Research Paper On Indo-pak Relation

  • Uploaded by: Ahmad Ali Ansari
  • 0
  • 0
  • April 2020
  • PDF

This document was uploaded by user and they confirmed that they have the permission to share it. If you are author or own the copyright of this book, please report to us by using this DMCA report form. Report DMCA


Overview

Download & View Research Paper On Indo-pak Relation as PDF for free.

More details

  • Words: 9,796
  • Pages: 37
INDO-PAK RELATION

Submitted by: Name: Ahmad Ali Ansari Roll No. : 080101028 Batch 07, (AERO)

Submitted to: Colonel Farooq

Date of Submission: 30th Aprail, 2009.

INSTITUTE OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY, ISLAMABAD

1

I dedicate this research paper to the people of Pakistan those who toil, sacrifice, and pray for their country and who wait patiently for a better future. AND To my father and mother who’s both unwavering faith in me has been the driving force in my life. ALSO To both the Pakistani and Indian nations for a forever friendship.

2

Contents Page No. 1. Introduction…………………………………………………………....................

4-5

2. Chap No. I: Initial Problems faced by Pakistan (1947 & 1948)……………. …. 3. Chap No. II: Kashmir Dispute (1948 upto date)……………………………….

6-8 9-11

4. Chap No. III: Indus Water Treaty………………………………………………… 12-16 5. Chap No. IV: 1965 War…………………………………………………………..

17-19

6. Chap No. V: 1971 War and Simla Agreement ……………….………………

20-21

7. Chap No. VI: Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missiles Program…………………..

22-24

8. Chap No. VII: Kargil War…………………………………………………………

25-27

9. Chap No. VIII: Present Situation………………………………………………..

28-29

10. Chap No. IX: Survey on relationship between Pakistani and Indians……..

30-32

11. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………

33

12. Bibliography………………………………………………………………………

34-35

3

Introduction The topic of this research paper is “Indo-Pak Relation”. It is a very crucial topic to discuss. Pakistan and India both came into being on August 1947. Muslims of subcontinent got Pakistan after long tiring efforts and great many sacrifices. So, they were very happy after independence. On the other hand people of India saw that independence as an assault on their nationalism. They even today consider that, Muslims of Pakistan has just divided their country which they consider as Hindustan (Land of Hindus). So the entire nation of India is just against Pakistan right form the day of independence. People of India till now have not accepted Pakistan. Due to this gap between the people of India and Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and India has not been good since 1947 upto date. All the types of relationships whether it is political or economical, whether it is cultural or social, all of them have been controversial upto date. Pakistan and India are the inheritors of two of the richest cultures and civilizations of the world. Along with other countries of South Asia, they are also among the poorest segments of mankind. Despite enjoyment of independence for over sixty years, they remain afflicted with mass poverty and all its concomitant ills. It is a tragedy of their short history as independent states that their mutual antagonism plunged them into three wars and when not engaged fighting, has kept them close to the brink. The major conflict between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. Besides Kashmir, there are also so many hot topics to discuss, but due to limitation of research paper’s length and shortage of time, this research paper will deal with the following chapters: i.

Initial Problems faced by Pakistan (1947 & 1948).

ii. Kashmir Dispute (1948 upto date). iii. Indus Water Treaty. iv. 1965 War. v. 1971 War and Simla Agreement.

vi. Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missiles Program vii. Kargil War. viii.Present Situation. 4

ix. Survey on relationship between Pakistani and Indians. All the above mentioned chapters will cover all the aspects of INDO-PAK Relation. Whenever you write something limitations are always there. So, I also faced difficulties in writing this research paper. The limitations were; 1) Approach to the books regarding Pakistan literature was quite difficult as IST’s library is short of books regarding literature. 2) National Library is quite far from IST’s hostel. 3) Transportation Problem.

4) Short of time. 5) Non availability of internet at IST’s hostel. 6) Power failure problem. Besides these limitations, I also restricted my mind-set towards Pakistan and India. As I am, by the grace of Almighty Allah, Pakistani. When I made a survey on internet and interact with the people of India, they just send me obnoxious sentences rather than welcome me. So I controlled my feelings and write this research paper as an unbiased being. But, if I remain inclined towards Pakistan, so it is natural. Just ignore that. At last I would like to thanks my father and mother who motivated me a lot on writing this research paper. I would also like to give credit to all my friends who helped me a lot, especially to Fayyazi, Ubaid-ur-Rehman, Jazib Hassan. I would also like to recognize all those fellows who assisted me in writing this research paper.

5

Chapter No. I:

Initial Problems faced by Pakistan (1947 & 1948) At the time of Independence Pakistan as a native nation so much difficulties. They are listed as:

The Problems Created by the Partition of the Sub-Continent: The partition of Indian Sub-continent created the following main problems: (a) Problems resulting from the physical partition of India. (b) Problems arising out of the creation of the two wings of Pakistan

Problems resulting from the physical partition of India: The partition of India created many serious problems between India and Pakistan. These are summarized below:

(i)

The Border Problems:

The partition of India created unnatural and un-demarcated boundaries between India and Pakistan which led to numerous controversies and armed clashes. The most unfortunate happenings were over the Rann of Kutch in 1965.1

1

For detail see D.C, Jha, Indo-Pakistan Relations 196-65, (Patna, 1972)

6

According to law made for the partition of the India was: “To divide up a piece of land into separate portions representing the proportionate interests of the tenants. It may also consist of dividing a property with common ownership into identifiable individual ownership”2 According to which independent states of India was given the rights to be part of India or Pakistan according to their own will. But India refused that and got the controlled of Junagadh, Kashmir, Hyderabad Dakan and Munavara, which disturbed a lot the relationship between India and Pakistan.

(ii)

The Migratory Problem:

The partition of India was claimed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah on the basis of his twonation theory. But there were several lakhs of non-Muslims in Pakistan and larger number of Muslims in India. The migration such people between the two countries, the communal riots in the two since 1947, the two=nation religious basis of the Pakistani State and others created several complicated problems making IndoPakistani Relations quite bitter.3

2

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition#Law

3

For detail see Gulab Mishra ‘Prakhar’, Indo-Pakistan Relations (From Taskent to Sima), Sheetal Printing Press, 1987, chapter five.

7

(iii)

Evacuee Property Problem:

Owing to the migration of non-Muslims in Pakistan to India and the Muslims of India to Pakistan on a mass scale the problem of evacuee property also came up causing serious differences between India and Pakistan. About 79, 00,000 Muslims moved from India to Pakistan.4These migrants left all their movable and immovable properties in their native places. About One thousand million rupees were left in India by the Muslims in terms of Immovable and movable properties.5 To solve the evacuee Immovable property several meetings between the representatives of Indian and Pakistani Governments took place between 1947-1950 out nothing came out of it. The attempt to solve this problem by the Government of India in 1953 also failed.6 In 1958 a ministerial level meeting took place but it was also not fruitful.7 Besides moveable and immoveable property of migrants, Pakistan also faced problems regarding distribution of national wealth between Pakistan and India. At the time of partition of India, national wealth was decided to be distributed among both the nations by British Government.8 Pakistan has to be given 750 million rupees as his share in national wealth. Also since the capital of Sub-continent was in India therefore all the capital at that time was in India. India first gave 50 million rupees to Pakistan and promised to give the remaining soon. But then India refused to give the remaining amount later. Later by the interruption of Gandhi Pakistan was given 500 million rupees. The remaining is still to be paid by Indian Government.

Problems arising out of the creation of the two wings of Pakistan: At the time of independence, the territory in which Muslims lived in majority became the part of Pakistan. As in East-Bengal was Muslim’s dominant area, therefore it became part of Pakistan. But the problem was that geographically it was located in the east of India and it was large territory also. So it became difficult for Pakistan to manage that territory. Due to large population of East Bengal it was named as East

4

Fr details, D.C. Jha, n. 4, page 308

5

Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Rehabilitation Retrospect, New Delhi, page 4. 6

D.C.Jha, n.4, page 308

7

Report, 196-61, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, page 24

8

For details, Rafique Ahmad, Pakistan and India Relations (Prospects for a durable Peace), Starlite Press, 176 Anarkali, Lahore.

8

Pakistan and the remaining territory of Pakistan which was at west of India was named as West Pakistan. A large number of migrants which was living at East part of India migrate towards East Pakistan as it was nearer and transportation problem was also there. On the other hand Non-Muslims of India made it difficult for the Muslims of India to live there. They assault on their property as well as to their lives. So a large of Muslims was compelled to leave their native land and migrate to Pakistan. When these migrants arrived Pakistan (both East and West), then it became difficult for the Government of Pakistan to manage it. Pakistan had no more resources at that time. Rehabilitation of migrants was a major problem. Also India refused to hand over the moveable and immoveable property of migrants to Pakistan. But Pakistani faced this problem with courage and a determination to lead Pakistan as a most powerful nation of the world.9

9

My grandmother Zulekha Khatoon (late) (1931-2008).

9

Chapter No. II:

Kashmir Dispute (1947 upto date) The major cause of worst relation between India and Pakistan is Kashmir. Since the partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947, the Kashmir dispute between them has become an intractable one. They fought three wars over it in 1947, 1965, and 1999, but have not resolved it the Indians and Pakistanis like Israelis and Palestinians make claims to the same territory.

Location: Kashmir is located in the northeast of Pakistan and northwest of Pakistan. Geographically it has its utmost importance. Most of the rivers which flows through Pakistan have their origin in Kashmir. So, for Pakistan it is an integral part.

Map of Kashmir10

The Genesis of the Conflict (1947-49) In 1947, when British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan, Hari Singh, the autocratic and unpopular Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu, a predominantly Muslim 10

http://www.kashmirpackages.com/location.htm

10

state, resisted the pressure to join either Pakistan or India hoping to get independence or autonomy from both countries. To buy time and to accomplish this goal, he signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan on August 16, and tried to sign a similar agreement with India. Pakistan claimed this territory, as 72 percent of Maharaja's subjects were Muslim. India wanted the Muslim majority territory of Kashmir as an emblem of her secularism. The Maharaja offered a "stand still" agreement to India and Pakistan, as he wanted some more time to make up his mind. Pakistan signed agreement but India refused. As the Maharaja continued to dither, violence broke in the Jammu and Poonch region where sections of local Muslims wanted to merge with Pakistan. There was a similar revolt in the northern hill territory of Gilgit. In violation of the "stand still" agreement Pakistan stopped the passage of food and other essential commodities to Jammu and Kashmir through her territory. In September 1947, tribal raiders backed by Pakistan army invaded the valley.11 (violence in Kashmir)

(First war in Kashmir)

The Maharaja requested India to send in its armed forces. India made it contingent upon his signing the instrument of accession in favour of India. The ruler signed the instrument of accession and India accepted with the provision that after the restoration of normalcy, the final political status of the territory would be decided through a referendum. Indian soldiers were airlifted to Srinagar on October 27, 1947. India and Pakistan began their first war in less than three months of coming into being as independent states. 12

In January 1948, India appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations to restore peace in Kashmir. On January 20, 1948, the UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was constituted (UNSC Resolution S/654). In April 1948, the UN adopted the first plebiscite resolution. The resolution called upon Pakistan "to withdraw all its armed personnel including the tribesmen from the territory of Jammu and Kashmir". It asked India "to reduce its armed forces to the minimum level needed to maintain law and order" and to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan. The plebiscite administration was to be nominated by the UN Secretary General. (UNSC Resolution S/726, April 21, 1948). A UN crafted ceasefire was implemented on January 1, 1949. The plebiscite resolution was reaffirmed. 11

Rathnam Indurthy, Professor of Government at McNeese State University, Kashmir Between India and Pakistan: An Intractable Conflict, 1947 to Present 12

Dr. Wasim Mallik, REAL STORY OF KASHMIR, [2001-2008]

11

Between 1949 and 1958 UNCIP made several attempts to implement the plebiscite resolution. Even partition of the territory along the ceasefire line with limited plebiscite in the valley was proposed at one stage. The intransigence of India and Pakistan defeated every effort of the UN. India and Pakistan established their political control over the territories of J&K under their respective control. Thus two separate political entities were created on the disputed territory -” “Government of Jammu and Kashmir State" on the Indian side and “Government of Azad Kashmir" on the Pakistani side. Needless to add that these "governments" were essentially "client" governments. The emergency of these political entities altered the ground situation as these new "stake holders" started manipulating the people of the divided territory on the command of their masters in Delhi and Islamabad. The Kashmiris, who disagreed with New Delhi or Islamabad, were termed traitors and spies and put behind the bars. By 1958, within ten-years of having taken the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations, and having asked for international intervention in the resolution of the dispute, India changed its position on outside mediation in Kashmir. As a result, during 1960 and 1964 India turned down the offers of mediation by President Nasser of Egypt, President Kennedy of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of United Kingdom. The second Indo-Pak war on Kashmir took place in 1965. The third Indo-Pak war of 1971, which began on the soil of former East Pakistan and present Bangladesh, spilled over onto the territory of Kashmir. For the last 52 years, India and Pakistan have been virtually at war with each other. At times this war was fought with guns, but most of the time it has been verbal devil. The so-called "Kashmir dispute" lies at the very core of this enmity. Both India and Pakistan feel incomplete without Kashmir. Because of this enmity the people of the former princely state of J&K have being living under virtual war conditions.13

(Violence and protest in Kashmir)14

13

For details, Rafique Ahmad, Pakistan and India Relations (Prospects for a durable Peace), Starlite Press, 176 Anarkali, Lahore. 14

http://images.google.com.pk/

12

Chapter No. III:

Indus Water Treaty (1960) Background: The Indo-Pakistani dispute over the sharing of the Indus River system has not been as contentious as one would expect it to have been. The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan is cited as one of the few examples of successful resolution of a major dispute over an international river basin. It is the largest, contiguous irrigation system in the world, with a command area of about 20 million hectares and annual irrigation capacity of over 12 million hectares. The partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 put the headwater of the basin in India, while Pakistan received the lower part of the basin. A serious dispute over the river waters occurred in 1948, when India halted water supplies to some Pakistani canals at the start of the summer irrigation season.15

Negotiation: The Indus System of Rivers comprises three Western Rivers the Indus, the Jhelum and Chenab and three Eastern Rivers - the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi; and with minor exceptions, the treaty gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers and their tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has exclusive use of the Western Rivers. Pakistan also received one-time financial compensation for the loss of water from the Eastern rivers. The countries agree to exchange data and co-operate in matters related to the treaty. For this purpose, treaty creates the Permanent Indus Commission, with a commissioner appointed by each country.16 The ensuing negotiations between the two countries did not resolve the problem. The water flow cut off by India affected 5.5 per cent of Pakistan’s irrigated area and put tremendous strains on the new country. After nine years of negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty was finally signed on September 19, 1960, with the cooperation of the World Bank. 15

For detail see Gulab Mishra ‘Prakhar’, Indo-Pakistan Relations (From Taskent to Sima), Sheetal Printing Press, 1987. 16

Adapted from Beach, H.L., Hamner, J., Hewitt, J.J., Kaufman, E.,Kurki, A., Oppenheimer, J.A., and Wolf, A.T. (2000). Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Resolution: Theory, Practice, and Annotated References. United Nations University Press. Hosted at the Transboundry Freshwater Dispute Database, Oregon State University.

13

Salient Features:

17

The salient features of the Indus Waters Treaty are: • Three Eastern rivers namely Ravi, Sutlej and Beas were given to India. •

Three Western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were given to Pakistan.

• Pakistan to meet the requirements of its Eastern river canals from the Western rivers by constructing replacement works. • Safeguards incorporated in the treaty to ensure unrestricted flow of waters in the Western rivers. •

Both parties were to regularly exchange flow-data of rivers, canals and streams.

• A permanent Indus Waters Commission was constituted to resolve the disputes between the parties. The Treaty sets out the procedure for settlement of the differences and disputes. It also provides for settlement of disputes through the International Court of Arbitration. Thus, future prospects persuaded the two countries to agree to a partition of the Indus Basin waters. Both countries were expected to exploit their respective water shares with the help of an Indus Basin Development Fund to be administered by the World Bank.

Wular Barrage Issue: Despite the signing of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, another dispute emerged in 1985, when Pakistan learnt through a tender notice in the Indian press about the development of a barrage by the name of Tulbul Navigational Project. The barrage was to be constructed by India on River Jhelum, below the Wular Lake located near Sopore, 25 km north of Srinagar, where the river Jhelum flows into the Lake in the South and flows out of it from the West. For Pakistan the geo-strategic importance of the site lies in the fact that its possession and control provides India with the means to intimidate Pakistan. A Dam on that site has the potential to ruin the entire system of the triple canal project within Pakistan namely, the upper Jhelum Canal, upper Chenab Canal and the lower Bari Doab Canal. According to the Indian Government, the purpose of the Wular Barrage was to construct a control structure, with a view to improving the navigation in the River Jhelum during winters, in order to connect Srinagar with Baramula for transportation of fruits and timber. 17

Haroon Ahmed, INDUS WATER TREATY BETWEEN INDIA & PAKISTAN, research paper, page 2

14

India claimed that 90 percent of the Tulbul project would be beneficial to Pakistan, as it would regulate the supply to Mangla Dam, which would increase Pakistan’s capacity of power generation at Mangla, as well as regulate the irrigation network in the Pakistani Punjab through the triple canal system. 10 India further suggested that Pakistan should bear the greater share of constructing the Barrage, as it would be more beneficial to Pakistan, and would be especially effective in reducing the flow of water during the flood season. Pakistan, on the other hand, argued that India had violated Article I (11) of the Indus Waters Treaty, which prohibits both parties from undertaking any ‘man-made obstruction’ that may cause ‘change in the volume É of the daily flow of waters’. Further that Article III (4) specifically barred India, from ‘storing any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers’. According to sub-paragraph 8(h) of the Indus Waters Treaty, India is entitled to construct an ‘incidental storage work’ on Western rivers on its side: •

only after the design has been scrutinised and approved by Pakistan; and



Its storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 acres feet of water.

Whereas the Wular Barrage’s capacity is 300,000 acres feet, which is thirty times more than the permitted capacity. Regarding the building of a hydro electric plant, according to the Treaty, India is only allowed to construct a small run-off water plant with a maximum discharge of 300 cusecs through the turbines which are insufficient to generate 960 Megawatts of electricity as planned by India.

Bilateral Negotiations: Pakistan referred the Wular Barrage case to the Indus Waters Commission in 1986, which, in 1987, recorded its failure to resolve it. When India suspended the construction work, Pakistan did not take the case in the International Arbitral Court. To date, eight rounds of talks have been held. In 1989, Pakistan agreed to build a barrage conditional to Pakistani inspection, which India rejected. The two sides almost reached an agreement in October 1991, whereby India would keep 6.2 meters of the barrage ungated with a crest level of 1574.90m (5167 ft), and would forego the storage capacity of 300,000 acre feet. In return, the water level in the Barrage would be allowed to attain the full operational level of 5177.90 ft. However, in February 1992, Pakistan added another condition that India should not construct the Kishenganga (390 MW) hydropower-generating unit. India refused to accept this condition. According to Pakistan, the Kishenganga project on River Neelam affected its own Neelam-Jhelum power-generating project, located in its Punjab province. The issue of Wular Barrage was one of the disputes on the agenda highlighted for the Indo-Pak talks, both at the Lahore meeting in February 1999, and at the Agra Summit of July 2001. 15

Implications for Pakistan: The control of the River Jhelum by India through a storage work would mean: • A serious threat to Pakistan should India decide to withhold the water over an extended period, especially during the dry season. It would also multiply and magnify the risks of floods and droughts in Pakistan. The Mangla Dam on River Jhelum, which is a source of irrigation and electricity for Punjab, would be adversely affected. • Provide India a strategic edge, during a military confrontation, enabling it to control the mobility and retreat of Pakistani troops and enhancing the maneuverability of Indian troops. Closing the Barrage gates would render the Pakistani canal system dry and easy to cross. During the 1965 war, the Indian Army failed to cross the BRB Link Canal, due to its full swing flow. India is already in control of the Chenab River through Salal Dam constructed in 1976. Many Pakistanis criticise the conceding of the Salal Dam to India.

Consequence: The Indus Waters Treaty is the only agreement that has been faithfully implemented and upheld by both India and Pakistan. Although its negotiation was often arduous and frustrating for the World Bank and for the Indian and Pakistani delegations, the final outcome was amenable to all parties. While the World Bank may have underestimated the political impediments to technical debate and agreement, Eugene Black's desire to "treat water development as a common project that is functional, and not political, in nature . . . undertaken separately from the political issues with which India and Pakistan are confronted" suggests possibilities for future areas of Indo-Pakistani cooperation. Although, it is doubtful whether "functional" areas of cooperation are ever devoid of political considerations - the will to agree, the will to accept ideas put forward by outside mediators, the will to change positions - these considerations might be met when

_____________________ Sources: Barrett, Scott, "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources," Policy Research Working Paper 1303, The World Bank, May 1994. Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation, Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973.

cooperation is vital. The Indus waters are the life blood of Pakistan and much of western India; functional cooperation was necessary for both sides to survive and prosper. The example of the Indus Waters Treaty suggests that cooperation between India and 16

Pakistan is possible in cases where the benefits of agreement are plentiful and pressing, overwhelming the political hedging that prevents other forms of reconciliation.

______________________ Michel, Aloys Arthur, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1967. Verghese, B.G., Waters of Hope, Oxford and IBH Publishing: New Delhi, 1990. Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_Waters_Treaty"

17

Chapter No. IV:

1965 War Background: The background of 1965 war between Pakistan and India is quite controversial. Embodied by a presumed victory against India in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, Pakistan made plans for “Operation Gibraltar” to recover Kashmir. As it did in 1947, it first sent Pakistani guerrillas into the Valley in August 1965 hoping that the Kashmiri Muslims would rise in rebellion against India. Instead, the guerrillas were apprehended and handed over to the Indian authorities. The situation worsened rapidly.

The War: On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on the region referred to by the disputants as either "Azad Kashmir" or "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir". Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked,[10] while Indian reports cite the attack as a response to massive armed infiltrations of Kashmir by Pakistan.18 Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had experienced successes; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass, eight kilometers inside Pakistani-occuppied territory On September 1, 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called "Operation Grand Slam", with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan initially progressed against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses.19 India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. Although Operation Grand Slam ultimately failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor, it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. 18

History Division, Ministry of Defence. Government of India. 1992

“A Country Study: India". Library of Congress. Government of the United States. September 1995 19

18

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6, marking an official beginning of the war.20 On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore.However,the Pakistani counter attack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.As said by Indian Lt. General Kaul,

Pakistan's Ichogil

"The C-in-C(Indian) got cold feet and decided, while the battle of Khem Karan was still in progress to take up an alternate position, several miles in the rear which would have meant giving up some well known and vital places and areas." (Kaul

op. Cit. P478) The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade: they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured 21 the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment[14] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.

20

Story of Pakistan.com

21

Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore", Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2006 19

On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the Indian 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police India's 1st Armored Division, labelled the "pride of the station (Barkee) in Lahore District. Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th armoured division (an understrength formation of few armoured regiments) at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khemkaran, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar. The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning - "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent - "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didnt see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.

Cease-Fire: In January of 1966, at the invitation of Soviet Premier Alexsei Kosygin, both Shastri and Khan met in the city of Tashkent (Republic of Uzbesistan) and signed the agreement known as the Tashkent Declaration. On January 10, the agreement was formalized and the hostilities ended followed by the withdrawal of the Indo-Pakistani forces to the previous cease-fire lines.2 Shastri died of a heart attack in Tashkent right after he signed the declaration and Mrs. Indira Gandhi succeeded him. In 1971 India and Pakistan fought a third war over Bangladesh’s Independence in which the Kashmir dispute was only a peripheral issue.

Consequence: At the end of the war not only India has suffered a lot but Pakistan also. Pakistan celebrate 6th September as its Defense day and consider 1965 war as to be its victory while Indians assumed that, that war had no conclusion. Consequently the hatred among people of both the nations increased by 1965 War.

20

Chapter No. V:

1971 War and Simla Accord Indo-Pakistani relations deteriorated when civil war erupted in Pakistan, pitting the West Pakistan army against East Pakistanis demanding greater autonomy. The fighting forced 10 million East Pakistani Bengalis to flee to India. When Pakistan attacked Indian airfields in Kashmir, India attacked both East and West Pakistan. It occupied the eastern half, which declared its independence as Bangladesh, on Dec. 17, 1971. Under great-power pressure, a UN cease-fire was arranged in midDecember, after Pakistan's defeat. Pakistan lost its eastern half, an army of 100,000 soldiers, and was thrown |INDO-Pak WAR OF 1971| into political turmoil. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged as leader of Pakistan, and Mujibur Rahman as prime minister of Bangladesh. “What happened in East Pakistan is the saddest episode in INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1971

Pakistan’s history. The loss our eastern wing and the creation of Bangladesh were all a result of inept political handling

ever since our independence Blame ultimately fell on the army. As events developed, the army was confronted with an impossible situation-a mass popular uprising within and an invasion from without by India, supposedly nonaligned but being helped overtly by the Soviet Union under treaty of peace and friendship. It was actually an alliance of war.”22 Tensions were alleviated by the Simla accord of 1972 and by Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh in 1974, but tensions have periodically recurred. On July 2, 1972, Mrs. Gandhi signed the Simla agreement with Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the first President and later Prime Minister of Pakistan who had succeeded the military dictator General Yahya Khan in 1971. Under this agreement, India and Pakistan, among others, committed themselves to “settling their differences through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them,” and that the “basic issues and causes which bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by 22

Pervez Musharraf, In The Line Of Fire, free press, free press is trademark of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2006, pg 54-pg 55.

21

peaceful means.” They also agreed that in “Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control (LOC) resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side." The agreement became the basis for the renewal of official relations between the two countries both at political and economic levels, thus ending any role for either the UN or outside powers including the US. On July 24, 1973, they both signed another agreement in New Delhi agreeing to repatriate all POW’s except for 195 who were held to be tried but were later released without trial. While it demanded a plebiscite in the Indian-part of Kashmir, Pakistan unilaterally detached Gilgit Agency and Baltistan from Azad Kashmir in 1974, and integrated them into Pakistan. This move ignored the UN Security Council’s longstanding resolutions in the same fashion that India did when it had integrated Kashmir into her union in 1956. Pakistan and India also renewed diplomatic recognitions in 1976.

Consequence: Unfortunately after 1971 war Pakistan splits into two parts, East Pakistan became Bangladesh and West Pakistan became remaining Pakistan which was later named as Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1971 constitution. The involving of India in 1971’s political situation of Pakistan which later Bangali called as Liberation War raise tension between India and Pakistan. The relationship between Pakistan and India became worst. But in 1972 after Simla Accord the relationship between both the nations came on the track towards peace.

22

Chapter No. VI:

Pakistan’s Nuclear and Missiles Program Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972. India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities. In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987. Photo of Chagi

Nuclear Tests: On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.23 23

For details see, Munir Ahmed Khan, NUCLEARISATION OF SOUTH ASIA AND ITS REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS REGIONAL STUDIES, Autumn 1998

23

On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation. Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal. 24

YIELD [estimated]

28 May 1998 28 May 1998

YIELD [announced] 25-36 kiloton 12 kiloton

28 May 1998 28 May 1998 28 May 1998 30 May 1998 not detonated

sub-kiloton sub-kiloton sub-kiloton 12 kiloton 12 kiloton

---4-6 kiloton --

DEVICE

DATE

[boosted device?] Fission device Low-yield device Low-yield device Low-yield device Fission device Fission device

total 9-12 kiloton

This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons. According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.

24

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/

24

These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.25 Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.

25

For details see, Rose Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ENHANCING NUCLEAR SECURITY IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM STRUGGLE: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation, , August 2002

25

Chapter No. VII: Pakistan Missile Test

Kargil War

Location: The town of Kargil is located 205 km (120 miles) from Srinagar,26 facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F).

War: The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict,27 was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir. The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC), which serves as the de facto border A Mujahid takes position on a ridge in a battle with between the two states. the Indian Army during the Kargil conflict. As a backup t understanding the Kargil conflict stressed that Kargil was not a ove off operation, but the latest in a series of moves and countermoves at a tactical level by India and Pakistan along the line of Control in the inaccessible, snowbound Northern Aras, India would capture a location where they felt that our presence was thin, and vice-versa.28 During and directly after the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid. In addition, since Kashmir is under Pakistani control, Pakistan was able to deploy Kashmiri fighters to fight alongside its 26

http://kargil.nic.in/profile/profile.htm

27

http://pib.nic.in/feature/feyr2000/fjul2000/f210720001.html

28

Pervez Musharraf, In The Line Of Fire, free press, free press is trademark of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2006, pg 87.

26

regular forces. The Indian Army, supported by the Indian Air Force, attacked the Pakistani positions and, with international diplomatic support, eventually forced withdrawal of the Pakistani forces across the LOC. July 4 marked a cease-fire, negotiated by President Bill Clinton with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, International pressure for a cease-fire was intense. President Clinton was the only statesman who had influence with both Pakistan and India.29

Truth regarding Kargil War: There are two ‘truths’ about Kargil. The first one is the version of defeatist Pakistanis who can’t see us doing any good. And the second truth is the Indian one. Surprisingly, some fair minded former Indian army officers are willing to give a balanced verdict on the Pakistani performance in Kargil than the ridiculous assessments of some defeatist and self-hating Pakistanis who have no problem making fun of their homeland and their military just because they differ politically with Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

A Mujahid takes position on a ridge in a battle with the Indian Army during the Kargil conflict.

I would like to give some of these defeatist Pakistanis a shock: The revealing statement to a Pakistani newspaper, The News, of an Indian army officer having something good to say about the Pakistani military capability as demonstrated in Kargil in 1999. Some of the defeatist, self-hating Pakistanis will find this difficult to swallow since they are more accustomed to criticizing Pakistan, not praising it.

Read the letter below by retired Col. Harish Puri from the Indian army’s Corps of Signals. He uses many of the Indian propaganda lines that raise doubts about the end result of the Pakistani operation, how the Indian people came together in those days to support their military, and how Islamabad underestimated the Indian response. All propaganda points. But then he makes two points very clear that I wish some of those self-hating defeatist Pakistanis, especially the ones in our English-language liberal newspapers, read and feel some shame – just a little – about how they have been putting Pakistan down whenever discussing Kargil and facilitating the propaganda victory of the other side.30

29

Pervez Musharraf, In The Line Of Fire, free press, free press is trademark of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2006, pg 95.

27

The two points that Col. Puri makes are: • It is correct to praise the brilliance of the Pakistani tactical maneuver of stealthily occupying the heights and the massive Indian intelligence failure exploited by the Pakistani military. •

The Pakistani military in professional terms ranks among the best in the world, along with the Indian army according to Col. Puri. The implicit irony here is that India is five times larger than Pakistan. For Islamabad to create this balance of power in just five decades is a Pakistani achievement.31 This is not about clearing the name of Gen. Musharraf. History, and military analysts, will do that. Our job here is just to tell those few, self-bashing, defeatist-minded Pakistanis this: Please spare us your self-hatred. We are good at anything we want to be good at if we put our mind into it. Celebrate your strength instead of wallowing in your weaknesses.

Pakistan Army shelling Indian Army positions.

30

For details see, Muhammad Ayub. An Army; Its role and Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army From Independence to Kargil 1947–1999) 31

http://www.friendskorner.com/forum/f39/real-truth-kargil-war-48790/

28

Chapter No. VIII:

Present Situation The Indo-Pak relation is still crucial. All the efforts made for a better relation between both the countries proved to be failed yet. Whenever the relationship between both the nations goes towards betterment, there happen some terrorist activities in India or in Pakistan such as Bombing in Calcutta, Dehli, Bombing in Samjhoota Express (India) or Blast in Meriot Hotel, Lahore, Karachi, Wazeeristan crises (Pakistan) etc and then all such activities make the relation between both the nations again crucial. Now a day’s India has suffered from Mumbai Attack which it blames on Pakistan to be involved in that. Taj Hotel where terrorist attacked

Change in India Pakistan Relations Post Mumbai Attacks:

India and Pakistan is the end product of the two nation theory. The bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan has always been marred with violence and constant disbelief of each other’s intention to bring an ever lasting solution for Kashmir conflict. Of late Kashmir has been regarded as an area buzzing with terrorist activity, loosing thousands of innocent lives to such barbaric acts year after year.32

INDO-PAK RELATION BEFORE MUMBAI ATTACK: After the Kargil war and the parliament attack in 2001 which brought both the nation to the brink of nuclear war, the bilateral relationship has improved in leaps and bounds. The trade between two nations resumed - Samjhauta Express , Delhi–Lahore Bus ,Srinagar–Muzaffarabad Bus , Thar Express , Indo-Pak Confederation, Indo-Pak Joint Judicial Committee were some of the high points. Even the Indian cricket team visited Pakistan for a full series after a long gap of 14 years. The troop withdrawals from Line of Control on both sides were well appreciated by the world community. There was a strong resolve from both sides to settle Kashmir conflict once and for all in a peaceful manner. No concrete talks about this issue have taken place after Greif on the death of their relatives of two women after Agra summit in 1998. Mumbai attack

The restoration of trade links could have been considered as small but strong step in settling the Kashmir issue. Democracy being reinstated in 32

M.S. Kiran, How Global Jihadi websites see Mumbai Attack, December 4, 2008

29

Pakistan after a decade of dictatorship was also considered as a great impetus for peaceful relationship between the two nations.

INDO-PAK RELATION POST MUMBAI ATTACK: Bilateral relation changed from sweet to sour when a group of terrorist attacked Mumbai on 26 / 11.33 Cross-border terrorism was always a major concern for our country. And terrorist camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir did not help the matters at all. The Mumbai attack can be considered as the last nail on the coffin, there was no way India could leave Pak terror groups get away with gruesome and dastardly attack on the financial capital of our country This has severely hampered the bilateral relationships. The confidence building measures and other initiative to bring peace to sub continent have gone in vain. Even after repeated request from Indian side to Pak to close down all terrorist camps in Pakistan, it fell on deaf ears. Pak president’s comment that terrorist are non-state actors and government of Pakistan has no role to play in it despite concrete evidence against them added fuel to fire. The sudden reaction from the Indian government to snap all the trade ties with Pak was Blood spread on floor inside Taj a result of this immature stand of Pak government. Hotel The secretary level talks between both sides on important matters like foreign policy, commerce, certain clauses in Shimla agreement, disputes in water sharing treaty has been put off indefinitely unless and until some concrete and stern step is taken by Pak government to curb the global menace of terrorism. In the future course of action, India has got many options in front of them. But care should be taken by India not to escalate the situation into a fully fledged war. It is to be noted that India and Pakistan are nuclear states. An armed confrontation between nuclear states is not the optimum move the world community is looking forward to. There is no point in India continuing to maintain cordial bilateral relationship with a nation known for their terror links also which provides the sufficient terror infrastructure for its training and support. India has to act as a responsible democracy in putting adequate pressure on Pakistan by sharing all the evidence gathered against the terrorist with the world community. This will force the Pak government to act against terrorist in an effective manner. The banning of JUD a terrorist organization linked with LeT by Pak government is a positive step but a long road is in front of them in gaining confidence of India and other nations of the world.

33

For details see The News, “Interior Ministry says Maulvi Fazlullah killed”, December 3, 2008.

30

Chapter No. IX:

Survey on relationship between Pakistani and Indians I made s survey on the relationship between both the people of India and Pakistan through internet. For this purpose, I used my id [email protected] and conversed with different people of India especially to those who are living in well known cities of India so that I might get perception of educated Indian people through Yahoo Chat Room. The most of the people which I met on internet are strongly against Pakistan. They just start to write obnoxious sentences on chat room. I tried to convince to chat with me. Then few people agreed to chat with me. I would like to quote some of their conversation: Some part of conversation with Nandni (Mumbai): diyadel4u: hi diyadel4u: will u talk for a while ans_ahmad15: hi.. how are you.. diyadel4u: fine thnx diyadel4u: r u frm pakistan ans_ahmad15: Yup ans_ahmad15: from where you are diyadel4u: stop talkimg to dem diyadel4u: talk to me ans_ahmad15: ok.. diyadel4u: i know u love ur country diyadel4u: dats good frm ur part diyadel4u: we love our country diyadel4u: dats our respect diyadel4u: but its true and u also know dat ur country caised such a damage for us diyadel4u: do u think we shd 4get all dis? ans_ahmad15: I am talking to whole chat room and trying to convince that we can minimize distance people of both nation.. but I have gotten nothing but just obnixious words and sentences

31

diyadel4u: but it went to extream point ans_ahmad15: Yup.. diyadel4u: even we dnt tollarate our muslim ppl ans_ahmad15: what do you thing..? diyadel4u: y dnt u take initiative to change mindset pf ppl of ur own country ans_ahmad15: what do you do..? diyadel4u: i will tell u ltr diyadel4u: my prof is nt imp here ans_ahmad15: I am trying it my best level... but I have realized that there is great distance between both nations people.. diyadel4u: i was really feeling bad dat u were abised by indians diyadel4u: but u need to understand wht we got frm ur country diyadel4u: we cnt 4get and 4give ans_ahmad15: thats not the point to remember.. My country has also gotten wounds from India .. the point to be noted that what can we do now for the betterment of both the nations diyadel4u: no we nwvwe started u always initialize diyadel4u: pppl over here will insult u a lot so pls leave dis room

Some part of conversation with Kumar Singh (New Delhi): ans_ahmad15: What do you think about Pakistan? (mentioned avoided): I‘ll not tell u only my thinkings but also my nations v jst hate Pak… Goto Hell…..!!!

Some part of conversation with Anchal (South Africa, Johansburg): ans_ahmad15:HI……………….? good play; Hey ans_ahmad15: Whats ur name and asl? good play; Anchal. 29, Female ans_ahmad15: Are you Indian..? good play; yup but now living in South Africa, Johnsburg Are u Paki ans_ahmad15: Yes I am Pakistani.. Can you help me out I am writing a research paper on Indo-Pak relation…? good play; Hmmm.. ok,, ask.. such a critical topic to discuss.. ans_ahmad15: Can you tell me the feelings of Indians towards Pakistan?

32

good play; Yup.. ofcourse.. But don’t take it to heart. Most people in India are miserably against Pakistan. They want to demolish and abolish pak… They consider paki to be responsible of Mumbai attack.

These are the few conversations which I quote in Research Paper. The rest are not suitable to write. One can conclude the feelings of Indians towards Pakistan via above conversation. Personally which I felt, while talking to Indians that they hate Pakistan so much and there is a great gap between both the nation’s people. The feelings of Pakistani towards Indians are the same. Both the nation’s people hate each other due to which the Indo-Pak Relation has been crucial since 1947 upto date.

33

Conclusion The INDO-PAK Relation can be concluded as that the relation which has been crucial and critical for the last sixty years. The International community has tried a lot to bring harmony and peace between the people of India and Pakistan. But people of both the nations decline to accept that. Now a day’s durable peace between India and Pakistan is far so necessary, not only for both the nations but also for the entire world, because another confrontation between them can’t be afforded by both nations and humankind also, as both of them are nuclear power. The key to the improvement of relation between Pakistan and India on a permanent basis lies in the acceptance by policy makers and thinkers of deep-rooted historical realities and factors which gave slapped the great South Asian Muslim and Hindu cultures. Once it is realized particularly by Bharati strategists, that Pakistan and India gave no other peaceful choice except to co-exist on equal footing, the way will be paved for the settlement of all existing disputes. The future holds a changing opportunity to those two South Asian giants either to become a self-reliant force for durable peace and prosperity or to plunge the region into fresh conflicts and disturbances which may give rise to new global and region power association. I think I am running out of my time. I would like to end by saying that neither India nor Pakistan can afford a war. In the final analysis, it is in India’s long term interest to have a strong friendly relation with Pakistan as its neighbor. And I hope we will continue our peace offensive, because I am sure, sooner or later, the both Indian and Pakistani leadership will recognize the value of strong and friendly relations as neighbors.

34

35

Bibliography Articles and Books: Barrett, Scott, "Conflict and Cooperation in Managing International Water Resources," Policy Research Working Paper 1303, The World Bank, May 1994. Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore", Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2006 Dr. Wasim Mallik, REAL STORY OF KASHMIR, [2001-2008] Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation, Rehabilitation Retrospect, New Delhi, Gulhati, Niranjan D., The Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation, Allied Publishers: Bombay, 1973. Haroon Ahmed, INDUS WATER TREATY BETWEEN INDIA & PAKISTAN, research paper Jha, Indo-Pakistan Relations 196-65, (Patna, 1972) Michel, Aloys Arthur, The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition, Yale University Press: New Haven, 1967. Verghese, B.G., Waters of Hope, Oxford and IBH Publishing: New Delhi, 1990. Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_Waters_Treaty Mishra ‘Prakhar’, Indo-Pakistan Relations (From Taskent to Sima), Sheetal Printing Press, 1987, M.S. Kiran, How Global Jihadi websites see Mumbai Attack, December 4, 2008 Muhammad Ayub. An Army; Its role and Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army From Independence to Kargil 1947–1999) Munir Ahmed Khan, NUCLEARISATION OF SOUTH ASIA AND ITS REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS REGIONAL STUDIES, Autumn 1998 Rafique Ahmad, Pakistan and India Relations (Prospects for a durable Peace), Starlite Press, 176 Anarkali, Lahore Rathnam Indurthy, Professor of Government at McNeese State University, Kashmir Between India and Pakistan: An Intractable Conflict, 1947 to Present Report, 196-61, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India Rose Gottemoeller, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ENHANCING NUCLEAR SECURITY IN THE COUNTER-TERRORISM STRUGGLE: India and Pakistan as a New Region for Cooperation, , August 2002 36

Pervez Musharraf, In The Line Of Fire, free press, free press is trademark of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2006

Websites: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition#Law www.encyclopedia.com http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke http://www.friendskorner.com/forum/f39/real-truth-kargil-war-48790/ www.google.com http://images.google.com.pk/ http://kargil.nic.in/profile/profile.htm http://www.kashmirpackages.com/location.htm http://pib.nic.in/feature/feyr2000/fjul2000/f210720001.html www.pdfcoke.com www.storyofpakistan.com

37

Related Documents


More Documents from "sohail arif chattha"