T3 B18 Jenkins Dod Reports 1 Of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Outline- Benjamin And Simon- Military 021

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Benjamin and Simon - Military Weeks before the Embassy bombings and based on intell UBL acquiring WMD, "targeteers" from the intelligence agencies and the Pentagon were ordered to draw up a list of potential targets for a US military strike and made recommendations 1. forwarded to Principals 2. A group of six terrorist camps was selected 3. Reno concerned if the strikes were proportional and met the requirements of self-defense under Article 51 4. Others know US not normally pursue a strategy of preempting threats militarily 5. Concern be/ decision to attack another country rarely made based on clandestine intelligence 6. Reno did not vote but the rest recommended destroy al-Shifa 7. August 20 chosen be/ reports UBL and senior leadership of al-Qaeda would be meeting that day [B&S, p. 259-260] Following the strike 1. press picked apart the administration's case for striking al-Shifa and controversy erupted over whether Clinton was trying to "wag the dog" 2. the principals realized after the strike that they had to be prepared to use force again, no matter how relentless the criticisms over al-Shifa had been 3. WH ordered Navy vessels armed with CM to remain on station in the Arabian Sea ready to fire if credible intelligence arrived concerning bin Laden's whereabouts 4. The military did not like this mission: disrupted scheduled cruises and training and left ships in the middle of nowhere 5. Los Angeles class attack subs remained on duty off the Pakistani coast the remainder of the Clinton administration Cruise Missiles 1. before Block III Tomahawk CM can be fired, it needs to spin in gyroscopes and set its guidance system 2. over 15 months after the embassy attacks, the NAC geared up for an attack on UBL three times and missiles were actually spun twice 3. Clinton was ready to pull the trigger 4. First time missiles were spun: 1C received work about an elaborate camp pitched in the desert. Collective feeling: Bingo! Had to be UBL! However, one more box had to be checked. Needed a second confirmation to be certain who owned the camp. After al-Shifa, no one could face a real miss. The order to spin was held, while CIA tried frantically to find out more. Word: the camp was not UBLs. The subs were told to stand down. 5. Second time missiles were spun: information arrived that put UBL in one of his compounds in an eastern Afghan city. Again presence not confirmed. No way to know how long he'd be there. He rarely spent moe than

B.Jenkins

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on night in one place. After spinning, CM needed several hours to reach destination, a long delay if you wanted to hit someone who moved to often. Another complication: the compound was near buildings filled with people. Hundreds would die. Without greater certainty UBL would be hit, collateral damage a larger concern (not decisive concern). "The inability to get good intelligence on bin Laden's movements became a source of unremitting frustration." [B&S, p. 282]. After strikes. Berger asked military for more targets in case of another attack 1. 11/98, WH began asking Pentagon for more options 2. Clarke argued for bombing a broad range of sites but intell and military found no suitable targets. Not much after 20 years of warfare in Afghanistan 3. Berger hesitant about bombing campaigns. Odds of getting UBL were low and a failure make US look impotent and its target invincible 4. Another problem: in 98-99, US conducted Kosovo and had sustained bombing in Iraq (Operation Desert Fox). Policy makers (esp. State Dept) and foreign criticism of that and US seen as the world's mad bomber. This could not be ignored though Berger prepared to act when intell was solid. NSC wondered by CIA did not produce - why no new assets were cultivated and why CIA's paramilitary forces were never even brought into discussion 1 .had a reputation as out-of shape former members of the military's SO Command and understanding in the WH that the Agency did not have great confidence in them. 2. WH told Tenet that covert operations against Al-Qaeda should not be limited be/ of resources. WH was skeptical of airpower and asked for more expansive military options in late 1998 1. CM good be/ kept US troops out of harm's way, but have a limited punch and took six hours to get a Presidential authorization to fire, then program the missiles, spin their gyroscopes, and finally fly them to the target, time in which UBL might depart. [B&S, p. 294] 2. Clinton wanted to hear about boots on the ground 3. Shelton briefed a Small Group meeting in Berger's office overlooking the WH front lawn and rattled off factors as to what military would require 4. There was no reliable information about UBL whereabouts at any given time, was a great deal of uncertainty about the environment that the troops would be entering, no good staging area in the region, closing off a large area would require tens of thousands of troops (meaning a lot of lift and large transport planes and sizable number of air-refueling tankers), need S&R, etc. The absence of a staging area made operating in Afghanistan genuinely difficult. "A canonical option." 5. This was not what was hoped for. Small group wanted to show what America's special operations forces could do. Instead, saw the military as

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opposed. Berger not happy with where the military came out. There was no creativity and enthusiasm. Pentagon position 1. Civilian leaders (except Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen) felt the Pentagon was blowing them off when they badly needed a solution 2. Shelton annoyed be/ he felt the administration's political leadership was looking to the military to solve a problem of diplomacy and intell; unrealistic expectations were being heaped on the uniforms 3. Shelton, "it was frustrating for us, and frustrating for everyone. We never had the intell." 4. The Pentagon was reluctant because they did not see CT as their mission. That was a matter of police, FBI, intelligence and diplomacy 5. Military believed NSC and State wanted to correct every problem with them as cannon fodder. [B&S, p. 295] Military differences 1. Within the Pentagon, less unanimity 2. Some experienced officers in JCS believed a mission was feasible and necessary, though not without risks 3. Knew a large package with a major deployment was a political nonstarter and would forfeit the element of surprise 4. They sketched out options that would have been small, stealthy and lethal and could have been staged from a US base in the region 5. Shelton said to believe idea had merit but wanted force protection package which would increase the no. of troops involved but not to the point impractical 6. The immovable roadblock came when the notion was put to the Central Command 7. Zinni made many objections to the proposal, arguing an attack on Afghanistan would rock the region, especially Pakistan 8. CINCs very powerful; it would be hard for Shelton to turn Zinni around 9. The trial balloon sank fast; no formal planning for a mission to capture al-Qaeda leadership was carried out - whatever the Principals may have thought. Rekindled desire for military plans [B&S. p. 318] 1. In 2000, a new desire for military options to end the UBL problem began 2 Clinton approached Shelton about "a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of helicopters into the middle of their camp." 3. NSC followed up with a request for a new military plan that did not require using the entire 101st Airborne Division (a small plan) 4. Cohen and Meyers later went to the WH and briefed Berger and Kerrick

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5. Military wanted help - Cohen and Meyers were also eager to act but the answer to the request for a small operation was that it would be Desert One the 1980 attempt to liberate American hostages in Tehran, resulting in incineration of two helicopters and deaths of eight servicemen 6 Military doctrine called for special operations forces to be used in support of other units 7. Reluctant to use Special Forces in risky operations that are prone to disaster, embarrassment and casualties Special Forces 1. 2.

after Desert One, military improved its special forces capacities 1990's - military theorists turned their attention to asymmetric warfare, large sums of money poured into SOCOM 3. Delta Force and Navy Seals developed into highly skilled, unconventional fighting forces and trained for a variety of terrorismrelated contingencies 4. But Chief very cautious about using them (reluctance to use them in Bosnia to capture war criminals irritated policymakers). [B&S, p. 319]

White House Reaction 1. suicidal

reluctant to make the military undertake a mission it saw as

Military Reluctant? 1. military establishments almost always conservative 2. military leaders unlikely to drastically revise their special forces doctrine 3. according to one former senior political appointee at the Pentagon, the military was particularly unwilling to go out on a limb for Clinton 4. decision to end discrimination against gays in the military and killing of Army servicemen in Somalia still in the memory of the military 5. Shelton and Powell believed Clinton did not have the guts to fight a war 6. "I think the Pentagon became more nervous and timid because they thought Clinton was - and so they would not put forward risky plans in a serious way. By the end, they just didn't believe." They wrote him off as taking strong action. Submarine Deployments 1. Rotation of submarines in Arabian Sea continued waiting for intelligence 2. Once more in 2000 a report arrived that detailed bin Laden's whereabouts

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3. 4.

Tenet said to Berger, "we don't have it." JCS decided to see about submarine deployments be/ believed the intell needed for a CM was not going to materialize 5. Believed submarine deployments an exercise in futility 6. Without better intell, the vessels should be brought home 7. Military ordered to draw a list of possibilities 8. What emerged included the unfeasible to the absurd 9. One appealed to Clarke: use a forty-nine-foot unmanned flying drone called the Predator 10. (See Predator sheet)

USS Cole 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

Showed how lightly the US military had been taking the threat of terrorist violence Navy disregarded prior admonitions and know threat conditions in Yemen (second only to Afghanistan on the list of states infested with terrorists) Commander of naval forces in ME, Commander Kirk Lippold, failed to deliberately plan, deliberately implement and actively supervise a force protection plan." [B&S, p. 324]. Navy had virtually all the entire body of intell on al-Qaeda and disregarded it Zinni also responsible. Regional commander and approved the decision to refuel in Yemen No response: to launch a military strike against targets in Afghanistan on the basis of nothing more than a strong intuition would have gone well beyond any US military precedent Any military action would have constrained the next President's room for maneuver and committed him to a policy he had not chosen No one believed it was right to encumber the new President with unfinished military business in Afghanistan (lesson from Bosnia and Somalia) On February 9, 2001, intelligence briefers told Cheney that the CIA concluded that al-Qaeda was responsible for bombing the Cole.

Bush Admin vs. Clinton Admin 1. Unspoken rule.. .its policies should contrast sharply with those of the previous administration, which was spoken of with contempt. All had to be changed. 2. Clinton admin came into office with strong views - about the need for US to act in a world with multilateral backing, about the role of IL, about using force only when sanctioned by the UN. 3. Military leaders who remained in office say terrorism moving farther to the back burner (Shelton) [B&S, p. 332, 335)

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Under Shelton 1.

Under Shelton, the JCS did not come up with more military options

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8.

Still a strong belief al-Qaeda was first and foremost an intelligence problem Chiefs were frustrated by the lack of CIA information operations - disinformation operations - to create dissent among Taliban. Last year of Clinton administration the JCS started developing a project of their own, they planned to launch in 2001. However, when they were briefed, the Pentagon's new leaders killed the project. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were against the Joint Staff having the lead (says Shelton) They have taken away tasks that the armed forces had taken on in recent years, but they did not consider being military missions, and this included disinformation projects. Missile defense and military restructuring were the key issues Rumsfeld's attention was on military doctrine, including existing guidelines that US forces needed to be able to fight two wars.

Clarke's options (military) FB&S. 3381 1. Predator 2. Proxy force into the field against UBL (the CIA not enthusiastic about too close a relationship) 3. Arm the Northern Alliance. Nothing short of a commitment of US air and possibly ground support could make the difference for the Northern Alliance. Few wanted to bind the US to an unpredictable bunch. A slippery slope to full-scale war in Asia. No one could image presenting the US with a war over a threat they knew so little about and did not view a critical 4. After the Embassy bombing, Clarke accepted this. As time passed, he began to lobby harder for support to the NA, believing that if Masssoud's forces could tie down more Taliban an al-Qaeda fighters, that could only benefit the US 5. He remained in the minority under Clinton.