Simplicity, Elanguescence, And Disintegration: Immanuel Kant’s “refutation Of Mendelssohn’s Proof Of The Persistence Of The Soul” And “the Second Paralogism Of Simplicity” In His Critique Of Pure Reason

Simplicity, Elanguescence, and Disintegration: Immanuel Kant’s “Refutation of Mendelssohn’s Proof of the Persistence of the Soul” And “The Second Paralogism of Simplicity” In His Critique of Pure Reason Steve Kemple Kant’s “Refutation of Mendelssohn’s proof of the persistence of the soul,” appearing on in the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason beginning on page B413, goes to the heart of much of his critical argument against the rational psychologists regarding the possibility of metaphysics in general, most notably the rationalists’ insistence that the soul is incorruptible and thus persists beyond death. Kant gives a concise account of his proof on B413-B414, according to which Mendelssohn argues that, assuming the soul is a simple substance, there are only two ways in which it could cease to exist: it must either “be gradually transformed into nothing,” (B414) or it must simply cease to exist, vanishing instantaneously. A formal assessment of the proof reveals a reductio ad absurdum: by assuming, for the sake of argument, that the soul does in fact die, he attempts to prove by contradiction that it does not. Upon close inspection, it is easy to see that the two possibilities are mere negations of one another: the soul either dies gradually (through disintegration over time) or it dies not gradually. The resulting dichotomy takes the form of a strong tautological claim, that is, either p or ~p. He then approaches each option separately: on one hand, that the soul disintegrates over time, by definition contradicts the first premise of the simplicity of the soul. For to assert a substance is simple is to assert that it is not comprised of parts: it is indivisible. The very notion of disintegration is a direct contradiction to this assertion, thus eliminating the possibility, leaving only the second: that the soul vanishes instantaneously, there being “no time at all between a moment in which it is and another moment in which it is not” (B414). He is quick to point out that this is impossible, and thus, having rendered null what he considered to be all ways by which the soul might cease to existent, the reductio ad absurdum has succeeded and his original conclusion is supported. Kant’s response to Mendelssohn is rooted in contradicting his central assumption. He claims to undermine his tautology, suggesting, “Yet he did not consider that ... one nevertheless cannot deny to [a simple soul], any more than to any other existence, an intensive magnitude, i.e. a degree of reality in regard to all its faculties, indeed to everything in general that constitutes its existence, which might diminish through all the infinitely many smaller degrees...” (B414). Thus, Kant argues, the soul could eventually come to be “transformed into nothing, although not by disintegration, but by gradual remission (remissio) of all its powers” (B414). A soul could thereby diminish in its faculties, and “through all the infinitely many smaller degrees” (B414) proceed, contra the rationalists, into nonbeing. At first read, this notion seems problematic. How does a gradual recession, or diminishment, or “elanguescence”, necessarily occurring over time, differ from a gradual disintegration, also occurring over time? How does this division of degrees avoid the same violation that a division into parts does? Aren’t they both divisions? Further, doesn’t Kant incite Zeno’s Paradoxes

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when he says that “there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness down to its vanishing?” (B415 footnote, emphasis mine). Looking at these problems will be the occupation of this paper, whereby I will be concern myself primarily with Kant’s “Second Paralogism Of Simplicity” (A352-361), as well as with the other three paralogisms (both the first and second editions), and to the last sections of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements whereby he defines and distinguishes the phenomenal and the noumenal (A235-A260 and B235-B315). In addressing these problems, we must be mindful of Kant’s terminology, as well as of the Critique’s overarching argument for Transcendental Idealism. Further, in order to address Kant’s distinction between diminishment and disintegration, we must look at what he has to say about composite and simple substances, and whether or not we can know where the soul falls in regards to this dichotomy. Kant begins his first edition “Second Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology” by remarking that it is the “Achilles of all the dialectical inferences of the pure doctrine of the soul” (A351). It is convenient for us that Mendelssohn’s proof closely mirrors that of the second paralogism: “That thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things, is simple. Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing. Thus etc.” (A351). Kant aims to expose the fallacy represented by this inference, thereby crippling the arguments of the rationalists, and thus Mendelssohn. The heart of rational psychology is rooted in a single misunderstanding. Kant points out that the authors of this false syllogism fatally mistake the unity of consciousness for an inutitable object, which they fallaciously proclaim to be a simple substance (A355), drawing all of their inferences from the single Cartesian proposition “I think”, by which the rational psychologists falsely conclude to isolate an independent, simple, incorruptible “I”. Kant makes it very clear that the inference “I” from the proposition “I think” is a case of wrongly abstracting a bound concept from a general experience of experience itself. (A354-A355). In his the conclusion to the second edition Paralogism, he clarifies this opaque notion: “...I confuse the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a separate possible existence of my thinking Self” (B427). An apt analogy might be of some poor soul, bewildered by their own reflection. After a number of similar encounters with various mirrors, the existence of a wholly separate and distinguishable person residing within the mirror is determined, whose likeness bears an uncanny resemblance to their own, and whose relentlessly sense of humor involves tireless, perfect pantomime of the poor soul’s increasingly exasperated perceiving self. While this analogy may be lacking in some regards, it employs the same general confusion and subsequent fallacious inferences Kant accuses the rational psychologists of falling into. Regarding cognition of self, it has already been shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic that our bodies “are mere appearances of outer sense, and not things in themselves” (A357). So far as we think of ourselves as existing in space, we also think of the thinking subject as an object of our inner sense and thus not corporeal simply by virtue of the fact that this is the sense in which we think it, as not appearing in space. Upon transcendental reflection, which he describes in his introduction to the “Amphibolies” as comparing one’s “representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated” (A261, B317), we achieve a clear distinction between a representation of self as within a manifold, and a unity of consciousness, which is the apperception, or self-consciousness, of oneself as an experiencing thinking thing. Given that this illusion is merely a result of a tautology disguised as a composite statement, (cogito, ergo sum), Kant concludes that “I am simple signifies no more than this representation I encompasses not the least manifoldness within itself, and that it is an absolute (though merely logical) unity” (A355).

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To put all this in much simpler terms, it is necessary to distinguish between the symbol I and the actual thinking, transcendental object “I”, that which could be described as nothing more than Something in general, to which the symbol “I” refers. In the quote concluding the previous paragraph, he is referring to the emptiness of the symbol, from which any inferences that may be drawn are inconsequential beyond the realm of our representations (the phenomenal). “This much is certain: through the I, I always think an absolute but logical unity of the subject (simplicity), but I do not cognize the real [noumenal] simplicity of my subject” (A356). Briefly returning to Mendelssohn’s proof, we see that he fails to distinguish, the signified “I” (perceiving transcendental Something) with the “I” (symbol) that serves as its signifier. When he declares the soul to be simple, he is referring to the symbol “I,” whereas in his conclusion that the soul is thus incorruptible, he is referring to signified, self, e.g. the unity of consciousness or the “Something in general” (B413-B415), which as noumena we know about only in a negative sense (B309). Thus, Mendelssohn’s proof is, as also is the “First Paralogism Of The Substantiality of the Soul,” a Sophisma figurae dictionis, relying on sophistical (antiminous) methods of proof by figure of speech: for the case that the same symbol “I” is used to indicate both concepts invalidates the argument (B411). But there is another element that has gone unmentioned up until this point, which is essential to both the Second Paralogism and to the Refutation of Mendelssohn’s Proof. While we have talked much about simplicity, we have avoided direct discussion regarding its definition. The simplicity of the soul is the very notion that the rational psychologists rest their argument on. Kant claims that continuity in an aggregate substance is one added by our own cognizing of accidents that we perceive to make up the substance. “For because the representations that divided among different beings (e.g. the individual words of a verse) never constitute a whole thought (a verse), the thought can never inhere in a composite as such” (A352). On A358, in the same discussion as in the transcendental object “I” is described, Kant discusses sensations transmitted by the outer senses as being grounded in the “same Something that grounds outer appearances” (A359), and that this Something could be the subject of our thoughts. Doing so, this transcendental object, or noumenon, appears to be absolutely simple. This is because it is essentially a turning inward, a sort of introspection or thinking about thinking. What follows is a sensation of simplicity that is only accurate in so far as it is a sensation (A359). Regarding our outer sense of matter, Kant argues that as being such an appearance lacking specifiable predicates, “hence I can well assume about this substratum that in itself it is simple” (A359). Once again we are at the conclusion that simplicity may be asserted, providing it is done so within the bounds of mere appearance (A358-A359). Returning once again to Kant’s Refutation of Mendelssohn’s argument, we may now look to the key distinction that we found problematic early on, namely the distinction between diminishing and disintegrating, and why the latter falls into contradiction while the former avoids doing so. The key to understanding this argument lies in the footnote beginning on B414, in which Kant expounds on the notion that “even consciousness always has a degree, which can always be diminished.” (B414). The case of clarity is such that it inherently has only to do with our experience, thus it is wholly subjective. Kant makes it clear that he is merely referring to the empirical, phenomenal realm. Clarity, since it is a sort of representation, cannot exist aside from a thinking thing, and, like thinking, contains in it already the necessary concepts by which to ground it solidly in the phenomenal realm of things that are thought. It would be nonsensical to make a claim regarding the clarity of an unthinking object; clarity can only have to do with someone looking at or otherwise encountering an object. The very concept presupposes an “I” perceiving, just as in thinking. Still within the footnote, Kant writes, “Rather a representation is clear if the consciousness in it is sufficient for a consciousness of the difference between it and others” (B415). Here we see that he ex-

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plicitly places clarity firmly into the realm of empirical, which also happens to be where one may, without contradiction, assert the simplicity of the soul and apply to it a manifold. Thereby, whereas in the case of the soul undergoing a gradual remission of its powers, until it is nothing, can be the case in so far as we are aware that it is: our awareness (which is empirical) of our consciousness could over time (which is also empirical) remiss until we are not aware of existing at all, which as far as we are concerned in the phenomenal realm. Even though it involves a manifold, it makes no assertion beyond the empirical realm, and thus does not fall into the same contradiction as disintegration does. (B414-B415). A closer look at the claims Kant is making counter Mendelssohn reveals no insight into the nature of the soul outside of our experiences of it. He writes, “Thus the persistence of the soul, merely as an object of inner sense, remains unproved and even unprovable, although its persistence in life, where the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense, is clear of itself; but this is not at all sufficient for the rational psychologist, who undertakes to prove from mere concepts the absolute persistence of the soul even beyond life” (B415). The final problem I would like to briefly address involves the diminishing consciousness, as discussed on B414 and B415. At the bottom of the footnote on B415, Kant says, “So there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness down to its vanishing.” This, I mentioned at the start, is potentially problematic in its use of infinite increments, within a finite traversal, otherwise known as Zeno’s paradox of the Tortoise and Achilles. I would hardly suspect Kant to be so careless as to brazenly forget about this paradox. I believe I can propose a hypothesis regarding its inclusion. Looking back to “On The Amphiboly Of The Concepts Of Reflection,” we see that he addresses several famous paradoxical problems. While this may not fit cleanly into one of his four proposed Amphibolies, it is nevertheless in the spirit of the discussion to permit its entry. In all of the problems presented, there is, as the extended title indicates, a “confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the transcendental” (A260/B316). If this is the case regarding Achilles’ paradox of the gradual vanishing of the soul, then at very least the locus of the paradox ought to be illuminated by means of transcendental reflection, as described on A261/B317. As was previously determined, apperception is already contained in the concept of clarity. As we also determined, in regards to one’s own diminishing clarity of consciousness, the effect is tautological in so far as the one is only aware of oneself as being aware to the extent that they are aware of it. So, the degrees by which the awareness dims into nonbeing truly is infinite, because in this case the only true nonexistence would be if there was some kind of awareness that the perceiver was not aware of, which is an impossibility. But, on account of it merely being the case of apperception and not awareness of itself as a transcendental object, then there could be a case when the apperception of the unity of consciousness has diminished completely, while the negative knowledge regarding the noumena, to the extent that it is possible, persists because the noumenal persists independently of the positive unity of consciousness. Thus, the soul may both persist and be corrupted, without contradiction.

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