Reconciling The State And Society In Somalia

Reconciling the State and Society in Somalia: Reordering Islamic Work and the Clan System

Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow) and Ibrahim Farah1

Introduction Somalia remains one of the world’s hot spots that attract news coverage on failed and collapsed states, African civil wars, cyclic droughts and floods, abuses of human rights, religious extremism, global war on terrorism, and military interventions. Successive regional and internal attempts to reconstitute the Somali state and numerous peace and reconciliation conferences had failed to bring neither peace nor functioning institutions. Approaches used in these conferences were swinging: from warlord conferences (1991-99) to civil societydriven (2000) and to warlord-dominated processes (2003-04).2 The emergence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006 and their encounter with the allied forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and those of Ethiopia added more agony to the Somali tragedy. Evidently, during wars and calamities, most people took refuge and solace in their faith and protection from their ethnic enclaves and clans. Subsequently, Islam and clan attachments, the basics of ‘Somaliness,’ developed gradually The authors are PhD candidates in Islamic and international studies respectively and are engaged in consultancies in regional political analysis on Somalia and the Horn. This paper was presented in the 10th Somali Studies International Association (SSIA) conference held in Ohio State University on 15-18 August, 2007. 2 “The first ‘Somali’ reconciliation conference in which all faction leaders participated was held in Addis Abba in March 1993 under the sponsorship of the UN and funded by the Swedish NGO Life and Peace Institute (LPI). The other three major conferences were held in Kenya (1994), Ethiopia (1996), and Egypt (1997). Participation in all these conferences was limited to the warring political factions. See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia: History of women’s Political Participation during four Decades (1959-2000).”African Renaissance. 4:1 (2007), 44. 1

into high position in the society that should be reckoned in any new power configurations.3 The balance of power that determines state-society relations has also shifted towards society in the aftermath of state collapse and the establishment of the ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland’ administrations. The same phenomenon was observed during Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000.4 In these local administrations and Djibouti conference, preliminary reconciliation of the state and society was launched on the basis of mutual recognition. Conversely, the IGAD-sponsored conference in Kenya (2003-2004) had reversed the reconciliation trend and instead, the conference was hijacked and manipulated by the warlords relegating all other stakeholders into the periphery.5 As a consequence of this faulty process, the Somali conflict shifted to a more knotty stage. Almost three years have passed since current TFG was formed in 2004 and the people of Somalia are more divided and attached to the interests of foreign powers. Moreover, protracted conflicts based on social, political and resources have added up new violent conflict on the interpretation of Islam with the emergence of the UIC. As the title implies, the paper points out the need to reconcile the state and society in Somalia although this process faces two main challenges:

Islamic

extremism on one side and radicalization of clans on the other, both of which are contentious and widely misused as instruments of the conflict. This will be done from a scholarly perspective and by provoking policy makers on Somali affairs. This paper, therefore, aims to study the impact of the breakdown of the indigenous systems and authorities and alerts the increasing level of threat to the very existence of Somalia. The fundamental assumption is that organized clan system and legitimate and authoritative interpretation of Islam will 3

See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Tribalism and Islam: The basics of Somaliness.” Muddle Suzanne Liluis, ed. Variations on the theme of Somaliness. Finland: Centre of Continuing Education, Abo University, 2001. 4 This new relationships became visible in the civil society-driven Arta peace process held in Djibouti in 2000, where both the Somali Islamic institutions and the clans were recognized. 5 ‘Somaliland’ had established “Golaha Guurtida” similar to the Senate form in other countries while in Puntland the Issimo similar to the Guurtida is also very active in the management of conflict just like Islamic organizations and civil society groups.

contribute to the stability of the Somali state, and bolsters regional and global security. 1. Theoretical Framework Just to refresh the memory of the reader, there are three important theoretical definitions to bring forth on the state and the society and their relationships: 1.1. The state: The state as defined by political scientists and jurists is a community occupying a specific territory which has a functioning government and recognized as such by other governments. 6 In public perceptions, however, the meaning of the state, regime and government are not quite discernable. Particularly, Somalis express these three terms as “dawladda.”7 The state in this paper means the institutions which enforce a public good and its capability is measured by its ability to “penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”8 Postcolonial states in the Muslim societies, and Somalia is not different, are fashioned to be secular in essence with some religious coloring; putting these states in conflict with the basic value system of its population. 1.2. The society: The society is “the aggregate of people living together in a more or less ordered community” or “a particular community of people living in a country or region, and having shared customs, laws, and organizations.”9 In this paper, society means the people living within jurisdiction of the Somali Republic organized traditionally as clans and religious brotherhoods.10 In the modern era, besides traditional organizations of the society, “Ururada Bulshada See Garner, Wilford, Political Science and Government (American Book Company, 1928), p.52. Lately, technical terms were coined such as qaranka (the state), xukuumadda (the government) and rejiimka (the regime) while the term dawladda remains a general term for all. 8 See Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak states: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1988), p.4. 9 See more at http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/society. 10 There are four major clans and a group of minority sub-clans making a clan on their own: Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and the Digil-Mirifle, the minorities (or others as was adopted during the Arta peace process. These clan groupings were formed during Arta peace process in 2000 into a 4.5 clan distribution formula. Moreover, the Sufi brotherhoods of Qaderia, Ahmadiya, Salihiya and other smaller brotherhoods are rampant throughout the country. 6 7

Rayidka ah” (civil society organizations) have emerged that include registered charities, developmental organizations, Islamic organizations and professional associations.11 1.3. State-society relations: According to Tracy Kuperus, relationship between the state and society represented by the civil society institutions (traditional and modern) are assumed to be conflcitual. However, these relations can be described in six possible scenarios ranging from extreme cooperation

to

extreme

conflict:

1)

mutual

collaboration;

2)

mutual

engagement; 3) conflictual engagement; 4) mutual disengagement; 5) enforced disengagement;

and

finally

6)

resistance-revolutionary

disengagement.12

Historically, this relation in the Somali context shifted with the change of the nature of the state from quasi democratic (1960-1969) to authoritarian (19691990). 2. Historical Background: Historically, state-society relations in Somalia are characterized as conflictual since state institutions were formed by the colonial powers without the participation of the community leaders (clan elders and Islamic scholars). Gradually, the state encountered two major internal conflicts and rebellions. These are the rebellion based on clan sentiments and insurgence in the name of Islam. Consequently, Islam and the clan, which are the two common denominators of the Somalis, were used as ideologies of conflict and instruments of struggle for political power. 2.1 Clans vs. the State: Clash and Compromise Some clans began their overt armed rebellion when some of them have dissented widening imbalances of military regime’s power-sharing modality or losing previous political privileges. Clanism as political factor was taking roots in Traditional and modern civil society organizations in Somalia are classified in these two categories. See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Non-State Actors in the Failed State of Somalia: Survey of the Civil Society Organizations in Somalia during g the Civil War.” Darasaat Ifriqiyayyah, 31 (2004), p.59. 12 See Tracy Kuperus, Frameworks of State-Society Relations, accessed at: http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/S&Ps/1994-Su/S&P_VIII-4/state_society_relations.html. 11

the early formation of the political parties in 1950s, even though official state policies were consistently vilifying and suppressing clan sentiments through variety of legislations and harsh policies.13 Yet, policies and approaches used during the military regime to suppress clan sentiments have not only nurtured the clan system but it also polarized and to some extent radicalized. As a result, armed opposition along these clan and sub-clan lines had emerged one after the other mainly in the 1980s: for example, the Majerten-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which was formed in 1978, the Isaq-led Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981, the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) in 1986, and the Ogaden-dominated United Somali Patriotic (USP) formed in 1989.

These armed factions have gradually weakened the

state and finally succeeded to topple the regime and the state in the early 1991.

Unfortunately, in the absence of the national vision, low capacity of

leaderships and Ethiopian strategic agenda that nurtured these factions, internal conflicts exacerbated and brutal civil war broke out reverting Somalia into pre-state primitive conditions. In the southern regions, Somalia remained in turmoil as fiefdoms in the hands of many ever fighting warlords answerable to no authority. On other hand, ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland,’ succeeded to overcome challenges of the armed factions and established peaceful and thriving but fragile administrations on clan-based power-sharing models. It can be argued that the official recognition of the roles of clan elders and Islamic scholars in the rebuilding institutions while at the same time eliminating extremist tendencies have saved these communities.14 Three important laws were passed prior to 1969. The first was intended to reduce the authority of the tribal chiefs, the second to lessen tribal solidarity and the third resulted in banning political parties that utilized tribal names. The military regime enacted laws to liquidate dabar-goynta charged to eliminating clanism in Somalia; abolishing the Diya (blood money) system, renaming clan chiefs in the rural areas; and introducing compulsory auto insurance and local government responsibility for funeral expenses. Above all, massive propaganda against clanism was conducted in the name of the ‘socialist transformation’ of Somali society. 14 Islamists participated in the formation of Somaliland and their influence is evident in the adopted flag and constitution. With respect to Puntland, they disbanded SSDF armed faction and 13

On the other hand, after more than twelve failed conferences, a new approach for reconciliation was set into motion in the Djibouti-sponsored peace initiative in 1999. This conference had adopted officially a clan power sharing formula based on the famous 4.5 system. This means that the clan factor was recognized and affirmed in the Transitional National Charter (TNC). The change of the elite’s views on state-society relations has not only practical relevance in the absence of modern political institutions, but also was a sealing victory of traditionalist approach over sophomoric modernist’s mythology.15 2.2. Islam vs. the State: Marginalization and Conflict Although Islam is the common religion of the people of Somalia, nonetheless, its practical application was limited and played a peripheral role in the modern Somali state. This means that despite the societal Islamic practice in ages throughout Somalia, the post-colonial state has been cilmaani Uyaal, meaning quasi-secular in the post-independence era and cilmaani, meaning secular during the military regime.16 As a result, Islamic organizations started to emerge in the late 1960s to express protestation against growing tendency of secularization and westernization in the society.17 Although a number of Islamic weakened Al-Itixaad Islamic organization the bloody war of 1992. 15 4.5 formula of power sharing adopting during Djibouti Reconciliation Conference in 2000 were strongly criticized by many scholars like Omar Enow, Mohamed Enow, Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar. However, these scholars failed to come up with acceptable practical approach of power sharing in the absence of political institutions. Also, it is important to note that 4.5 formula offered women and minority clans more seats in the parliament while so called dominant clans received less seats comparatively. In the final analysis, 4.5 was a temporary measure of democratization of traditional society and never intended to be used as permanent approach for future political model. See Mohamed A. Enow. “Inclusive but unequal: the enigma of the 14th SNRC and the Four point five (4.5) factor” in Abdullahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Souare (edited), Somalia at the crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed State (London: Adonis and Abby publishers Ltd, 2007). 16 Constitutions of 1960 indicate that the state was not secular; nevertheless, the way of life continued secular treats prevalent during colonial era. On the other hand, ideology of socialism adopted during military regime that negates Islamic values qualify military regime to be characterized as secular. 17 17. The most active Islamic organization in the early years of the Islamic movement was “AlNahda Movement” founded in 1967 by Sheikh Abdul-Gani and Sheikh Mohamed “Geryare”. For more details, see Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Political Islam in Somalia.” Middle Eastern Affairs Journal. 1:3 (1993): 44-55.

organizations were covertly organized during the military rule (1969-1990), nonetheless, three major Islamic movements, namely Al-Islah, Al-Ittihad and AlTablig appeared to the public scene after the collapse of the state. 18 Evidently, these three organizations took different approaches and means in achieving their programs and strategic goals.19 Also, other splinter groups or smaller organizations showed activism during the civil war including some extremist groups. During the civil war, Islamic organizations succeeded to outreach Somali communities in the Diaspora and inside the country. Moderate elements of the Islamists have actively participated in Buroa and Borama Conferences of ‘Somaliland’ and in the Growe Conference of ‘Puntland’. The Islamist inputs in these conferences are evident in the adopted constitutions of the two administrations.20 Moreover, in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000, the role of Islam was placed high as the supreme reference for all state laws.21 Moreover, Islamic organizations and Ulama not only fully participated in the conference as part of their clans, but in the name of Ulama, five special seats were allocated in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA).22 Conversely, the IGAD-sponsored Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process discriminated against and excluded almost Islamic organizations and renowned Islamic scholars.23 The famous Al-wahda movement in the Northern regions “Somaliland” was incessantly breaking into sub-groups unifying with other movements. Names such as Al-Ittihad (1981), AlTajamuc(1992) and al-Ictisam (1996) were adopted by the Salafia movement originally established under the name of Jama Islamiyah (1979) . 19 See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Recovering the Somali State: the Islamic Factor.” In Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa, edited by A. Osman Farah, Mamo Mushie, and Joakim Gundel. London: Adonis & Abby Publishers Ltd, 2007. See also Andre Le Sage, "Al-Islah in Somalia: An analysis of modern political Islam," unpublished manuscript; and Roland Marchal, "Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war," in Alex de Waal (ed.), Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indiana University Press, 2004). 20 See for example the flag of ‘Somaliland’ and its constitution. The same is true in ‘Puntland.’ 21 See the Article 2.2 and Article 4.4 of transitional National Charter adopted in the conference. 22 These five seats were offered mainly to the Ulama of the clan-based Islamic Courts from Mogadishu constituency. Delegates of the Somali Reconciliation Conference mandated the president of Djibouti to allocate 20 parliamentary seats outside of 4.5 power sharing formula. 23 For example, among excluded Islamic scholars from the conference after their invitation was Dr. Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Al-Qutubi because of his affiliation to Al-Islah movement. Many prominent Islamic scholars were absent from the conference because they were not invited at all. Interview with Dr. Al-Qutubi on 21 July, 2005, Mogadishu, Somalia. 18

As a result, the exclusive warlord-dominated conference was concluded with the formation of the TFIs. Moreover, with US financial and political support, the warlords formed an anti-terror alliance against Mogadishu-based Islamists, notably the UIC and its allegedly Mogadishu-based backers in February 2006. However, this undertaking did provoke unprecedented upsurge of Islamic rage in Mogadishu under the UIC leadership and the US-backed warlord program was aborted. Thus, the political environment of Somalia had changed dramatically with the outright victory of UIC over the warlords and their uncontested power in Mogadishu and the surrounding regions. Nevertheless, the jubilation of UIC lasted short with the impasse of the peaceful dialogue and escalation into a total war participated by the Ethiopian military with US tacit support. This is evident in the fact that Islamic and clan sentiments -- if aroused as political agenda -- are capable of crashing the Somali state. It was so in 1991 regarding clan extremism and the same scenario repeated itself in 2006 vis-àvis religious extremism inclinations. The major difference between 1991 and 2006 with respect for the Somali state is post-9/11 developments which changed the landscape and language of international relations. Because of that change, any armed Islamic movement is at risk to be labelled to have links with global terrorist networks. In the Somali case, the United States and its regional ally in the Horn, Ethiopia, claimed that the UIC has terrorist elements in its ranks and in that pretext, Ethiopia with US military backing intervened militarily in Somalia and defeated the UIC forces. 3. Chaos of the Islamic Work Islam is a complete way of life that provides guidelines for the political, social and economic life of Muslim communities and states. Historically, Somali people confronted external threats using the concept of “Jihad” against infidels as resistance ideology against all colonial powers. Conscious of the strong presence of unreceptive culture of nomadism combined with the ideology of

Islamic Jihad, colonial power offered due consideration to Islam and did acquiescence lately with the leading Ulama.24 As a result, the role of Islam was well placed in the first constitution of the Somali Republic in 1960. 25 The constitution affirms that “Islam is the religion of the state” and that “the doctrine of Islam shall be the main source of laws of the State.”26 Moreover, “laws and provisions having the force of law shall conform the constitution and to the general principles of Islam.”27 The post-colonial Somali government also adopted a law restricting the spread of other religions within Somali territory in 1963.28 In order to do justice to the founding fathers of Somalia, general policy of the government (1960-1969), as recorded in the constitution, was to preserve the general ethical values of Islam, promote the unity of Islamic Ummah and encourage Islamic education in the public schools.29 Nevertheless, the inertia of colonially inherited political, social and economic systems continued and remained intact. Moreover, colonial laws and westernized culture of the elites were also sustained as part of the status quo. Furthermore, westernized urban culture such as night clubs and alcohol drinking and selling in the public spaces were not restrained. In the nutshell, the capacity of the state to initiate any reform program was very slim and therefore the status quo was sustained.

This policy was adopted after long confrontation with Ulama leading Jihad since 1990. In particular after the emergence of Darwish Movement led by Sheikh Abdullah Hassan (19901921). Moreover, Italian Fascist policy was to forge alliance with the Islamic communities in his war against Ethiopian Empire in 1935. As a result, Italy had built Islamic institutions such as Mosques in the town of Baidoa Furthermore, though Italian colonial administration supported Christian Missionaries, nevertheless, they were restrained in order to avert conflict with the Muslim communities. 25 Please note the political connotation involved in the terms “Somali Republic,’ and the “Republic of Somalia.” The first signifies the unity of Somalia, i.e. both northern and southern Somalia while the latter shows the former southern Somalia before independence and unification. 26 See for example Article 50 of the 1960 Somali Constitution. 27 See Article 98, para 1 of the 1960 Somali Constitution; See also Paolo Contini, The Somali Republic: an Experiment in Legal Integration (London: Frank Cass & Company LTD., 1969), p.58. 28 See Article 29 of the 1960 Somali Constitution which states that “Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience and freely to profess his own religion .... However, it shall not be permissible to spread or propagandize any religion other than the religion of Islam.” Restricting the spread of other religions was adopted on 29 June 1963. 24

29

At the national level, the national institution designated for the Islamic affairs was the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The office of Mufti, an expert of Islamic jurisprudence, designated to offer official religious fatwa for the public and appointed as such by the state had never existed in Somalia. Moreover, an Islamic Council issuing collective fatwa on the Islamic matters through research and deliberations was also never established. Traditional Islamic institutions such as mosques, mawli’is and Qur’anic schools were initiated and maintained by

charitable

individuals

and

non-governmental

organizations

(NGOs).

Practically, the Somali state considered Islamic institutions as belonging to the private realm and never allocated any budget for its promotion and development. On the other hand, Islamic education was limited to the traditional Halaqa education in the historical Islamic centers, mosques, and mawli’ics and Qur’anic schools. Traditional Islamic education primarily focuses, after the memorization of the Qur’anic text, on specific curriculum of Shafi’i Jurisprudence, Sufism and Arabic Grammar. However, that tradition began to change with the appearance of the schools administered by Egypt’s Al-Azhar University by 1953 and government school of Islamic Studies aimed to train Islamic judges for the elementary courts. Few graduates of these schools were offered scholarships to Al-Azhar University before the independence in 1960. Also, Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia graduated few Somali students after the independence. In the subsequent years of 1960s and 70s, many Somali students graduated from the Islamic universities in the Arab world.30 Locally, the Faculty of Shari’a and Arabic Language was one of the last faculties of the former Somali National University (SNU) inaugurated in 1985.31 Beyond that, Islamic education was limited and only confined to the graduates from the Islamic universities in the Muslim world, New Islamic scholars began to graduate from the Islamic universities such as Al-Azhar in Egypt, Al-Iman University in Saudi Arabia. Among these are Sh. Abdulqani Sh, Ahemb, Sh. Mohamed Ahmed Nur “ geryare”, Sh. Mohamed moalim and others. These scholars had founded Al-Nahda society in Mogadishu. For more detailed account see Abdurahman Abdullaahi, “ political Islam in Somalia”. Middle eastern affairs jounal. 1:3 (1993):46-47 31 The 1969/1990 military regime looked at Islamic organizations as an impediment to its socialist programs and the regime did not promote Islamic education and institutions. 30

mostly from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.32 Many of the graduates of these universities were offered jobs by Islamic Institutions like Dar-Al-Ifta in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and were sent back to Somalia as preachers to spread what nowadays termed as Salafism. Only few Somalis received post-graduate degrees in Islamic studies as post-graduate opportunities in Islamic studies and in research were and remain scanty. As part of the cultural interaction with the wider Islamic world, religious practices have nevertheless witnessed tremendous change since the 1970s. Besides traditional Shafi’i Jurisprudence prevailing in Somalia for centuries, other schools of jurisprudence have registered some presence.

With the

emergence of Islamic revival by the 1970s, a new phenomenon of noncomplete-affiliation to the historical school of jurisprudence -- the prevailing Shafi’i school -- became visible in Somalia. The interpretations of other schools have been introduced and some of these practices and advocacy of some of these schools of thoughts have created disorder and conflict in the spaces of worship and Islamic studies. In particular, the Salafiya movement and other graduates from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia emphasised on the selected aspects of Hambali Jurisprudence, a school which is widely practiced in Saudi Arabia but is more alien to the Somalis. The impact of the Salafiya movement was so great that religious conflicts were mounting all over Somalia and the Sufiya vs. Salafiya confrontations were evident in all religious spaces. As time went, both groups radicalized and religious tolerance has been waning. Ideologically affiliated groups to the evolutionary approaches of Muslim Brotherhood like Al-Islah, Al-Wahda and Al-Ikhwan played a moderating and soothing role of the mounting conflictual religious debates.33 As a reaction to the Somali socialist programs, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia offered hundreds of scholarship to Somali students in their universities and particularly admitted most of them in Islamic universities. 33 Al-Islah is an Islamic organization ideologically affiliated to the approaches of the International Muslim Brotherhood networks. Al-Wahda is a local organization historically well-known in “Somaliland” that follows the same ideology of non-conflict with the traditional Sufi Orders. AlIkhwan is similar to Al-Wahda and concentrated in the South and affiliated to the renowned 32

On the other hand, parts of the Hanafi jurisprudence spread in the Indian subcontinent and made inroads with the appearance of the Tabliq group in Somalia especially in the last two decades. Nonetheless, one should keep in mind that the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali, are identical in most of their legal conclusions. Differences in the remaining questions are traceable to methodological differences which most of the Islamic workers in Somalia do not master. Moreover, most of the scholars agree that non-experts on Islam, which means Muslim masses, should follow one of the schools of jurisprudence and do not allow flip-flopping for one school to another. The reaction of the military regime to the activities of the Islamic movements was brutal and violent. It was a denial of the basic rights to freedoms in all its forms. As a result, like all the other dissident political organizations in the early 1970s, Islamic activists in Somalia were pushed to underground activities.34 These harsh policies included banning the Islamic Hijab, imprisoning and executing Islamic scholars, adopting laws that go against Islamic Sharia such as the law of inheritance and the family laws in general.35 Naturally, religious extremism mostly developed as a reaction to the ruthless state repression of these Islamic movements. Conversely, after the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1991, Islamic political institutions emerged and -- as a result of this vacuum -- became completely free from state control. However, within the chaotic situation, some individuals and groups interpreted Islam in extreme forms. In fact, in first time in the history of Somalia, Islamic armed groups were engaged in bloody confrontations with the clannish factions and

new

phenomena known as Salafia Jihadist had shown presence in Somalia.36 Islamic scholar sheikh Mohamed Moallim. 34 Because the military government banned other political parties and social organizations, all dissidents therefore resorted to the underground option or exile. 35 Somali religious scholars had voiced their concerns with respect to the regime’s interference in the family law by introducing articles equalling genders in the inheritance. This legislation directly contravenes Islamic law and indicated lack of respect that the regime retains to the Islamic laws and values.

At the national level, Islamic consciousness had reached its height during the civil war. The constitutional debate during Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti produced an interim Charter regarded as the most Islamized constitution in the history of Somalia. It included two important provisions. For example, in Article 2.2, the Charter reinforced that “Islam shall be the religion of the state and no other religion or ideas contrary to Islam may be propagated in its territory.”37 Similarly, Article 4.4 stated that “the Islamic Sharia law shall be the basic source for national legislation. Any law contradicting Islamic Shari’a shall be void and null.”38 These two articles were rewritten in the Transitional National Charter of 2004 with slight modifications. All above said is a manifestation of the chaos in the Islamic works that constantly generate conflicts within communities and society at large. Moreover, this chaotic situation provoked religious conflict among Islamic workers too. Furthermore, armed and extreme ideologies had led to the bloody confrontations with local administrations and state institutions provoking regional and international intervention in Somalia. 4. Anarchy and the Breakdown of the Clan Authority 4.1. Anarchy in the Clan System: Since 1980s, individuals claiming to represent their clans called “warlords”, constantly appropriated authority from the legitimate clan elders. They claimed to defend the interest of the clan, waged wars, established sparo, looted, collected legio, confiscated properties and lands, killed at will and signed alliance pacts with other warlords.39 In doing The ideology of Salafia Jihads calls for wagging continuous Jihad against regimes that claim to be Islamic because they do not follow Shari’a Law. Some of these organizations are part of the global networks of Jihadists known as Al-Qaida. Al-Itihad Islamic organization adopted this ideology in 1992 and accordingly confronted armed factions in many regions of Somalia ( Juba, Puntland and Gedo) 37 See the Transitional National Charter (TNC) adopted in 2000 in Arta, Djibouti. 38 Ibid. 39 Sparo is known as the road block used by the militias to control streets. Legio is the money collected from the people as taxation of the militias. 36

so, they never consulted legitimate leaders of their clans. Sometime, they even punish legitimate leaders who refuse to conform some of their policies and actions. Often, these warlords created new loyalist elders of the clan and demoted legitimate elders by splitting sub-clans or diya-paying groups and marginalizing the legitimate clan leaders. They have mastered how to manipulate clan sentiments and as a result, received the support of the uneducated youth recruited to their armed militia. They also received financial support from the business men and women of the clan who considered them as protectors of clan political interest and grantors of security, dignity and prestige. Moreover, in more than 10 years (1991-2000), these warlords succeeded to hijack national agenda representing their clans in the failed reconciliation conferences and were accepted as such by the international community. In the last Reconciliation Conference in Kenya (2003-2004), these warlords were erroneously privileged to select members of the Transitional Federal Parliament. Consequently, the whole Impagathi reconciliation process was deceptive and forgery of the national political agenda. This process remains in the historical records as a hallmark of shame for those who coached and offered legitimacy. Moreover, in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000, new traditional elders appeared to the scene claiming that they represent their clans. These new traditional elders were created during the conference to represent their clans in the selection process of the members of the parliament. Some clans claimed new identity and affiliation to new clan groups by joining alliance or the cluster of so called minority clans. This new rearrangement gave them more members in the parliament unattainable if they had stayed in their traditional clan groups. From this conference, the new political vocabulary of “Duub Carte” meaning traditional elder of Arta had appeared. Furthermore, in March 2007, Hawiye Elders Committee appeared to political arena in Mogadishu articulating what is termed as “Hawiye Political Agenda and

grievances”. They expressed opposition to the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian military intervention. Often, these elders seemingly represented political agenda of the opposition groups. The leader of this group was Haji Abdi Imam, a brother of Imam of Abgal sub-clan, Imam Mohamud Imam Omar. The group claimed that they represent Hawiye clan interest and the international community had dealt with them as such.40 In reality, however, they were not the legitimate traditional leaders of Hawiye nor were elected as such by any Hawiye clan conference. They were self-appointed group claiming to speak in the name Hawiye clan-lineage. Later, the group had splintered into two factions and each faction claimed that their group represent legitimacy of the group. One of the splinter group joined the National Reconciliation Congress while the other group remained in the opposition. The formation of this politically motivated group in the name Hawiye is part of the continuous and illegitimate use of the clan names as the warlords did earlier. Three above examples shows how clan system and authority broke down and how its fragility is exploited by the political elites. The same phenomena occur in

the

all

regions

of

Somalia

including

“Puntland”

and

“Somaliland”.

Notwithstanding the natural erosion and breakdown of the clan system by splinting into smaller groups mostly without any new social contract between the clans, the illegitimate use of the clan name is indicative to the breakdown of the traditional authority. And, manipulation and contra manipulation of clan system by the political elites and their continuous forgery of the social reality remains one of the biggest challenges in Somalia. 4.2 Literature Review: Many scholars have written about the origins, processes, types and different management approaches of the Somali conflict. For the purposes of this paper, three scholars stand out of the crowd: Bradbury, On March 22, a day after the newel of fighting in Mogadishu, Hawiye Elders Committee was publicly announced. Ethiopian officers and international community were negotiating with the group for cease firing and other issue concerning reconciliations processes. See www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_leaders_Ethiopian_commanders_ meet_with_Hawiye_elders_printer.shtml. 40

Samatar and Clark and in all perspectives, the role of the clan, and/or the kinship system is mentioned. For example, Bradbury argues that there is no single factor, which can explain the causes of the Somali civil war. 41 He, however, points out that the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali kinship system, contradictions between a centralised state and a pastoral culture, Cold War politics, militarization and uneven development, ecological decline, lack of power-sharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulative impact of decades of armed conflicts have all contributed. Bradbury further argues that the common use of ‘anarchy’ and ‘madness’ to describe the war and state of disintegration in Somalia, demonstrates an ignorance of Somali society and the nature of the civil war, by the outsiders. To him, this ignorance was evident in the massively expensive and controversial UN military intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s. Samatar, on the other hand, argues that the Somali society was torn apart because their blood ties without the Xeer,42 was manipulated by the elite so as to gain or retain access to resources.43 He traces the conflict to two major historical benchmarks in the evolution of Somalia: the commercialisation of the subsistence economy; the imposition of a colonial structure and the creation of post-pastoral democratic nodes of power. While Samatar agrees with other analysts that it was the unseating of President Siyad Barre that finally pulled the trigger that sparked off the Somali conflict, he comes up with two components which should be part of the task to restructure Somalia if it is to come back to normal: the creation of an economy in which productive investments; and crafting political order which is accountable, representative and entrepreneurial, and which does not allow for the personal appropriation of public resources. Clark, on the other hand, takes a different stand and links the problem of the See Bradbury, Mark Somaliland Country Report (Totton: Hobbs Printer Ltd., 1997), p.1. Xeer is the Somali traditional or customary law, which is more of social conventions/contracts. It serves very important roles in managing not only social life but also present day Somali politics in this new era of statelessness an anarchy. 43 See for example Samatar, A., Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil, Minority rights Group, London, 1991. 41 42

Somali people partly to the nature of their social and political organization, which is based on a decentralized culture.44 The above summary of the literature reviewed shows the centrality of the clan system and its significance in the conflict and attempts to manage. 4.3. The Somali Clan System: History vs. Reality As much of the contemporary conflict in Somalia can only be understood in the context of its history, historical claims and grievances by most Somali clans and sub-clans play an important and powerful role in the current political debates in Somalia. Also, although the interpretation and misinterpretation of Somali history is itself a contentious political issue due to its clan-based nature, it is important to carefully examine the significance and/or implication of the clan system in the Somali conflict and its management. There are a number of issues that need to be looked at: 1) the historical fact that the movement by Somali clans is a major source of production and dominance of the Somali culture, lineage identity and adherence to Islam throughout the Eastern Horn of Africa; 2) that the history of pre-colonial Somali migration shows the scattered nature of clan settlement throughout Somalia;45 3) that Somalia was a stateless society except for very few exceptions. As Roland argues like most broad generalizations, this one merits qualification. Some parts of Somalia did at different points in history sustain Sultanates and quasi-state polities.46 Customary law and/or Xeer47 evolved to manage relations within and among Somali clans, sub-clans and sub sub-clans. It is also still one of the few conflict management elements that survived to the present day. See Clark, J. “Debacle in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs Vol.72, No.1, pp.109-123. A good example for this is the Ogaden/Darod sub-clan members who are also found in Ogaden, Ethiopia; southern Somalia and Kenya’s northeastern region. 46 See for example Roland Marchal, “A Few Provocative Remarks on Governance in Somalia,” Nairobi, UNDOS Discussion Paper, November 1997; See also Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1982). 47 Throughout Somalia, a combination of Islamic Sharia law, customary law and the pre-1991 penal code is widely used. 44 45

Historically, there was a decentralized political authority vested in the community elders and clan leaders who had to negotiate disputes and conflicts with other community elders and clan leaders by relying on customary law. There was also the diya system or blood compensation, which was part of the Xeer but mainly derived from the Islamic Sharia law.48 Generally, the Somali customary law, Xeer, and the diya system helped prevent not only communal conflicts and criminality but also served and contained lawlessness in precolonial Somalia. To-date, however, the 4.5 clan distribution formula took over the place and the role of the clan. In other words, everything is to be done according to the famous 4.5 clan system: from recruitment; to political powersharing to cooperatives in wealth creation. Although it is meant to safeguard the interests of the group at any one time, it is making a very negative contribution to the historical cycles of Somalia at such a critical time. Despite the fact that this has been the fruits of the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti, it has nonetheless been very useful during the process.49 It, however, left a bad legacy: one of exclusion; misrepresentation; and nepotism. It was also explained within the confines of Somali politics. In real terms, today’s Somalia is ‘no man’s’ land. One can see an internationallyrespected but impotent Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) that lacks total control of the country. Islamic insurgencies with some support from Hawiye clan continue to fight against TFG and its Ethiopian supporters. In addition to that, ‘Somaliland,’ claims to have seceded from the rest of the country while ‘Puntland,’ which used to claim that it was an autonomous regional state waiting for a future federal government to share power with, is yet to be brought onboard. Instead, the ‘Puntland’ administration is dealing with the Diya system or blood compensation was negotiated and members of the group that committed the crime had to pay what was agreed with the other group. In Islamic Sharia law, the diya is 100 camels for men and 50 for women. This is paid to the aggrieved clan as compensation. Presently, due to the Somali customary law Xeer, clans pay whatever they agree. This also becomes another binding Xeer when the same is done to any of their members. 49 For example, it created the concept of the Somali 6th clan: the Somali women. 48

outside world, printing new Somali currency notes and working on oil exploration. There is a clan dispute over Kismayu where each and every Somali clan claims at least partial ownership. While the Digil-Mirifle clan is yet to fully reconcile, there is a rift emerging in Beletweyne over the administration of Hiran region. In all the above fragile social relations the Somali people are divided over their religious groups’ affiliations: from traditional Sufist Ahl Sunna Wal Jama’ah; to Al Ittihad Al Islami; to Al Islah and so on. The same differences and wrong perceptions exist among the Somali clans. For example, Somali politics is widely believed to be between the Hawiye and Darod while, interestingly enough, the rest are marginalized and are helplessly watching from afar. 5. Conclusions The paper offered a brief background of the state versus the clan system and Islamic work in Somalia. It examined the disintegration of the clan system and explored the chaotic situation of the Islamic work and the misuse of the legal fatwa. The paper finally provided some suggestions for the reordering of the clan system and the reorganization of the work of Somali Islamic institutions. For example, from the above brief literature survey, the kinship system argued by Bradbury; the traditional Xeer by Samatar; and the social and political organization by Clark all point out to the fact that the clan played an important role in conflict prevention and/or management from pre-Colonial Somalia. This also witnesses that Somalia’s long history of migration, conquest and assimilation, coupled with the colonially imported ‘nation-state’ system, has made a serious impact upon the social, and in this case the clan system, the political and administrative health of the nation; so much so, that conflict has become almost a recognized part of daily life. It is also true to say that the rootless ‘pastoralist’ nature of the majority of the Somali people has even further exacerbated the already difficult situation. A pertinent illustration of this premise lies in the work of two Africanist scholars, Richard Burton and Ian Lewis, both of whom carried out extensive research on

Somalia. The conclusions they drew from their studies, though in apparent contradiction, clearly illustrate the contradictory and conflicting nature of the Somali psyche. Richard Burton characterized the Somali people as ‘fierce republicans’; Ian Lewis, meanwhile, dubbed them ‘pastoral democrats’. Both, perhaps, are correct. The fact that one cannot be a fierce ‘republican’ and a pastoral ‘democrat,’ at the same time, calls for a reordering of the clan system. This is based on the notion that the clan system is the root cause and/or trigger of the Somali conflict; and that it can be used positively and constructively to manage the conflict if carefully approached. The paper calls for a return to the positive use of the clan and/or kinship system; the traditional Xeer and the social and political organization Somalia and Somalis have had for long. Similarly, comprehensive reconciliation in Somalia could only be realized when the current clan conflicts are resolved; Somali Islamic institutions reorganized and state-society relations improved. This means that a holistic approach needs to be used in all the processes towards the achievement of this goal: for example bringing all Somali actors onboard from the TFIs, the opposition, civil society, the Somali Diaspora, and other regional administrations. However, reaching this goal demands reorganizing society without which the state is exposed to cyclical destabilization and collapse.50 In the last two decades, the role of Islam – particularly the misinterpretation given -- and the clan system, as the basis of Somali society, had been changing from being shared societal norms to a means for divisive political agenda. Thus, self appointed warlords were waging wars in the name of their clans and sub-clans while religious clerics were also engaged in Jihadist tendency toward the issuance of fatwas thus letting the country fall into a more serious trap especially in the absence of a

recognized

and

functional

Somali

government

with

weak

traditional

authorities and interested groups exploiting Islam and the clan system.

There is a possibility of cyclical collapse where weak state institutions (1960-1969) leads to a military takeover (1969-1990) and civil war (1990-2004), and back to the starting point of weak state. Current TFIs represent the beginning of instituting the weak state. 50

Religious extremism in Somalia is part and parcel and an extension of similar phenomena in other Muslim countries. Moreover, the current chaotic situation in the country is part of the civil war syndrome and lack of a visionary and responsible state authority. The plethora of literature produced about this worldwide phenomenon is too general for the Somali case. It was apparent that most Somalis do not comprehend the severity of extremism in their countries. Hence, the research and comprehension of the problem is highly needed. Although this paper attempted to raise the awareness of the problem, it does not aim to offer ready-made answers to the complex question: what are the major causes of religious extremism? Three major causes could be summarized as follows. There is a growing influence of the “takfir” doctrine in the society, a dangerous doctrine whose proponents judge other Muslims to be non-Muslim. There is also a prevalent illiteracy and strong emotional attachment to Islam in Somalia where superficiality in understanding Islam, strong emotional attachment, the failure of other solutions, and perpetuation of violence in the name of Islam projected in the media, all contributed to the nurturing of excessiveness towards Islam. And finally, there is absence of a credible Somali Islamic authority. Most of the Muslim countries have a national authority charged with Islamic affairs. This kind of authority could be vested on a Mufti and/or a consultative council who can interpret Islam and issue legal fatwa on any disputed matters.

Somalia

never had such a Mufti or a consultative council and this vacuum lets nonqualified clreics to decide on such sensitive matters and without proper authority from the Somali people whose behalf they issue fatwas. Finally, the question remains on why reconcile the state and society? First, the state is both artificial and it is imposed. Its nature, structure and functions are also alien to the culture of the Somali society and this led to state collapse; secondly the argument that the society can not live without a state no longer holds especially in the Somali case as the 17-year old absence of the Somali

state serves a good example; and finally any Somali state will not return nor will it be able to sustain without resolving its original conflict with its society. In other words, unless the Somali state becomes a state by the people and for the people, the chance of cyclic collapses is very high. The imperative of reconciliation between the state and society therefore lies on four key foundations: 1) promoting and abiding Islamic principles and values; 2) grassroots reconciliation between and among the Somalis; 3) attaining and sustaining of minimum level good governance; and 4) building on equality of all citizens with no reference to the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula anymore an no monopoly of religion by one group. From the above, the ultimate reconciliation of the state and society will be realized only when the roles of Islam and that of the clan system are well demarcated vis-à-vis the borders of the state, and when both the state and society respect these boundaries. References: Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Non-State Actors in the Failed State of Somalia: Survey of the Civil Society Organizations in Somalia during g the Civil War.” Darasaat Ifriqiyayyah. 31 (2004). Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia: History of Women’s Political Participation during four Decades (1959-2000).”African Renaissance. 4:1 (2007). Abdullahi, Abdurahman.

“Tribalism and Islam: The basics of Somaliness.”

Muddle Suzanne Liluis, ed. Variations on the theme of Somaliness. Finland: Centre of Continuing Education, Abo University, 2001.

Abdurahman M. Abdullahi. "Recovering the Somali State: The Islamist factor." A. Osman Farah, Mamo Mushie, and Joakim Gundel (edited). Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa. London: Adonis & Abby Publishers Ltd, 2007. Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Political Islam in Somalia.” Middle Eastern Affairs Journal. 1:3 (1993): 44-55. Ahmed Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil, Minority rights Group, London, 1991. Andre Le Sage, "Al-Islah in Somalia: An analysis of modern political Islam," unpublished manuscript. Clark, J. “Debacle in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs Vol.72, No.1, pp.109-123. Garner, Wilford, Political Science and Government (American Book Company, 1928). Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak states: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1988). Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1982). Mark Bradbury, Somaliland Country Report (Totton: Hobbs Printer Ltd., 1997). Paolo Contini, The Somali Republic: an Experiment in Legal Integration (London: Frank Cass & Company LTD., 1969).

Mohamed A. Enow. “Inclusive but Unequal: the enigma of the 14th SNRC and the Four point five (4.5) factor,” In Abdullahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Souare (edited). Somalia at the crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed State; (London: Adonis and Abby Publishers Ltd; 2007). Power and Interest News Reports Roland Marchal, “A Few Provocative Remarks on Governance in Somalia,” Nairobi, UNDOS Discussion Paper, November 1997. Roland Marchal, "Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war," in Alex de Waal (ed.), Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indiana University Press, 2004). The Somali Constitution, Mogadishu, 1960. Tracy Kuperus, Frameworks of State-Society Relations http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/s&ps/1994-su/s&pviii4/statesocietyrelations.html http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/society. www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_leaders_Ethiopi an_commanders_meet_with_Hawiye_elders_printer.shtml.