carry out these strategies?

•

How well integrated were the instruments of U.S. powerdiplomacy, military force, covert action, etc.-to achieve P9licy aims before 9/11? What mechanisms were used to coordinate agency actions? Were all the pistons firing?

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What were the key policy decisions before 9/11? How were they made? Were opportunities missed to disrupt al Qaeda?

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What lessons can we learn for the future? COMMISSION SENSITIVE