Spec Pro Cases.docx

Testate Estate Of Josefa Tangco Vs Tasiana Vda. De De Borja

the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions”

Facts: The first case (L-28040) is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Second case (Case No. L-28568) is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix". Third, (Case No. L-28611) is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II. Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco filed a petition for the probate of her will. The will was probated Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits. A compromise agreement was entered by and between the hheir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr. wherein: “That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos . That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja

Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R7866; and againto the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The validity of the agreement is attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect. Issue: Whether or not the Guevera ruling is applicable in the instant case Ruling: 1. 2.

The ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property or whether it forms part of the conjugal partnership with Josefa Tangco.

I. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or

predecessor in interest,there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits. As the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Since the compromise contract was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings.

undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden. Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja is void because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights. It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco that the compromise agreement had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The inability to reach a novatory accord cannot invalidate the original compromise and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal. We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed. II. Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611

Thus, Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract. This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her

The Court of First Instance of Rizal declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code. We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quitclaims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative. It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal. Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja.

First, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). Second, the statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony. It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendantappellantare not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the selfserving statement of Francisco. Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.

Heirs Of Valentin Basbas Vs. Ricardo Basbas Case: A claim of status as heir of a decedent must always be substantially supported by evidence as required under ourlaw. The resolution of a case, in this instance, an action for annulment of title and reconveyance of real property, cannot be further stalled and waylaid by a mere assertion of a party of an ostensible conflicting claims of heirship of the common decedent. Not all rights to property and incidents thereof, such as titling, ought to be preceded by a declaration of heirship, albeit supposedly traced to a single decedent and original titleholder. Facts: Both parties, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas (Valentin), and respondent Ricardo trace their claim of ownership over herein subject property to Severo. Petitioners filed an Action for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance with Damages against Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo before the Municipal Trial Court, Santa Rosa, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 1913. Countering petitioners’ allegations, Crispiniano and Ricardo denied petitioners’ ownership over Lot No. 39 and contended that upon Severo’s death, he was survived by two heirs, Valentin (grandfather of petitioners) and Nicolas Basbas (Nicolas) (paternal grandfather of Crispiniano and Ricardo) who evenly divided Severo’s estate, comprising of two lots, herein subject property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, and Lot No. 40, adjacent thereto, among them. Lot No. 40 was inherited by Valentin, while Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas. Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo. They had a child named Valentin (Basbas). During Severo’s lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in Santa Rosa, Laguna adjacent to Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate which lot was acquired, by purchase, by Valentin Basbas. Sometime in 1995, herein petitioners Heirs of Valentin Basbas discovered that [respondents] Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas were able to secure for themselves Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 over Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Sometime in 1987, [respondents], through Crispiniano Basbas, filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title before the Regional Trial Court. Subsequently thereafter, an Order was issued by the RTC granting the aforesaid petition. The title covering Lot No. 39 was ordered reconstituted in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) was issued. Defendants Crispiniano Basbas y Talampas and [respondent] Ricardo Basbas y Talampas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of deceased Severo Basbas stating among others that the only heirs of Severo Basbas are Felomino Basbas and Melencio Casubha. On the basis of said Extra-Judicial Settlement the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 was issued in the names of therein defendants Crispiniano Basbas and respondent Ricardo Basbas. Petitioners then brought the matter to the Barangay but no settlement was reached. Hence, this instant action.4 STIPULATION OF FACTS

1. 2. 3. 4.

Severo Basbas is married to Ana Rivera. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle name Talampas. Petitioners are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of Severo Basbas The property at dispute was originally registered in Severo’s name.

Issue: Spplicability of our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario. Ruling: We cannot subscribe to the appellate court's ruling unqualifiedly applying Heirs of Yaptinchay. Mistakenly, the Court of Appeals glosses over facts, not controverted by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo: (1) Valentin was a legitimate child of Severo and Ana Rivera; and (2) Petitioners are themselves legitimate descendants of Valentin. The status of Valentin as a compulsory heir of Severo and of petitioners’ statuses as heirs of Valentin and Severo are stipulated facts agreed to by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo: 1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera. 2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle name Talampas. 3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of [Severo] Basbas. 4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo’s] name On the other hand, Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo miserably fail to establish the status of their ascendant and purported predecessor-ininterest, Nicolas. In fact, the testimony of respondent Ricardo tells about the status of Valentin, not about Nicolas’ status. Herein respondents' status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista — and thus, Marcelo Sr.'s heirs — has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals. True, this Court is not a trier of facts, but as the final arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court. In short, petitioner Valente's, Violeta's, Virginia's, and Maria Concepcion's representation in the RTC that our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong. Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT's was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate "any proof or even a semblance

of it" that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.'s estate, which explicitly recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.'s legitimate children and heirs. The same document settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista's paraphernal properties, and separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably. Thus, we find no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of Severo in order to resolve petitioners’ Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of the subject property. Prescinding from the foregoing, a closer scrutiny of the documents presented in evidence by Crispiniano and Ricardo before the trial court, betray the fraudulence of their claim. On the Order of the RTC (Laguna) a Petition for Reconstitution of Title filed by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo: Petitioner alleges that a certain parcel of residential land, situated in the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Province of Laguna is registered in the name of the legal heirs of Severo Basbas as evidenced by a Transfer Certificate of Title At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. During the hearing of the petition, Atty. Agapito G. Carait, counsel for the petitioner, presented Crispiniano Basbas. Finding the petition to be in order and meritorious and there being no objection on the part of the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) as to the technical description of Lot No. 39 is granted. 2. Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Severo executed by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo: Ultimately, we agree with the disquisition of the trial courts in annulling TCT No. 294295 and ordering the reconveyance of Lot No. 39 to petitioners. Defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late SeveroBasbas. They (defendants) [including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed that they derived their title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in representation of Felomino Basbas, an alleged [grand]son of the late Severo Basbas; that Severo Basbas gave Lot No. 39 to Nicolas Basbas; and that Lot No. 40 was also given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas. Such a claim has no basis at all. Based on the evidence on hand, defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] acquired the property in question through fraud and, therefore, an implied trust was created in favor of [petitioners] If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The fact that the subject lot was already registered in the defendants’ [including herein respondent Ricardo] name and indeed a Tax Declaration was issued in their favorfor taxation

purposes, and they have paid the taxes due thereon, are not conclusive evidence of ownership. We add that Valentin’s rights to the succession vested from the moment of death of the decedent Severo. 19 In turn, petitioners’, as Heirs of Valentin, who is an uncontested heir of decedent Severo, rights to the succession vested from the moment of Valentin’s death. As such, they own Lot No. 39, undisputedly titled in Severo’s name and forming part of Severo’s estate, and are entitled to the titling thereof in their names. One final note. Severo, as well as Valentin, have been long dead. It is well-nigh that title to the subject property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, appear in the names of the petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, herein declared heirs of Severo, or their successors-in-interest, to finally settle title thereto and prevent occurrences of fraudulent titling thereof. Hence, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin and their successors-in-interest, are directed to take the appropriate action for titling of the subject property. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

In The Matter Of The Intestate Estate Of Deceased Ismael Reyes Vs. Cesar R. Reyes Facts: Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City.The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes. Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied4 sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government.

The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby denied for being unwarranted, A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied. While the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners. Respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the probate court’s order. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the respondent Court erred (1) in ruling that the court a quo correctly included one half (1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes (2) in upholding that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership. Issue: Ruling:

Petitioners’ predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIR’s tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 49836 upon payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount of about P18,000.7 Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981. petitioners’ predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes. Private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon . Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase. The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased and the special powers of attorney executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot conforming to his appointment as administrator.12 Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters. On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds. Probate court issued its Order ”either of the administrator oppositor, or heir Felisa R. Reyes, in her personal capacity as apparent co-owner of the Arayat Street properties, may commence the necessary proper action for settling the issue of ownership of such properties in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and to inform the Court of the commencement thereof by any of them as soon as possible.

I.

Petitioners argue that a probate court’s jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person since the probate court has the power and competence to determine whether a property should be excluded from the inventory of the estate or not. We find no merit in this argument.

The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law. The declaration of the provisional character of the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. II. Petitioners next claim that as an exception to the rule that the probate court is of limited jurisdiction, the court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased and they submitted the question of title to the property, without prejudice to third persons.

We are not persuaded. Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.22 The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It bears stress that the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within the probate court’s competence. At the hearing today of the pending incidents, it was agreed that the said incidents could not be resolved without introduction of evidence. Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the merits of accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes to the inventory as well as the respective evidence of the parties to determine for purposes of inventory alone if they should be included therein or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that "for resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to consider what properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included." There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively. In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its determination of the ownership was merely provisional and suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may commence the proper action in the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court admitted that it was not competent to pass upon the ownership of the subject properties. Thus, apart from the absence of a specific document of transfer, the circumstances and factors he gave may not suffice in and by themselves to convey or transfer title, for, at best, they may only be the basis of such transfer. They may be considered as proof of the intention to dispose in his favor or as evidence of a set off among the heirs, which seems to be what he has in mind. There might also be substance in his assertions about the abandonment in his favor, which, if raised in the proper action, could constitute either prescription or laches. It is hardly needed to stress, therefore, that more than these are required to predicate the exclusion of the properties from the inventory. Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on the property covered in TCT 4983 and did not include the property covered in TCT 3598 (39303). This somehow detracts from the logic of the oppositor’s assertion of ownership of the entire Arayat Street properties; even if his assertion is valid and true, it can encompass, at most, only the

property subject of the BIR’s levy and declaration of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983), not the property covered by TCT 3598 (39303). These pronouncements should not by any means diminish or deprive the oppositor of whatever rights or properties he believes or considers to be rightfully his. This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal ownership of the properties. Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary action for the purpose of having his claims or rights established over the properties. If he still cares hereafter to prosecute such claim of ownership adversely to the estate and the apparent co-owner, his mother Felisa. As stated in Valera, et al. vs. Judge Inserto, et al. (149 SCRA 533), this Court, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction; accordingly, its determination that property should be included in the inventory or not is within its probate jurisdiction, but such determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties." The aforecited findings clarify that there were several reasons for having the issue of ownership ventilated elsewhere. Apart from the fact that only one-half of the two lots known as the Arayat property (i.e., the half that could pertain to the estate) could be settled herein, there was the realization that the evidence adduced so far (including that bearing on the oppositor’s basis for excluding from the estate the property) was inadequate or otherwise inconclusive.

Grace F. Munsayac-De Villa Vs. Court Of Appeals Facts: A recapitulation of facts shows that the present controversy before [u]s stems from Special Proceeding Case No. 704-R, entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta Munsayac and pending before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The said special proceeding case was filed on November 17, 1998 by Grace F. Munsayac-De Villa (DE VILLA), Lily F. MunsayacSunga (SUNGA) and Roy Peter F. Munsayac (ROY) three (3) of the five (5) children of the late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC for letters of administration nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents. DE VILLAs nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children of the late Munsayac Spouses, namely, Gelacio F. Munsayac, Jr. (MUNSAYAC, JR.) and the late Nora F. Munsayac-Visperas (VISPERAS), who nominated MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late Munsayac Couples intestate estate. MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator. Despite the approved 60-day suspension of the proceedings to enable the parties to discuss an amicable settlement, the protracted exchange of pleadings between the opposing siblings in Special Proceeding Case No. 704-R was of no help in the immediate settlement of the intestate estate of the late Munsayac Couple. For their failure to comply with the Order of this Court dated May 24, 2000, the petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are hereby ordered ARRESTED in accordance with Section 8, Rule 71, of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, until their compliance to immediately surrender in custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of P13,506,343.33 plus the legal interest of 12% per annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully complied with or a total amount of P23,802,788.00 more or less, as of May, 2000. The petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are likewise ORDERED to surrender in custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest of 12% per annum compounded annually, Issue: Whther or not Respondent Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in not ordering the inhibition of the respondent presiding judge who, as shown in all his actuations and orders, [has] demonstrated vindictiveness, arbitrariness, prejudice and bias against petitioners and partiality in favor of private respondents thereby denying petitioners fundamental right to be entitled to an impartial tribunal.

In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court -- as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of a criminal case in which the whole case is opened for review -- the appeal is limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Since respondents did not contest the Decision of the CA, no affirmative relief can be sought by or given to them. Thus, not all the issues raised before the appellate court need to be considered by this Court. The sole issue in the present Petition is the question of inhibition of respondent judge. We emphasize at the outset that the main case from which this Petition arose has already been decided by the CA. The Decision is now final and executory. Petitioners, however, argue that since there are still matters pending before the trial judge, such as the withdrawal/release of money deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of a freeze order on certain jewelry, his inhibition is still needed. We disagree. After the CA terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, we see no more reason why the inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The Petition therefor has already become moot and academic in view of the termination of the main case. How can he be inhibited from a case that has already been decided with finality? It should be clear that the CA Decision terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the parties was the final, complete and absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac. As such, any and all incidents relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated. When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners and to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis, he did so as the presiding judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R. Now that the case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the special proceedings. Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited with the court should be effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property deposited should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the long-standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only provisional -- not conclusive -- in character and subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.

Ruling The Petition for inhibition has no merit, but the trial judge must lift the freeze order and cause the return of property or money still in custodia legis.

Generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third

parties are not impaired. These principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to an end. To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings.Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis. In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in custodialegis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. To achieve that end and to expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a directive to the trial judge to lift the freeze order and release the property deposited with the court becomes indispensable.

Mendoza Vs Teh Facts: Petitioner for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a complaint for reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for preliminary injunction. Private respondents filed their answer with motion to dismiss alleging among others that the complaint states no cause of action and that petitioners demand had already been paid. Private respondents filed another pleading entitled motion to dismiss invoking, this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and prescription. In support of their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for reconveyance. In her opposition to the motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking appointment as administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the complaint. Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioners husband resided in Quezon City at the time of his death, the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the RTC of that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction over the case. RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh dismissed without prejudice the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary civil action and a special proceeding are different. Issue: Whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case? Ruling: We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides: Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)... xxx xxx xxx (4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate .... Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that: Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise: (1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate... (italics ours). The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title title to property worth millions of pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise

falling within its jurisdiction are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as the appointment of an administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73) impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration. On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents confuses jurisdiction with venue. Second, the cases citedby private respondents are not at point as they involve settlement of estate where the probate court was asked to resolve questions of ownership of certain properties. In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. The above allegation is not even a jurisdictional fact which must be stated in an action for reconveyance. The Court therefore, should have at least, proceeded with the reconveyance suit rather than dismiss the entire case. Third, jurisprudential rulings that a probate court cannot generally decide questions of ownership or title to property is not applicable in this case, because: there is no settlement of estate involved and the RTC of Batangas was not acting as a probate court. It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. Moreover, the instant action for reconveyance does not even invoke the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. Considering that the RTC has jurisdiction, whether it be on the reconveyance suit or as to the appointment of an administratrix, it was improper for respondent judge to dismiss the whole complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction. Finally, judges should not dismiss with precipitate haste, complaints or petitions filed before them, just so they can comply with their administrative duty to dispose cases within 90 days at the expense of their judicial responsibility.