T2 B24 Aircraft As Weapons 1 Of 2 Fdr- Undated Report- Aviation Security 1950-2000 671

Aviation Security 1950-2000 Threat and Response The threat to civil aviation over the last 25 years has not diminished. It remains a dangerous world. The number of incidents worldwide of unlawful interference with civil aviation, primarily hijacking and sabotage, have decreased over the last 25 years, while the number of flights, enplanements and passenger-miles flown by scheduled air carriers have increased. As graphically demonstrated by the two most recent hijackings, however, this decrease in the number of events does not minimize the tragedy of these crimes. Governments, airlines and airports must work together cooperatively to achieve our common goal: safe and secure air transportation worldwide. When hijacking was an all too frequent occurrence in the late 1960's and 1970-71, air carriers voluntarily cooperated with the Federal Government on measures to counter the threat, but not without some concern. One history describes the situation at the time as follows: "The airlines as a group had consistently argued that combating hijacking and airport security were largely Federal responsibilities. They had therefore fought for Federal operation and payment for anti-hijacking programs. The airlines were especially unhappy about the prospect of their employees physically searching passengers or engaging in any other activities normally assigned to law enforcement officials. Most were, therefore, pleased with the infusion of Federal agents under the sky marshal program. When it became clear that security systems would have to be extended to virtually all of their boarding areas, the airlines began an intensive lobbying campaign for an expansion of the existing Federal security force to handle the operation."1 Criminal acts against civil aviation are not committed exclusively by terrorists. Most crimes against civil aviation have been committed by mentally deranged persons, or fugitives and would-be refugees who resorted to hijacking only as a means of transportation with no clear intention of harming the aircraft or its occupants. Others are more deadly. In 1955, a United Airlines aircraft disintegrated in flight 11 minutes after takeoff near Longmont, Colorado. A dynamite bomb detonated in a baggage compartment, killing 39 passengers and five crew. One J. Graham was arrested, tried, and executed for the crime, for which the motive was insurance fraud.2 Another incident of sabotage over Bolivia, North Carolina, in early 1960 killed 34 passengers and crew and was also related to insurance fraud. A ceiling on the amount of airline trip insurance passengers can purchase was imposed, and

1 Kent, Richard J., Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961-1972," U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1980, pp. 349-50. 2

President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, "Report to the President," Washington, DC, May 15,1990, p.160.

baggage screening was improved. Domestic airline sabotage declined until there were no fatal incidents in the 1970 's.3 In 1969, Eastern Air Lines voluntarily agreed to an FAA test of an "operational screening system for boarding airline passengers" with "weapon-detection devices" used in conjunction with "FAA's evolving psychological profile to identify and isolate suspicious individuals for further surveillance or search."4 Eastern was joined later in that year by TWA, Pan Am, and Continental in "using the screening system."5 The sharing of the costs of passenger screening was then and has continued to be a topic of debate and divided opinions. A solution found in 1972 was to require air carriers to provide screening personnel and the airport operators to provide law enforcement support. On March 18, 1972, Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 107 was issued requiring each airport operator to implement prescribed security measures by developing and observing an airport-specific security program. Part 107 has been amended on several occasions. On January 15, 1981, Title 14 CFR part 108 was issued to separate air carrier security requirements from part 121, which contains general safety requirements for large transport category aircraft. Historically, the threat of hijacking has been directed toward large passenger-carrying aircraft. The security requirements needed to protect those aircraft were placed in this new part 108 with applicability to scheduled and public charter passenger operations. While there were 134 domestic hijackings between 1961 and 1972, and seven explosions aboard commercial aircraft between 1955 and 1976 in , | these domestic security incidents did not contain clearly "terrorist" elements until a hijacking at LaGuardia Airport in September 1976. A group called "Fighters for Free Croatia" hijacked a TWA flight bound for Chicago. After stops in Montreal, Quebec; Gander, Newfoundland; and Iceland for refueling, they dropped leaflets over London and Paris landed in Paris and surrendered.6 Ironically, the perpetrators believed that security screening was tight at LaGuardia and decided to use simulated explosives made from material smuggled on board rather than traditional weapons, which probably would have been discovered. The group met the profile and triggered more than usual rigorous searching. The ruse was bolstered by a genuine bomb that had been planted in a New York subway locker; the hijackers notified police, and the bomb exploded during examination.7

Rochester, Stuart I., "Takeoff at Mid-century: Federal Civil Aviation Policy in the Eisenhower Years 1953-1961," U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington DC, 1976, pp. 262-3 & 275.

3

Kent, Richard J., Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961 - 1972," U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, 1980, p. 338. The recommendations and the test were devised by the FAA Task Force on Deterrence of Air Piracy, created by Acting Administrator Dave Thomas on February 17, 1969.

4

5

Id., p. 340.

St. John, Peter, "Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism," Quorum Books, New York, Westport, Connecticut, and London, 1991, p. 31.

6

Preston, Edmund, "Troubled Passage: The Federal Aviation Administration During the Nixon-Ford Term 1973-1977," U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1987, pp. 215-17. This incident should not be confused with the self-service baggage locker bombing at LaGuardia Airport in New York on December 29, 1975. See also: Moore, Kenneth C., 7

In the 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Senator Cannon, Chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, introduced the "Air Transportation Security Act of 1973" as S.39, "A Bill to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to provide a more effective program to prevent aircraft piracy and for other purposes."8 For most of the last 25 years, the executive branch of the Federal Government has maintained that providing security is a cost of doing business, which should be borne by the air carriers and airports just as they bear the cost of ensuring safe operations. The most authoritative statement of this position was recorded during the hearings in February and March 1973, which led to amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, now codified in title 49, United States Code. These amendments were contained in two related titles of Public Law 93-366: title I--the Antihijacking Act of 1974, and title II--the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974. In those hearings, the views of a high-ranking Transportation Department official clearly indicated that the users of civil aviation should bear its costs, and those costs explicitly included those derived from the application of security measures.9 Through the 1970's and into the 1980's, concerted action by the world aviation community reduced the number of hijacking attempts. A number of approaches to the problems caused by the threat of terrorism and other criminal acts against civil aviation were taken in those two decades. They include: • •

more effective passenger and baggage screening; imposition of contingency or extraordinary security measures in special circumstances; • worldwide use of x-ray and metal detection equipment; • increased use of other, more advanced screening and detection devices; • in-depth assessments of U.S. and foreign airport and air carrier security; • the U.S. Federal Air Marshal Program; • tightened control of access to aircraft and security sensitive areas; • increased research and development of explosives detection and other security technologies; • improved analyses of intelligence on terrorist activities; and, • better technical assistance and training. The 1980's saw a change in the nature of violent acts against aviation. Hijacking, seemingly the preferred form of criminal and terrorist "Airport, Aircraft, and Airline Security," Second Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann, a division of Reed Publishing (USA), Inc., Boston, London, Oxford, Singapore, Sydney, Toronto, and Wellington, 1991, pp. 28, 165, and 389. S.39 was introduced on January 4, 1973. Senator Cannon then noted that there were more than 1,700 Federal security officers on duty at U.S. airports. 8

"Anti-Hijacking Act of 1973": Hearings on H.R. 3858, H.R. 670, H.R. 3953, and H.R. 4287 (and all identical or similar bills) before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong. 222 (1973) (statement of Hon. Egil Krogh, Jr., Under Secretary, Department of Transportation), February 27, 1973. See also Kent, Richard J., Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961 - 1972," U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, 1980.

9

activity, was joined once again by the placement of explosive devices aimed at the total destruction of aircraft, passengers, and crew. The vast majority of criminal and terrorist acts against civil aviation J during this decade occurred overseas rather than in the United States. M \f(W* Some believe the decline in hijacking may have been due to more , ,«-c ' effective security at airports.10 In any case, the threat has broadened H J to include the introduction of bombs aboard aircraft and murderous J^ attacks within airports. The following terrorist incidents are ^ illustrative examples of what FAA seeks to prevent through effective security measures efficiently applied: June 13, 1985: Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 847 from Athens, Greece was hijacked. The hijacking lasted 17 days before the terrorists released the aircraft and its remaining hostages in Beirut, Lebanon. U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was killed by the hijackers. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83, Title V, Pt. B) was enacted soon thereafter. It established security standards and procedures concerning foreign air transportation; required the Secretary of Transportation to conduct assessments of security measures at foreign airports; and, designated Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), standards and appropriate recommended practices, as the guidelines that must be used by the Secretary of Transportation.11 June 23, 1985: Air India Flight 182 from Toronto and Montreal to India crashed at sea after an explosion in the front cargo hold, probably caused by a bomb. All 329 passengers were killed, including 22 U.S. citizens. The same day at Tokyo's Narita Airport, a checked bag being transferred from a Canadian Pacific to an Air India flight exploded, killed two baggage handlers and injured others.

s K

November 23, 1985: An EgyptAir flight was hijacked enroute from Athens to Cairo and diverted to Malta. An Egyptian commando unit stormed the plane after several passengers were shot, including three Americans, in reprisal for failing to meet hijacker demands. A total of 59 of 96 passengers died in the gun battle and fire. December 27, 1985: Simultaneous attacks occurred at two European airports against passengers and the general public in open terminal areas. Sixteen people were killed and 74 wounded at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci International Airport including five Americans; three persons were killed and 45 wounded at Vienna's Schwechat International Airport. April 2, 1986: A bomb placed onboard TWA Flight 840 detonated enroute from Rome, Italy. Four passengers were killed but the aircraft made a safe landing in Athens, Greece.

(I,

May 30, 1986: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Canadian authorities uncovered a terrorist conspiracy to bomb an 10 Simon, Jeffrey D., "The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism," Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1994, pp. 349-50 and 396-99.

" FAA Security Specialists conduct these assessments and provide their findings to the Secretary through appropriate channels.

Air India jet departing from JFK International Airport. Five individuals were charged with sabotage, but only two were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. September 5, 1986: Terrorists assaulted Pan American (Pan Am) Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan as the aircraft waited to depart. The four terrorists were dressed similar to airport security personnel and drove a van resembling an airport security vehicle alongside the aircraft. The flight crew was able to escape while the terrorists stormed the aircraft. After 17 hours of negotiations, the aircraft's auxiliary power unit failed. Anticipating an attack by security forces, the terrorists opened fire on the massed passengers killing 22 persons and injuring 125 others before security forces could intercede. November 29, 1987: A bomb on Korean Airlines Flight 858 detonated over the Indian Ocean. All 115 persons onboard were killed.

T5 ^~

pril 5, 1988: Kuwait Airways Flight 422 was hijacked enroute from Bangkok, Thailand. The hijackers left the aircraft 15 days

\-\r in Algiers, Alg

release prisoners in exchange for hostages. The hijackers had killed two Kuwaiti passengers to emphasize their demands. December 21, 1988: Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed in flight by a omb placed in checked baggage. All 243 passengers and 16 crew n board, plus 11 persons on the ground at Lockerbie, Scotland were killed. Subsequent inspection of the reconstructed aircraft determined that a device consisting of plastic explosives inside a tape cassette player was concealed in checked luggage. Individuals working for the Government of Libya are responsible for the bombing. One conspirator was the former manager of the JLibyan Arab Airlines (LAA) office in Valletta, Malta and retained vfull access to the airport. Using this access privilege and Dther knowledge gained as representatives of LAA, the conspirators bypassed security checks at Valletta's Luqu airport md inserted the suitcase containing the bomb into baggage of an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, Germany.

p I? '—

September 19, 1989: Union de Transport Aeriens (UTA) Flight 772 * was destroyed by a bomb over Chad, nine months after the Pan Am P 103 explosion over Lockerbie. All 171 persons on board were killed, including seven Americans. November 11, 1989: A bomb placed onboard Avianca Flight 203 (5> petonated over Columbia in the cabin area destroying the aircraft lin-flight. One hundred and seven passengers and crew were killed. July 19, 1994: An Alas Chiricanas Airline plane exploded in flight over (? ,/ Banama, killing all 21 people on board, including three U.S. citizens. December 11, 1994: On Philippine Flight 434, a bomb detonated enroute to Tokyo from Cebu. One passenger was killed. Investigation of this act revealed an increased threat in early 1995 to U.S. carriers operating in the Asia-Pacific region. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef has been indicted for bombing Philippine

\? ^

Airline Flight 433, for conspiracy to bomb U.S. flag aircraft, and for bombing New York's World Trade Center in February 1993. December 24, 1994: In one of the most provocative terrorist acts in history, a hijacking may have included the intent to destroy Air France Flight 8969 in-flight over Paris. While on the ground at Houari Boumedienne International Airport, Algeria, Air France Flight 8969 was commandeered by four terrorists armed with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and explosives. The four gunmen wore what appeared to be Air Algerie uniforms and displayed airport identification. The hijackers killed three passengers. French counterterrorism forces stormed the aircraft at Marseille Marignane Airport; all four hijackers were killed. Improvised explosive devices were found on the aircraft, leading to speculation that the hijackers intended to blow up the aircraft over Paris. In addition, individual acts of revenge or criminality must also be prevented since the consequences of such acts can be just as deadly as those spawned by terrorism. For example, on December 7, 1987, Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) Flight 1771 crashed after a recently terminated airline employee boarded the Los Angeles-San Francisco flight with a handgun, shot one passenger (his former supervisor), the flight crew, flight attendant, and presumably himself. As a result, all 38 passengers and five crew on board were killed. The fired employee retained his airline ID after his dismissal and used it to bypass the passenger screening checkpoint. On August 14, 1990, a man armed with a .38 caliber revolver entered the Ogden Allied Services garage at Washington, D.C.'s National Airport, and held several employees at gun point. He was a former employee at Ogden and had voluntarily left his job. He commandeered a fuel truck, forced an Ogden employee to drive onto the air operations area and fired several shots at a second Ogden fuel truck, wounding two persons. He was in possession of 30 to 40 rounds of ammunition when he was arrested. A Molotov cocktail was recovered from the commandeered fuel truck, and several others were found in the gunman's vehicle. On May 7, 1995, at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport, a man armed with a 7.62mm Norinco SKS rifle attempted to enter a secure area through a door in the baggage claim area. Unable to gain access, the gunman fired several rounds, shattering several panes of plate glass, and then proceeded through the terminal firing his weapon. The gunman then exited the terminal to a public driveway, exchanged fire with responding police officers and was shot three times before being apprehended. Three persons were injured by flying debris, but none seriously. The weapon used appeared to have been altered to fire automatically and the gunman was in possession of 90 rounds of ammunition. The gunman I never gained access to sterile or secure areas of the airport.

The Bombing of Pan Am 103 It was the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland during a flight from Frankfurt on December 21, 1988, that stimulated the most significant changes in aviation security since the early 1970's.

"Libyan agents struck again, according to U.S. intelligence, on Dec. 23, 1988, when Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed by a bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two hundred and seventy people died in the terrorist incident." (Washington Post: "Terror Strikes: Palestinian Terror and the Rise of Libya" © Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company) In February 1989, Secretary of Transportation Skinner attended a Special Session of the ICAO Council called as the result of a joint U.S./U.K. initiative to specifically address the sabotage of Pan Am Flight 103. Nine other ministers responsible for civil aviation attended, as well as representatives from 23 other Member States. During the session, the 33-member ICAO Council unanimously adopted a resolution describing a high priority plan of action to review and improve all existing international standards applicable to all operations. It also considered developing a set of extraordinary measures for use when increased threat levels exist. ICAO agreed to encourage States to expedite research and development on the detection of explosives and explore the possibility of establishing an international regime for the marking or "tagging" of explosives to facilitate detection, which resulted in a treaty signed and ratified by the United States. On April 3, 1989, Secretary of Transportation Skinner announced several aviation security initiatives after an intensive internal review of the U.S. aviation security system and after meeting with the families of the Pan Am 103 victims, the Congress and the President. These included: deployment of explosives detection systems (EDS); improvements in the FAA security bulletin process; deployment of additional FAA security specialists overseas; elevating standards for x-ray and metal detection equipment; creation of an Aviation Security Advisory Committee; a comprehensive review of carrier compliance with the extraordinary security measures required on December 29, 1988; and discussions with foreign governments. On August 4, 1989, the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was created by Executive Order 12686, its Charter completed

and submitted to the President by DOT. Its objective was to conduct a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy options to prevent terrorist acts against civil aviation with particular reference to the destruction of Pan Am 103. Many hearings were held. The Commission's report was issued on May 15, 1990, and has been reviewed in detail by the Departments of State and Transportation, other government agencies and the industry. Its recommendations formed the basis of many of the provisions of the Aviation Security Improvement Act Of 1990 (P.L. 101-604) .

The crash of Flight 103, which had been full of Americans heading home for Christmas, left a crater in the ground at Lockerbie. Investigators combed the countryside for clues. (CORBIS/Bryn Colton)

iAviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 On November 16, 1990, the President signed Public Law 101-604, the Aviation Security Improvement Act, which strengthened the role of the Federal government in civil aviation security including a number of actions recommended by the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. The Act mandated regulatory responses, security program guidelines, establishment of new positions, Congressional reports, and other research and development, and administrative initiatives. All actions assigned to FAA have been completed in a good faith attempt to meet both the letter and the spirit of the Act. The results were structured to ensure that all views were taken into account while still carrying out the law. Listed below are five themes that cover elements of the 1990 Act. ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL: Since the Act, both the Office of the Secretary and the FAA have specialized organizations that handle aviation security. Both are headed by senior executives who report lirectly to the Secretary or the Administrator. Concerns about security are not filtered. There are 18 Civil Aviation Security

Liaison Officers (CASLO) overseas to cover foreign airports and 19 Federal Security Managers here at home stationed at our largest and busiest U.S. airports (Category X). All report to the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. FAA published rules that improve air carrier and airport security personnel education, training and performance, establish employment standards, and provide for employment investigations and criminal history record checks for those requiring unescorted access to sensitive areas of an airport. RESEARCH, ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT (R,E&D): FAA increased the intensity of explosives and weapons detection and aircraft hardening research programs, and expanded the scope of work, particularly by developing a comprehensive human factors program. An R,E&D Scientific Advisory Panel of independent experts was established to critically examine the program and provide advice to the FAA. Threat assessments are taken into account when making decisions about program priorities. INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ASSESSMENT: Guidelines were developed and published for airline employees on reporting threats, for public notification of threats and for threat notification of flight and cabin crews. At the same time, procedures to minimize the number of individuals having access to security threat information were developed. Intelligence community cooperation and coordination has been enhanced. Intelligence reports are routinely received and analysis of information is shared efficiently. Effective liaison with the intelligence community is in place. FAA has full time liaison officers at the FBI, the CIA and the State Department. EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEMS (EDS): The final performance criteria for bulk explosives detection systems and the certification test plan with independently developed test protocols were published in 1993, after the assigned deadline but meeting the requirements for testing mandated by the law. The first EDS, the InVision CTX-5000, was certified in December 1994 and was operationally tested in three airports in accordance with the Act. TECHNICAL AIRPORT AND AIR CARRIER SECURITY ISSUES: A review and revalidation of foreign air carrier security programs to determine whether or not they provide a similar level of protection was completed. Joint FAA/FBI threat and vulnerability assessments of major U.S. airports were completed and comprehensive security plans were prepared for each major airport. Improvements in cargo and mail security were made. Guidelines were published on incorporating good security practices in airport construction and renovation. The key to any effective aviation security system is the vigilance and abilities of the people staffing the screening checkpoints. To aid screening personnel, FAA is not only conducting aviation security human factors research, but evaluating better equipment, improving training, and modifying procedures to make air carrier personnel more effective and efficient.

The Domestic Aviation Security Baseline The aviation system within the United States has been on alert since 1995, and security measures overseas have been adjusted a number of

10

times since then. Increased security measures contained in previously agreed contingency plans have been in effect within the United States since the spring of 1995. The decision to increase security was based upon information provided by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, combined with an analysis of the state of affairs at the time. It was reasonable and prudent to ensure that proper measures were in place to deter or prevent all foreseeable terrorist or criminal acts against transportation. On August 9, 1995, Secretary of Transportation Pena asked the FAA to direct airports and air carriers within the United States to begin implementation of increased security measures, and on October 1, 1995, called for even more stringent measures. Many adjustments to these measures have been made. Stringent security measures have been in place for flights departing the United States for overseas locations for many years. In part because of disruptions in airline and airport operations caused by contingency plan-based security measure adjustments, the FAA and the Office of the Secretary of Transportation in 1995 and 1996 worked through the National Security Council to focus U.S. Government attention on the need to revise the domestic aviation security baseline. This effort culminated in the creation by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) of the Baseline Working Group (BWG) on July 17, 1996. Deputy Secretary of Transportation Downey and Congressman Oberstar both addressed the plenary ASAC meeting and strongly endorsed improving aviation security in this manner. The destruction of TWA Flight 800, which followed by only a few hours the BWG's creation, accelerated a process already underway.

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security President Clinton established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security chaired by Vice President Gore on July 25, 1996, and directed that preflight security inspections be conducted on all overseas international flights: "every plane, every cabin, every cargo hold, every time."12 A preliminary report by the Baseline Working Group was completed and provided to the Commission on August 30 in support of the President's call for an initial White House Commission report by September 9, 1996. The BWG was able to provide important data and analyses on aviation security to the "Gore Commission" from its inception to its final report. The final report of the ASAC Baseline Working Group was published on December 12, 1996." The White House Commission published its final report on February 12, 1997. The primary FAA focus in the late 1990' s has been to implement the White House Commission recommendations and the provisions of the 12 White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President at Hangar 12, JFK International Airport," July 25, 1996. 13 BWG, "Domestic Security Baseline Final Report," Washington, DC, December 12, 1996, pp. 78-79. This report contains sensitive information and is not available to the public. It is subject to the provisions of 14 CFRpart 191. No part of it may be released without the express written permission of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1), Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591.

11 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, which funded many of the Commission's initial recommendations dealing with aviation security. The Two-Year Agenda for DOT'S National Security Goal states that the goal is to "advance the nation's vital security interests in support of national objectives such as the National Security Strategy, National Drug Control Strategy, and economic growth by ensuring that the transportation system is secure and available for defense mobility and that our borders are safe from illegal intrusion."14 First among the outcomes to be achieved is to "reduce the vulnerability and consequences of intentional harm to the transportation system and its Implementation of the recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security16 is the DOT Flagship Initiative designed to achieve this important goal. Among the most important recommendations are: improve checked baggage and checkpoint screening by deploying advanced security technologies; develop federal standards and procedures for certification of security screening companies and training of security screening personnel; strengthen security through consortia and partnerships with airport, airline and law enforcement personnel; conduct unannounced, realistic operational tests of security systems; and, enhance controls on access and movement in secure areas of airports.

The Current Aviation Security System The mission for the FAA in civil aviation security is to protect the traveling public in air transportation throughout the world and provide for the integrity of the civil aviation system. FAA oversees a complex system composed of trained Government and private sector personnel, properly maintained and calibrated equipment, and appropriate procedures to provide multiple layers of security from the airport perimeter to the aircraft. The Office of the FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security develops and implements regulatory policies, programs, and procedures to prevent criminal, terrorist, and other disruptive acts against civil aviation; protect FAA employees, facilities, and equipment; ensure FAA employees' suitability to serve in positions of trust; ensure the safe transportation of hazardous materials by air; assist in interdicting unlawful drugs and narcotics coming into the United States; and support national security. The FAA is responsible for establishing and enforcing regulations, policies, and procedures; identifying potential threats and appropriate countermeasures; deploying Federal Air Marshals on selected U.S. air carrier flights; and providing overall guidance to ensure the security of passengers, crew, baggage, cargo, and aircraft. FAA personnel 14

Department of Transportation Website, lnip://www.dot.gov/onedot/fla jjsec.htm. August 26, 1999.

15

Id.

16

White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Washington, DC, February 12, 1997, available on: http://www.aviatkmcommission.dot.gov.

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monitor and inspect air carrier and airport security, taking compliance and enforcement measures, such as finding violations and assessing civil penalties when necessary to maintain discipline in the system. The FAA also has a responsibility to protect its own assets, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the safety and security of the commercial aviation system. FAA facility and National Airspace System security issues support the ability of the FAA to accomplish its mission. These latter security responsibilities are among those addressed by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which was established in July 1996,17 and published its final report in October 1997.18 In addition, the FAA must ensure that designated personnel at air route traffic control centers, terminal radar approach control facilities, and other staffed facilities are properly trained and equipped in matters related to security and that they meet the standards of integrity necessary for them to perform their security duties in support of the National Airspace System. Security is taken into account during the design and refurbishment of FAA facilities. The FAA strives to provide for effective air traffic control voice and data communications security, and ensure effective navigation system security, including that of the Global Positioning System. The Office of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security maintains close ties to its customers: private sector air carriers; State and local governments and airport authorities; facility and air traffic control elements of FAA; and the traveling public. The current organizational structure is the result of exhaustive review and analysis by many entities since 1989. Many functions are codified in law. In addition to policy, intelligence, and operations functions, the organization's work includes aviation security training at the FAA's Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, Oklahoma City, and the responsibility for guiding the aviation security research and development program conducted at the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City. The Office of Intelligence and Security in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation coordinates security and intelligence within the Department of Transportation.19 Consultation and coordination between the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security and the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security is close and continuous.20 Cooperation among modal security elements has been encouraged and improved by the formation of a Department of Transportation Security Working Group under the leadership of the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security.

" Executive Order 13010 of July 15, 1996, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (1996). 18 The Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, "Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures," Washington, DC, October 13, 1997.

19

Section 101 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Public Law 101-604, November 16, 1990.

20

Id., section 103.

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The FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence provides intelligence analysis of the threat to civil aviation as the basis for determining the application of aviation security measures. This is accomplished by synthesizing intelligence and threat information into products such as security directives, information circulars, and threat assessments. These products are needed by the operations and planning offices for ruling on carrier amendments to approved security programs, determinations of foreign airport security effectiveness, and support in changing regulations. The highest level of security is applied in specific situations when there is credible and specific threat information. The FAA, in consultation with the aviation industry, has developed contingency plans that make it possible to implement only those security measures applicable to specific threat situations. , .receives , and, The Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence analyzes all information regarding potential or direct threats to civil aviation. The information can be original or from other centers of analysis, classified and open source. It comes from agencies of the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities, foreign government authorities, and private sector elements. To keep abreast of rapidly changing threat situations worldwide and to determine their relevance to civil aviation, FAA intelligence analysts stay in contact with their counterparts in other agencies and with FAA special agents in field -offices. Decisions to impose additional security measures result from coordinated effort among operations, policy, and intelligence specialists, U.S. and foreign air carriers, and airport operators. Aviation security threat information and additional security requirements are disseminated to U.S. airlines and airports by official FAA communications called "information circulars" and "security directives," respectively, under section 108.18 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR §108.18), as well as other written and oral communications. The Department of State, pertinent U.S. Embassies, foreign government security officials, and others may also receive these communications. FAA information is passed to airline crews by their companies. If a specific and credible threat cannot be thwarted and security measures cannot counter it, either the specific f light (s) will be canceled or public notification will be made by both the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Department of State for international flights, or by DOT for domestic flights. Finally, to review FAA' s responsibilities in customer service terms, the services listed on the next page are those provided by the FAA to industry in the field of aviation security.

15 These services enhance the overall security posture of U.S. air carriers through deterrence and many other ancillary benefits not directly related to terrorism prevention or Federal regulations. Air carriers bear the primary responsibility for applying security measures to passengers, service and flight crews, baggage, and cargo. Airports, run by State or local government authorities, are responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and for providing law enforcement support for implementation of airline and airport security measures. There are about 100 entities conducting screening at airports in the United States. These include units conducting screening at small airports, air carriers that conduct their own screening, and the large screening companies.21 Five of the largest screening companies employ approximately 64 percent of the estimated 18,000 screeners nationwide. At least 16 different companies, including two air carriers, conduct screening at the 19 Category X22 airports. The baseline security required of air carriers and U.S. airport operators represents an effort to match the level of security with FAA's best estimate of the level of threat. The goal is to allocate industry and government resources efficiently to protect commercial air carrier operations. The Aviation Security Contingency Plan mentioned earlier allows the FAA and the aviation industry to respond promptly to security emergencies, focusing on those measures that effectively counter threats while taking into account local conditions. Any change in the prevailing threat must be addressed by an adjustment to the baseline. Air carriers also must counter other crimes unrelated to air terrorism, such as theft and fraud.23 Air carriers' security are inherently broader than the prevention of terrorism, and security programs deal with more than is required by Federal Regulations.

piracy or interests their Aviation

Aviation Security, Terrorism and National Security In the 1986 report of his task force on terrorism, then Vice President George Bush asserted that the United States views terrorism as a threat to the national security.24 A logical evolution of this view could lead An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on Certification of Screening Companies was published in the "Federal Register" at 62 Fed. Reg. 12724 (1997) on March 17, 1997; the comment period closed on May 1,1997. Comments were received and analyzed, a draft NPRM prepared, and concurrence scheduled for February 20, 1998. Having a reliable and consistent way to measure actual screening performance was critical. It was decided to add more specific screening improvements to the rule based on data gathered by threat image projection (TIP) systems. On March 4, the FAA decided to withdraw the ANPRM, and a notice to that effect was published on May 13, 1998. Special evaluations by field agents were conducted to validate data gathered by TIP, which was found to be a reliable means of measuring performance. The NPRM was published on January 5, 2000.

21

Category X airports are generally among the busiest and most complex of all U.S. airports. Category I airports are also among the busiest airports, followed by progressively smaller airports in Categories II, III, and IV. The precise definitions of each category and the identification and location of airports within each category are sensitive information subject to the provisions of 14 CFR §191.1 et seq. 22

23

President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, May 15, 1990, p. 46.

Bush, George, "Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism," Washington, DC, February 1986, p. 7. 24

16 to the conclusion that the Federal Government should be responsible for the costs of combating terrorism, just as it pays for the cost of providing for the common defense of the Nation. In the late 1980's, a former Administration official extended this view further, including "freedom of the air," meaning the maintenance of civil aviation security, as a vital national interest.25 Several years later, Senator Lautenberg, who had been a member of the post-Pan Am Flight 103 President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, expressed similar views in his opening statement at a hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee on August 1, 1996: "Congress, our Nation's airlines, and our airports have been unwilling to make the investments necessary to protect the public. Terrorism is an act of war against an entire nation, with civilians on the tragic front lines, and we have got to confront it with the same commitment and fervor that we must reserve for other threats to our national security. "26 Ambassador Morris Busby, former U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, agreed during testimony at the same hearing, saying: "...the idea that aviation security is a national security issue has received a lot of support around this room today, and I am absolutely 100 percent in support of that."27 President Clinton and members of his Administration have made statements of policy indicating that the security of civil aviation should be treated as a matter of national security. In a speech at George Washington University on August 5, 1996, President Clinton stated: "We cannot reduce the threats to our people without reducing threats to the world beyond our borders . That's why the fight against terrorism must be both a national priority and a national security priority. We have pursued a concerted national and international strategy against terrorism on three fronts: first, beyond our borders, by working more closely than ever with our friends and allies; second, here at home, by giving law enforcement the most powerful counterterrorism tools available; and, third, in our airports and airplanes by increasing aviation security."2B

"The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103: A Critical Look at American Aviation Security": Hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong. 34 (1989) (statement of Mr. Noel Koch, President, International Security Management, Inc.). 25

"Aviation Security": Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 13 (1996) (statement of Senator Lautenberg).

26

27

Id., p.86 (statement of Morris D. Busby, President, BGI Inc.).

White House Press Release, "Remarks by the President on American Security in a Changing World," at George Washington University, Washington, DC, August 5, 1996. 28

17

On September 9, 1996, when receiving the initial report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security from Vice President Gore, the President reiterated this theme by saying: "We know we can't make the world risk-free, but we can reduce the risks we face and we have to take the fight to the terrorists. If we have the will, we can find the means. We have to continue to fight terrorism on every front by pursuing our three-part strategy: First, by rallying a world coalition with zero tolerance for terrorism; second, by giving law enforcement the strong counterterrorism tools they need; and, third, by improving security in our airports and on our airplanes."29 The White House Commission, in recommendation 3.1 of its final report, stated: "The federal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, and provide substantial funding for capital improvements. The Commission believes that terrorist attacks on civil aviation are directed at the United States, and that there should be an ongoing federal commitment to reducing the threats that they pose. "30 In section 314 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-264), the Senate appears to endorse these views, stating the "Sense of the Senate Regarding Acts of International Terrorism." After finding that "...there has been an increase in attempts by criminal terrorists to murder airline passengers through the destruction of civilian airliners and the deliberate fear and death inflicted through bombings of buildings and the kidnapping of tourists and Americans residing abroad," section 314 states: "It is the sense of the Senate that if evidence establishes beyond a clear and reasonable doubt that any act of hostility towards any United States citizen was an act of international terrorism sponsored, organized, condoned, or directed by any nation, a state of war should be considered to exist or to have existed between the United States and that nation, beginning as of the moment that the act of aggression occurs."31

29 White House Press Release, "Remarks by the President during White House Commission on Aviation Safety Announcement," the Oval Office at the White House, September 9, 1996.

White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Washington, DC, February 12, 1997, p. 27.

30

31

Section 314 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-264, October 9, 1996.

18

Again, the President's words are reflected in the White House publication, A National Security Strategy for a New Century: "We further seek to uncover, reduce or eliminate foreign terrorist capabilities in our country; eliminate terrorist sanctuaries; counter state-supported terrorism and subversion of moderate regimes through comprehensive program of diplomatic, economic and intelligence activities; improve aviation security worldwide and at U.S. airports; ensure better security for all U.S. transportation systems; and improve protection for our personnel assigned overseas."32 As a result, the Federal Government recognizes aviation security as an element of national security strategy and U.S. counterterrorism policy.33 An FAA integrated product team of acquisition and security experts, including representatives from airport authorities and carriers, was formed by FAA in 1996 to plan, purchase and install explosives detection systems (EDS) and other advanced security equipment at many of the busiest U.S. airports. The Federal Government is subsidizing air carriers' capital expenses related to security improvements. Under law, all major air carriers assume operations costs for installed EDS and other technologies and pay maintenance costs upon expiration of warranties and initial maintenance periods.

Aviation Security Research, Engineering, and Development For many years, the Federal Government and the FAA have been fulfilling a major responsibility by fostering and funding security research, engineering and development (R,E&D), which was accelerated by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. From 1991 to 1996, the FAA spent over $209 million on R,E&D on explosives and weapons detection technology development, airport security technology, security systems integration, aircraft and container hardening, and human factors. This effort will continue. The FAA must continue research and development in the aviation security field to provide the technologies and other tools to support the strategic goals, cope with new threats and improve existing countermeasures. The result must be usable products to meet FAA requirements for future deployment, which will, in turn, require the commitment and expenditure of significant human and financial resources. Particular attention must be paid to the development of hardening standards for new aircraft and completion of the transition to hardened containers to prevent catastrophic damage. Human factors work must continue to be emphasized to aid in the solution of a variety of problems including the identification of threats, interaction with advanced technology, hiring qualifications and specialized training.

32

The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," May 1997, p.10.

The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," May 1997, p. 10; reaffirmed in publications with the same title dated October 1998 and December 1999. 33

19 We want to improve the detection of explosive devices concealed in carry-on bags without introducing significant operational delays and without requiring the use of extraordinarily expensive detection systems. Historically, threat items concealed on individuals have accounted for an appreciable percentage of all civil aviation security incidents. These include explosives and other improvised explosive device (IED) components, as well as weapons. Consequently, means must be developed to reliably detect IED components and weapons carried by people. In terms of weapons detection, conventional metal detectors are generally considered to be effective, although clearly there are nontraditional weapons for which other detection means may be required. The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-649) made it illegal for any person to manufacture, import, sell, ship, deliver, possess, transfer, or receive any firearm that is not detectable by walk-through metal detectors calibrated to a specified level. The Act also instructed the FAA to conduct a research and development effort necessary to improve the effectiveness of airport security metal detectors and airport security x-ray systems in detecting firearms, which has been an integral part of FAA's research program ever since. The primary mission of the R,E&D program is the development of equipment and methods for the detection of improvised explosive devices. In accordance with the 1990 Act, the FAA, based on intelligence data provided by U.S. and non-U.S. government agencies, established the explosive types and amounts and detonator types that pose a threat to civil aviation. The detection rate for these threats, combined with false alarm rates and throughput requirements, comprise the FAA's certification criteria for explosives detection systems (EDS) published in September 1993 and amended in April 1998. These certification criteria were extensively coordinated with the scientific and intelligence communities, the aviation industry and properly cleared members of the public (e.g., manufacturers and vendors). Modifications to the certification criteria require going through the rule making process, but to remain effective, the certification criteria must address the terrorist threat, which may reasonably be expected to change over time. A major thrust for the R&D program will be the systematic assessment of the many devices and techniques which are applicable to checkpoint security. Based on these assessments a security screening checkpoint model will be developed and a trade off analysis performed. The result will be an architecture for the checkpoint of the future. This architecture will address the mandates of both security and operations, and will form the basis for prototype configurations to be tried in airport testbeds. In 1996, a consortium of organizations proposed a public/private partnership to assist FAA in the development and testing of aviation security and safety technologies. The organizations included Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority, the Metropolitan Airports Commission, the University of Tennessee, the Tennessee Air National Guard, the Honeywell Corporation, and a number of private companies, each with its own expertise in related technologies. On October 4, 1997, the FAA Administrator signed a memorandum of understanding between FAA and the National Safe Skies

20

Alliance (NSSA), which lead to the establishment of a national test bed at McGhee Tyson Airport for operational evaluation and testing of newly developed technologies for checkpoint screening. Following the recommendations of the White House Commission, the Federal Government returned to an area not visited since the height of the hijacking threat in the mid-1970's: the capital purchase of security equipment for use by private sector air carriers to enhance their ability to screen passengers and baggage effectively and efficiently prior to boarding. On October 30, 1996, the FAA established the Security Equipment Integrated Product Team (SEIPT) to acquire and deploy advanced security equipment through "non-competitive contracts or cooperative agreements with air carriers and airport authorities, which provide for the FAA to purchase and assist in installation of advanced security equipment for the use of such entities."34 The equipment acquisition has been funded in the FAA Facilities and Equipment account derived from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. The team includes working representatives of air carriers and airport authorities. The following table depicts planned expenditures for various types of equipment selected by the integrated product team for purchase and deployment during FY's 1997-99:

TABLE II

FAA Expenditures in FY 1997-98 for Acquisition of Security Technologies

Explosives Detection Systems

$ 68,313,400

Other Automated Technologies

$ 15,550,000

Explosives Trace Detectors

$ 45,036,600

Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening

(CAPS)

$ 10,000,000

Screener Proficiency Evaluation & Reporting System (SPEARS)

$

Total

$144,200,000

5,300,000

An agreement to create a National Academy of Sciences Panel on Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security was 34

This was authorized and funded by Title V of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law 104-208.

21

signed by FAA and the Academy on May 19, 1997. The panel was asked to assess the results of the advanced security equipment deployments, hardened cargo container tests and planned deployments, and formulate recommendations on how to more effectively deploy explosives detection systems and hardened containers to improve security. The consensus report was published in November 1999. The panel will continue as the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on the Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security for an additional three years.

Continuing Efforts, Future Trends and Challenges Terrorism, for the most part, affects U.S. interests overseas, and the threat to U.S. civil aviation is assessed to be higher abroad than it is within the United States. However, members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorism are present in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-established capability and infrastructures here. The terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania remind us of the global nature of terrorism and the need for everyone to work together to oppose it anywhere in the world. The relationship between Osama bin Laden, who was behind these terrorist attacks, and Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted of bombing the World Trade Center in New York and attempting to place bombs on a dozen U.S. air carrier flights in the Asia-Pacific region in 1995, reaffirms the continuing tangible threat to civil aviation. The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and the French airline UTA Flight 772 in 1989, coupled with the events in Asia and the Pacific in 1995 and the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 in 1999, remind us that aviation security is an international concern. Even though the threat of terrorism within the United States has increased, the threat still remains greater overseas. Terrorism is a crime, but the threat to civil aviation is not restricted solely to those motivated by political concerns. In addition to terrorism, we must also prevent other criminal acts regardless of motivation to ensure safe and secure air transportation. As noted earlier, the Federal Government recognizes aviation security as an important element in national security strategy and overall U.S. counterterrorism policy. As a result, federal funding for aviation security has been increased substantially. FAA plans to continue to purchase explosives detection systems and other advanced security technologies for expedited deployment as part of the overall effort to improve security and implement provisions of laws35 enacted to require and fund many Commission aviation security recommendations. The FAA has purchased and deployed advanced security technologies including over 90 explosives detection systems for checked baggage screening and over 550 explosives trace detection devices for use at 35

Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264) and Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 (P. L. 104-208)

22

screening checkpoints at over 80 U.S. airports. Voluntary security consortia have been established at 170 airports where government agencies and airline industry representatives assess and discuss security and work together to eliminate vulnerabilities. Interagency efforts to assess and mitigate potential threats posed by chemical and biological weapons and surface-to-air missiles actively continue. The U.S. Government has worked with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to strengthen international security standards. U.S. Customs Service and FBI resources devoted to counterterrorism have increased. We have issued final rules requiring enhanced passenger manifests and background checks for security screeners. FAA and the airlines have worked together to implement domestic passenger-bag match voluntarily, based on systemwide use of the Computer-Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS), which will be required by regulation. All of this work will continue. In the coming years, we will continue to increase the number of EDS and explosives trace detection devices deployed at a steady rate to be joined by purchases of several hundred advanced checkpoint x-ray devices. We expect 20 more than the current 170 voluntary airport consortia to be formed. The number of explosives detection canine teams subsidized and certified by FAA rose from 87 teams at 26 airports in 1996 to 174 teams at 39 airports in 1999. Growth in this program will continue but slowly; we have teams at all major airports now for the first time in the 27 year history of the program. Rules on certification of screening companies to improve screener performance and domestic automated passenger prescreening systems with bag matching or EDS should be in effect within the next few years. Access to aircraft and air operations areas must be tightened and that will come about through increased labor intensive, but realistic operational testing and special assessments in combination with surveillance and scheduled inspections. Literally thousands of such inspections have been conducted since 1997 as well as screener evaluations and tests of many types of security measures including, but not limited to, cargo, checked baggage, carryon bags and persons. Ensuring effective screening of ever-increasing numbers of passengers, baggage and cargo on more flights without restricting movement remains our greatest challenge now and in the future. Effective and efficient civil aviation security is based on a system of shared responsibilities in place for the last thirty years. All partners must do their fair share to make the system secure. The U.S. airline industry must embrace improved aviation security as part of its mission to provide better service to its customers. All airline personnel must be trained to understand and support the effective accomplishment of the security responsibilities of the commercial aviation industry. The industry must work together to develop a new set of best practices all will use effectively. We in government stand ready as good partners to assist them and guide them, as well as to monitor, test and challenge them. Together, we must also improve the quality of security through better equipment for screening passengers, bags and cargo that is used by carefully selected, better trained and tested screening personnel. We must continue research and development to improve explosives and weapons detection, technology integration, aircraft hardening and

23

aviation security human factors. Hopefully, technology will not become a barrier to progress so that we are able to produce what we want and need to help make the air transportation system more secure.

Future Trend; Aviation Security Training Changes in the current system, which have been debated for years, have occurred only incrementally, often in response to a crisis or loss of an aircraft. One of the common threads weaving throughout all reports, books, hearings, articles, and recommendations over the years has been the need for better and more standardized aviation security training and an increased role for the Federal Government in both. Many new, more complicated but more effective types of equipment are being deployed at U.S. airports. The operators of advanced security equipment need far more detailed training, management attention, and motivation to ensure that devices are properly and effectively operated. Much more in the way of following operational procedures and making decisions needs to be done by the screeners, placing additional burdens on the selection, training, and maintenance of at least this part of the screener work force. As long ago as the September 1989 hearings of the House Government Activities and Transportation Subcommittee on the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Mr. Noel Koch, formerly Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in his prepared statement said: ".... we have to pay much closer attention to the personnel side of the security equation. At the present time, the economics of security appear to militate in favor of hiring entry-level minimum wage people. They often get little or no training, they have frequently the most limited 'people skills,' and the turnover rates among them are wholly inconsistent with the requirements of an effective security system. Put minimum wage people on a million dollar machine, give them little or no training, manage them like entry level people, and you will get minimum wage performance out of your million dollar machine.... Coupled to a more imaginative hiring philosophy, we will benefit from a systematic approach to training security personnel. This is an area in which the FAA may need additional authority, to standardize training requirements for security personnel, and to assist in bringing training regimes up to those standards."36 Mr. Koch's comments are still pertinent today. The "Certification of Screening Companies" rulemaking offers an opportunity for FAA to present to the public for comment both selection criteria and training standards and seek ideas for improving aviation security training.

"The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103: A Critical Look at American Aviation Security": Hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong. 34 (1989) (statement of Mr. Noel Koch, President, International Security Management, Inc.).

36

24

In his 1993 book Combatting Air Terrorism, Rodney Wallis, former director of security for the International Air Transport Association, also suggested an increased role for the FAA in the area of training: "Training is a truly vital part of air transportation's fight against terrorism, yet too many governments, airport administrations, and airline managements fail to ensure their staff are adequately prepared for their roles...A role the FAA might well enlarge is the physical monitoring of U.S. based airlines' training and security implementation at home and abroad."37 Senator Rollings in his prepared statement for the aviation security hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee on August 1, 1996, stated: "...the public deserves the best technology operated by the best trained individuals, to reduce the risks of a terrorist attack. Another thing is clear-security is going to be costly. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has estimated that it will cost as much as $2.2 billion to install up to 1,800 machines at 75 airports. The FAA should be authorized to collect a fee to pay for the machines. Today, there are approximately 14,000-18,000 screeners, paid an average of $10,000 to $15,000 per year. These screeners are one line of defense, but a critical one in the fight against terrorism. They need training, and they need to be paid in accordance with their responsibilities. The present turnover rate among these employees is extremely high. Unless we change the way we provide security, we cannot upgrade it...I am considering whether the FAA should provide the screeners, thereby relieving the air carriers of this responsibility; this also will cost money."38 There is broad, although not universal, agreement that the regime of shared responsibilities should stay the same. However, it could be argued that the Federal Government should increase its involvement by setting training standards, thereby adding to its other responsibilities for capital equipment purchases, R,E&D, intelligence assessments, testing countermeasures, standard setting, and compliance and enforcement of regulations. Air carriers would still be responsible for screening, but their employees, the screeners and their supervisors, would be trained to standards set by the FAA in accordance with White House Commission recommendations 3.2 and 3.10. Commissioner Victoria Cummock introduced and supported recommendation 3.2 at the final meeting of the White House Commission on February 12, 1997. Later, she went further in her discussion of training under recommendation 3.10 in her dissent, contained in appendix I of the final report: 37

Wallis, Rodney, "Combatting Air Terrorism," Brassey's (US), Washington, New York, London, 1993, p. 117.

"Aviation Security": Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 93 (1996) (statement of Senator Hollings). 38

25

"This recommendation contains a number of admirable objectives but it, like its predecessor recommendation in President Bush's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism lacks teeth. Following President Bush's Commission of Aviation Security and Terrorism and the follow-on Aviation Security Improvement Act in 1990, the FAA established standards for the selection and training of aviation security personnel. Those standards were, and still are, totally inadequate. There is nothing to prevent the same inadequate actions by the FAA to this recommendation. The Commission should specifically recommend that the FAA mandate 80 hours of intensive classroom/laboratory and 40 hours of on-the-job training before performance certification for all airline security screening personnel."39 An identical recommendation for 80 hours of classroom and 40 hours of on-the-job training had been made by Patricia Friend, international president of the Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO, at the White House Commission meeting on September 5, 1996. These discussions, contained in the final report and its dissent, and in testimony, all support the need for improved, more comprehensive training. Again, the certification of screening companies rulemaking offers an opportunity to improve training and thereby improve screener performance. Investment in training and requirements for improved performance will offer an economic incentive for airlines to retain the most productive, efficient, and effective screeners which will, in turn, lead to higher wages and better benefits. The FAA takes human factors into account (as required by the provisions of Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990)40 by providing appropriate training and developing utilization standards, clear guidance, and operational procedures in partnership with the airlines to ensure the effective use of security equipment by trained and properly motivated air carrier and contractor personnel. FAA is already taking steps to improve initial and recurrent training curricula for checkpoint screeners and their supervisors. Such FAA involvement will increase. All of us must be concerned with how to help people do the difficult job of screening baggage for explosive devices better by improving the human factors engineering of their work environment. Lessons learned from the operational deployment of explosives detection systems (EDS) substantiate the need for screeners who use the machines to be properly trained and highly motivated. Personnel selection criteria and training standards are important considerations receiving particular attention by all concerned. The FAA developed and is currently deploying a computer-based training (CBT) system for screeners. CBT modules for training security screening checkpoint x-ray machine operators are now operational at 37 major airports, including Seattle, Miami, Los Angeles, St. Louis, White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Appendix I, dated February 19, 1997, unnumbered p.8.

39

Sections 105 and 107 of Public Law 101-604, November 16, 1990, adding sections 316 (d) and (g) to the former Federal Aviation Act of 1958, now 49 U.S.C. 44912 (a) and 44935 (b), respectively. 40

26

Baltimore, Detroit, Houston, Dallas, New York, Denver, Orlando, San Juan, Atlanta, and San Francisco, with additional airport installations continuing to about 77 of the busiest U.S. airports. Specialized modules for training operators of explosives detection systems are installed on all deployed systems. The Threat Image Projection (TIP) system electronically inserts images of possible threats (e.g., a gun, knife, explosive device) on x-ray and explosives detection system monitors as if they were within a bag being screened. Its purpose is to provide training, keep screeners alert, and measure screener performance. High scores in detecting TIP images equate to a high probability of detecting actual bombs. Not only can TIP data be potentially used to assess screener performance over time, the results can also be used to analyze any correlation between performance, experience, and compensation. The FAA provides formal training through airport security seminars for law enforcement officers and airport personnel with aviation security responsibilities. Aviation security special agents are also asked by individual airlines to provide 1- or 2-hour blocks of instruction in airline training courses. Similar participation occurs in industry association-sponsored schools and conferences as part of FAA's partnership efforts. Specialized courses of instruction on specific topics have been prepared by the FAA and are presented on request. While air carriers should not have to bear all the costs of security, they should bear a substantial portion of the personnel costs to provide security screening and the operational costs of using the advanced security equipment that the Federal Government provides. At the same time, the Federal Government should continue to control the quality of aviation security and security screening by setting higher, but realistically achievable, standards for screener selection, training, and performance.

27

ACS STAFFING HISTORY FY 86-00 •Actual Staffing

Staffing

151)0 1300 \c J f t S«2 'I « A KUO. i *)r,

1100

1168. >—--*"! 1 82

noi6 900 700

500 300

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

FY

86

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88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

00

NOTE: FY 99 represents Conference agreement, FY 00 represents OMB request

File: NCSSTF 11/6/98

28

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY FUNDING PROFILE Dollars in Millions

Ops. -»~R,E&D -*-F&E

I

86

87

88

89

1

90

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91

92

1

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96

1

97

1

98

Fiscal Years

NOTK: FY 99 represents cotiierence agreement, FY 00 represents OMB request

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