Priest - The Mission (2004) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: September 6, 2004, 7:00 p.m. Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 2004). Introduction: Pax Americana. Gen. Anthony Zinni visits embattled Yasir Arafat in Ramallah in April 2002 (11-12). Zinni: “No military solution to terrorism” (11). “Yet U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic. This has become the American military’s mission and it has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate. Vanquishing terrorism is the latest example” (11). “New unilateralists” in the Defense Department (12). U.S. military “unmatched by factors of ten” (13). Political and economic role “de facto”: “The military simply filled a vacuum left by an indecisive White House, an atrophied State Department, and a distracted Congress. . . . But “decision-makers understand less and less about their military” (14). Women in Vitina, Kosovo, press bill of rights on U.S. infantry officer in Nov. 2001 (14-16). CinCs (16-17). Special forces (=Special Operations Forces) (17-18). Mismatch of military culture and new mission (18-19). Methodology: 1998-2002 research; 18month leave from Washington Post; visits to 13 countries with 4 CinCs; visited special forces teams in Colombia, Nigeria, Kosovo, & Afghanistan, U.S. Army Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, NC, and 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Campbell, KY; special research on 82nd Airborne Division in Vitina, Kosovo. Ch. 1: A Different Kind of World. Rumsfeld shakes up military, rejects “military engagement” supported by Generals Shelton, Zinni, and Franks (2134). 9/11 (34-37). “Rumsfeld’s campaign to rein in the armed forces” ends abruptly on Sept. 11 (38-40).

Ch. 2: The Rise of the American Military. Clinton reaches modus vivendi with military tasked with new responsibilities (41-49). Sec. of State Madeleine Albright (51-54). Gen. John Shalikashvili (54-57). THE COMMANDERS Ch. 3: The CinCs: Proconsuls to the Empire. Zinni in Vietnam (61-65). Role in post-Gulf War Kurdish relief mission (65-66). CinC Central Command (66-69). Youth, values (69-70). Regional CinCs as power centers (71-77). Biannual redrawing of CinCdoms (73). Staff, intellectual centers, training and educational programs, intelligence centers (74-76). Travel, communications, aides-de-camp (76-77). Ch. 4: The Royal CinCdoms of the Persian Gulf. Gulf states: “The United States hired out its military as a regional mercenary force for Arab rulers who could not raise their own armies. . . . no coherent strategy” (78-79). U.S. Middle East policy (82-85). “Central Command” (83). Permanent troop presence in Kuwait disguised as “exercise” (84). Vinnell Corp. (85). Zinni’s visit in May 1998 with Senator Ted Stevens, chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, to Saudi defense minister, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz [one of the “Sudairi Seven,” the seven sons of the favored wife of Abdul Aziz (a.k.a. Ibn Saud, the king and founder of modern Saudi Arabia), father of Bandar Bush, a passenger in the space shuttle Discovery in 1985, heard from and gave Osama bin Laden the impression he had accepted (though he did not) a proposal to wage jihad against Saddam Hussein after invasion of Kuwait in 1990, alleged to have funded several Islamic charities that provided al-Qaeda

at least $6 million acc. to Craig Unger’s House of Bush, House of Saud (2004)]: “Come! Please. Sit with me. You are my shield!” (85-86) Zinni’s view of Saudi Arabia as benevolent monarchy (87-89). Confused lines of authority in U.S. policymaking (89-91). Problem of military organization and service rivalries (91-95). Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 (95-96). Cheney, Aspin, Perry, Cohen as secretaries of defense (96-98). Ch. 5: The Invisible Front Line of Central Asia. Zinni promotes engagement with the “‘stans’ of Central Asia” ― Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (99-104). Oil reserves; terrorism (105-08). Human rights; debate whether to engage or to isolate authoritarian regimes (108-09). Pakistan (109-14). Sanctioned, but “the Pentagon found a quiet way to maintain relations . . . By 1993, Special Operations Command had essentially created its own separate foreign policy track” (11011). After Musharraf’s coup and Clinton’s protest, Musharraf calls Zinni (112-13). CinCs’ overseas “engagement programs” hidden from Congress (114-15). Zinni: “We [CinCs] already have [political authority]” (115). Fourteen-day May 2000 visit to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan (115-17). Zinni finds lack of U.S. “leadership” (117-18). THE SPECIAL FORCES Ch. 6: Inside the Wire with Special Forces. Visit to Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo in Nov. 2001 (121-22). Special forces culture (122-23). Rick Turcotte, Team 055 sergeant (123-25). Army organization: A-team (10-12 men), Operational Detachment Bravo (5 Ateams & HQ), Operational Detachment Charlie (3 Bravos & HQ), Special Forces Groups or SFGs (3 Charlies + support group company + HQ = approx. 1,380 men); also, there are Operational Detachment Delta, the covert “Delta

Force” units (126). 1st SFG works in Pacific Command [its 2nd & 3rd battalions are based at Fort Lewis], 3rd SFG in Africa exc. Eastern Horn, 5th SFG in Central Command, 7th SFG in Central and S. America, 10th SFG in Central & E. Europe, Balkans, Turkey, Israel, & Lebanon, and 19th & 20th SFGs are reserve groups (126). SFGs are staffed and trained under U.S. Army Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg, but are deployed as assets of regional CinCs (126). Navy (SEAL units) and Air Force also have specialized special forces units; together, all SF units are called Special Operations Forces (SOF); the Marines, exempt from the 1986 legislation that created U.S. Special Operations Command, maintain “forward-deployed Special Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Units” (127). Training and mission (127-29). Alpha-male culture (129-35). Origins of special forces; Vietnam (135-38). Delta Force (138-39). Nunn-Cohen amendment to 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act elevated special operations to its own joint command (139). SOFs are now “the unofficial fifth service,” with a classified budget, civilian oversight conducted by an asst. secretary of defense, and self-determined force structure, funding requirements, equipment procurement, training, and deployment (139). Panama, Gulf War, Somalia (139-40). Ch. 7: A-Teams in Afghanistan. Account of Team 555 of Army’s 5th SFG in Afghanistan. Rendez-vous with “Hal” and “Phil,” CIA paramilitary operatives (142, 148-49). “UW,” or unconventional warfare (154-55). “Terminology game” permits civilian targeting (155-58; 163). TSC-93 satellite terminal (159). Technology supporting warfare distinguished from technology of warfare by 1st Sgt. Mike Murray (160). Team 595’s sergeant: “The problem we have as soldiers is we don’t make policy” (161). Unity-of-command doctrine controverted (165). Team 574; bombing

error (168-71). Team 532 builds an army for Jeff Naderi/Sayyed Jaffar, then become embroiled in local political struggle (171-74). Ch. 8: Below the Radar in Nigeria. SF training project (delivered by a Russian helicopter owned by a joint U.S.-Russian charter company [175,188]) leads to anti-American violence after Sept. 11 (175-78). Operation Focus Relief (179). Theme of book: “Using the American military to address global problems had become almost a reflex in Washington. But even the best U.S. troops could deal only with the symptoms, not the causes, of incipient problems. Military programs did little to help political systems move from dictatorship to democracy, or economies from government control to free market” (179). “The two CinCs who divided Africa” ― Zinni & Wesley Clark ― debate “engagement” in the Ritz-Carlton in the Pentagon City mall in Nov. 1998 (180-81). Corruption in Nigeria (182-83). Nigerians want weapons and planes, not training (183-85). Nigerians resist complying with Leahy amendment requiring vetting of foreign soldiers receiving training (185-86). 3rd SFG has done training in 26 African countries; soldiers as diplomats (187). Benue massacre: “human nature in its rawest form . . . man’s evil soul,” says an SF major (188-89). Training at the Serti camp (190-92). Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone (192-94). Ch. 9: Gambling with Green Berets in Columbia. Background (195-203). Military assistance limited to Fighting drug trafficking (203-12). Training exercise (212-14). Ch. 10: The Indonesian Handshake. The Indonesian military (TNI) (216-17). East Timor atrocities lead Congress to ban Indonesia from Int’l Military Education and Training (IMET) program (217-18). Indonesia “a case study in how persistent CinCs in the Pacific, and their

supporters in the Pentagon, worked around congressional and State Department roadblocks to maintain military ties (218-19). Commander Subianto Prabowo of Kopassus (Indonesian special forces) (219-22). Military uses Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program to evade Congressional restrictions (222-24). Abuses lead to suspension of JCET in May 1998 (224-5). Adm. Dennis Blair as CinC in the Pacific vs. Ambassador Robert Gelbard (226-42). Resumed military relations (242-43). THE CINC

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HIS SOLDIERS

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KOSOVO

Ch. 11: Force Trumps Diplomacy in the Balkans. Gen. Wesley Clark’s advocacy of war intervention in Kosovo (248-50). Clark’s background (250-52). SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) post (252-54). Defining the military’s role (255-57). Clark advocates aggressive, improvisational post-war practices (257-64). Clark’s conduct of the war (265-74). Ch. 12: Waging Peace in Kosovo. Restrictions on Apache helicopters followed by limits on peacekeepers (27579). Peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (279-83). Frustration at lack of clear mission (283-91). Ch. 13: Drita’s Kosovo. Drita Perezic, Albanian-American from Staten Island hired as a translator in Kosovo war (292302). “The growing civilian-military gap” (298-99). Cultural difference and prejudice (300-02). Ch. 14: Ellerbe’s 82nd Airborne Division. Lt. Col. Michael Ellerbe (30305). 82nd Airborne mystique (305-06). Command Sgt. Maj. Kalinofski indoctrinates recruits from the environment (civilian world) (306-08). Ellerbe’s optimism (308-11). Kidnapping of two Serbian teachers (311-12). Ellerbe determined to investigate (312-15). Brig.

Gen. Craig Peterson studying crime networks, encourages Ellerbe’s research (315-19). Ch. 15: Vitina and the New Mafia. “Criminal” element in Vitina includes Albanian MRP members (320-21). Capt. Kevin Lambert placed in charge by Ellerbe (321-25). Italian carabinieri form MSU crime-tracking unit (325-26). Some army units cultivating MRP (326-27). Platoon leaders Donnelly and Serafini (327-28). Ellerbe’s aims jive with Gen. Ricardo Sanchez’s (328-29). Donnelly and Serafini investigate murder (329-34). Staff Sgt. Frank Ronghi, obsequious and vicious, leads squad that roughs up civilians (334-36). Serafini, Ronghi, and SSgt. William Langham beat up suspect (336-37). Donnelly and Serafini closure of café leads to seizure of KLA founding member Xhavit Hasani and Heset Baftjari (338-42). Ch. 16: Dishonoring Merita. 11-yearold Merita Shabiu raped and murdered by Frank Ronghi (343-45). He and Pfc. Stegemoller bury body (345-47). Stegemoller turns in Ronghi (348-49). Repercussions (350-52). Ellerbe’s effort to pacify Mitrovica, where Serb-Albanian violence has broken out, leads to a riot (352-59). Failure due to a lack of “a clear and reasonable peacekeeping doctrine that could be taught” (360). Lambert and Ellerbe reprimanded (360-61). Hasani’s rendition to Macedonia provokes crisis; Hasani released (361-62). Merita’s funeral paid for and her family given $5000, but her family falls into destitution (362). Ronghi in disciplinary

barracks at Fort Leavenworth (362). Army investigatory report (363-64). Ellerbe, Lambert, Serafini, and Donnelly later promoted (364). Army abandons its offensive against “the political-criminal axis that has come to control Kosovo, a dishonor to Merita’s memory” (364). Ch. 17: Vitina, One Year Later. Army major in charge of public affairs office doesn’t recognize national flag of Albania (367). Capt. Darrell Driver evicts squatters from town drunk’s brother’s house (368-84). Afterword: The Mission. “Postwar Afghanistan was postwar Kosovo times ten” (385). Bagram Air Base (386-87). “Miniscule American postwar reconstruction effort outside Kabul”; Maj. Brian Cole (387-88). Lack of security (389). Former CinCs astonished and disgusted (390). U.S. has no effective reconstruction corps; compared to the Marshall Plan, triumph of rhetoric over reality (390-92). Local warlord’s plea: “You promised many things for Afghanistan and we want you to keep your promise” (394). List of Interviews. Approx. 200 interviewees. Acknowledgments. Washington Post; John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; Jennings Randolph fellowship program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Notes. 8 pages. Index. 23 pages; fairly useful.