Spec Pro Digests.docx

83. SEBIAL v SEBIAL

83. SANTERO v CFI

Gelacio Sebial died leaving three children with his first wife and six children with his second wife. Benjamina Sebial, his child by second marriage, filed a petition for the settlement of Gelacio’s estate, praying that she be appointed administratrix thereof. This was opposed by Roberta Sebial, a child of the first marriage of Gelacio, contending that the properties had already been partitioned. The court granted the petition and prayer. An inventory was filed by Benjamina, opposed by Roberta, prompting the probate court to order the two parties to submit their respective suggested inventories. The court approved that which Benjamina submitted. Roberta appealed, contending that the probate court no longer had jurisdiction to approve the inventory as it had been file beyond the three-month period mandated by Section 1, Rule 83.

The late Pablo Santero left 3 children by his first wife Felixberta Pacursa and 7 children with his second wife Anselma Diaz. All children are natural as Pablo was not married to either wife. Anselma Diaz prayed in the proceedings for the settlement of Pablo’s estate that support be granted for the matriculation of 3 of the children of Pablo, and another prayer for the grant of support for the matriculation of the other children not included in the earlier prayer. She contends that all her children are entitled to support ebem of of age and gainfully employed. The trial court granted the prayers.

I: W/N the court has jurisdiction to approve the inventory submitted beyond the three-month period. AFFIRMATIVE. The three-month period under Rule 83 is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of the letters of administration and publication of notice of hearing, the probate court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and retains the same until the proceeding is closed. The only effect of filing beyond the period is that the same may be a ground for the administrator’s removal.

I: W/N the children of Anselma who are gainfully employed and of age are entitled to support. R: AFFIRMATIVE. The controlling provision is not Rule 83, Sec 3 but ART 290 and 188 of the NCC, which states that support shall be given to the surviving spouse and children during liquidation of inventoried property until what belongs to them is delivered, the same to be deducted from the amount that is ultimately pertaining to them. While Rule 83 limits support to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the same procedural law cannot impair the aforediscussed substantive law in the NCC.

83. LESACA v LESACA

83. CHUA TAN v DEL ROSARIO

Baldomero Lesaca died survived by his second wife Juana Felix and two minor children wth her, and two children by his first marriage, and three natural children with a third woman.

This case is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Chua Tan and others, from the judgment of the RTC which dismissed their complaint and absolved the defendant as administratrix of the estate of Chua Toco. They assign that the lower court erred in appreciating Del Rosario’s contention of res judicata.

Proceedings for the probate of his will pending, the CFI granted, despite opposition of all other parties, a monthly living allowance of P100 and P300 for matriculation and uniforms to the two minor children of Baldomero from his first marriage. The co-executrices refused to deposit the same on the ground that the same should be chargeable against the hereditary portion of the aforesaid minors. I: W/N the allowances for support granted to the minors pending estate liquidation is collationable and deductible from their share of inheritance. R: AFFIRMATIVE. ART 188 of the NCC provides in clear language that while the widow and children are entitled to support during the inventory and liquidation of a decedent’s estate, the support should be deducted from their portion insofar as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to as fruits or income. ART 1041 does not apply as the same refers to properties or rights received as donation during the lifetime of the decedent, which does not improverish the donor or enrich the donee, since it is not taken from the capital but from the fruits thereof. Allowances for support, on the other hand, is of a different nature compared to collationable donations.

I: W/N this case is barred by res judicata. R: NEGATIVE. There is identity of parties. Previous case: Benedicta Juana, judicial administratrix of the estate of Chua Piaco, filed a case against Del Rosario, administratrix of the estate of Chua Toco. Present case: presumptive heirs of Chua Piaco filed a case against Del Rosario. It is the duty of the administrator to protect not only the estate but also the creditors, heirs and legatees, so that they may receive what is due to them. While there is no actual identity of parties, there is identity through legal representation. There is identity of subject matter: the former case is a petition to render accounting of funds allegedly delivered in trust by Chua Piaco to Chua Toco; the present case is a petition for the partition of the same funds between the heirs. There is identity of cause of action. Both cases concern the same alleged trust concerning funds which was delivered in trust by Piaco to Toco, which the administrator of the latter’s estate refuses to render an accounting on.

83. REYES v MOSQUEDA

83. VDA DE RODRIGUEZ v CA

Dr. Emilio Pascual died survived by his sister, Ursula, and the children of his other late sisters. The heirs of Emilio filed a petition for the administration and settlement of his estate. Ursula moved to exclude some properties from the inventory of the estate and that the same be devliered to her, pursuant to a donation mortis causa executed by Emilio. The trial court ordered the exclusion of the real properties identified by Ursula. The petitioners asked reconsideration of the same order as one of the lots excluded belonged to them, by a deed of donation inter vivos executed by Emilio during his lifetime. The RTC ruled in favor of Ursula, as affirmed by the CA. The petitioners now assail the jurisdiction of the RTC to exclude the properties it so excluded.

Beatriz Bautista adopted Carmen Bautista. Beatriz’s husband, Jose Valero, although unable to adopt her as he was disqualified to adopt because of his first marriage, consented to her use of the surname Valero. Jose donated to Carmen ½ pro-indiviso shares of two conjugal lots. Upon death of Jose Valero, the executor of his will included in his inventory the 2 lots donated to Carmen. She moved for the exclusion of the lots. The executor opposed, citing prematurity of the motion as the same is an issue of collation. The probate court excluded the lots from inventory, and ruled that the same is subject to collation. Carmen moved for reconsideration, that the lots were not subject to collation as she was the actual owner thereof. This was granted by the court.

I: W/N the RTC had jurisdiction to exclude the properties it excluded from the inventory.

I: W/N the lots are subject to collation.

R: AFFIRMATIVE. The order specifically stated that the exclusion be without prejudice to the final determination in a separate action; the probate court has no power to adjudicate with finality title to properties equally claimed by two parties, but it may, however, rule as to whether or not it shall be included or excluded in the inventory of the estate fo the deceased. Whatever order is given is not conclusive and is subject to final determination in a separate action regarding ownership.

R: The issue is premature. The decision of the RTC was interlocutory and did not settle with finality title to the lots. The general rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a property should be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon title thereto, but such determination is not conclusive and subject to final determination in a separate action regarding ownership. To rule therefore as to whether or not it is subject to collation is premature and not necessary for the resolution of the case which merely involved inclusion to or exclusion from the inventory. An issue of collation is not yet justiciable in the early stages of the proceeding, since the same concerns distribution of the estate—it is not yet justiciable since the debts of the estate had not yet been paid.

84. SAN DIEGO v NOMBRE

84. MANANQUIL v VILLEGAS

Nombre was the administrator of an estate subject of a settlement proceeding filed before the RTC. In his capacity as administrator, he leased one of the lots under administration to Escanlar, without authority or approval from the court. He was then removed as administrator by order of the court and replaced by Campillanos. Escanlar, meanwhile, refused to surrender the leased lot, prompting the court to cite him in contempt.

Mananquil charged Villegas, the counsel of Leong, who is the administrator of the estate of the deceased Filomena Cerna, for gross misconduct and malpractice. It appears that a lease contract was executed by Leong and Villegas’ partnership involving lots under Leong’s administration.

Campillanos filed a motion asking authority to lease the same lot in favor of petitioner San Diego. Nombre opposed on the ground that the same had been leased to Escanlar. He argues that his previous authority to lease the same must be recognized and assumed valid unless declared by the court as void. I: W/N the administrator had power to lease a property which forms part of the estate under administration. R: NEGATIVE. Under Rule 84, a judicial administrator has, among others, the power to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will, without authority from the Court. Lease is deemed to be an act of administration under our jurisdiction, supported by jurisprudence. Moreover, an administrator is required to file a bond prior to assumption of the position. This serves as sufficient protection to the persons he represents.

I: W/N respondent committed acts of misconduct in failing to secure the approval of the court before leasing properties under his administration. R: NEGATIVE. Rule 84 Sec 4 allows an administrator to perform acts of administration without approval from the court, including the power to enter into lease contracts as long settled in jurisprudence. His counsel is, however, subject to disciplinary sanction, as having participated in the renewal of the lease contracts in favor of the partnership of which he is a member and at one point managing partner, as per ART 1646 of the NCC: a lawyer is disqualified by public policy from leasing the properties under their administration in view of the fidiuciary relationship involved and the peculiar control they have over the properties of others that they hold.

84. LAT v CA

84. PHIL TRUST CO v WEBBER

In the settlement of the estate of Mariano Lat, the CA rendered a decision reversing the order of the RTC and ordered the delivery to the administrator of a sum of 4700 pesos by Cleotilde Lat, without prejudice to the rights of the compulsory heirs thereto.

The RTC approved a final accounting of the estate of the deceased Frankel, filed by the administrator Phil Trust. The appellants, however, objected to the accounting on the ground that the estate had not been invested in a bank with a higher rate of interest.

A motion forexecution was filed by the administrator of the estate, to which Lat opposed, on the ground that there had been an agreement by all parties prior to the decision that the appeal shall be withdrawn. Nevertheless, the CA issued the writ of execution prayed for by the administrator.

I: W/N the administrator can be faulted for not investing the estate in a bank with higher interest.

I: W/N the CA erred in issuing the writ of execution. NEGATIVE. Regardless of whether or not the agreement amounts to renunciation of the heirs of their shares to the inheritance, the legalization of the execution thereof by the CA remains to be correct as the decision was rendered in favor of the administrator, not the heirs. Moreover, the case is filed prematurely as there is no showing that the settlement of the estate is in its latter stages; the net assets available for the distribution had not yet been determined.

R: NEGATIVE. The conduct by the administrator in depositing the estate in a current account of a solid and responsible bank over depositing in a fixed account with higher rate of interest, with a view of having them subject to withdrawal at the court’s notice, is not unlawful or improper, but worthy of approval. In default of instructions to the contrary, the administrator is not called to speculate with funds in his custody or place them where they may nt be withdrawn at the order of the court, but rather managing them in accordance with the law, always keeping them subject to the orders fo the court.

84. BADILLO v FERRER

84. MATUTE v CA

Macario Badillo died intestate survived by his widow, Clarita Ferrer, and five minor children. Each of the children inherited ½ of his estate, or 625 pesos each, less than the two thousand pesos mentioned under ART 320 of the NCC. The widow, on her behalf and as guardian of the minors, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition and sale of the minor’s participation to a real property left by Macario in favor of Soromero and Rana.

Matias Matute is the duly appointed co-administrator of the estate of the late Amadeo Matute. Carlo Matute filed a petition praying that Matias Matute be removed as coadministrator, alleging neglect in the exercise of his duties as administrator, failing to render a complete accounting of the account of the administration. This was opposed by Matias. The court removed Matias and ordered him to submit a final accounting of the administration, and Carlos Matute was ordered to take his place.

Modesta Badillo, sister of Macario, obtained guardianship over the children as their mother cannot be found, and filed a complaint in their behald to annul the sale of their participation in the property so sold; that as co-owners, they be given right of redemption. I: W/N the sale of the minors’ participation is a voidable contract. R: NEGATIVE. It is not voidable as ART 1390 contemplates, that for a contract to be voidable, the parties’ consent must have been vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation or fraud or undue influence. In this case, the minors were not parties to the contract involved; their names were merely dragged into the contract by their mother who claimed a right to represent them. The deed is therefore, unenforceable, as it is an unauthorized contract under ART 1317 of the NCC; the power given to the mother as guardian covers only matter of administration and does not cover disposition, unless she obtains a prior permission from the court. Neither is there ratification, as the minors in fact question the validity of the sale entered into in their behalf.

I: W/N the probate court may remove Matias as coadministrator, in this case. R: NEGATIVE. While Rule 82 gives the court the power to remove an administrator, giving wide discretion as to the sufficiency of the ground of removal, in this case, the Supreme Court is constrained to nullify the order of removal as the same had been ordered by the probate court without affording the administrator of his day in court, denying him of his right to due process. Moreover, assuming that the removal is valid, the appointment of Carlos is also improper; there was no showing that any hearing was conducted, nor was there notice sent to the heirs and interested parties regarding such appointment. The requirement of hearing and notification to all known heirs and interested parties are essential to the validity of the proceeding for appointment of a judicial administrator, in order that no one be depreived of their rights or properties without due process of law.

84. LINDAIN v CA

84. LITONJUA v MONTILLA

The minor plaintiffs are the owners of a parcel of land. Their mother, a widow, sold the land to the defendants, acting as guardian of her minor children. The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale, contending it was null and void as it had been made without authority and/or court approval.

Pedro Litonjua obtained favorable judgment in a civil case against Claudio Montilla for the payment of sum of 4000 with legal interest. A writ of execution was issued but there exists no property of Montilla which can be levied. In the estate proceedings of Agustin Montilla, Pedro filed a motion that the shares of Claudio be sold and from the proceeds thereon, the judgment debt to him be paid.

I: W/N the mother, as guardian, can unilaterally dispose of the properties of her minor children. R: NEGATIVE. Under ART 320 of the NCC, the parent acts as a mere legal administrator of the property of his minor children, and does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the same without judicial approval. This lack of judicial authority, being known to the respondentvendees, negate their contention that they are buyers in good faith.

I: W/N the remedy availed of by Litonjua is proper. R: NEGATIVE. An execution cannot be legally levied upon property of an intestate succession to pay the debts of the heirs of the deceased, until all credits held against the latter at the time of his death had been paid, and only after the debts of the estate had been paid can the remaining property that pertains to the debtor be attached.