T3 B18 Jenkins Working Docs 2 Of 3 Fdr- 11-29-03 Jenkins Outline- Information On The Predator 015

11/29/03

Unclassified

Information on the Predator In early Summer 2000, there were a number of military options floating around. One that captured the attention of Clarke was the use of the forty-nine-foot unmanned flying drone, the Predator, armed with precision video and infrared cameras, to locate bin Laden. (B&S, 321). The Predator was one, the use of a proxy force into the field against UBL was the second and arming the Northern Alliance forces was the third. There were different objections to this idea: 1. Pentagon folks did not like the idea of the new battlefield surveillance system being adapted for an intelligence mission. 2. CIA voiced opposition, "They had to cram it down the throat of the Agency." 3. DO of CIA concerned because it is paramilitary and would "screw up my relationship with the host government." (B&S, p. 321) 4. Some in intelligence believed it intriguing and backed the idea. In the summer of 2000, first round of tests conducted in the US to acquaint the 1C with the Predator's capabilities. 1. flight tests over Afghanistan began in September 2. the drone failed to take off properly in first test 3. another was sent afloat and Clarke later shown a videotape of Arabs and someone likely to be UBL. A CD of this tape was shown to Clinton and Berger The Predator flew twelve times over Afghanistan 1. one flight was aborted 2. most of the missions dedicated to viewing sites UBL believed to frequent 3. three times believed they spotted UBL, twice on film shot by the drone and once in real time as he emerged from his house outside Kandahar 4. In DC, a debate began over if that was UBL 5. Later, Taliban radar tracked the drone and MiG fighters were sent to intercept it. These failed and fly right past the drone 6. The tests ended in October as winter arrived in Afghanistan and a battle began in DC over the future of the program Money issues 1. After the first drone crashed, there was a bill to pay 2. CIA had not budgeted for this and did not want to compensate the Pentagon 3. Program was suspended: who would cover further costs - satellite time for relaying pictures for example - was unclear 4. Price tag approximately $200,000. 5. In December 2000, Secretary of the Air Force, Whit Peters, found the money but the future of the program was not assured. [B&S, p. 322-323] Clarke remained interested in the Predator 1. the program was not yet back on track, despite successes

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11/29/03 2. CIA and DOD continued to argue after AF paid for the damage to earlier one 3. The two argued as to who would pay for lost craft in the future - CIA did not want to pay. [B&S, p. 336 4. CIA was still unsure, but backed the idea of trying to arm the drone (see below) Nature of the program 1. the nature or the program changed 2. discussions began about adding a weapon on the Predator 3. Why: if can see UBL in real time and fire a missile, that would take seconds to strike 4. Problem: launching cruise missiles and not knowing if the target would remain in place for hours would disappear Weaponizing the Predator 1. Air Force began experimenting with mounting a Hellfire C missile - a laser guide, hundred-pound air-to-surface missile- on the craft 2. however, now, the Predator would not fly over Afghanistan in the spring, as planned, and so could not provide the possible second thread of intelligence indicating UBL's whereabouts 3. not enough drones or technicians to handle them do to reconnaissance and testing at once 4. the submarines had been taken off station in the Arabian Sea 5. Any near term chance of striking terrorists with CM was foreclosed. 6. The armed predator idea was originally slated for 3 years of testing and modifications before it was deployed 7. Clarke and Cressey worked on the AF to compress the program and complete in 3 months (Cressey also wanted to get the Predator into action) 8. Tests for the drone were conducted in late spring and early summer 9. Cressey watched the Predator test in Nevada and thought the outcome excellent (watched the Predator fire from thousands o feet at a replica of UBLs house outside Kandahar Hold-ups 1. Test not enough to get the Predator deployed to Afghanistan 2. raised a host of issues discussed for months following 3. Whose finger on the trigger when the Predator went after UBL — the AF or CIA? If the Predator's control unit was in another country, would that country's permission be required to fire the missile? What was the chain of command for such an operation? Who would issue the decision to fire - the CIA? White House? IF the White House, who in the White House? Did there have to be a list of approved targets if the President was not readily available? [B&S, p. 338] Change in CIA's position 1. The Agency's position on the Predator had changed by the Summer of 2001

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11/29/03 2. its enthusiasm for the Predator had waned 3. individuals at Langely did not want responsibility for the program, despite strong advocacy of prominent people in the 1C for the program 4. Record of the debate in incomplete 5. CIA obstacles a. Objected that the Hellfire missile had not done enough damage t the mock UBL house b. A bigger drone was needed to ensure sufficient destruction c. DO argued it wanted to use the money to push harder for human sources d. WH responded that it thought the DO had enough money for that purpose e. Argued it was not appropriate for CIA to operate the Predator. The responsibility belonged to the Air Force, which deployed aircraft that carried ordinance f. DO heard to say if used with lethal force and responsibility for this laid at the CIA's doorstep, it would endanger the lives of CIA operatives around the world g. the AF responded that if it had the mission, it would use B-52s and not "some spindly drone." h. The generals raised other issues: where could UBL be targeted? Could he be hit in a mosque? What about the issue of the placement of the control unit in a foreign country? i. "Predator was a hornet's nest." [B&S, p. 344] First Principles Meeting to discuss As-Qaeda, September 4, 2001 1. Rice asked, who is going to run it? Would it do the job? 2. raised at the meeting the Hellfire missile was not a penetrator and there was concern it would hit the roof of a structure and not destroy the target 3. Monitors the SF used scored the test at somehow below the 85% kill probability that was desirable 4. AF wanted more testing. The first shot was the best the US would get. 5. Who would operate the Predator? a. Tenet: it would be a mistake for CIA to operate and fire a weapon. "Over his dead body." b. WH responded - that decision is for the President c. Meyers: if we do it, we'll do it with CM. If it is CA, it belongs to the 1C. d. "Any possibility of agreement was slipping away." 6. What about an operation for reconnaissance only and not an armed Predator a. Tenet: more palatable, but CIA still needs to review the matter 7. Test another weapon besides the Hellfire? a. Who would fire an armed Predator was deferred. "The meeting ended. There was no decision on Predator and no strategy to forward to the President." [B&S, p. 346]

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11/29/03

November 2001 1. The armed Predator flew over Afghanistan 2. it identified a house where a large al-Qaeda meeting was taking place 3. Navy F/A-18 fighter were alerted and bombed the house 4. Predator fired two Hellfire missiles when the inhabitants emerged 5. Milled Muhammad Atef, al-Qaeda's military chief for nearly a decade. [B&S, p. 349] Rotation of submarines in Arabian Sea continued 1. once more in 2000 a report arrived that detailed bin Laden's whereabouts for a brief window of time 2. Missiles were spun. Tenet called Berger and told him, "We don't have it." Interview with Stephen Hadley by Bart Gellman Hadley notes that the Predator was armed and shown to be able to work by June 2001 however, it did not get deployed.

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