COMMISSION SENSITIVE London, The United Kingdom Requested Meetings: Senior Foreign Ministry official responsible for the war on terrorism, relevant MI-5 and MI-6 officials, Ministry of Defense officials responsible for terrorism, Intelligence Coordinator Lines of inquiry for UK government officials: •
UK assessments of the 9/11 attacks and the UK's understanding of the threat at the time, and with the benefit of hindsight
•
UK perspective on transnational threat and strategies to counter it.
•
Major concerns on the horizon for the US-UK efforts on terrorism.
•
UK perspective on building and preserving the coalition of countries fighting terrorism. Improving the European cooperation on terrorism.
•
Developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Gulf states in the war on terrorism, the defeat of al-Qaida.
Requested Meetings: US Ambassador, Senior Intelligence official Lines of inquiry for the country team:
11
•
Current state of US-UK relations regarding the war on terrorism and following leads related to the attacks of September 11,2001.
•
State of military and intelligence relations regarding the war on terrorism.
•
British perspective on US prosecution of the war abroad.
•
Lessons learned to date on fighting al-Qaida in the UK and other parts of Europe.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10/9/03
TEAM 1 QUESTIONS SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FOR UK •
After 9/11, the UK was criticized for allegedly having served as a safehaven for Islamic extremists, such as Abu Hamza (reportedly wanted in Yemen on terrorism charges), Abu Qutada (reportedly convicted in Jordan for inciting terrorist attacks), and Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed (reportedly the leader of the extremist group al-Muhajiroun). Also, the UK has been criticized for lengthy delays in the extradition of alleged terrorists to the US. Has the UK changed its laws and procedures after 9/11? To what extent do problems remain?
•
How much support does UBL or Al Qaeda have within the UK's Muslim community? Is it rising or falling?
TEAM 1 QUESTIONS
GENERIC QUESTIONS FOR ALL COUNTRIES •
Are publications by or supportive of AlQaeda readily available? In what languages? o Everywhere in country? If only available in certain areas, why those places?
•
How does the general public view the events of September 11 ? Bui Laden? Al Qaeda? Does the public draw distinctions between them?
•
How widespread is support for fundamentalist views? Any variations in support by class, location or some other factor?
•
Has this level of support changed over the past year? If so, how and why? FOR EMBASSY IN ALL COUNTRIES
• Can you identify specific groups, institutions, and/or individuals openly supportive of extremist religious views? •
What are the motives of such supportive individuals?
•
What role, if any, does internal politics play in this support?
•
How cooperative do you find the host government?
• Can you identify any elements of the local government that are especially helpful to our anti-terrorism efforts? Especially obstructive? How influential are these groups? Do they have patrons in the national leadership? If so, who are these patrons?
CONTENTS
Travel information and itinerary
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Sana'a, Yemen Doha, Qatar Qandahar, Afghanistan Kabul, Afghanistan Bagram, Afghanistan "Salerno'YKhowst, Afghanistan
8
Islamabad, Pakistan Peshawar, Pakistan
10 Karachi, Pakistan
11 London, United Kingdom
12 Staff Directory
___
13
Health information
14 Miscellaneous
15 »
COMMISSION SENSITIVE Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Meetings Requested: Welcome advice of Embassy Team. May include appropriate officials at the Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry, Mabahith, Ministry of Islamic Affairs Commission will have specific interview requests for individuals of interest to the 9/11 plot. We will be forwarding those names separately. General lines of inquiry for Saudi government officials: •
Any information the Kingdom has gathered on the 9/11 plot or the Saudi citizens who participated in it.
•
The pre-9/11 relationships of the Kingdom with Usama Bin Laden and Al Qa'ida, including concerns about the activities of charitable organizations or mosques supported by the Saudi government.
•
Compare the pre-9/11, or pre-May 2003, working relationships with the US government entities in countering global terrorism, fighting al-Qaida and removing the al-Qaida support structures with those in place today.
•
The general perception of the Saudi government of the global terrorism threat does the government share the US view of the threat?
•
Relations with Yemen, the Gulf states, and Iraq and their impact on the war on terrorism.
•
Saudi government strategy for its efforts against al-Qa'ida within its borders.
Lines of inquiry for the US country team: US Ambassador, DCM, Senior US Military official, Senior US Intelligence official, Legal Attache, Military Attache, •
The status of the US-Saudi relationship regarding the war on terrorism and the investigation of the 9-11 attacks.
•
The current state of the US-Saudi intelligence and law enforcement relationships and how they have changed since the 9-11 attacks? Since the May 2003 attack?
•
The level of embassy involvement in counterterrorism efforts (e.g., the number of officers assigned full time from various agencies, their jobs).
•
State of political and economic stability of Saudi Arabia and its impact on the war on terrorism. Steps Saudis are taking to destroy al-Qaida in their country.
•
The commitment of the Saudi government in supporting US counterterrorism efforts at home and abroad.
•
The quality of the direction and guidance the country team receives from Washington's regarding the war on terrorism.
•
Morale and security of the US team.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10/9/03
TEAM 1 QUESTIONS QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO SAUDI ARABIA Some commentators suggest Yemenis and Saudis may be the two largest groups in Al Qaeda. Do you have a sense of whether this is true? If so, are there particular areas or groups within country where al Qaeda draws support? Is that changing? What is the current status of Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and alleged terrorist financier Mohammed Jamal Khalifa? As of January 21,2003, the Christian Science Monitor reported that, despite the suspicions of analysts and intelligence agencies, the Saudi government has released Khalifa from prison and pronounced him "clean." Is this in fact the position of the Saudi government? What contacts, if any, has the US Embassy had with the Saudis relating to Khalifa? Do the Saudis believe Iran is harboring Al Qaeda fugitives? If so, what is the Saudi sense of possible Iranian motives? Have the Saudis asked Iran to turn over any Al Qaeda fugitives? How have the Iranians responded? What is the status of Al Qaeda's network — both operational and financial — in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the May 12, 2003 attacks in Riyadh, and subsequent Saudi efforts against the group? FOR EMBASSY ONLY; After September 11, 2001, have the Saudis reinterrogated former Al Qaeda official Madani al Tayyib, a/k/a Abu Fadhl al Makkee, who was the head of Al Qaeda's finance/business committee in Sudan? (He was reportedly in Saudi custody in 1997.) Is there anyone else that the Saudis have talked to since 9/11 that we should be aware of? FOR EMBASSY ONLY: Does Al Qaeda have significant support within the Saudi royal family or the Saudi religious establishment? Have the May 12 attacks in Riyadh significantly diminished the group's appeal? If so, among whom?
TEAM 1 QUESTIONS QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO YEMEN •
It may be helpful to get a briefing from the Ambassador and staff (and, as appropriate, Yemeni officials) on the status of the Cole investigation and the degree of Yemeni cooperation. In particular, how much progress has been made in developing a factual reconstruction of the plot and a complete list of suspects/conspirators? o Attached are relevant pages from the indictment of alleged coconspirators Badawi and Quso. Note, in particular, the somewhat mysterious trip by Cole suicide bomber Nibrass and coconspirator Quso to Bangkok to deliver funds to Khallad in January 2000. o According to press reporting, 10 suspects in the Cole bombing escaped from a Yemeni jail in April 2003, and two suspects have been subsequently rearrested.
•
Historically, government authority over a number of areas of rural Yemen has often been weak. To what extent does the national government now control these areas? (FOR EMBASSY ONLY: are there any tribal areas of particular concern?) To what extent has/does Al Qaeda recruit and operate in these areas?
•
Some commentators suggest Yemenis and Saudis may be the two largest groups in Al Qaeda. Do you have a sense of whether this is true? If so, are there particular areas or groups within country where al Qaeda draws support? Is that changing?
TEAM 1 QUESTIONS QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO AFGHANISTAN •
We recommend an on-site tour of a former terrorist training camp, if any have been preserved, to see firsthand how a terror camp worked, and where and how military/terror training was conducted. o Two camps that would definitely be of interest are Farook and Tarnak Farms, in or near Kandahar. However, according to open source reporting, U.S. bombing "obliterated" Al Farook training camp, while Tarnak Farms has been described as a "heavily mined cluster of bombed-out buildings and walls" that we turned into a U.S. army training facility after the liberation of Afghanistan. Other camps that would be of interest would be Derunta Camp, Khaldan Camp, or any other training camp used by Al Qaeda and/or allied terror groups.
•
How serious a threat do Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters pose to the current Afghan government and to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan? Is the threat increasing or decreasing? Is there sufficient information to make a clear judgment on these issues?
•
How do Afghan officials view Pakistani cooperation in the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban?
TEAM 1 QUESTIONS QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO PAKISTAN •
Prior to 9/11/01, did Pakistan seek to prevent Al Qaeda and other militants from reaching training camps in Afghanistan?
•
How much of a Taliban and/or Al Qaeda presence currently exists in Pakistan?
•
How aware was Pakistan of links between Kashmiri militant groups and Al Qaeda prior to 9/11? (Leader of Harakat ul-Mujahidin signed Bin Ladin's 1998 fatwa calling for attacks on US interests; in addition, Bin Laden was suspected of funding Jaish-e-Mohammed; both groups maintained training camps in Afghanistan).
•
It has been alleged that the Binori mosque in Karachi was used as a meeting spot and waystation for Al Qaeda operatives, and for communications and planning by Al Qaeda supporters in Pakistan. Is there any truth to this? Are there any other such sites in Pakistan? What is being done about such sites?
•
FOR EMBASSY ONLY; Following the fall of Afghanistan, has there been an influx of militants into Kashmiri training camps?
•
FOR EMBASSY ONLY; Press reporting indicates that several Pakistani Army officers have been arrested over the last several months for links with Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and also raises questions about possible Taliban links to lower-level officers in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency. Is the search for UBL and other Al Qaeda loyalists being hampered by these elements and/or by Pakistani religious parties?
Unclassified - Commission Sensitive
Generic questions (Byman) for U.S.-Saudi relationship today
I.
Overall Importance of Terrorism A. Is/Was terrorism considered part of your portfolio B. How do regional priorities fit with various terrorism concerns
II.
Saudi relationship A. Please describe the relationship B. What benefits do the Saudis derive from the U.S.? C. What benefits does the U.S. derive? D. How would you prioritize these? E. Does the United States have a "Saudi policy?" If so, please describe
III.
Saudi Arabia and radicalism A. Describe level and type of support, if any 1. For groups using violence 2. For anti-Israel causes 3. Distinguish between government and private individuals B. How does the United States try to change this? C. Impression of overall U.S. knowledge D. Saudi government counterterrorism policy
IV.
Post-911 Initiatives A. Describe B. Evaluate C. Reasons for problems, if any D. Additional changes necessary E. High level U.S./Saudi involvement? F. May 2003 a turning point?
V.
Level of cooperation on specific terrorist incidents A. What help did you receive? B. What was missing? C. What changes were made after the fact?
VI.
Problems in U.S.-Saudi relationship today?
VII. Recommendations? Unclassified - Commission Sensitive
COMMISSION SENSITIVE Sana'a, Yemen Requested Meetings: Yemen political, military and intelligence officials, senior law enforcement officials, others deemed appropriate by the country team Commission will have interview requests for specific individuals of interest in relation to the 9/11 plot. We will provide those names separately. Lines of inquiry for Yemeni government officials: •
Any information the government has gathered on the 9/11 plot or the Yemeni citizens who participated in it.
•
The pre-9/11 conditions in Yemen that help explain activities of Al Qa'ida in Yemen.
•
The general working relationship with US government entities operating in Yemen against terrorism (Defense, intelligence and law enforcement).
•
The government's perception of the war on terrorism and its sense of the US role in Yemen.
•
Yemen's ability to control its borders, clear frontier areas of al-Qaida operatives, and generally combat the use of its territory as a staging area.
•
Future areas of cooperation on combating terrorism and possible institutional changes to improve US-Yemen relations.
Requested Meetings: US Ambassador, DCM, Senior US Military official, Senior Intelligence official, field visits Lines of inquiry for the US country team: •
The nature of the US-Yemen relationship regarding the 9-11 investigation and counterterrorism efforts in general.
•
The current state of the US-Yemen intelligence and law enforcement relationships and how they have changed since the 9-11 attacks?
•
The level of embassy involvement in counterterrorism efforts (e.g., the number of officers assigned full time from various agencies, the number of terrorism reports filed with Washington).
•
State of political and economic stability of Yemen and its impact on the war on terrorism and its ability to control its borders and territory.
•
Steps Yemen is taking to destroy al-Qaida in their country. How it is working with countries in the region. Its efforts to control the frontiers.
•
How are politically sensitive aspects of the counterterrorism strategy being coordinated with the Yemenis?
•
Morale and security of the US team. COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10/9/03
OCT. 14. 2003 1 0 : 3 5 A M
9 - 1 1 COMMISSION
Thomas H. Keao
NO. 0932
P.
FAX COVER SHEET
CHAIR
Lee H. Haudton VJCE CHAJR Richard Ben-Venistc Mil* Cleland Fred P. Fielding
From:
Jamie S. Gortlick Skde Gorton John Lehman
Date:
Number of pages (including cover sheet): (.
Timothy J. Roema: R- Thompson
Philip D.
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Q-
TEL (202) FAX (202) 296-5?
OCT. 14. 2003 10:35AM
9-11 COMMISSION
.
NO. 0932
P. 2
Team 5 Questions QUESTIONS FOR CONSULAR OFFICIALS IN SAUDI-ARABIA 1. CONSUL GENERAL Background • Background and when arrived Training » What training did you receive on Saudi Arabia with respect to the presence or transiting of Al Qaeda, UBL associates, and other terrorist groups who may pose a threat to the US? •
Specifically in Washington, and at post?
•
Did you receive interview training specifically on how to interview someone to determine whether they are a terrorist? What training do the consular officers receive?
•
What training did you receive on how to identify fraudulently obtained passports? Fraudulent cachets? What training do the consular officers receive?
•
Have you ever received any DOS training on behavior to help determine whether an applicant is truthful in his/her answers during an interview?
Intelligence • What information have you received about the activities in Saudi Arabia of Al Qaeda or. other terrorist groups in Washington and at post? •
How frequently is your intelligence information updated? Do all the consular officers receive the same intelligence?
•
By what channels do you and the consular officers receive intelligence information on Al Qaeda and other terrorist group activities?
•
What information do you receive on current trends in terrorist mobility and tradecraft?
•
How active is your Visas Viper program?
•
How many Viper submissions do you make on average per month?
•
Is all your intelligence information provided through Viper?
•
What forms of fraud do you observe among Saudi applicants?
OCT. 14. 2003 1 0 : 4 9 A M
9 - 1 1 COMMISSION
'
NO. 0932
P. 3/6
Visa process • What is the current process for handling NIV applications? •
Are any travel agency or third party receiving agent programs still in use? (eg Visa Express)
•
What is your interview policy?
»
Do you require all applicants to fill out all the visa application fields?
•
If they don't, what do you do? Refuse? Request more information? Request an interview?
•
How well do your automation programs (CLASS) meet your needs?
•
What could be done to improve CLASS?
•
What are your interview and refusal rates for Saudis and Third Country Nationals?
•
Do you receive information on the exit rates of Saudi Nationals who have received NIVs? Have you conducted a statistically valid study (per DOS guidelines)? What is the overstay rate of Saudis?
•
What is the current status of the Condor and other namecheck programs?
•
What effect are these namecheck programs having on NIV application and processing rates? Please provide any empirical evidence of your views, and/or any relevant anecdotes,
•
What role do interviews play in the visa process? Have interviews in your view enabled you to detect ineligible applicants? What types of ineligibility? What is your percentage rate of interviewing applicants? What triggers an interview?
New MOU with DHS • What is the current status of the working relationship with the DHS representative (Office of Enforcement) at Riyadh and Jeddah posts? •
Have you seen the MOU recently entered into between DOS and DHS?
•
On what date did the new working relationship take effect?
•
How has the visa process changed since DHS got involved with it?
•
What is your view on how this relationship is working and whether it makes sense? 2
OCT. 14. 2 0 0 3 1 0 : 5 0 A M
9 - 1 1 COMMISSION
NO. 0 9 3 2
Overall opinions • In your view what works and what doesn't work about the visa process? CLASS? Interviews? More personnel needed? Namechecks? DHS role? Better training? More intelligence information? More fraud detection personnel? •
If you had to name one or two things that most needed correction in the visa process as currently set up, what would they be and what corrections would you put in place?
P. 4/6
OCT. 14. 2 0 0 3 1 0 : 5 0 A M
9 - 1 1 COMMISSION
NO. 0 9 3 2
P. 5/6.
Team 5 Questions QUESTIONS FOR CONSULAR OFFICIALS IN SAUDI ARABIA (continued) 2. DHS REPRESENTATIVE Background • General background and when arrived. Training and mission • How are DHS personnel selected to work in the new visa program? TDY? •
What training did you receive to prepare you for your mission?
•
What is the mission of DHS at post? To whom do you report?
New MOU with DOS •
What access do you have to DOS databases and intelligence at post?
•
From your vantage point, how has the infusion of DHS into the visa issuance process altered the process? Tell us the positives and negatives.
•
What information do you provide to State officials at post that you uniquely have access to through DHS?
•
How has the visa process changed since DHS got involved in it?
•
Have you worked with consular officials before, and if so, what is different about the working relationship now?
•
What is the current status of the working relationship between State and DHS at Post?
•
Have you seen or read the MOU recently agreed to between State and DHS?
•
What is your overall view on how this relationship is working and whether it makes sense?
Intelligence •
What information have you received on UBL activity in Saudi Arabia? In Washington? At Post?
OCT. 14. 2003 1 0 : 5 0 A M
9 - 1 1 COMMISSION
NO, 0932
•
From what entities do you receive information on the latest trends in terrorist mobility and tradecraft from Washington? From the field? Do you have to seek out information, or are you on distribution lists for such information?
•
What is your role in providing intelligence back to Washington about terrorist mobility and tradecraft onindividuals of special interest?
•
Do you have access to watchlist information? What watchlists? Can and do you receive the intelligence to support the watchlisted names on a need-to-know basis?
Overall opinions • In your view what works and what doesn't work about the visa process? CLASS? Interviews? More personnel needed? Namechecks? DOS role? Better training? More intelligence information? More fraud detection personnel? •
P. 6/6
If you had to name one or two things that most needed correction in the visa process as currently set up, what would they be and what corrections would you put in place?
COMMISSION SENSITIVE
Doha, Qatar Requested Meetings: US Ambassador, Officials at GENICOM Forward HQ, Senior Intelligence official, Senior JSOC and SOF officials, field visits Lines of inquiry: •
General relations with the government of Qatar and future cooperation on the war on terrorism.
•
State of political and economic stability of the government and prospects for the future. Impact of the US presence on the government of Qatar.
•
Central Command perspectives on the nature of the enemy, strategies being pursued, key political, military, and intelligence issues.
•
CentCom intelligence fusion in executing the Iraq war and the war on terrorism. Lessons learned from this experience.
•
Suggestions from the country team on the way ahead for the US war on terrorism in the region.
•
Morale and security of the US team.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10/9/03
COMMISSION SENSITIVE Qandahar, Afghanistan Requested Meetings: Governor of Qandahar, Senior Tribal leaders, field visits Lines of inquiry for local officials: •
Qandahar before the 9/11 attacks. Role and visibility of Al Qa'ida in the area; location and character of Al Qa'ida operating bases.
•
Impact of the war on terrorism in the region.
•
Local perceptions of the role of the US in the region. Regional impact of redevelopment assistance.
•
Current presence of al-Qaida and Taliban, efforts to destroy the organization.
Requested Meetings: Relevant military and intelligence officials, including those of coalition forces. Field visits Lines of inquiry for the US country team: •
Current state of the war on terrorism in the region, the US strategy, measures of success. Current threat level
•
Coordination of political, military, intelligence and law enforcement components.
•
Ability of the Kabul government to project power and authority in Qandahar.
•
Current strength and threat level posed by al-Qaida and hard core Taliban in the south of Afghanistan. Cross-border activity and operations conducted from Qandahar.
•
Morale and security of the US team.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10/9/03
TEAM 1 QUESTIONS QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO AFGHANISTAN •
We recommend an on-site tour of a former terrorist training camp, if any have been preserved, to see firsthand how a terror camp worked, and where and how military/terror training was conducted. o Two camps that would definitely be of interest are Farook and Tarnak Farms, in or near Kandahar. However, according to open source reporting, U.S. bombing "obliterated" Al Farook training camp, while Tarnak Farms has been described as a "heavily mined cluster of bombed-out buildings and walls" that we turned into a U.S. army training facility after the liberation of Afghanistan. Other camps that would be of interest would be Derunta Camp, Khaldan Camp, or any other training camp used by Al Qaeda and/or allied terror groups.
•
How serious a threat do Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters pose to the current Afghan government and to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan? Is the threat increasing or decreasing? Is there sufficient information to make a clear judgment on these issues?
•
How do Afghan officials view Pakistani cooperation in the war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban?
COMMISSION SENSITIVE Kabul, Afghanistan Requested Meetings: President Karzai, Afghan National Security Advisor, Defense Minister Fahim Khan, Afghan Minister of Interior AH Jalali, Deputy Interior Minister Hilal Hilaluddin and Director of National Directorate of Security, field visits Lines of inquiry for Afghan government officials: •
Assessment of Afghanistan before 9/11. Contrast to present conditions.
•
Major issues or concerns regarding the prosecution of the war on terrorism and relations with the US regarding the war effort.
•
Protection of Kabul officials from terrorist attacks.
•
Effectiveness of Afghan efforts to attack remaining al-Qaida and Taliban members in the regions. Strengths and weaknesses, timelines.
•
Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan and regional stability.
•
Major impediments to expanding Kabul's control into the regions.
•
Relations with tribal leaders.
Requested Meetings: US Ambassador, DCM, Senior Military official, Senior Intelligence Official, field visits Lines of inquiry for the US country team: •
US, integrated military, intelligence and law enforcement strategy against alQaida, Taliban and other terrorist actors in the region. The strategy to apprehend UBL including military, intelligence and Special Forces efforts.
•
Guidance and direction from Washington on the conduct of the war on terrorism, regional relations, drug enforcement, border security and development.
•
Quality of the relationship with the Kabul government, key players, strengths and weaknesses of the relationship. Control of Kabul government over the other major cities in the country and rural areas.
•
Relations with other nations represented in Kabul in the collective efforts against terrorism, economic development and stability.
•
Perceptions of the Kabul government on the success of the foreign development assistance programs.
•
Morale and security of the US team.
Also request meetings with key officials from ISAF and UN.
COMMISSION SENSITIVE 10/9/03