Pure Nihilism

Mogilevsky 1 Miriam Mogilevsky Mr. Ahrns AP US History 21 December 2007 Pure Nihilism “Pearl Harbor has now been partially avenged,” said Admiral Chester Nimitz after the Battle of Midway, in which the Unites States inflicted a crushing defeat on Japanese forces. For the U.S., World War II started and ended with two terrifying attacks – the first being Pearl Harbor; the second, the atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To some Americans, and much of the American government at the time, the first attack was unprovoked and monstrous, while the second was reasonable and rational as a strategy for war. However, historians, scientists, and laypeople have all challenged the Unites States’ actions against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They assert that the atomic bomb attack should not have been carried out for moral issues, that Japan was about to surrender anyway, and that the second bomb should not have been dropped. The ethics of dropping a bomb that will surely kill thousands of innocent civilians are difficult and complex. Over 180,000 people died from both atomic bomb attacks. Many were women, children, and the elderly – as well as men who had never personally taken any action against the United States. The Japanese citizens had no warning, and no real way to avoid the attack. Furthermore, even if they survived the explosion, many died years

Mogilevsky 2 later from radioactive fallout. The Japanese considered this an attack not only on their nation and people, but on God and humanity itself. As a Japanese newspaper put it, “This is not war; this is not even murder; this is pure nihilism.” They also felt that the Americans were being hypocritical because they had opposed Japan’s military actions against China, even though they certainly had not involved the instant annihilation of hundreds of thousands of citizens. Many Americans, too, opposed the attacks on moral grounds. The Christian Century, an American Protestant journal, claimed that “the use made of the atomic bomb has placed [the United States] in an indefensible moral position.” Such opponents of the bombing thought that, if demonstrating to Japan the power of the United States was really necessary, they could have simply dropped the bombs in Japan’s countryside, where few people would die, but the terrifying effects of the weapon could be witnessed nonetheless. Indeed, even simply explaining the bomb to the Japanese may have sufficed; after all, despite America’s warning that the Japanese faced “complete devastation” if they did not surrender, they did not know that the United States had nuclear weapons. In addition, historians have added more moral implications for the bombings by suggesting that Truman carried them out in order to coerce Stalin of the Soviet Union to cooperate with him. Clearly, killing hundreds of thousands of people in an act of war is one thing; killing them in order to attempt – unsuccessfully, at that – at passiveaggressive diplomacy with another nation is something different. Similarly, Truman may have decided to drop the nuclear bombs because he wanted to

Mogilevsky 3 prevent the Soviet Union from truly entering the war in the Pacific, because the entrance of the Soviets would also enable communism to gain a foothold in East Asia – an occurrence that Truman feared greatly due to his mistrust of communism. For these reasons, from a moral standpoint, the United States should not have dropped atomic bombs on Japan. Aside from issues o f ethics and humanity, critics have also pinpointed why the bombings were logistically unnecessary and excessive. After all, the battles of Leyte Gulf and Okinawa had left the Japanese military forces devastated and almost nonexistent. The Americans, of course, were completely aware of this – American battleships and bombers attacked Japanese industrial centers without any retaliation from the Japanese. Clearly, Japan could not inflict serious damage to the U.S. military, so a nuclear bombing could not be considered an attack of preemption. Also, at the time, factions within the Japanese government were struggling for control. Moderate leaders demanded peace at almost any cost (the one stipulation being that the emperor must remain in place). However, Japan’s military leaders refused to give up the fight. Furthermore, the United States refused to allow the emperor to remain (even though this decision was later reversed and the emperor remained on the throne), and many Japanese refused to surrender without this one compromise. The most reasonable course of action for the United States would have been to wait for the Japanese factions to finish debating, because they would almost certainly eventually agree to surrender, making the bombings obviously unnecessary.

Mogilevsky 4 The United States, too, had suffered from wartime disagreements between factions and parties before (such as the notable debates over neutrality preceding both world wars), and therefore must have recognized the situation for what it was. The possibility of attack was clearly not a factor – the United States had just decimated the Japanese military. Continuing the “war” for a few more weeks surely would not have cost a large amount of money or American lives. Therefore, the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki should not have been carried out because they were unnecessary. A final argument against the United States’ attack on Japan is that it should have dropped one bomb, not two. After all, if the purpose of the attack was to frighten Japan with America’s power and convince it to surrender, would just one bomb not showcase the superior military achievements of the U.S. just the same? Furthermore, after the dropping of the first bomb, the people of Japan were stunned, just like Americans were after Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had not anticipated this attack and had never dealt with such a disaster before. However, just a few days later, the Soviet Union declared war on them, given them a second front to consider. The United States expected an immediate surrender, but the government of Japan was still trying to come to a final decision. However, the United States gave them almost no time at all – only three days – and dropped a second bomb on Nagasaki. Numerous historians have argued that, even if Japan would not have surrendered before the attacks, it would certainly have capitulated after the first one. Therefore, dropping just one atomic bomb

Mogilevsky 5 would have achieved the same results but saved the lives of 80,000 Japanese citizens. Among numerous criticisms of the United States’ controversial decision to bomb Japan with nuclear weapons, the prominent ones question the morality, necessity, and extent of the attack. Americans and Japanese alike deplored this inhumane and brutal treatment of innocent Japanese citizens and cities. Historians have questioned the decision on a tactical basis, due to evidence that the Japanese government was working towards a decision to surrender, and did not have the military strength to cause any true damage to U.S. forces. Even many of those who supported attacking Japan with nuclear weapons criticized the decision to drop a second bomb. In all, this controversial decision by the United States ended World War II, altered the course of the rest of the 20th century, and introduced significant complications to the techniques and ethics of war. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the only two nuclear attacks in history – and for good reason. To guard the people of the world against the dangers of increasingly effective military technology, we must understand why the nuclear attacks on Japan were so immoral and terrifying – and why they must never be repeated.

Mogilevsky 6 Works Cited Brinkley, Alan. American History: a Survey. McGraw-Hill, 2007. David, Kennedy M., and Thomas A. Bailey. The American Spirit: Since 1865. 9th ed. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998.