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May 11,2004

Caution and Years of Budget Cuts Are Seen to Limit C.I.A. By DOUGLAS JEHL

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ASHINGTON, May 10 - Even now, 32 months after the Sept. 11 attacks, America's clandestine intelligence service has fewer than 1,100 case officers posted overseas, fewer than the number of F.B.I, agents assigned to the New York City field office alone, government officials say. Since George J. Tenet took charge of the Central Intelligence Agency seven years ago, rebuilding that service has been his top priority. This year, more new case officers will graduate from a year-long course at Camp Peary in Virginia than in any year since the Vietnam War. They are the products of aggressive new recruiting aimed in particular at speakers of Arabic and others capable of operating in the Middle East and South Asia. But it will be an additional five years, Mr. Tenet and others have warned, before the rebuilding is complete and the United States has the network it needs to adequately confront a global threat posed by terrorist groups and hostile foreign governments. In an interview on April 30, James L. Pavitt, who as the C.I.A.'s deputy director for operations oversees the clandestine service, said he still needed 30 to 35 percent more people, including officers based overseas and in the United States, supervisors and support workers. "I need hundreds and hundreds, thousands," Mr. Pavitt said. At a time when the United States is fighting a war on terrorism and a war in Iraq, he said, "we are running hard to get the resources we need." On Capitol Hill and among former intelligence officers, most experts agree that the clandestine service needs improvement, but there is some debate about whether the agency is addressing the right problems. "The question is, should you require better before you get bigger?" said a senior Congressional official, describing a question on Capitol Hill that he said had been prompted by inquiries into intelligence failures involving Iraq and the Sept. 11 attacks. The size and scope of the clandestine service, whose overseas officers recruit and supervise spies and work with foreign intelligence services but rarely try to infiltrate foreign targets themselves, has always been among the government's most closely guarded secrets. But as the dimensions of the intelligence failures on Iraq and Sept. 11 have come to light in recent months, so too has a picture of American spying operations stretched thin through the 1990's and only now recovering. In numbers, Mr. Pavitt said in the interview, the clandestine service hit a low point in 1999, when its ranks had been trimmed by 20 percent from its highs during the cold war. And in morale and sense of

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put together a network," Jumper said. "Did we build that for him? No, we had to invent all this in the course of battle." Ijuring a dust storm in Iraq, crews manning Rivet Joint, Global Hawk and other platforms watching Iraqi movements had to force-feed information to each other because their systems could not connect. "That's working at the speed of typing, not the speed of light," Jumper said. "We didn't build a

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The project, ultimately a great success, finally went forward when he agreed to fund it out of his budget. "This is not the fault of the acquisition community. This is the rules that we work by," he said. "It's not that we can't do it — somehow, we're afraid to do it. "This is us, people, and we can be a hell of a lot better." The key is to work on getting the machines talking to each other because "the digits don't

nate on. "Possibilities open up by the mere notion of platforms collaborating with platforms in another medium," he said. But the key is to keep focused on the ultimate goal, he said. "I worry about space-based radar, not because I'm worried about space-based radar, but because I'm worried about something where the name implies a solution," he said. "The problem is not space-based radar. The problem is what? Killing the target.

radar working with the airborne platforms in this domain, then I have a completely new way of thinking about it than if I think the solution has to all reside in space." Jumper said it isn't about any specific technology, it's about things that make "killing the target" easier. "Hell, I don't know what network-centric warfare is," he said. "I know what I need to do — I need to put the cursor on the target."

cess to focus more on results than on specific technologies is not impossible, it just requires a clear vision and the willingness to pursue it aggressively, he said. And it's essential to do now, because the U.S. military is going to be dealing with the threat of terrorism for some time and needs all the technological help it can get, he said. "You have to track 'em down one at a time and take 'em out," Jumper said. "That's what I mean by 'cursor over the target.'" D

Security chief envisions integrated signals Intel Signals intelligence today is just as likely to come from a MaSAN ANTONIO — In a major change rine in a Humvee as it is from a from the way it used to do busi- base station in the United States ness, the National Security — and both may be working the Agency is working to provide sig- same target but for different purnals intelligence more quickly to poses. those who need it, including frontAnd those who use the Sigint line troops — even if the intel is often are capable of extracting the not fully processed. information they need from the Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, di- data without the need to wait for rector of the NSA and chief of the complete processing by the NSA, Central Security Service, told at- he said. But opening the data to more teirdees at an April 20 luncheon that it no longer is practical to try users also means that securing it to separate national, strategic and is even more important. tactical intelligence collection or "The fact that you have Marines needs, because they all overlap. in a Humvee plugging into NSA The new vision is "one global, in- Main is a wonderful thing," he tegrated, self-aware, self-synchro- said. "But that means NSA Main is now less secure," nizing Sigint system," he said. By Rod Hafemeister TIMES STAFF WETTER

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Air Force Times

Those are the dilemmas facing Hayden as he works on what NSA has dubbed Transformation 2.0, a follow-on to the internal rebuilding Hayden undertook when he took over NSA in 1999. Like the rest of the military, the NSA had gone through nearly a decade of cuts while at the same time, the world experienced an explosion in communications technology, including the Internet and cellphones. But with a policy of reducing staff by "shutting the front door" — restricting new hires to about 200 a year — the NSA was not bringing people on board with the new skills needed for dealing with the new technologies. "Our battle space — the place

where we conduct operations — had shifted on us," Hayden said. Hayden's first task was to rebuild NSA to deal with 21st-century threats, including the explosion in signals information. Although he said there still is work to do, he has since 2001 received Hayden about a 60 percent increase in his budget, which is classified, and expects to hire about 1,500 people this year. But the big challenge is to work out ways to get signals intelli-

gence to the people who need it — before it's too late. Hayden cited the example of an F-16 pilot who might appreciate an intercept on air defense radar that would allow operators to tell when that same radar was used somewhere else, years later. But the pilot might have more immediate concerns, like whether the radar is on and targeting him. So the new goal is to "push" Sigint material to the "earliest point of consumability" — which means what goes to whom will depend both on the Sigint and on the capabilities and needs of the customer getting it. D Rod Hafemeister can be reached at (210) 6586400 or [email protected].

2. Sept. 11 families slam Congress for failing to follow through ALEXANDER BOLTON The Hill Relatives of the victims of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks say the House and Senate intelligence committees have failed to follow up on the recommendations of their joint report issued at the end of 2002. The recommendations, made after a joint investigation by the committees, preceded the current investigation by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known as the Sept. 11 commission. The family members, whose vocal advocacy was instrumental in persuading Congress and President Bush to create the independent commission, say there is no evidence that any of the findings of the joint congressional investigation have been implemented. In addition, the families charge that the lack of congressional follow-up fits into a larger pattern of weak oversight and supervision of federal intelligence agencies by Congress. Some of the family members are questioning whether Congress can adequately scrutinize the administration when the same party controls both branches. To this point, Congress has largely avoided blame for the intelligence failures leading to Sept. 11 or for hindering efforts to reform national intelligence operations. Some leading victims' family members are also criticizing the Sept. 11 commission for failing to address sufficiently the issue of weak congressional oversight of the intelligence community, one of the commission's mandates. Several commission members previously served in Congress. However, sources on the commission and on the Senate Intelligence Committee say they have already held several staff-level meetings on how to overhaul congressional oversight of the national intelligence agencies. Reforms under discussion include making the House and Senate intelligence panels permanent instead of select committees, lifting term limits on membership, unifying budgetary control of national intelligence operations and declassifying the overall intelligence budget as well as the budget for individual agencies. 'We have some issues with the intelligence committees, namely that they had the joint-inquiry report released in December of 2002, it's been in their hands for almost a year and five months, and they have yet to have a hearing on any of the public recommendations," said Kristen Breitweiser, a member of a highly visible group known as the Family Steering Committee, which represents many of the victims' families. Breitweiser, whose husband, Ron, died in the collapse of the World Trade Center's second tower, said she and other family members met with the top Republicans and Democrats on the House and Senate Intelligence Committees last fall to ask that the panels follow up on their 2002 recommendations with a hearing. 'They promised public hearings after the new year, and we are entering the month of May and have yet to see any public hearings," she said, adding that there is no evidence that Congress has followed up on its recommendations after the joint Sept. 11 inquiry. "Congress is great at

PRESS CLIPS FOR MAY 5, 2004

"Bob has been a really invigorating addition to the commission," says Lehman. "He asks questions that are really insightful and provoke everybody to think about new ways of looking at problems. He's been absolutely nonpartisan." Kerrey, of course, is fully capable of making his own quick work of complaints aimed at him: "I'm not in politics anymore and I don't give a damn." He has two years remaining on his New School contract and, while he won't rule out a political comeback, he's not encouraging such speculation. For now, Kerrey is content to be the free spirit on the 9/11 Commission and to informally push for a rewrite of the Iraq fix-it manual. Bush, he believes, erred by framing the war as "a religious cause," a quasi-biblical clash between right and wrong, between noble Christians and misguided Muslims. Kerrey, for one, is willing to entertain the notion of turning prison operations over to the Iraqis. The sooner they get the hang of running their own country, the better. The key, he says, isn't whether they like Americans. It's whether they believe this newfound freedom can ease the burdens of their daily existence, whether Kurds and Sunnis and Shiites can put aside centuriesold grudges and forge a singular national identity. At the moment, Bob Kerrey - former professional soldier, current amateur poet - hears beauties soft and quiet calling. He's overlooking street demonstrations, beheadings, prison-photo fallout and all that chatter about parallels to Vietnam. He is casting his lot with the starry-eyed idealists. "I believe that you cannot establish a democracy without some naivete. Because there's the presumption in democracy that people will do the right thing."

14. A Kerry-Kerrey Ticket? MICHAEL KELLY The Omaha World-Herald The Dallas Morning News asked Democratic pundit James Carville who will be John Kerry's running mate. "It will be Bob Kerrey, "Carville said, "and it will happen two weeks before the convention." A Kerry-Kerrey ticket? Rockin' Bob, 60, the former governor and U.S. senator from Nebraska, has raised his profile anew with pointed questioning on the 9/11 commissiqn.

15. Tenet speaks to A&M grads LAMONICA The Houston Chronicle CIA Director George Tenet acknowledged that his agency has made mistakes, but defended it and its values Friday during a commencement ceremony at Texas A&M University.

PRESS CLIPS FOR MAY 15-17, 2004

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9. How to Set the C.I.A. Free THOMAS POWERS The New York Times Recent staff reports from the 9/11 commission, soon to be followed by the results of a Senate investigation into flawed intelligence before the invasion of Iraq, lend powerful new support to conclusions long fermenting in official Washington: American intelligence is broken, and the moment is ripe to do something about it. Prominently at stake in any reorganization will be the title and job description of the director of central intelligence, the post soon to be vacated by George Tenet. Successful reform will require three things: more independence for the C.I.A., fewer distractions for the person running it, and some way to divide up the whole intelligence pie while compelling our myriad organizations to cooperate. Change will not be easy or automatic — presidents and directors of central intelligence both like the way things are arranged now, and the C.I.A. has weathered many storms in the past. What promises to make the difference this time are the succeeding body blows of the full reports from the 9/11 commission and the Senate due later in the summer. Mr. Tenet is reported to have told friends that he is not being chased out of his job "by a piece of paper," but it seems clear that neither he nor the White House was looking forward to weeks of explaining why the C.I.A. missed things it ought to have seen before Sept. 11 and then conjured up stockpiles of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that weren't there. Intelligence errors so glaring inevitably raise two urgent questions: how could the C.I.A. have failed so completely on questions central to its mission? And what can be done to ensure it never happens again? Chapter and verse on the C.I.A.'s failures will come first in the two official reports, followed eventually by a list of recommendations for improving American intelligence from senators and commissioners. But too long a list will diffuse attention and weaken resolve. The challenge facing reformers is not to tighten every loose nut and bolt, but to identify what is really broken and come up with ways to fix what matters most. Three years of official studies, public debate and news reporting on 9/11 and Iraq, amply backed up by the history of secret intelligence during the cold war, suggest that the many dysfunctions of American intelligence may be reduced to two: resistance to cooperation between separate intelligence organizations (especially between the C.I.A. and the Federal Bureau of Investigation); and the tendency of intelligence officials and organizations to interpret thin or ambiguous evidence to support the assumptions or desires of the next official or organization up the chain of command. A frequently cited example of the latter was the ability of Air Force intelligence, beginning in the 1940's, to repeatedly find evidence of dangerous new Soviet bombers or missiles that urgently required research and development of whatever was at the top of the Air Force wish list. Naturally, Air Force intelligence officers never admitted this systematic abuse of the evidence — just as C.I.A. officers from George Tenet on down vigorously deny now that analysts devised scary claims about Iraqi weapons because that was what the White House wanted. But the pattern is the same, and in the long run in the intelligence world, as elsewhere, bosses get what they want. The best solution to this problem and to that of bickering among agencies is arguably the same: a cabinet-level official, over the director of central intelligence, responsible for all American intelligence service. Public discussion of such proposals so far has focused on a "national intelligence director," but without making clear how much the director is intended to direct.