Pollack - The Persian Puzzle (2004) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper: June 19, 2006, 7:00 p.m. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004). “My principal goal is to discuss U.S.Iranian relations, how they have been shaped by their history, and ultimately how best to treat them in the years ahead” (427). Much of the book seems to have been written in the late summer and early fall of 2004. Published in November 2004.

“step[ping] in” at the demand of “both sides” (57-58). Mossadeq portrayed as eccentric, unreliable, xenophobic (58-60). Mossadeq’s political maneuvering characterized as “effectively overthrow[ing] the shah” (60-62). 1953 coup framed as a “countercoup” (63-67). Legacy of the coup (67-71).

Tough-minded policy analyst, combines liberal & realist approaches to international affairs.

Ch. 4: The Last Shah. The Shah after the 1953 coup; the U.S. has only good intentions.

Foreword. By Strobe Talbott. President of the Brookings Institution praises Pollack’s “impeccable sense of timing” (ix). “[S]huns simple answers . . . offers a diplomatic way forward” (x).

Ch. 5: Come the Revolution. Revolution ascribed to a combination of circumstances: oil boom, U.S. “Twin Pillars” of Gulf Security according to the Nixon Doctrine of relying on proxy states, “malfunctioning” economy, urbanization, bazaari discontent, resentment at SAVAK (“‘only’ thousands” of deaths [116]), and regime isolation (101-17). Mullahs antagonized (117-19). Carter created the impression he had provoked liberalization, then seemed to betray Iranians (120-27). Attack on Khomeini in the press sets of riots; 40-day cycle of arba’een (memorial services for the dead) (127-31). U.S.’s & Shah’s perspectives (132-35). Causes of the revolution: Pollack says they are indeterminate, yet asserts: “The shah brought the Iranian Revolution on himself” (137). Denies the U.S. had the upper hand; improbably claims it was in “a subordinate position” to Iran (138); equally improbably, claims “no evidence has ever been produced that the United States directly aided SAVAK. . . . Ultimately, the United States was not culpable in the crimes committed by the shah’s regime against the Iranian people; we were simply indifferent to them” (139; note that Pollack does not deny the claim per se). Accepts “a portion of the blame” (140).

List of Maps. Iran; Ancient Persia; Iraqi Invasion of Iran, 1980; Iran’s counteroffensives, 1981-1982; Iranian offensives, 1986-1987; Iraqi offensives vs. Iran, 1988. Introduction: The Persistence of Memory. Importance of history (xix-xx). “. . . I don’t think the United States ‘needs’ Iran”; a non-apologetic tone (xxxxii). The present moment (xxii-xxiii). Sec. of State Madeleine Albright’s apology and Supreme Leader Khamenei’s response, March 2000 (xxv-xxvi). Ch. 1: From Persepolis to the Pahlavis. History of Iran up to World War I (3-26). Ch. 2: Reza the Great. Reza Shah Pahlavi, modernizer (27-39). Ch. 3: The Ugly Americans. Aftermath of WWII (40-48). Background to crisis (48-53). Oil nationalization framed as unreason on both sides (5357). U.S. portrayed as regretfully

Ch. 6: America Held Hostage. Postrevolutionary institutions (149-52). The hostage crisis (153-80; “The hostage crisis has left a terrible scar on the American psyche. . . . few Americans have ever forgiven the Iranians for it. . . . We never discuss it openly, but the residual anger . . . has colored every decision made about Iran ever since” [172]; but there was nothing, really that the U.S. could have done better [179]). Ch. 7: At War with the World. IranIraq war (181-216; vigorous denial “that the United States colluded with Iraq on its invasion of Iran” [466 n.81]). Irancontra principally caused by Reagan’s concern for hostages (208-16). Ch. 8: The Imam’s Legacy. Account of end of Iran-Iraq war presents it as ‘vanquishing’ of Iran (217-31). Complacent account of Iran Air 655 disaster, shot down “in the heat of battle” (231-33), Under Reagan, Washington “dragged kicking and screaming” into “an undeclared war with the Iranians,” but the U.S.’s reluctance is proved by the fact that it could have dnoe “more more” to support Iraq (23335). Faqih strengthened (235-27). Rushdie affair used by Khomeini to overturn liberalizing trends (237-40). Khomenei drops Montazeri, reduces religious qualification for supreme leader (240-41). Khomeini-Khamenei transition, June 1989 (241-43). Ch. 9: Collision Course. Iraq overshadows Iran (244-49). Rafsanjani’s pragmatism (249-59). Dual Containment” (Iraq and Iran) policy of U.S.; EU “Critical Dialogue” policy toward Iran (259-65). “Increasingly rabid” confrontations between U.S. & Iran 19921996; May 6, 1995, sanctions block Conoco deal (265-73). Gingrich gets another $18m for U.S. covert action program to overthrow Iran’s government (273-77).

Ch. 10: To the Brink. Iran considers U.S. to have declared war on Iran (27880). Bahrain riots (280-81). Khobar Towrs bombed, Jun. 25, 1996, by Iranianbacked group (282-83). No response [Richard Clarke says U.S. made “chilling threat” (NY Times, Apr. 16, 2006)] (28385). D’Amato’s Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, Aug. 5, 1996 (286-89). Verdict in Germany in Apr. 1997 when Iran is linked to the Mykonos Restaurant murders in Berlin (290-92). Sudden turnabout in Iran’s behavior in mid-1997 (292-93). Reflections on “containment” policy; “Americans have an inherent dislike of containment (294-9 Ch. 11: The Ecstasy and the Agony. Khatami’s reformist presidency; U.S. overtures; “hard-liner” attacks in 1999; infighting; Khatami backs down on 6th day of rioting, July 1999 (303-41). Ch. 12: Coming Full Circle. Early Bush administration thinking on Iran (343-45; rejects term ‘neoconservative’ [485 n.4]. Considerable cooperation from Iran in Afghan war, including use of airfields (345-49). Israeli intercept on Jan. 3, 2002, of the Karine A: Iranian arms for Palestinians (350-52). “Axis of evil” (352-53). Iran “not unhelpful” in Iraq war (354-57). MEK and terrorism (358-61). Revelation of Iran’s nuclear program (363-66). “Ultimately, all Iran really had to do was play for time” (366-67). Internal divisions in Bush administration (368-69). Iran’s “China model”: political repression, social liberalization (369-72). Disqualification of reformists for Feb. 2004 elections; return to status quo ante (372-74). Ch. 13: Toward a New Iran Policy. Iran cannot be ignored (375-76). Iran’s rulers probably tractable (376-69). Review of policy options (379-82): Invasion rejected (382-86; cf. comments on “the willingness of the Iranian people to make sacrifices” [178]). Prospects for

a successful coup nil (386-89). Rejects preferred policy option of “the far Left and the far Right”—unilateral concessions (390-91). Calls military strike on Iran’s nuclear program “counterproliferation” and says it “actually has a surprisng amount to recommend it” and “should not be ruled out entirely”; it is very high-cost, highrisk, but “might be a very sensible option . . . might well be worth the payoff” if the U.S. had good intelligence (391-95; with respect to Pollack’s amoral attitude, cf. also his bland and unmoved account of Iraqi use of chemical weapons, with no allusion to the U.S.’s connection to them or the world’s lack of condemnation [19798 & passim]). Blames Iran for not being interested in a “Grand Bargain” (395400). Advocates “Triple Track” strategy, involving (1) holding out the prospect of “the Grand Bargain,” (2) real carrots & sticks, and (3) preparing for “a new containment regime” should the strategy fail (400-15). “We cannot help the Iranian people directly because of our long, painful history and their psychological scars, but we can play an indirect role” (416). A nuclear Iran “probably can be deterred” (416-22). “How to handle Iran and, in particular, its pursuit of nuclear weapons is a problem from Hell. There simply is no school solution” (422). “[A]nything the United States did would probably just make the situation worse” (423). The “Iran problem” illustrates the post-Cold War world, and also the U.S.’s central role in it (423). Author’s Note. Has studied Iran for 16 years. Epiphany that Iran is different from other countries came in 1989 when as CIA analyst he realized that Iranians were “arming to defend themselves against us” (426). Pollack’s longtime fascination with Iran frustrated by a need

to focus on Iraq. Has never been to Iran (visa requests denied); does not speak Farsi (426-27). Acknowledgements. Wife Andrea; research assts.; Shaul Bakhash; Mark Gasiorowski; Daniel Burmberg; Ray Takeyh; Gary Sick; ms. cleared by CIA & NSC; Martin Indyk, “my boss”; gave him “the opportunity to write this book” (431). Glib, effusive praise for all. Notes. 61 pp. Selected Bibliography. 46 govt. documents, 153 books, 443 articles or book chapters, 20 “miscellaneous”; 24 pp. All in English. Index. 21 pp. About the Author. [B.A., Yale, 1988; Ph.D., MIT, 1996 (became a “Middle East hand” and worked for CIA while a doctoral student).] Director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution [created in 2002 with a grant from L.A. financier Haim Saban; “the dynamics of the Iranian reformation” is one of four research interests specified at its founding]. Director for Gulf affairs at NSC, 1995-1996 & 1999-2001. Seven years as Persian Gulf military analyst for CIA. Author of The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (Random House, 2002; 528 pp.) and Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (U. of Nebraska Press, 2002; paperback 2004; 784 pp.). [Affirrmed that he was the unnamed U.S. government official known only as "USG0-1" in documents indicting Larry Franklin. Author of A Switch in Time: A New Strategy for Iraq (Brookings, 2006; 123 pp.)]