UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: August 23, 2004, 7:00 p.m. David Ray Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11 (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2004). Acknowledgments. Debt to work of Nafeez Ahmed, Paul Thompson, Thierry Meyssan, and Michel Chossudokovsky, and to Richard Falk, “my main discussion partner about these matters” (vi). Foreward by Richard Falk. This book depicts “a profound crisis of legitimacy for the most powerful sovereign state in the history of the world” (vii). Griffin makes “an overwhelming argument for a comprehensive, unhampered, fully funded, and suitably prominent investigation of the entire story of how and why 9/11 happened” (vii). Forces opposing this: “patrioteering” and “denial” (ix). Introduction. The press has failed to provide an “in-depth investigation of whether the official account of what happened fits with the available evidence and is otherwise plausible,” (xiii) the government having “consecrated” [Meyssan] its version of events at the National Cathedral on Sept. 14, 2001 (xv). Even “the left” has abjured complicity theories (xvi); but “we should . . . avoid a too strong dichotomy between structural and conspiratorial analysis. . . . [S]tructures, as such, being abstractions, do not enact themselves. They are influential only insofar as they are embodied in agents – both individual and institutional – who act in terms of them. These agents . . . have degrees of freedom. . . . Finally, and most important, the exposure of a conspiracy may, rather than diverting attention from a society’s problematic structures, turn attention to them” (171 n.25). How Griffin came to write the book (xviii-xix). Eight degrees of complicity defined: (1) false account; (2) something expected by agencies; (3) specifics known by agencies; (4) agencies involved in planning; (5)
Pentagon involved in planning; (6) something expected by White House; (7) specifics known by White House; (8) White House involved in planning (xxixxii). “I have found . . . that the revisionists have made a strong prima facie case for at least some version of the charge of official complicity” (xxiii). Evidence not verified by author. A cumulative, not deductive, argument (xxiv). Note on “conspiracy theories”: “We cannot . . . divide people into those who accept conspiracy theories and those who reject them” (xxiv). In this case, all versions are conspiracy theories (xv). Purpose of book: “merely to summarize what seem to be the strongest reasons that have been given for considering the official account to be false (so as to show the need for a full investigation to find out what really happened)” (176 n.32). Part One: The Events of 9/11 Ch. 1: Flights 11 and 175. American Airlines Flight 11 (3-7). United Airlines Flight 175 (7-8). Different stories about when jets were scrambled. Weren’t “stand down” orders necessary for a plane to crash into the World Trade Center? (11) WTC buildings collapse (12). Fire temperatures; melting steel impossible (13). Weakening? (14) No steel-framed building had ever before collapsed from fire (15). Controlled demolition theory (17). Pulverized concrete; dust (18). WTC-7 (20-22). Ch. 2: Flight 77. Assertion it hit Pentagon generally accepted “sometime in the afternoon” (26). ID made “gradually”; military & Ted Olson (27). Impact made 15’ x 18’ hole in Pentagon’s west wall (29). What about the wings and tail? (30) Wrong kind of fire (red
flame) (31). Ed Plaugher, Fire Chief, on 9/12, and Terry Mitchell on 9/15: only “small pieces” (33). Second version emerges in April 2002: pieces of fuselage, wings, landing gear, seats, engine recovered (34). Reported sighting dissolve under scrutiny (36-38). Eastman’s two-aircraft hypothesis (39). West wing site caused least possible damage to Pentagon (40). Alleged pilot’s incompetence (41). Standard operating procedures (42-45). No evacuation of Pentagon (45). Official reaction: recriminations (45-46). Evidence from first three flights demonstrates either incredible incompetence or criminal complicity (47).
(85). Questions about identities of hijackers (85-87).
Ch. 3: Flight 93. Thompsen believes plane downed because passengers were gaining control (50). Sounds; physical evidence (52). No general evacuation of White House begun till 9:45 a.m. (54).
Ch. 8: Did U.S. officials block captures and investigations after 9/11? Reports that al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, were allowed to escape (105-08). Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence (ISI) as CIA-alQaeda link (108-14). Atta received money from Saeed Sheikh at the instruction of Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad, the Director of the ISI (109-10). Murder of Daniel Pearl (115-16). Reports that hijackers received flight training at U.S. military installations (118-19). Quick release of Omar al-Bayoumi, who helped two hijackers in L.A. (119-20). Six hijackers spent weeks before 9/11 living in Laurel, MD, near NSA headquarters (120). Moussaoui case’s later developments (120-22). Promotions and absence of reprimands for those in positions of responsibility (122).
Ch. 4: President’s Behavior. When did president’s entourage know? (58). Bush dawdles in classroom (61). Bush later said he “saw an airplane hit the tower” before entering the classroom” – how is this possible? (62-64). Part Two: The Larger Context Ch. 5: Did U.S. officials have advance info? Hijacked aircraft as weapons were foreseen; Project Bojinka (68). Warnings (70). Stock market: put options (71-72). Ch. 6: Did U.S. officials obstruct investigations prior to 9/11? Knowledge of bin Laden not acted on (76). Bin Laden in American hospital in Dubai? (76-77) Connections to Saudis (77-79). Ken Williams, FBI, Phoenix (80). Zacarias Moussaoui case (80-82). Robert Wright, FBI, Chicago (82). Investigation request on Khalid Almihdhar in NY turned down 8/28/01 (83). Sibel Edmonds case (83-84). David Schippers (84-85). Visa & watch list violations of hijackers ignored
Ch. 7: Did U.S. officials have reasons for allowing 9/11? Plans for war in Afghanistan (89-92). Plans for war in Iraq (92-95). Central Asia and space as strategic concerns (95-96). “Full Spectrum Dominance” as goal (96-100). “The three men who have been most identified with advocacy of the US Space Force are also the three figures who would have been most directly involved in promulgating and overseeing a ‘stand down’ order on 9/11, if such was given” (100). Operation Northwoods as 1962 precedent (101-03).
Part Three: Conclusion Ch. 9: Is complicity of U.S. officials the best explanation for 9/11? Intelligence agencies, military, Space Force increased budgets (127-28). Bush administration’s popularity grew (12829). World’s resistance to imperial U.S. policies reduced (129-30). Talk of “opportunities” (130). Summary of evidence for complicity: 24 points (132-
34). Difficulties for complicity theory (135-38). There are really two competing “incompetence” theories (138). Usefulness of a “big lie” (138-39). “But the truth may be that they really were terribly incompetent” (140). Problems of the alternative “coincidence” theory (141-45). It “requires even greater credulity” (145). “My book is an attempt to show that [Thierry Meyssan] and others have [clarified the dire need for an in-depth investigation into the events of 9/11]” (146).
fail “even to raise the question” of complicity (156). Recent events. Meacher’s Sept. 2003 Guardian article (156-58). Sept. 29, 2003 Wall Street Journal article on German belief in complicity (158-59). Michael Moore’s Dude, Where’s My Country? (159-60). Krauthammer “disciplines” Dean in Dec. 2003 (161-62). Cynthia McKinney’s statements distorted by the press (16264). Ellen Mariani’s complaint (164-66). 9/11 Commission’s difficulties (166-67). John Buchanan’s “truth candidacy” (168).
Ch. 10: The need for a full investigation. Joint Inquiry of House and Senate Intelligence Committees “apparently simply assumed from the outset that no deliberate complicity was involved” (147). Also: lack of resources; intimidation; allowing suspects to decide limits of investigation (148-49). The 9/11 Independent Commission: little money; short; obstacles; decision not to assess blame but to look toward the future (149-51). Difficulties in the conduct of the commission’s work: obstacles; prejudices; conflicts of interest (152-55). Possibility the commission may
Frequently Cited Works Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq. The War on Freedom (2002). Chossudovsky, Michel. War and Globalization (2002). Meyssan, Thierry. 9/11: The Big Lie (2002). ________. Pentagate (2002). Thompson, Paul, “September 11: Minuteby-Minute,” www.cooperativeresearch.org. ________. “Was 9/11 Allowed to Happen? The Complete Timeline,” www.cooperativeresearch.org