Spec-pro-digests.docx

G.R. No. 145022 September 23, 2005 ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Doctrine: Jurisdiction vs Venue; Venue can be waived in civil cases FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article. INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that the venue was improperly laid, among many others. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed an Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City of Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati" RTC admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been cured in the Amended Complaint. Also, there is no substantial amendment, but only formal, in the Amended Complaint which would affect the defendants’ defenses and their Answers. Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners and the other by defendants .The two petitions were consolidated. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this PETREV filed by the petitioners. Petitioners argue that since the original complaint only contained the office address of respondent and not the latter’s actual residence or the place where the allegedly

offending news reports were printed and first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations, failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court. ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CIVIL CASE UPON THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES HELD: YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Here, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is the RTC that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon. Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties. Here, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint that the article and the caricature were printed and first published in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege these allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not

properly laid. The term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as referring to the place where actions for libel shall be filed or "venue." The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions. Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed and first published. Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may still be amended. In so doing, the court acted properly and without any grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: WON VENUE MAY BE WAIVED IN CIVIL CASES HELD: YES. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction. Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first published would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case. The failure of the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which

goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not jurisdictional. CA’s DECISION AFFIRMED. RULE 4 – VENUE

G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000] RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE REGISTRY CITY, respondent.

OF

DEEDS

OF

PARAÑAQUE

NATURE: A petition for review on the decision rendered by RTC of Parañaque City, Metro Manila involving questions of law. FACTS: Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Parañaque City. The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit

Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Parañaque City. In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.

matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial.

Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course.

HELD:

Amendments as a matter of right

Venue of real actions

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition. ISSUE:

This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court held that it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue. Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law.[16] It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject

Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.

PACIFIC BANKING CORP vs CA

FACTS: [Consolidated Case]

CASE#1 (union)(5th division) 1. Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines and, was placed under liquidation. a. A Liquidator was appointed. 2. RTC: the Central Bank filed a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." a. The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court. 3. Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union), herein petitioner, filed a complaint-inintervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC.

a. RTC ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union. 4. The Liquidator filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. a. DENIED! 5. The Liquidator filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. a. The respondent judge disallowed Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late. (Filed more than 15 days after receipt of the decision) 6. *CA: Liquidator filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus a. CA held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the RTC was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. b. Since the notice of appeal was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. c. RTC should give due course to the appeal. 7. *SC: The Union filed a petition a. The union contends that the case is a special proceeding and that the appeal was filed out of time.

CASE #2 (stockholders/investors)(14th divison)

1. *RTC: Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondent, filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. a. Respondent judge directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents as preferred creditors.

allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

ISSUE: Whether a petition for liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action

2. The Liquidator moved for reconsideration a. DENIED!

HELD: SPECIAL PROCEEDING

3. The Liquidator filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders. a. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. b. The judge directed the execution of his order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim. 4. *CA: Liquidator filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus a. CA held that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. b. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered is 15 days c.

Since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late.

5. *SC: The Liquidator filed a petition a. Liquidator contends that the Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s a Special Proceeding case and/or one which

Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide: §1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.

( I made a table para masmadali maintindihan haha – joel ) ACTION (CIVIL ACTION)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

The act by which one sues The act by which one seeks to another in a court of justice establish the status or right of a for the enforcement or party, or a particular fact. protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

A formal demand of a right by A petition for a declaration of a one against another. status, right or fact. Proper remedy of a party Proper remedy of a party litigant that seeks to recover whose purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for property from another. an insane.

A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Since a petition for liquidation is in the nature of a special proceeding, the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal.

In CASE#2 (Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of

receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.

Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final.

In CASE#1 (union), CA correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal.

CA correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition and its decision should be affirmed.

Note: Liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest

therein. This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.

-The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that :

(1) the requisite docket fee had not been paid; Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment. Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER

Facts: -The holographic will of Alice O. Sheker was admitted for probate in the RTC of Iligan City. Thereafter, the RTC issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. - In compliance, petitioner, Allan Sheker filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate of Alice Sheker, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by Allan Sheker in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

(2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

- RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Allan Sheker filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied . Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

-Allan Sheker maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of nonforum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner

Issue :

Whether or not Allan Sheker’s contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is entirely correct.

Held: No.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides: Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable. The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.1[4]

This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of nonforum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to

special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Notes:

Certification of non forum shopping:

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's

contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

Docket fees:

the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

Written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally:

Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with.

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,2[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.

Emilio Pacioles v. Miguela Chuatoco-ChingFacts: 1.Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her huband (petitioner) and two minor children.2.Emilio filed a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate.3.Miguelita’s mother filed an opposition to the petition for issuance of letters of administration. That the bulk of the estate is composed of paraphernal properties. She wishedto be appointed. She also said that she has direct and material interest in the estate becauseshe gave half of her inherited properties to the deceased on conditio ntaht they wouldundertake a business endeavor as partners.4.The mother asked that one Emmanuel be appointed.5.Court appointed Emilio and Emmanuel as jointadministrator.6.No claims were filed. Thereafter, Emilio filed an inventory.Emmanuel failed to file one.7.Court declared Emilio and his children as the only compulsoryheirs of the deceased.8.Emilio then petitioned the court for the payment of estate tax andthe partition and distribution of the estate.9.RTC denied the petition as to the partition and distribution. CA affirmed.

Issue: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?

is merely todetermine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory . The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.i.

Held:

First

1. General Rule:a.jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only tomatters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceasedpersons but

, the inventory was not disputed.1. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and

does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership thatarise during the proceedings .i. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.b.A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probatecourt may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is todetermine whether or not a property should be included in the inventoryi.Pastor v. CA1.As a rule, the question of ownership is an extrataneous matter which theprobate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included inthe inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the titlethereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subjectto the final decision in a separate action to resolve title2. Reliance to Pastor v. CA

a. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such relianceis misplaced .b. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of theintestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership

sought the exclusion of thespecific properties which she believed or considered to be hers . But instead of doing so,she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on thereal estate properties.ii. Second, Emmanuel (respondent’s son) did not file an inventory1. He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those propertieswhich respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor tosubmit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory. 2.Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Itsproper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It iswell- settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions,that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of theestate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to thatof the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to thecourt in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court. a.

Jurisprudence states that: i.

probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estateand which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regardssaid properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventoryor list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well andgood, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have toresort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title becausethe probate court cannot do so.3. Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverseclaim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

Borja v. Borja 46 SCRA 577 FACTS: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal. He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his son Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special administatrix. Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise agreement. She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of Francisco has not yet been probated. HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid. The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and Josefa. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirsthereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995 PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its members, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents. G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995

EMPLOYEES officers and COURT OF Liquidator of

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents. NOTES: The principal question in these cases is whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from. FACTS:

RTC: 

September 13, 1991-the trial court ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union



September 16, 1991-Liquidator received a copy of the order



October 16, 1991-he filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order



December 6, 1991-the judge modified his September 13, 1991 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration



December 9, 1991-the order was received by the Liquidator



December 10, 1991-he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal



December 23, 1991-another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas



February 10, 1992- in his order, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision and he ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and again, beyond 15 days. The judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration.



March 27, 1992-the judge granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution

The cases are consolidated. Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under liquidation and a Liquidator was appointed. The Central Bank filed with the RTC of Manila a petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." The petition was approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court. Nañagas, a new Liquidator, was appointed by the Central Bank. In G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union): Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-inintervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC.

CA: The Liquidator filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal. In its decision of November 17, 1992, the Fifth Division held in the case of the Union that the

proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing. SC: The Union contends that the Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed by Nañagas was filed on time. In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors): Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents filed claims for the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.



October 28, 1992- the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim

CA: The Liquidator filed Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal. On December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division ruled in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition. SC: The Liquidator contends that the Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation is a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

RTC: 

September 11, 1992-respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors

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September 16, 1992-the Liquidator received the order

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September 30, 1992-he moved for reconsideration



October 2, 1992- his motion was denied



October 5, 1992- He received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration



October 14, 1992-he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992

ISSUES: Main Issue: 1. Whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. Sub-issues: 2. Whether or not In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time.

3. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. 4. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373, (case of the Labor Union), the Liquidator can question the order of the court or appeal from it, in which the liquation plan was already approved by the Monetary Board. 5. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373, (case of the Labor Union), the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. HELD: 1. The petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding. BP Blg. 129 provides: §39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpuscases the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from. No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof. This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:

19. Period of Appeals. — (a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from. (b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides: §1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. §2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding. Distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding by Chief Justice Moran states: ACTION (CIVIL ACTION)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

The act by which one sues The act by which one seeks to another in a court of justice establish the status or right of a for the enforcement or party, or a particular fact. protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A formal demand of a right A petition for a declaration of a by one against another. status, right or fact. Proper remedy of a party Proper remedy of a party litigant that seeks to whose purpose is to seek the

recover another.

property

from appointment of a guardian for an insane.

Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person. What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. The petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets. Also, contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for interpleader. Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their order of payment. Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As stated:

A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby. The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal priority and the approved distribution plan. Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of a particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved, and which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation where multiple appeals are allowed. A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court.

Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order allowing or disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original records of the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of appeal is instead required to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court. Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a record on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164). 2. Yes, In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending. Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently, the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.

3. Yes, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), the court find that the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal. 4. Yes, the Liquidator can question the order of the court or appeal from it In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." As this Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: There is no question that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]). In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank. Under §§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.

5. Yes, the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central Bank. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC.

Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragrante G.R. April

No. 27,

L-770 1948

FACTS: On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (21/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the law. ISSUE:

Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality. HELD: The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived after his death. The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending application at the commission. SULPICIA VENTURA,petitioner, vs.HON. FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, in His Capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional

Trial Court,7th Judicial District, Branch XII, Cebu City; and JOHN UY,respondent.

ISSUE: WON A DEAD PERSON OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE A PARTY PLAINTIFF IN A COURTACTION.HELD:

G.R. No. 63145 October 5, 1999

No.Firstly, neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a courtaction. A deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action somuch so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. Anaction begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal person,since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to amend theparty plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court toamend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to thesame extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be named aparty defendant in a court action. .

FACTS: Private respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money and Damages againstpetitioner. However, petitioner moved to dismiss the foregoing complaint on the ground that “the estate of Carlos Ngo has no legal personality,” the same being “neither a natural no r legal person in contemption of law.” The petitioner then filed an opposition to privaterespondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The public respondent then gave private respondent 15 days to make the amendment of the complaint. Petitioner filed a MR of the order of publicrespondent. First, she argued that the action instituted by the private respondent to recoverP48, 889.70, representing the unpaid price of the automotive spare parts purchased by herdeceased husband during his lifetime, is a money claim which, under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, does not survive, the same having been filed after Carlos Ngohad already died. Second, she claimed that the public respondent never acquired jurisdictionover the subject matter of the case which, being an action to recover a sum of money froma deceased person, may only be heard by a probate court. Private respondent opposed theforegoing motion. Public respondent then issued an Order giving private respondent 24hours to file his amended complaint. Private respondent then filed his amended complaint. Petitioner then filed a Comment to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Private respondent then filed A Rejoinder to Defendant’s Comment. Public respondent then issued the hereinassailed order. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari assailing the said Order.

Secondly, It is clear that the original complaint of private respondent against the estate of Carlos Ngo was a suit against Carlos Ngo himself who was already dead at the time of thefiling of said complaint. At that time, and this private respondent admitted, no specialproceeding to settle his estate had been filed in court. As such, the trial court did notacquire jurisdiction over either the deceased Carlos Ngo or his estate. It is true thatamendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that everycase may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trialof causes or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. But amendmentscannot be allowed so as to confer jurisdiction upon a court that never acquired it in the first place. When it is evident that the court has no jurisdiction over the person and the subjectmatter and that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to be susceptible of amendment,or that to permit such amendment would radically alter the theory and the nature of theaction, then the court should refuse the amendment of the defective pleading and order thedismissal of the case.

Philippine Savings Bank vs Lantin Duplex-apartment house on a lot in Sampaloc, Manila owned by Filomeno and Socorro Tabligan duplex built by Candido Ramos, a duly licensed architect and a building contractor for 32, 927 spouses paid 7,139 only- hence the architect used his own money to finish the construction of the duplex-apartment 25,788.50. in dec 1966 and feb 1967 spouses Tabligan obtained from Philippine Savings bank 3 loans in the total amountof 35,000 to complete the construction of the duplex apartment. To secure the payment of the loans, the spouses executed 3 PNs and 3 Deeds of REM over the property subject. all REM were registered with ROD Manila, TCTs were free from all liens and encumbrances at that time. spouses later failed to pay their monthly amortizations so BANK FORECLOSED ON THE MORTGAGED AND WASTHE HIGHEST BIDDER AT THE PUBLIC AUCTION. Lantin also filed an action against spouses to collect on unpaid cost of the construction and later succeeded inOBTAINING A WRIT OF PREL ATTACHMENT over the property- later adverse claim annotated at the back of the TCT. Trial court ruling: in favor of Architect but writ of exec unsatisfied. Architect wrote letter to PSB FOR THE DELIVERY TO HIM OF HIS PRO-RATA SHARE OVER THE PROPERTY. PSB REFUSED TO PAY ISSUE: WON ARCHITECT IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM A PRORATA SHARE IN THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION? Bank: De Barretto vs Villanueva- not the proceedings contemplated- there must be an insolvency proceeding orother liquidation proceeding; architect's lien did not acquire the character of a statutory lien equal to PSB'sregistered mortgage. Ramos:proceedings in trial court can qualify as a general liquidation of the estate of the spouses Tabliganbecause the only existing property of spouses is the duplex apt

Held: the proceedings in the court below do not partake of the nature of the insolvency proceedings or settlement of a decedent's estate. The action filed by Ramos was only to COLLECT THE UNPAID COST of the construction of the duplex apt. insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are bindingagainst the whole world regardless of WON persons having interest were notified or not- they are equally bound. although lower court found that there were no known creditors other than the plaintiff and defendant herein. it will not bar other creditors in the event they show up and present their claims against PSB claimingthat they also have preferred liens against the property involved. TCT issued in favor of bank is supposed to be indefeasible. it wouldnt hurt if annotated. as far as bank knew, it financed the entire construction "equivalent general liquidation"purchaser in good faith and for value takes the registered land free from liensand encumbrances other thant the statutory liens and those recorded in the TCT. Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA. CRISANTO DE BORJA, administrator-appellant, vs. JUAN DE BORJA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees. [J. Felix, 1957]

Doctrine: An administrator may be held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his administration may incur by reason of his negligence, bad faith or acts of maladministration (i.e. mixing the funds of the estate under his administration with his personal funds instead of keeping a current account for the Intestate in his capacity as administrator). He may be made to reimburse the Intestate for amounts that were not properly accounted for. Expenses which are reasonable and necessary for the care and preservation of the Intestate are allowable charges to the estate.

Facts: - Qunitin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, are legitimate children of Marcelo de Borja. Marcelo died intestate and Quintin de Borja became the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja. Quintin died testate and Crisanto de Borja, son of Francisco de Borja, was appointed as administrator of the Estate of Marcelo. Francisco, on the other hand, became the executor of the will of Quintin. - Francisco was later required by the Court to resign as such executor and was succeeded by Rogelio Limaco, a son-in-law of Quintin de Borja; while the Intestate remained under the administration of Crisanto de Borja until the then outbreak of the war. - After the war or in 1945, the court ordered the the reconstitution of the records of this case, requiring the administrator to submit his report and a copy of the project of partition. - The heirs of Quintin de Borja opposed to the approval of the statements of accounts rendered by the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja on the ground that it was not detailed enough to enable the interested parties to verify the same; that they cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer any loss considering that during the administration of the same by Quintin de Borja, the Estate accumulated gains of more than P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs as well as cash balance; that they desired to examine the accounts of Dr. Crisanto de Borja to verify the loss and therefore prayed that the administrator be ordered to deposit with the Clerk of Court all books, receipts, accounts and other papers pertaining to the Estate of Marcelo de Borja. - On July 6, 1950, herein oppositors-appellees, filed a motion for the delivery to them of their inheritance in the estate, pursuant to the provisions of the project of Partition, and expressing their willingness to put up a bond if required to do so by the Court. Motion was granted and affirmed by the SC.

- On August 16, 1950, by order of the Court, the properties adjudicated to Juliana de Borja in the project of Partition were finally delivered to the estate of said heir upon the filing of a bond for P20,000. It also ruled that as the petition of Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco made mention of certain properties allegedly belonging to the Intestate, said petition should properly be considered together with the final accounts of the administrator. - On August 27, 1951, the administrator filed his amended statement of accounts covering the period from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949, which showed a cash balance of P36,660. An additional statement of accounts filed on August 31, 1961 for the period of from August 1, 1949, to August 31, 1951, showed a cash balance of P5,851.17 and pending obligations in the amount of P6,165.03. - The heirs of Quintin de Borja again opposed the approval of the statements of accounts on the ground that certain fruits which should have been accrued to the estate were unaccounted for. But as the other heirs seemed satisfied with the accounts presented by said administrator and as their group was only one of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate, they prayed that the administrator be held liable for only P119,932.42 which was 1/4 of the amount alleged to have been omitted. - On October 4, 1951, the administrator filed a reply to said opposition containing a counterclaim for moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin de Borja which was admitted by the court. The administrator later on filed an amended counterclaim impleading the counsel for the oppositors as defendant, which was denied by the lower court.

Issues:

What may be considered as acts of maladministration and whether an administrator, as the one in the case at bar, may be

held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate under his administration may incur by reason of his negligence, bad faith or acts of maladministration [Yes, administrator may be held accountable]

Ratio:

SC: After a protracted and extensive hearing on the matter, the Court, finding the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, guilty of certain acts of maladministration, held him liable for the payment to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of 1/4 of the unreported income which the estate should have received. Hence, he is liable for: (a) P7,084.27; (b)12,175.00; (c) 16,113.95; and (d) 3,352.75.

The SC relied on the evidence presented by the oppositors (i.e. testimony of Lauro Aguila, testimony of Narciso Punzal who was instructed by appellant to testify in court that he was the overseer of the Mayapyap property for Quintin de Borja from 1937-1944, delivering the yearly proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of Palay to Rogelio Limaco, and testimony of Basilio Javier who worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is near the land belonging to the Intestate, the 2 properties being separated only by a river. He knew the tenants and the yields.)

TOPIC: COMPENSATION

It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and collected from the estate the sum of P13,294 as his fees from

1945 to 1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is no controversy as to the fact that this appropriated amount was taken without the order or previous approval by the probate Court. Neither is there any doubt that the administration of the Intestate estate by Crisanto de Borja is far from satisfactory. Yet it is a fact that Crisanto de Borja exercised the functions of an administrator and is entitled also to a certain amount as compensation for the work and services he has rendered as such. Now, considering the extent and size of the estate, the amount involved and the nature of the properties under administration, the amount collected by the administrator for his compensation at P200 a month is not unreasonable and should therefore be allowed. MANOTOK REALTY v. CA, GR No. L-45038, 1987-04-30 Facts: Felipe Madlangawa... claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision... since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores... with the understanding that the... respondent would eventually buy the lot. the lot,... the owner of t Clara Tambunting... died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were placed under custodia legis. the private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00 which was received by Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner... private respondent did not pay or was unable to pay this balance because after the death of the testatrix, Clara Tambunting de Legarda, her heirs could not settle their... differences. Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate

Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the lot in question. the petitioner became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting-Legarda Subdivision In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters and occupants, the petitioner caused the publication of several notices... private respondent was one of the many occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were occupying... he petitioner filed the action below to recover the said lot Issues: In this petition, the petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding that the sale by Don Vicente Legarda in favor of the private respondent is valid, binding, and enforceable against the petitioner. petitioner contends that since there is no dispute that the property in question was the paraphernal property of Clara Tambunting,... no authority whatsoe Vicente Legarda had no a... o the private... ever to sell the said property to the private respondent... on May 12, 1950 since... the former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting only on August 28, 1950 Ruling: There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambuting during the lifetime of the latter Thus, it cannot be said that the sale with was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Dona Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the former for and on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death.

n Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in... dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting. After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request,... then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his... interests or to pay the balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator. Principles: sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be the... subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court. Malig vs. Bush, 28 SCRA 449 , No. L-22761 May 31, 1969 Facts: the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush. They prayed that They prayed that the project of partition be annulled; that the defendant be ordered to submit a complete inventory and accounting of all the properties left by the deceased and another project of partition adjudicating to the plaintiffs their legal participation in the said estate and/or in the event that the defendant had disposed of all or part of the estate, that she be ordered to pay them the market value thereof; and that the defendant be ordered to pay for the value of the fruits received, damages and attorney's fees. The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of limitations.

After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date thereof the hearing was postponed upon the defendant's manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss. The motion, when filed, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since the action was one to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963 the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by the defendant but because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were turned down; hence, this appeal.

Issue: The procedural question posed by appellants is: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss? Held: No. The Court should not dismiss a case based on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss because it is tantamount to depriving the opposing party of their right to respond or argue the case.

have her civil status put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry. HELD: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that “for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Lukban vs Republic L-8492, February 29, 1956

GUE vs REPUBLICNo. L-14058 March 24, 1960

FACTS:

Petitioner and appellant: Angelina L. GueOppositor and appellee: Republic of the PhilippinesNature of the case: Appeal from the order of the CFI of ManilaPOnente: Montemayor, J.Issue:Facts:1)Appeal from an order of the CFI Manila dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue

Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to marry again, she desires to

2) Oct 11, 1944: married to William Gue and had a child Anthony Gue; another child Eulogio

3) on January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and went to Shanghai China but since then had not been heardof, neither had he written to her nor in any way communicated with her and she failed to locate himdespite of her efforts and diligence4)they had not acquired any property during the marriage5)she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of William gue (Art 390 of the CC)CFI: after publication and hearing, issued the order of dismissal-no right had been established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be predicated and thisaction is not for settlement of the estate of the absentee as it is clear he did not leave any

knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls." If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must be beyond reasonable doubt, the rule of presumption was not applied and the fact of death was deemed established, with more reason is this Court justified in entering a finding of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for, the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.

* A judicial presumption even if final and executor, would still be a prima facie presumption only and it stilldisputable—it is for this reason that it cannot be a subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration—proof of actual death would still have to be determined6)Appealed- invoked the provisions of Art 390 of the New Civil Code—absence of 7 years—for successionshall not be presumed dead till after an absence of 10 years7)According to appellant with promulgation of the NCC in 1950, the courts are now authorized to declarepersons presumptively deadSOLICITOR GENERAL:opposed to the petition; same reason as above (*)SC: the appeal order dismissing the petition is AFFIRMED. Eastern Shipping v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-60101, August 31, 1983 (124 SCRA 425) There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or

REPUBLIC OF APPEALS,et.al.

THE

PHILIPPINES

v.

COURT

OF

458 SCRA 200 (2005), THIRD DIVISION Apolinaria Malinao filed a petition before the Ormoc Regional Trial Court for the Declaration of Presumptive Death of her Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc. The petition was thereafter granted by the trial court. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the present case is a special proceeding which requires that a record of appeal be filed and served pursuant to Section 2 (a) Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding. The CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special proceeding.

HELD: Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW contains Article 238 which provides that unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in the said Title shall apply in all cases provided for in the Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. The petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required and is therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code as her purpose was to contract a valid subsequent marriage, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court‘s order sufficed.

with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

HELD:

The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.

Valdez vs. Republic GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009 Montaner vs. Shariah District Court FACTS:

Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage

Facts: Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Alejandro died. Petitioners herein are their three children. Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court. They claim to be the first family of Alejandro. Petitioner children filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss becasue Discangcopan failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners point to Disangcopan’s petition which contains an allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was

insufficient. Issue: Whether or not the proper docket fees were paid for “Complaint” for the judicial partition of properties. Held: Yes, only because the petitioner children failed to present the clerk of court’s assessment. Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiencyassessment lies with the same clerk of court. In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees. As every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment. However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency. In the case at bar, petitioner children did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether Disangcopan correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment. URIARTE V. CFI Short summary: alleged natural child of the deceased filed petition for settlement of INTESTATE estate of Don Juan Uriarte y Goite in Negros Occidental Court. PNB was even appointed as special administrator, but PNB failed to qualified. MTD filed by nephew of Don Juan, alleging that while he was in Spain, the deceased made a will AND that petitioner had doubtful interest (proceeding for his recognition as a natural child not yet done). Pending this, the nephews instituted a petition for probate of the

will of Don Juan in Manila. Alleged natural son opposed, contending that Negros courts already had exclusive jurisdiction of the case.But Negros court dismissed the special proceeding, and the Manila court proceeded to probate the will. Petitioner contested it. Court held that since the decedent was a nonresident, both Manila and Negros courts may be proper venues for the proceedings. But since probate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings, action by Manila court proper. Even if the venue was improper, petitioner considered to have waived the defect by laches. Lastly, the court held that if ever recognized as the natural child of the decedent, he could opt to intervene in the probate proceedings, or to have it opened if already finished.

Facts: -Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila and Negros -The alleged natural son of Don Juan, VICENTE URIARTE, filed petition for settlement of INTESTATE ESTATE of Don Juan before the Negros Occidental court. Note that during that time, the proceedings for compulsory acknowledgment as the natural son of Don Juan was still pending -PNB also was appointed as special administrator of the estate, but PNB failed to qualify -OPPOSITION TO PETITION by HIGINIO URIARTE (nephew of Don Juan): Don Juan left a will, executed in Spain, duly authenticated submitted before Negros court ViCENTE's capacity and interest are questionable -JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA (di ko alam how related) commenced SPECPRO for PROBATE OF LAST WILL OF DON JUAN before Manila courts + MTD in Negros Courts

Since there's a will, no need for intestate proceedings before Negros Courts Vicente had no legal personality to sue

at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.

>>>OPPOSED by VICENTE: Negros Courts first took cognizance, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same

If will rejected or disproved, proceedings shall continue as intestacy

NEGROS COURT: DISMISS proceedings before it

VICENTE already waived IMPROPERLY LAID

-VICENTE filed OMNIBUS MOTION in Manila Court for leave to intervene + dismissal of petition for probate + annulment of proceedings - DENIED -Manila court admitted to probate the last will

procedural defect

of

VENUE

-He knew that there was a will when a MTD was filed in Negros court, so he should have filed a MTD in Manila court earlier: Manila court already *appointed an administrator

WON NEGROS COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE IT? NO. Decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country (Spain) during the time of his death, so the courts in the province s where he left property may take cognizance of settlement of his estate -here, decedent left properties both in Manila and in Negros Even if Negros court first took cognizance of the case, still has to give way to Manila court

*admitted the will to probate more than 5 months earlier -court would not annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction As to interest of Vicente in the case -two alternatives for an acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent:

special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate.

(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and

BUT testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.

ROBERTS V. LEONIDAS

So even pending Intestate proceedings, if it is found it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if

(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.

Short summary: Intestate proceedings already commenced and was about to be closed (there already been a project of partition) when testate proceedings initiated. The decedent left 2 wills which the petitioners for the intestate proceedings knew. Court held that probate proceedings are proper and intestate

proceedings should proceedings.

be

consolidated

with

the

testate

-Administrators submitted an inventory

Facts:

-Palawan Pearl Project (business owned by deceased) sold to Makiling Management Co (owned by Ethel and husband and lawyer), acquiesced by Linda (daughter in 2nd marriage) and Juanita (other daughter in 1st marriage)

-Edward Grimm died in Makati Med

-PROJECT PARTITION APPROVED BY INTESTATE COURT

-Heirs

-Ethel filed MOTION for accounting so that Estate properties can be partitioned among heirs and intestate estate be closed.

1st marriage (ended in divorce) children: Juanita Grimm Morris Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden) 2nd marriage

TESTATE COURT: filed 2 years after intestate proceedings -sought to set aside the 1979 partition approved by intestate court -Ethel filed MTD - denied for lack of merit

2nd wife MAXINE Son Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) Daughter Linda Grimm -he left 2 wills: 1 for his properties in RP (conjugal property w/ 2nd wife), the other for his estate outside RP wherein the daughters in the 1st marriage were intentionally not given anything -43 days after decedent's death, ETHEL filed Intestate proceedings, was named special administrator >>>Maxine (2nd wife/stepmom) filed OPPOSITION + MTD: there's Utah proceedings for the probate of will Prayed that she be appointed special administratrix >>>w/drawn by Maxine INTESTATE COURT: since the parties wanted it, Maxine, Pete and Ethel were all appointed as joint administrators (Intestate court already knew there was a will but did not do anything about it)

WON THE TESTATE COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR PROBATE? NO -A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court). -The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases. -so dismissed Ethel's petition for certiorari Eusebio vs. Eusebio, et al., 100 Phil. 593 , No. L-8409 December 28, 1956 Facts:

Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings (Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos), stating that they are illegitimate children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly laid. The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his siblings’ objection. Issue: Whether venue had been properly laid in Rizal? Held: No. Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a stroke and was forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health” even if coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home. Having resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such domicile. Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.

The requisites for a change of domicile include (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice, (2) physical presence at the place chosen, (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third requisite is absent. Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same. In sum, the Court found that Andres was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the CFI of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.

Doctrine: Domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile is gained. It is not changed by presence in a place for one’s own health. Figuracion v. Vda. G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006

De

Figuracion

On August 23, 1955, Leandro Figuraciom executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children. When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land. Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents. What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and her sister, respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she

and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled. ISSUE: Is an action for partition appropriate in this case? No. In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including those related to her father’s final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition. In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estate’s obligations.

Petitioner Ma. Socorro Avellino, the compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino Sr. Petitioner filed before the RTC for a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Avelino Sr. The respondent Sharon Avelino the second wife of the children and Angelina Avelino filed a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.

ISSUE: WON converting petitioner‘s petition for issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition is valid.

HELD: Petition is denied. SC ruled that if the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatee are all of age, section 1 rule 74 of the rules of court should apply. Extra judicial settlement by agreement between heirs if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors represented by their judicial or legal representative duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition.

Avelino vs. Court of Appeals, 329 SCRA 369 , G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000

It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extra judicial action for partition is possible, the ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case.

FACTS:

Ancog v. Court of Appeals (274 SCRA 676) Facts

The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of spouses Gregorio Yapand Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario, andchildren, petitioners Jovita Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap ashis heirs. Thereafter, Rosario obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on thedisputed land, which was annotated on its OCT. When Rosario applied again for a loan, offering theland as security, the bank’s lawyer, Atty. Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlementcovering the disputed land as a means of facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestionwas accepted. The extrajudicial settlement, which was prepared by Atty. Serna, was signed by theheirs, with the exception of Gregorio, Jr., then only a minor. After the document was notarized, theOCT was cancelled and a TCT was issued. Upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on theland, the loan was approved by the bank. Rosario exercised rights of ownership over the land. She brought an ejectment suit against Jovita’s husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to pay rent. Shortly thereafter, Jovita learned that Rosario hadoffered the land for sale. She informed her younger brother, Gregorio, Jr. and they filed an actionfor partition. As Caridad was unwilling to join in the action for partition against their mother, shewas impleaded as a defendant. Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulatedand therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument, they did not really intend to conveytheir interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable her to obtain the loan on thesecurity of the land to cover expenses for Caridad’s school fees and for household repairs.

part of Jovita and Caridad to cede their interest in the land to their mother rosario. It is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan.Under Art. 1082, CC, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among coheirs isdeemed to be partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.2.)No. As he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. At thetime the extrajudicial settlement was executed, he was a minor. As such, he was not included or even informed of the partition. Instead, the registration of the land in his mother’s name created animplied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451, CC, which provides that “when land passes bysuccession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust isestablished by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. As a general rule, a resultingtrust arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determinedfrom the facts and circumstances existing at the time the transaction out of which it is sought to beestablished. For prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated byunequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence.A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the time when thetrust is repudiated. The rule that the prescriptive period must be counted from the date of issuanceof the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the PropertyRegistration Decree. Since this action by Gregorio, Jr. to claim his share was brought shortly after he was informed by Jovita of their mother’s effort to sell the property, his claim cannot beconsidered barred either by prescription or by laches.

Issue: 1.) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is valid and can be enforced against petitioners?2.) Whether or not Gregorio, Jr. is barred by laches from recovering his share in the property?

Sebial v. Sebial Digest

Held

G.R. No. L-23419

1.) Yes. The heirs meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective. The record reveals thatthere was an intention on the

Facts of the Case:

Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and 6 other children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother). In 1960, BEjamina filed for the settlement of her father's estate and her appointment as administrator. Thisd petition was oppsed by Roberta on the ground that said estate had already been apportioned and that she should be the one appointed as administrator and not Benjamina. The Court appointed Benjamina and found that alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. So the letters of administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issue don the same date. The oppositors motion for reconsideration was denied. For the possibility of an amicale settlement, the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of the porperties of te decedent with segregation for each marriage. On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or six months from the appointment. Roberta them moved for the motion reocnsideration alleging as ground that the court has no jusridiction to approve the inventory as it was files beyiind the 3-month period. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court. Issue: Did the court lose jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months after the appointment? Ruling. NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-month period is not mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper court and the publication of the notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and retains such until the probate proceedings is closed. Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after the three-month period, this delay will not deprive the probate court of its jurisdiction to approve it. However, under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, such unexplained delay can be a ground for an administrator's removal. Reyes vs Enriquez G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008

Facts: Petitioners claim to be the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land located in Talisay, Cebu, with Anacleto Cabrera. On the other hand respondents, claim to be the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as husband and daughter of Anacleto's daughter.

On June 19, 1999, petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann Enriquez, sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in this case. When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only owned ¼ of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico.

Alleging that the documents are fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for damages. They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject property.

The RTC dismissed the case, but upon appeal it was reversed, hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera

before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes.

Ruling: Yes, the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance. The respondents have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property.

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court. A real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the avails thereof. Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Case # 13 G.R. No. 118680

March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner (Maria Elena R. Pedrosa-the adpted child) and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. On November 21, 1972, private respondents (Rodriguezes) filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants. On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals. On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered 14 parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein by virtue of Deed of Sale. On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. CA dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, to claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and her daughter were not heirs since they were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed." Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed The RTC dismissed the complaint. Petitioner appealed to the CA. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the TC. Petitioner filed a MR, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: 1. WON the complaint for annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed; 2. WON said deed is valid; and 3. WON the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been transferred to the respondent buyers.

HELD: 1. NO. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial

settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that: [The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, the court holds that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

2. The Deed of extra Judicial settlemet of estate and partition is Invalid. Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a

notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.

3. Given the circumstances in this case, it is constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.

A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid

The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate and in the proceedings instituted in the CFI Tarlac for theadministration of his property, Leona Pasion Vda. De Garcia (surviving spouse) wasappointed judicial administratrix. Sanchez left legitimate children, named Juan, Patrocinioand Luz Garcia. Luz Garcia married Pablo Utulo and during the pendency of theadministration proceedings of her father, she died. Her only forced heirs were her motherand husband. Pablo filed a petition, which stated the following:1.

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid

Utulo v. Pasion Vda De GarciaFacts:

That Luz’ only heirs were himself and his mother-in-law2.

That the only property left by Luz consisted in the share due her from the intestateof her father, Juan Sanchez3.

That he should be named administrator of the Luz’ propertyLeona objected to the petition and alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left noindebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration. However statedthat should the court grant administration of the property, she should be appointed theadministratrix as she had a better right than Pablo. Issue: 1. Whether judicial administration of the property left by Luz Garcia lies with theconsequent appointment of an administrator2.

necessary so that he may have legalcapacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he wouldappear in the said intestate by the right of representation, it would suffice for him toallege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wifewho, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she wereliving. In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of theproperty it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceasedwife be instituted an administration, which will take up time and occasioninconveniences and unnecessary expenses. 2. Thus, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential right to theoffice of administrator.

Whether Leona has a better right to the said office than Pablo Held:

G.R. No. L-26306 Necessity of Probate April 27, 1988

1. No. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property in the PhilippineIslands, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court shouldappoint a qualified administrator, in the order established by law, in case the deceasedleft no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. Thisrule, however, is subject to the exceptions. First, when all the heirs are of lawful ageand there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition theproperty without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointmentof an administrator. According to the second, if the property left does not exceed sixthousand pesos , the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the requiredpublications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all he knownobligations, to partition all the property constituting the inheritance among themselvespursuant to law, without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment ofan administrator.

Page 1 of 2 101st Case TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA, executrixappellant, MIGUEL VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants, v. GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositorsappellees. PARAS, J.: FACTS:

There is no weight in the argument adduced by Pablo to the effectthat his appointment as judicial administrator is

Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio

executrix and administrator Maria Ventura on the grounds that (1) that she is grossly

Ventura. appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate

incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of

children with his former wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano.

the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have

On December 14, 1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees. In the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate. Said will was admitted to probate on January 14,195. Gregorio Ventura died on September 26, 1955. On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favour. On October 17, 1955, Maria

no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the Court. The court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate, rendered the questioned decision. ISSUE:

Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was

Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria Ventura

issued in her favour. On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory

as executrix and administratrix. RULING:

of the estate of Gregorio Ventura. On June 17, 1960, she filed her accounts of

REVERSED.

administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive.

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is

Oppositions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to remove as

Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and

Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled

and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent

under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property.

both interests.

G.R. No. L-26306 Necessity of Probate April 27, 1988 Page 2 of 2

[G.R. No. 120575. December 16, 1998.]

101st Case

DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, in her capacity as special administratrix of the estate of the late DON ANDRES PASCUAL and as executrix of the testate estate of the late DOÑA ADELA S. PASCUAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 162; DEPUTY SHERIFF CARLOS G. MAOG; and ATTY. JESUS I. SANTOS, respondents.

It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator.” Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred." As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J:

Facts: Don Andres Pascual died intestate and survived by his widow, children of his full blood brother, children of his half blood brother, intestate estate of his full blood brother, and acknowledged natural children of his full blood (herein petitioners). Doña Adela (the surviving spouse) was appointed administratrix. To assist her with said proceedings, Doña Adela hired Atty. Jesus I. Santos, herein private respondent, as her counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of the gross estate of the decedent. While the settlement was still pending, Doña Adela died, leaving a will which named the petitioner as the sole universal heir. Six years after Doña Adela's death Judge Padolina rendered a Decision, which had become final and executory. Private respondent then filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of

Execution insofar as the payment of his attorney's fees was concerned. Despite opposition from the petitioner, the motion was granted and the court directed "the issuance of a writ of execution in the partial amount of P2,000,000.00 in favor Atty. Jose I. Santos to be implemented against the 3/4 share of Doña Adela S. Pascual, upon payment by the movant of the prescribed docket fees for the said partial amount." Having exhausted all remedies, petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari challenging the Decision of the CA denying the Petition for Annulment of Judgment. They claim among others that, without any hearing or notice to them, the judge approved and awarded the attorney's fees of private respondent, who was purportedly his classmate and compadre. Furthermore, they allege that, in the settlement of Doña Adela's estate, private respondent filed a similar collection case before the RTC of Malabon, which was, however, dismissed for violating the rules against forum shopping. Private respondent allegedly filed another collection case before the RTC of Makati wherein petitioner, in her Answer, alleged that she had paid him approximately P8 million from the time his services were engaged, aside from some unreported "commissions" from tenants, squatters and other businesses included in the Pascual estate. Issue: Whteher or not he portion of the decision dated January 19, 1994 awarding attorney's fees is void from the beginning because it was made after trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the attorney's client by reason of her [client's] death.

Ruling:

NO. The death of Doña Adela did not ipso facto extinguish the monetary claim of private respondent or require him to refile his claim with the court hearing the settlement of her estate. Had

he filed the claim against Doña Adela personally, the rule would have applied. However, he did so against the estate of Don Andres. Thus, where an appointed administrator dies, the applicable rule is Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, which requires the appointment of a new administrator, viz.: "Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal. —. . . When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letter to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person." The rule does not have the effect of divesting the intestate court of jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction subsists because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don Andres, which is distinct and separate from that of Doña Adela who merely served as the former's administratrix. Doña Adela was merely a representative party, and the claim was an item of the administrative expense of Don Andres estate. It is well-settled that a monetary claim against the person administering an estate, in relation to his or her acts of administration, in its ordinary course, can be filed at the court where a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate is pending. Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was the duty of the intestate court to determine whether the private respondent's claim was allowable as administrative expense — if it was obtained in reference to the management of the estate; the performance of legal services which the administratrix herself could not perform; the prosecution or defense of actions or suits on behalf of or against the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation of properties of the estate. In other words, the intestate court has a mandate to resolve whether the said claim is a "necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of the estate." For the same reason, the fact that the private respondent's lien was recorded four months after the administratrix had died is of no moment.

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the Petition and the Omnibus Motion are hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Case Digest:Union 452 SCRA 228

Bank

v.

Santibanez

FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.

Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement. Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document. In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.

HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows: In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows: o

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.

The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said tractors. The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in

accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as comaker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty. MANINANG vs. CA

June 19, 1982

FACTS:

Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years. The will also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son,

claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings.

Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449, digested Posted by Pius Morados on January 4, 2012

ISSUE:

Was Bernardo preterited?

HELD:

In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.

By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however, that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable. Such preterition is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is REMANDED to the lower court.

(Special Proceedings – Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance) Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters. Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her. Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void. Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir. Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar. Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs. Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case

is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance. Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”. Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues. Acain v. IAC (1987) Facts: On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of Cebu City, apetition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to Acain ofletters testamentary. When Nemesio died, he left a will in which Acain and his siblings wereinstituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner withoutobjection raised by private respondents.Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case Segundo pre-deceas es Nemesio, Segundo’s children would then succeed. After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally adopteddaughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on thefollowing grounds: for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; he ismerely a universal heir and the Rosa and Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was

denied. After the denial, respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition withpreliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC granted the privaterespondents' petition and ordered the TC to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will ofNemesio.His MR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition for the review of IAC’s decision. Issues: 1. Whether private respondents have been preterited. No for the widow, yes for Fernandez. 2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings. No. **3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority. No. Ratio/Held: 1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of themeither because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither institutedas heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is nopreterition, for she is not in the direct line . However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. Itcannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator. Neithercan it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case ofpreterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain and his siblings to the entireinheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating

the will.2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have aninterest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or asa claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate. Acain, at the outset, appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy havingresulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs, Acain is in effectnot an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left bythe deceased and must then be dismissed.**3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity ofthe will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance withthe requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comesonly after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however, isnot inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerlessto do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Wherecircumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon evenbefore the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue.The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Roberts 129 SCRA 754

v.

Leonidas

FACTS: Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel. Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will. However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.The estate was partitioned. In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills. Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit. ISSUE: Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss. HELD:

We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court). The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.