Legislative Department.docx

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CASES) House of Representative a. District Rep and Questions of Apportionment AGAPITO AQUINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy(CoC) for the position of Representative for the new 2nd Legislative District of Makati City providing the following information; Residence in Constituency: ___ years & 10 months. Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the elections. Petitioner filed another CoC amending the certificate. Petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency for l year and 13 days. Petitioner filed his Answer praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case. On the same day, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner presented in evidence, his Affidavit, lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano. 2nd Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution which DISMISS the: petition for Disqualification against respondent Agapito Aquino and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the 2nd District of Makati City. Elections were held. In Makati City where 3 candidates vied for the congressional seat in the 2nd District, petitioner 38,547 votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes. Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's 2nd Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. COMELEC issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.

Petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether or not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sec 17, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution. COMELEC issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the 2nd Division dated May 6, 1995. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the 2nd Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City in the elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid. HELD: Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid. Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. His certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate that the sole purpose of

transferring his physical residence is not to acquire's new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City. Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati.

ALDABA VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 188078, JANUARY 25, 2010 Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007. House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010. Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress. Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected. Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification

based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides: The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB. The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized. The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated. It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.

Naval vs. Comelec G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014 Facts: Naval had served as member of the Sanggunian, 2nd District of CamSur. On October 12, 2009, RA 9716 was approved, reapportioning the legislative district of Province of CamSur. Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with five towns from the old First District. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. He served until 2013.

In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 7810 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected from. The three-term limit rule’s application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed. COMELEC cancelled Naval's COC. The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in the instant case as the records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th time for the same government post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v. [COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor, having been elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, canrun as city mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took into account the following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. Ruling: Court denies the petition. A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal.

R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second Districtis to be created, but the Third Districtis to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say. The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of representation among the districts. It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013. Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.

Bagabuyo vs COMELEC FACTS: Cagayan de Oro only had one legislative district before. In 2006, CdO congressman Jaraula sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were created. Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court. He was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which was required by the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar. HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not

bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

Case Digest: Reyes vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013 Facts: Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October 31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit. On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and executory. Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for office Discussion: Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of Representative. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the consulgeneral of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Held: The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC

used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest). B. Pary-List System BANAT VS COMELEC FACTS: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules: 1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); 2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; 3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC. 4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case). The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties. ISSUES: I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house? II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling. III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid. IV. How are party-list seats allocated? V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections. VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid. HELD: I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives. How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula: (Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives Hence,

(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55 II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled. III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained: To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat. But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules: RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation). The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the twopercenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives. How is this done? Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed. Example: In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900). Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79 Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2

seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats. Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied. V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections. Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Atong Paglaum v. Commission on Elections FACTS: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners’ application for accreditation and cancelling the

existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll body’s “denial” to accord them due process in the evaluation proceedings. The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case. Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots. THE RULING In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, through Carpio’s ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54 petitions and remanded these petitions to the Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41 petitions that obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance to make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to determine “whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections” under the new parameters set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were remanded to the poll body merely for purposes of determining whether they may be granted accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the May 2013 elections. The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting on the basis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court regarding the party-list system. These earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on who may participate in the party-list system. New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may participate in the May 2013 party-list race and subsequent party-list elections The Decision identified three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations which intend to participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines state that these parties “do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any ‘marginalized or underrepresented sector.'” As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under the party-list system and no longer field congressional candidates. These

parties, if they field congressional candidates, however, are not barred from participating in the party-list elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral wing or party under the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered an “independent sectoral party” linked to a political party through a coalition.

“The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system… In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.

The question is: where does underrepresented” sectors come in?

“There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties,” the Decision read.

representation

of

“marginalized

and

The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in the party-list system. The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent “marginalized and underrepresented” constituencies or those “lacking well-defined political constituencies.” The high court went on to enumerate “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, as follows: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent also applies only to the sectoral parties or organizations. The high court ruled that it is enough that “[a] majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations… must belong to the ‘marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.'” The same is true for those who lack “well-defined political constituencies.” As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines provide that they must either be members of the sector or have a track record of advocacy for their sector. Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations be disqualified, the party or organization itself will not be disqualified “provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.” The party-list system, according to the Decision Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high court stated that it is “not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.” The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave out “non-sectoral parties” in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral groups.

To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which states: Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, also known as the Party-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of Terms): (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the others, could only mean that they are not one and the same. Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec and BANAT v. Comelec

In Ang Bagong Bayani’s parameters for the party-list system, guideline 2 states that “while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors… to be elected to the House of Representatives.'” However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed out that there was an “inherent inconsistency” in the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since the requirement that the major political parties should represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors essentially “automatically disqualified” these major parties from the party-list system. As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court said that the guidelines in this ruling “merely formalized the prevailing practice” when it prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list elections even if through their allied sectoral organizations.

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizen in the Philippines, Inc. vs COMELEC Facts: March 2007, COMELEC accredited Senior Citizen as a party-list organization. Senior Citizen then participated in the May 2007 elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes cast. In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, Senior Citizen was given one seat. Subsequently, Senior Citizen was allowed to participate in the May 2010 elections. After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho). Later, David Kho tendered his resignation letter as representative which was followed by a board resolution of Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in

accordance with the term-sharing agreement made between the nominees of the party-list. COMELEC, however, did not recognize the resignation saying that it is against public policy. The term of public offcials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private parties for public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject to any private agreement. COMELEC resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior Citizens as party-list. December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante orders of Senior Citizens and directed COMELEC to include the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of offcial ballots for the May 2013 elections. SC later ruled that the cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition. Ruling: We find merit. (1) In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organization’s qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position. In its Comment to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the opportunity to present their side on the issue of the termsharing agreement during the hearing on April 18, 2012. Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners’ continuing compliance for accreditation as a party-list organization. The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011.

More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the termsharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. COMELEC EN BANC, GR No. 205505, 2015-09-29

(2) The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.

it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first... nominee OMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.

Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.

Facts: Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his party-list organization, on the other. Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization... registered... under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law). Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.

Ating Koop earned a seat in the House... of Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office... and thereafter assumed office. Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations,... Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term Ating Koop... introduced amendm... ents to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was the composition of the Central Committee,... The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National Convention. In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee. The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group. almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner

Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and Bylaws. Rimas Group... h COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico... prayed that petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives COMELEC RESOLVES... to: DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the House of Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party Representative, for lack of... jurisdiction Issues: Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his party-list organization, on the other. Ruling: the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was... the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition. the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity even after their terms had... expired;... and that the COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the expulsion. We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond its purview. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution... ndows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representative In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and... he assumed office in the House of

Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case. We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon... the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be represented. The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intraparty matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the... jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner. In the pre The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of... bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it... declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST VS COMELEC G.R. NO. 206952, OCTOBER 22, 2013 Facts: This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod challenging the May 2013 resolution issued by COMELEC cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration.

COMELEC says that it is not enough that the party-list organization claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to claim. Records shows that Abang Lingkod failed to stablish its track record which is important to prove that the party-list continuously represents the marginalized. Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures of some alleged activities they conducted after the 2010 elections. These pictures appears to be edited. Under The PartyList System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD’s registration.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. Petitioner is a sectoral party-list group that purports to represent the peasant farmers. However, it did not even comply with the bare requirement that sectoral party-list groups representing a sector should show that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. As correctly argued by the public respondent, petitioner will not, therefore, qualify even under the new parameters set forth in Atong Paglaum.

Abang Lingkod filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by COMELEC, thus this current Petition for certiorari.

(2) COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Issues: I. Whether national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations are required under the law to show their genuineness and bona fide existence in determining if they are eligible for registration with the Commission on Elections; and II. Whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the party-list system.

Akbayan vs. HRET

Ruling: (1) A party, by law, is either "a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."17 A political party is defined as: x x x an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. (Emphasis provided) A party is a national party "when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region." On the other hand, a sectoral party: x x x refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

C. Qualification, Privileges, Inhibition and Disqualification 1. Age, Citizenship, Literacy and other Qualification David vs. Poe 2. Xxx 3. Incompatible and Prohibited Offices, Art VI, Sec 13, 14 DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON, GR No. 175352, 2009-07-15 Facts: During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,[1] he was elected Chairman of the PNRC Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board... of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution Issues:

Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution Ruling: PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions... the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress.[13] The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Issues: constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. Ruling: remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people's representatives, to perform the functions of... their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making... prerogatives of Congress and its members. But as to Senator Santiago's unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

F. Powers of Congress a. Legislative and Oversight Functions Art. VI Sec. 21, 22

D. Quorum and voting majorities E. Discipline of Members, Art. VI Sec. 16 (3)

Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003 Suffrage, Overseas Absentee Voting JANUARY 27, 2018

ANTERO J. POBRE v. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, AC. No. 7399, 2009-08-25

FACTS:

Facts: statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other... disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator. Senator Santiago, through counsel,... explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the

ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. ISSUE: Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid & constitutional? RULING: Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL: a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;” b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;” c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” and d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission” of the same law; for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC. Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA G.R. No. 166715 14, 2008

August

Facts: Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law “transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters” as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies. In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel. Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment

and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues: Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight committee. Discussions: The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, which states that “the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. “ To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented. Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral

to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the overaccumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings: The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges. Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions – taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.”33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

d. Passage of Law - Requirement as to bills - As to the Title of the Bills (Imbong vs. Ochoa) 2. Non-Legislative Power r. informing power Belgica v. Executive Secretary FACTS: HISTORY In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations. SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE 2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act. All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; and b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1. Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester. 4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the BTr. Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be. 5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by thenPresident Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR. ISSUES: A. Procedural Issues 1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy 2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review 3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue 4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel” WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on… 1.) …separation of powers 2.) …non-delegability of legislative power 3.) …checks and balances 4.) …accountability 5.) …political dynasties 6.) …local autonomy C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel” WON the phrases:

(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power HELD AND RATIO: A. Procedural Issues No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. 1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds. As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive

branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: i.)

ii.)

There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.

It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient. iii.)

When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly,

so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles. iv.)

The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution). 3.) YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases. Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply. On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of postenactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle. In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would not apply. B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”

1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded postenactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article). Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. 2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described

in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. 3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto. The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.” 4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this

very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office. However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis. Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment. 5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not selfexecuting due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties. 6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President –

who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel” YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.” However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.” The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting. Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected. Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides: The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB. The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated. It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.