State Immunity.docx

IV. General Considerations A. State Immunity 1. Basis Art. XVI, Sec. 3 Section 3. All courts existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases, civil and criminal, pending in said courts, shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force.

2. When it a suit against the state? 3. Express Consent A. Money Claims arising from contract ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED Section 1. Complaint against Government. — Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties. Sec. 2. A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented his claim to the Insular Auditor 1 and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of its presentation. Sec. 3. Venue. — Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant resides, at the option of the latter, upon which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions. Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and appellate, as if the litigants were private parties. Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action between private parties. Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the authority granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General 2 whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense, either himself or through delegates.

Sec. 7. Execution. — No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General, 3 within five days after the same becomes final. Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. — The Governor-General, 4 at the commencement of each regular session of the Legislature, 5 shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body determine that payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to pay, including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year. Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval. Approved: March 16, 1923. COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 26 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1445 - COA has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities CASE: UP vs. Dizon FACTS: University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction and renovation of the buildings in the campus of the UP in Los Bas. UP was able to pay its first and second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid balance. On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the UP filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion. The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon Nolasco (Atty.Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17, 2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of the UP but the OLS inDiliman, Quezon City. Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002. However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution. On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence, Stern Builders filed in the RTC its motion for execution despite their previous motion having already been granted and despite the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003, the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9, 2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of execution on October 4, 2002).

Consequently, the sheriff served notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the RTC ordered the release of the funds. Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA. The CA sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: I. Was UP's funds validly garnished? II. Has the UP's appeal dated June 3, 2002 been filed out of time? HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public funds; suability vs. liability of the State) Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UPs mission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives. A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable. The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated the claim against the UP.

HELD: The period of appeal did not start without effective service of decision upon counsel of record. (The doctrine of immutability of a final judgment; service of judgments; fresh-period rule; computation of time) At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust funds. Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on September 26, 2002. It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted several exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render its execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the declaration of finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of the UPs right to due process. Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record of the UP. Verily, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states that: "If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side." Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco was valid and effective, such that the remaining period for the UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to the rule then prevailing. However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in mid-September of 2005

through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, viz: "to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration." The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural law that aims "to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution," is impervious to any serious challenge. This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure. Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002, when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on June 3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days counted from service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June 3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: "If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. B. Torts committed by special agents Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) C. INCORPORATED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Incorporated: If the charter provides that the agency can sue and be sued, then suit will lie, including one for tort. The provision in the charter constitutes express consent on the part of the State to be sued. See: PNB v. CIR, 81 SCRA 314; Rayo v. CFI of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 460; SSS v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 707. i) Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and, therefore, should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. However, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their respective charters provide that they can sue and be sued [Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Judge Firme, 195 SCRA 692]. One of the corporate powers of local government units, as enumerated in Sec. 22, Local Government Code, is the power to sue and be sued. ii) In National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 35, the Supreme Court reiterated that NIAis a corporate body performing proprietary functions, whose charter, P.D. 552, provides that it may sue and be sued. iii) In Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 217 SCRA 401, it was held that although the charter of PNR is silent on whether it may sue or be sued, it had already been ruled in Malong v. PNR, 185 SCRA 63, that the PNR “is not performing any governmental function” and may, therefore, be sued. 4. Implied Consent a. Government submits itself to court’s jurisdiction - State itself files a complaint CASE: Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003 Facts: Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (“EO No. 1”) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (“AFP Board”) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (“Ramas”). Later, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaano’s residence a search warrant captioned “Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.” The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized firearms, jewelry, and land titles. Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (“RA No. 1379”) against Ramas. The complaint was amended to include Elizabeth Dimaano, the alleged mistress of Ramas, as co-defendant. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.” The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State. Trial ensured. However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because there was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated, among others. Hence, this appeal. Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and seizure “on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution.” Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were “taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people.” Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right. Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right. Issue: Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal Held: The search and seizure of Dimaano’s home were NOT legal.

The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquino’s Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was “done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.“ The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government (“PCGG”) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. The protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remained in effect during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR and the UDHR, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the ICCPR requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present ICCPR.” Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.” The UDHR, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the UDHR did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a UDHR, the Court has interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted principles of

international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the UDHR. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the ICCPR or the UDHR is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the UDHR as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the ICCPR. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the ICCPR or the UDHR in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the ICCPR or the UDHR. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant. It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano. Santiago vs. GRP December 19, 1978 Fernando, J:

Facts: Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot. When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the government. Issue: Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit. Held: Yes. The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) vs. SPOUSES VICENTE ABECINA and MARIA CLEOFE ABECINA G.R. No. 206484 June 29, 2016 BRION, J.: FACTS: Respondent spouses Vicente and Maria Cleofe Abecina are the registered owners of five parcels of land in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. The DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract for the management, operation, maintenance, and development of a Regional Telecommunications Development Project (RTDP) under the National Telephone Program. The DOTC and Digitel subsequently entered into several Facilities Management Agreements (FMA) for Digitel to manage, operate, maintain, and develop facilities comprising local telephone exchange lines in various municipalities in Luzon. The FMAs were later converted into Financial Lease Agreements (FLA). The municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated 1200sq.m. parcel of land to the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the municipality erroneously included portions of the respondents’ property in the donation. Pursuant to the lease agreements, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on the property which encroached on the properties of the respondent spouses. Respondent spouses Abecina discovered Digitel’s occupation over portions of their properties. They required Digitel to vacate their properties and pay damages, but the latter refused, insisting that it was occupying the property of the DOTC pursuant to their FLA. They sent a final demand letter to both the DOTC and Digitel to vacate the premises and to pay unpaid rent/damages in the amount of 1.2M. Neither the DOTC nor Digitel complied with the demand. Respondent spouses filed an accion publiciana complaint against the DOTC and Digitel for recovery of possession and damages. DOTC claimed immunity from suit and ownership over the subject properties but it admitted during the pretrial conference that the Abecinas were the rightful owners of the properties. Sps Abecina and Digitel executed a Compromise Agreement and entered into a Contract of Lease which was approved by the RTC. RTC decision It brushed aside the defense of state immunity. Government immunity from suit could not be used as an instrument to perpetuate an injustice on a citizen. It held that as the lawful owners of the properties, the respondent spouses enjoyed the right to use and to possess them. RTC ordered the DOTC (as a builder in bad faith) to forfeit the improvements and vacate the properties and to pay actual,

moral, and exemplary damages. CA decision CA upheld RTC decision but deleted the award of exemplary damages. It denied the DOTC’s claim of state immunity from suit, reasoning that the DOTC removed its cloak of immunity after entering into a proprietary contract – the Financial Lease Agreement with Digitel. It adopted the RTC’s position that state immunity cannot be used to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from an unlawful taking without the proper expropriation proceedings. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. DOTC’s contention Its Financial Lease Agreement with Digitel was entered into in pursuit of its governmental functions to promote and develop networks of communication systems. Therefore, it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of state immunity. It argues that while the DOTC, in good faith and in the performance of its mandate, took private property without formal expropriation proceedings, the taking was nevertheless an exercise of eminent domain. Instead of allowing recovery of the property, the case should be remanded to the RTC for determination of just compensation. Respondent Spouses’ contention State immunity cannot be invoked to perpetrate an injustice against its citizens. They also maintain that because the subject properties are titled, the DOTC is a builder in bad faith who is deemed to have lost the improvements it introduced. ISSUE: Whether or not DOTC may properly invoke state immunity HELD: NO The fundamental doctrine that “the State may not be sued without its consent” stems from the principle that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. But as the principle itself implies, the doctrine of state immunity is not absolute. The State may waive its cloak of immunity and the waiver may be made expressly or by implication. It is necessary to distinguish between the State’s sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and its private, commercial, and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Presently, state immunity restrictively extends only to acts jure imperii while acts jure gestionis are considered as a waiver of immunity. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that when the DOTC constructed the encroaching structures and subsequently entered into the FLA with Digitel for their maintenance, it was carrying out a sovereign function. Therefore, we agree with the DOTC’s contention that these are acts jure imperii that fall within the cloak of state immunity. However, the doctrine of state immunity cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. Our laws require that the State’s power of eminent domain shall be exercised through expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is a waiver of State immunity. If the DOTC had correctly followed the regular procedure upon discovering that it had encroached on the respondents’ property, it would have initiated expropriation proceedings instead of insisting on its immunity from suit. The petitioners would not have had to resort to filing its complaint for reconveyance. When the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked. Therefore, DOTC ’s entry into and taking of possession of the respondents’ property amounted to an implied waiver of its governmental immunity from suit.