T3 B18 Jenkins Dod Reports 1 Of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Notes And Quotes- 1-16-02 Gellman Interview Of Hadley (w Ivo Dalder)

  • Uploaded by: 9/11 Document Archive
  • 0
  • 0
  • May 2020
  • PDF

This document was uploaded by user and they confirmed that they have the permission to share it. If you are author or own the copyright of this book, please report to us by using this DMCA report form. Report DMCA


Overview

Download & View T3 B18 Jenkins Dod Reports 1 Of 3 Fdr- 7-23-04 Jenkins Notes And Quotes- 1-16-02 Gellman Interview Of Hadley (w Ivo Dalder) as PDF for free.

More details

  • Words: 947
  • Pages: 3
07/23/04

B.Jenkins

Interview with Stephen Hadley by Bart Gellman, Washington Post. Jan 16. 02: Focus on the Military Notes that The Plan and strategy was developed before 9-11. As of September 4, the military as part of the plan was to have the option to use military force against the Taliban and al Qaeda. P. 565. P. 557 We had a meeting, a deputies committee meeting on April 30th. And we addressed what's our overall approach to al Qaeda. We talked about what we could do to increase our aid to the Uzbeks. We talked about what we could do to increase assistance to the Northern Alliance. We talked about going after, more aggressively, al Qaeda's fundraising. And we talked about the need for a public diplomacy strategy to go along with this. The direction to the military (as part of the plan) was to create these options both against Al Qaeda and against the Taliban. This is based on the decision of September 4, and it was ready for the President's signature. They wanted the military to go against al Qaida and their leadership command, control, communications and training facilities. They also wanted the military to develop options for targets against the Taliban, including leadership, command and control, ground forces and logistics. There was a diplomatic front end. P. 566. It was clear at that point that you're not going to get Al Qaeda without tackling the Taliban. This was about terrorists and those that give them safe haven. You either had to get the Taliban to give up al Qaeda or you were going to have to go after both the Taliban and Al Qaeda, together. You must either brake them apart or go after them together. P. 566. Are you really prepared to show some seriousness of going after this, or your're not - and one of the things - again, I know it's outside September 11th, but - the planning that we are calling for is, as you can see, as I describe it, you can't do all those things just with cruise missiles. If you are going to do the things I describe and what the military was chosen - was directed to plan for, you are going to have to use air forces and you are going to have to use ground forces. And that's what they were told to do. P. 567 You've got to be serious about it, you can't say no casualties and stand off weapons only, you've got to go in and put boots on the ground and American young men and women at risk, in order both to get the job done and also to show that you're serious about it. And that's really what the President - those are the two things that I think characterize the approach of the administration. You've got to deal with both Taliban and al Qaeda. And having read to you the tasking that the military was given, you can only do that with all of your military forces. You can't just do it with the cruse missiles.

07/23/04

B.Jenkins

It is a phased strategy that we lay out. And in some sense, whether you have to use the military option is going to depend in some sense whether the first part of your strategy fails or succeeds. The other thing I would say is that the covert piece, what George has asked, planned and then prepared to do, is also much more robust and involves putting people in country and putting them at risk. P. 571. The very last thing. I reported that the last administration forward-based the submarines and the AC 130, in case they got a lead on where bin Laden was. I also - what I didn't report, but I now know is they took those offline before they left. And I hear that they were not put back on line before 9/11 and I wonder about that. If I could add, the Predator's ready, the armed Predator is shown to work by June, but doesn't get deployed. So that's what I'm trying to capture here. Strike asset.. .that's forward-based.

Interview with Ivo Dalder Notes on the military: Dalder: The primary mission of the Guard should be homeland defense. DoD is doing fine otherwise. NORTCOM is good in responding. DoD will do whatever it is told to do. It will do it well. However, it is not a player in homeland security and should be. 80% of intelligence assets are in DoD. 3 days after the Embassy bombings, I saw Clarke who stated we would put boots on the ground. There was a recommendation to put boots on the ground (Special Forces) and Shelton did not disagree. However, TLAMS were chosen instead. Without Monica, we could have done something. They knew who did it. There was a window but the Monica issue closed that window. It was impossible for him. Even the strikes he did do were condemned. After the Cole, (only 17 sailors), there was no way we could bomb between October 12 and November 5 because of the elections. Gore was behind. To have bombed would have been difficult. After November 5 you can bomb. Interestingly, there was a presidential debate between Bush and Gore the night after the Cole and the Cole did not come up once! There are two assumptions in national security policy that should be challenged: 1. the military only fights wars overseas. The US is the only country that its military does not defend its borders. 9-11 questioned that validity. 2. The primary enemies can be destroyed from a long distance and with great precision. Not necessarily the case.

Related Documents


More Documents from "9/11 Document Archive"