Poli Rev 1 Case Digest.docx

Javellana vs. Executive Exec On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-inChief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable. 2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. 3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people. 4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief. 5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force. HELD: 1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show. 2. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution. 3. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a

certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable." Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

PBA v. COMELEC FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the

Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.” The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.

Lansang v. Garcia Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were

filed

by

persons

(13)

who

have

been

arrested

without

a

warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually staging”. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues: 1. W/N the proclamation of Proclamation No. 889 is valid and effective. 2. W/N the president can suspend the writ of habeas corpus under the said proclamation. 3. W/N the petitioners herein belong to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended Held: 1. The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP. 2. Yes it is valid and such suspension is limited. The President could have declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith. 3. If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid — and We so hold it to be — and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing of a complaint or information against him does not affect the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his release may not be ordered by Us

AYTONA V. CASTILLO FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void. ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid. RULING: No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration.

He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

IN RE SATURINO BERMUDEZ Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows: Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...

Ruling: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the

government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government. B. Republic of the Phil as a State 1. Elements of a State; Def of a State

CIR v. CAMPOS RUEDA Maria Cerdiera is a Spanish national (Filipina married to a Spanish citizen), lived in Morocco and died there. In the Philippines, she left intangible properties. The person tasked as administrator of the intangible properties is Antonio Campos Rueda. He filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all properties left by her. The Collector of Internal Revenue, the respondent, pending the investigation of the tax value of the properties, issued an assessment for estate tax worth P111,592.48 and inheritance tax worth P187,791.48 with a total amount of P369,383.96. These tax liabilities were paid by Antonio Rueda. Later, Campos Rueda filed an amended tax return wherein the properties worth P396,308.90 are claimed as exempted from taxes. Respondent, still pending investigation on the same subject, issued another assessment for estate tax worth P202,262.40 and inheritance taxed worth P267,402.84 with a total amount of P469,665.24. Issues: Respondent’s reply to the request for exemption of taxes, etc.: (1) There is no reciprocity as it did not meet the requirements mentioned in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Tangier is a mere principality and not a foreign country. (Note: As argued, section 122, in relation to the case, grants certain exemption of taxes provided that ‘reciprocity’ be met and for reciprocity to be met, Tangier must be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122).

(2) Respondent denied request for exemption because the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. (3) Respondent demanded the payment of the sums of 239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance tax including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled: (1) Tangier allows a similar law for the exemption of taxes. Such exemption is sufficient to entitle Antonio Rueda to the exemption benefits. There is no lacking of reciprocity. The Collector of Internal Revenue asked a question of law: (1) Whether the requisites of statehood is necessary (sine qua non) for the acquisition of international personality. (2) Whether acquisition of international personality is required for a ‘foreign country’ to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by Section 122. Held: (1) Requisite of Statehood is necessary. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound’s formulation that:“it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law.”

(2) Tangier is a state. (3) Section 122 does not require that the “foreign country” possess an international personality. In other words, international personality is not a requisite. (4) Supreme Court affirms Court of Tax Appeals ruling. (Note: Look at the ruling of the Court of Appeals found in the issue.)

US v. DORR Facts Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of violating Section 8 of Act No. 292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or speeches" and the writing, publication, or circulation of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety, and order of the Government". The same provision also punishes the deliberate concealment of the aforementioned acts. The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the newspaper Manila Freedom criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission of certain persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera— to key government positions. The said article referred to the aforementioned appointees as "rascals" and "corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil Commission as "rotten" and "corrupt". Issue Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview of Section 8 of Act No. 292. Held No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8 of Act No. 292. In addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in general, and not of specific individuals.

Ratio Decidendi N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did not have the tendency to produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292, other than all the justices agreed on the same conclusion. As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the Executive, which are also specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law intended to mean specific government personnel, they would have expressly stated so. In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil Commission and some of its individual members, not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview of Act No. 292. 2. The Doc of State of Immunity a. “That the State may not be sued w/o its consent.” Art XVI s3

KAWANANAKOA V. POLYBANK Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82. The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that after the execution of the mortgage a part of the mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory of Hawaii, and was now part of a public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but the territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea was argued. Then the plea was overruled, and after answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made, the appellants having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the territory, and directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the debt. Eq. Rule 92. The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of the mortgage land must be joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be entered until all the mortgaged premises have been sold. In aid of their contention they argue that the territory of Hawaii is liable to suit like a municipal corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which does not extend to this case. They liken the territory to the District of Columbia (Metr- [205 U.S. 349, 353] opolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 , 33 L. ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19), and point out that it has been a party to suits that have

been before this court (Damson v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 , 50 L. ed. 470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248). The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 , 44 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. See act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 160. But in the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.' Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61. As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual administration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and property, from which persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not the case with a territory of the United States, because the territory itself is the fountain from which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might intervene, just as, in the case of a state, the Constitution does, and the power that can alter the Constitution might. But the rights that exist are not created by [205 U.S. 349, 354] Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of certain limitations of power. The District of Columbia is different, because there the body of private rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. But for the territory of Hawaii it is enough to refer to the organic act. Act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 6, 55. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw. 478. See, further, Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.) 396, 405; Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33; Fisk v. Cuthbert, 2 Mont. 593, 598. However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties and to sell all the land is due to a conveyance by the mortgagor directly or indirectly to the territory, the court is not thereby deprived of ability to proceed. Decree affirmed. Ruling: To Justice Holmes, however, the doctrine of non-suability is based not on any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground

that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.

Garcia v. COS FACTS: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totaling no less than Php 4,000 at the rate of P20 per month and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of Php 2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the lower court has jurisdiction on the said matter and dismissing the complaint on ground it being the money claim against the government. HELD: The court affirmed the lower court’s decision on dismissing the complaint for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. If there is a money claim against the government should be filed with the Auditor General. Plus, under the doctrine of state immunity, the state cannot be sued without its consent. Moreover, it is in line with the principle that the State cannot be charged without its content as provided by the Commonwealth Act 328 Sec. 1 that in all cases involving the settlement of accounts and claims other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days. Also, if all administrative remedies have been made and if superior administrative officers could grant relief, it is not necessary to entertain actions against the administrative officers as established by the rule.

THE HOLY SEE V. ROSARIO Petitioner in this case is the Holy See (who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome Italy and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal

Nuncio. Respondent in this case is Hon. Edilberto Rosario in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. The petition started from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5A registered under the name of the Holy See, is connected to Lot 5B and 5D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation. The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio which represented the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome Italy for his residence. The said lots were sold to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales, Inc. When the squatters refused to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between these two parties because both were unsure as to whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from the said lots. Respondent Starbright insists that the Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that Starbright should do it or the earnest money will be returned. Since Starbright refused to clear the property, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, returned P100k earnest money. The same lots were sold to Tropicana Properties. Starbright filed a suit for annulment of sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, Philippine Realty Corporation and Tropicana. The Holy See moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity of suit. The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the petitioner already shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. Petitioner filed for Petition for Certiorari in the SC. On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before the SC by the DFA, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner. Issue: W/N Petitioner is immune from suits. Held: YES. The Court held that the Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. In Article 31 (A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomatic envoy (a representative government who is sent on a special diplomatic mission) shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for

profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint Furthermore, the DFA certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

US V. RUIZ Facts: This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

Issues: W/N the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity. Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

USA V. GUINTO Facts: The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.

The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-suability, but trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.

2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Rulings: 1. The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below. 2. Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.

The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings.

TORIO V. FONTANILLA FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 156 whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the town fiesta committee with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the construction of two stages, one for the zarzuela and the other for the cancionan. On January 22, while in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla who died thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for recovery of damages. Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting as agents of the municipality. 1. ISSUE: Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of the municipality? 2. Are the councilors liable for the death of Fontanilla? HELD: The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. The provision on Section 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent-superior, the municipality is held liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla. Since it is established that the municipality was acting a proprietary function, it follows that it stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation where officers are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it. Thus, the municipal councilors are absolved from any criminal liability for they did not directly participate in the defective construction of the stage. b. waiver of immunity Express consent; general or special law

MERRITT V. GOVT OF PH FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act

2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. ISSUES: 1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? 2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance? HELD: 1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. 2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable. NOTE: ■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code) ■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents.

■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA Facts: A MTD was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service , where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed. I s s u e : W/N the respondent’s decision is valid R u l i n g : No. Rationale: The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to paraphrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the

public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so manyyears, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [ Switzerland General Insurance Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government

USA VS GUINTO(SUPRA) These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. FACTS: 1.

USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607) The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding. ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties. RULING: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a

contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied. In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings. NOTE: 1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS. 2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto) Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO. FACTS: -Feb 3, 1951 - Plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appelant, Pan Oriental, alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 and due to non-payment of installments of chattel mortgage, the Shipping Commission took possession of the said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. -The Shipping Commission delivered the said vessel to Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed to the President of the Philippines and in its meeting, Aug 25 1950 - the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contact with the Shipping Commission. He demanded from Pan Oriental possession of the vessel but the

latter refused. -Nov 10, 1951 - The Government of the Republic of the Philippines intervened alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in question and that the State was entitled to the possession of the said vessel under the terms of the original contract. Therefore, it prayed for Froilan to deliver the vessel to its representative, the Board of Liquidators in accordance with the revisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. -Nov 29, 1951 - Pan Oriental filed a counterclaim that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase. It alleged that it had made the necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right to it. It prayed that if the GRP was successful in obtaining the possession of the said vessel, it should comply with its obligations of delivering it to Pan O. -Nov 29, 1951 - Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators a check in payment of his balance/obligation to the Shipping Commission as claimed by the intervenor GRP. -Feb 3, 1952 - the lower court held that the payment of Froilan discharged his obligation to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines therefore the complaint in intervention has been dismissed -May 10, 1952 - GRP filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping against it on the ground that the purpose of the counterclaim was to compel the GRP to deliver the vessel to it in the event that the GRP recovers the vessel from Froilan however since payment has already been made by Froilan, the counterclaim is no longer feasible. ISSUE: W/N the RP of the Philippines is immune from suit. HELD: No The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus explains: "No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to an

application to Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth Ed., pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.) It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complaint in intervention was directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel in question. c. Immunity against Execution of Judgment: suability vs liability

PNB VS PABALAN Facts: The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA).

Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint against Judge Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and therefore may not be garnished, attached or levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued. 2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited with the petitioner bank is valid.

Discussions: The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In this case, Consent to be sued was given impliedly when the State enters into a commercial contract. When the State enters into a contract, the State is deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment. Rulings:

1. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied. 2. The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of execution be imposed immediately. d. suits against govt agencies i. charted agencies

ARCEGA VS. CA FACT: The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business under the firm name “Fairmont Ice Cream Company,” filed a complaint before the court against the respondents Central Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from allegedly unauthorized payments made by her of the 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange. The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds, among others, that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, because the judgment sought will constitute a financial charge against the Government, and therefore the suit is one against the Government, which cannot prosper without its consent, and in this case no such consent has been given. The petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground set forth in the Central Bank’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner Arcega filed a MR of the resolution to which an opposition was filed by the Central Bank. This time, the Central Bank submitted a certification that the balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of foreign exchange was turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippines. Then the court denied the petitioner’s MR as a result Arcega appealed to the Court of Appeals. Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent, the CA affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Finally the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the suit against the Central Bank for refund is a suit against the State? Held: It is a suit against the State but under the charter of Central Bank of the Philippines, is an entity authorized by to sue and be sued. The consent of the State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given. This doctrine was reiterated in Philippines Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines where it was pointedly stated that "sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 601 (as amended) directs that refund of taxes be made by the Central Bank."

RAYO VS CFI OF BULACAN FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the respondent corporation. Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court. ISSUE: W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort. HELD: YES the power to sued for tort is included. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (See National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781.) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.

PNR VS IAC Facts: The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of Defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La union and bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Calumpit, Bulacan got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing

damages to Plaintiff's bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53 others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for damages against defendants. The defendants, in their answer traversed the material allegation of the complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes. Issue: WON PNR being a governmental agency has immunity from suit. Held: The PNR did not become immune from suit. The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593). Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the State. In the instant case, the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR, which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. ii. unchartered

or unincorporated agencies

NAC VS TEODORO Facts: The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.

Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an action in the court against the Philippine Airlines, Inc.

The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands.” The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a MTD on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, because first, because the National Airports Corporation “has lost its juridical personality,” and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued Issues: W/N Civil Aeronautics Administration is subject to suit. Held: Yes. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3 of EO 365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its management. These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the National Airports Corporation's creditors access to the courts of justice against the Civil Aeronautics Administration is to say that the government could impair the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies.

BOP VS BOP EMPLOYEES ASSO

Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General Services and Director of BOP). The complaint alleged that both the secretary of DOG and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor practices. Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending result of administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic performing governmental functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the BOP are “exclusively proprietary in nature,” since they receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, therefore consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP) to present petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued. Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the BOP cannot be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court). It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are “exclusively proprietary in nature”. Overtime work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its jurisdiction. Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court.

MOBIL INC VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE Facts: This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case plus other damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant BOC as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals. Issues: Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the BOC can invoke state immunity. Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of money and damages involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. The Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed. The BOC is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a separate juridical personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. As stated in the law, agencies of the government is not suable if it is performing governmental functions and if it an unincorporated government entity without a separate juridical personality. e. Immunity not an instrument to perpetrate injustice

SANTIAGO VS RP

FACTS: In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit. HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the Bureau of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.

AMIGABLE V. CUENCA FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government. Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees. The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its consent to be sued. ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government. HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking.

A. Political Law; Definition PP V. PERFECTO FACTS:

This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery." Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. ISSUEs:

o o

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel HELD: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in

force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. "From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks." DECISION: To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered. MACARIOLA V. JUDGE ASUNCION FACTS

Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola, concerning the properties left by their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so. One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as President and his wife as secretary of said company. A year after the company’s registration with the SEC, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion alleging: • that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was one of those properties involved in the partition case; and • that he violated Art14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This case was referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the complaints filed against him. ISSUE 1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E, which was among those properties involved in the partition case. 2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics when he associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a ranking officer

HELD 1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices, judges among others from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who earlier purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable consideration, without any intervention of Judge Asuncion. Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in question. Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that judges’ official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety. It was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge Asuncion to have purchased the property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. His actuations must not cause doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. 2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of the SC, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service from engaging in commerce, either in person or proxy or from holding any office

or have an direct, administrative or financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the territory in which they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of saidprovision. B. The Supremacy of the COnstitution MUTUC V. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation. ISSUE: Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC. HELD:

The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. 2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony. 3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature 4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that: 1. It is a self-executing provision. 1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. 2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are

self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. 2. The Court agree. 1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. 2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. 3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises

the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. 3. It is not premature. 1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law. 2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum. 4. There was grave abuse of discretion. 1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the

Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions. 2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose. TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYESS ASSO ET AL VS CA 1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general areas of reform: A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; B. Secure funding for priority public health programs; C. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance; D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; E. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) F. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the

Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. G. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” H. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and wellbeing. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation. I. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department. Issue: Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution? Held: The Court finds the present petition to be without merit. 1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically,

Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. 2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court. The Preamble

AGLIPAY VS RUIZ Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the

Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government. Art I- national territory Art II Declaration of principles and state policies

BACANI VS. NACOCO During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees.

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:

Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of government, make them a part of the Government of the Philippines.

Discussions: NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”. The term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. Rulings: No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its

corporate existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. ACCFA VS. CUGCO FACTS: ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its named changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land Reform Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association were referred to as Union in the ACCFA. The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of one year. Few months have passed, however,The Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practices and non implementation of said agreement. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from committing further acts tending to discourage the Union members in the exercise of their right to self-organizatoin, to comply with and implement the provisions of the CBA, and to bargain with good faith with the complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but it was turned down in a resolution. ACCFA appealed by certiorari. Issue: W/n ACA is a government entity Held: yes Ratio: It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside

from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. PVTA VS CIR Facts: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. 1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444. 2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds

that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. 3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.” The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration. There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive. A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that

such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained. 3. parens patriae GOVT VS MONTE DE PIEDAD A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan. In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank. HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the

government has the right to take back the money intended for the people. CABANAS VS PILAPIL Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries. ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy. HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed. 4. de jure and de facto govt CO KIM CHAN VS VALDEZ TAN KET Facts:

Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto government. Issues: 1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces. 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts. 3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions: 

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Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.” General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending

in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Rulings: 1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. 2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the

intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. 3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character. PERALTA VS DIR OF PRISONS FACTS: William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the

Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused. ISSUE: Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional. HELD: Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid. ALCANTARA VS DIR OF PRISONS Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that said the court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus from petitioner. ISSUE: Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid? HELD: The court held that the sentence served by Alcantara is a criminal act that has no political complexion. A punitive or penal sentence becomes that of political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal law or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant.

It cited the case of co kim chan, where the Japanese republic and the Phil Executive Commission were governments de facto and the judicial acts of the courts were thereof good and valid and remained as such after the Commonwealth Government was restored those crimes with political complexion (political crimes). Also there was no substantial change in the jurisdiction and structure of CA when the Japanese-initiated Republic abolished the pre-WW2 CA and reorganized it into several courts. 5. sovereignty a) b) c) d)

Legal Political Internal External

“sovereign as auto-limitation” TANADA VS ANGARA Facts: This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign

powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy. 2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress. 4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence. 5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.

Discussions: 

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1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing

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economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.” In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the

law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings: 1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.” 2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. 3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also

commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.” 4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. 5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in. REAGAN VS COMM OF INTERNAL REVENUE William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at 17,912.34 and that his income tax would be 2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation. ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax?

HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable. PP VS GOZO Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country. ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base? HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty,

the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. B. section 2, Art II 1. the incorporation clause and doc of incorporation KURODA VS JALANDONI . THE FACTS Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international. II. THE ISSUES Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional? III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.] YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that – The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person

military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution. xxx

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Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. 2. Conflict between international law and municipal law or local law. ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ Facts: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are: (1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:   

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof. The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions: A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.” GONZALES VS HECHANOVA Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements

During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at

bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. REYES VS BAGATSING Freedom of Speech – Primacy of the Constitution over International Law

Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the AntiBases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we “adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”. ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit. HELD:

I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights. II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an issue in this case). Sec.4(2), sec.5(2)(a), Art.VIII Art.13, declaration of rights and duties of states (cited in bayan vs Zamora) C. Section 3, Art. II (Civilian Authority) Art. VII, Sec.18. President is Commander-in-chief Art. XVI, Sec.5 No partisan politics. No appointment in any capacity to a civilian position while in active service. D. Section 4, Art. II (government to serve and protect the pp. duty of pp to defend the state) PP VS LAGMAN Defense of State

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.” PP VS MANAYAO Citizenship – Defense of State – Treason

Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao conspired together with his Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan where they killed 60 to 70 residents. The residents they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of guerillas fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was positively identified by credible witnesses and he was later convicted with the high crime of treason with multiple murder. He was sentenced to death and to pay the damages. Manayao’s counsel argued that his client cannot be tried with treason because Manayao has already lost his Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of allegiance to support the Japanese cause. Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine courts for any war crimes for only Japanese courts can do so. ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason. HELD: No. Manayao’s swearing of allegiance to Japan was not proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the Japanese Naval, Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and simple. The Supreme Court also emphasized that in times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional provision which state

The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required to render personal, military or civil service… no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country, leaving and joining the opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Forces. Or even if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is also indicated that no such person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty. E. sec5 Art II F. sec6 Art II Art III s5 Art VI s28(3) Art VI s29(2) Art IX, C s2(5) Art XIV, s3(3) GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION FACTS: 1. Republic Act No. 1265 took effect on June 11, 1955. The Secretary of Education, acting upon Section 2 of said Act authorizing and directing him to issue or cause to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony, issued Department Order No. 8 on July 21 of the same year. 2. Pertinent portions of the said department order include the directive that pupils and teachers or students and faculty who are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. And, said assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem with everyone standing at attention and execute a salute. Moreover, immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison the patriotic pledge (in English or vernacular version). 3. Petitioners who are members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses wrote to the Secretary of Education allowing their children to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the

sides and that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge. 4. Petitioners’ religious beliefs, which served as bases for this action, state that: “thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them.” They consider that the flag is an “image within this command.” 5. Petitioners’ children were expelled as a consequence and the Sec of Education denied the former’s petition to reinstate the children from the school. 3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one. 1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending. EBRALINAG ET AL VS THE DIVISION SUPT OF SCHL OF CEBU FACTS: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for

refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge. All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion? HELD: YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. PAMIL VS TELERON Facts: Petitioner/apellant is the rival candidate of Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest who won asp the mayor in Albuquerque, Bohol, who filed a quo waranto case against the latter. This is as per the 2175 Revised Administrative Code (RAC) that states: “In no case there shall be elected/appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastes, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial/national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.” Respondent-appellee is the judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol. Court of First Instance ruled that the RAC was repealed by the Election Code of 1971, which therefore allowed the prohibitions of the RAC.

Issue: Whether or not the RAC is not in effect or already repealed, thereby making the appointment of Fr. Gonzaga in mayor’s position as a priest, constitutional.

Held: Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position. It is also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal. Dissenting Opinion: J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.

GERMAN VS BARANGAN Political Law – Religious Freedom vs Clear and Present Danger Doctrine

One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering the church because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacañang. And considering that German’s group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacañang. ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion. HELD: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an anti-government demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full controland had the capability to stop any untoward move. There was no clearand present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang. Dissenting Opinions

J. Fernando – It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without that faith, man’s very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance. J. Teehankee – The right to freely exercise one’s religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence. INK VS GIRONELLA Facts: 1. Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., on behalf of the INC, charged respondent Judge due to his opinion in the course of acquitting the defendants-accused of Triple Rape. In his opinion, Gironella said that, “it cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing the community of La Paz,

Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem.” 2.Respondent, in so doing, was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench. Ruling: 1. The use of the word “gimmick” could offend the sensibilities of the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. 2. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a “gimmick” to gain coverts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. No one, much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost sight to either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution. ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the

Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Issue: Whether or Not the State such conjugalarrangement.

could

penalize

respondent

for

Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolentneutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolentneutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugalarrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion. IMBONG VS OCHOA

Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: 1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. 2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. 3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. 4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. 5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. 6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. 7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. 8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Power of Judicial Review Actual Case or Controversy Facial Challenge Locus Standi Declaratory Relief One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Right to life Right to health Freedom of religion and right to free speech Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) Freedom of expression and academic freedom Due process clause Equal protection clause Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Actual Case or Controversy Facial Challenge Locus Standi Declaratory Relief One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions: PROCEDURAL Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case. Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the

court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the

matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.” Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s: SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.” In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization. The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible. The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it. However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and

be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down. 2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”. 3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decisionmaking, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family. The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.” However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in lifethreatening procedures. 5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education. Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State. The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children. By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. 6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider. The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures. The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers. The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education 8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and nongovernment health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise. However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now. 2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take

cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. 3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. 4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows

that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: 1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s; 2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs. 3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-

threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse; 4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. 5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and 8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. State Policies G. sec.7 Art II Sec.8 Art II H. sec.9 Art II Sec.10 Art II

Sec.11 art II 1. what is social justice Art XIII sec.1 and 2 CALALANG VS WILLIAMS The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality. Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To

this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. 2) No. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” ONDOY VS IGNACIO Facts: The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked under Virgilio Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the ship of the

respondent’s enterprise as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter was found dead due to drowning. Thus the petitioner asked for compensation, however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were dismissed by the hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration was also filed before the Secretary of Labor, but was denied again due to lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the compensation for Jose’s death is constitutional. Whether or not Social Justice has a role in this case. Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting Estrella Ondoy 6,000 pesos as compensation for Jose’s death, 300 pesos for burial fees and 600 pesos as attorney’s fee with the costs against respondent, Ignacio. Ratio Decidendi: The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, and not equality. The Supreme Court recognized the right of petitioner to claim a compensation from the respondent, as Jose did drown while “in the actual performance of his duty.” To fortify this ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with accordance to the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, Workmen’s Compensation Act, which dealt with the right of workers for compensation for personal injury, was applied. Among them is a case where there was no direct testimony attesting that the deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty, however, the compensation was sustained. Lastly from another case, the SC quoted that “as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter strict compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection. I. sec.12 Art II 1. Family; protection of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. IMBONG ET AL VS OCHOA (Supra)

2. natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth MEYER VS NEBRASKA 

(summary: The Court declared the Nebraska law unconstitutional, reasoning it violated the liberty protected by Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty, the Court explained, means more than freedom from bodily restraint. It also includes the right of a teacher to teach German to a student, and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their child as they see fit. While the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging the growth of a population that can engage in discussions of civic matters, the means it chose to pursue this objective was excessive. )

Plaintiff is a teacher in Zion Parochial School in Nebraska. He was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton country, Nebraska on the ground that he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in German language to Raymond Parpart, a 10-year-old child who had not yet attained and successfully passed the 8th grade. This conviction was based on an “act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska (approved April 9, 1919). The said act prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the 8th grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, Plaintiff claimed that education was a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected. He further claimed that the statute infringed the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff by the 14th amendment. Hence, this appeal to the US Supreme Court. Issues 

Is control over the education of their children a fundamental right of parents?

Holding/Rule 

Parents have the fundamental right to control the upbringing, including the education, of their children.

Reasoning



Liberty denotes not only freedom from bodily restraint but also the right… o To contract o To engage in any occupation of his choosing o To acquire useful knowledge o To marry o To establish a home and bring up children o To worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience



This liberty may not be interfered with under the guise of protecting the public interest.



It is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life, and nearly all states make education of children compulsory. o Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Before the War, it was looked upon as helpful and desirable.



Meyer had the right to teach, and the parents of the child had the right to engage him so to instruct their child. These actions are within the liberty of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The right is clearly infringed upon. The state says their interest is to foster a homogenous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters. o The means adopted exceed the limitations upon the power of the state.  Proficiency is a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age, and experience shows that it is not injurious to the health, morals, or understanding of an ordinary child.

 

PIERCE VS SOCIETY OF SISTERS In 1922 Oregon amended its compulsory attendance statute to require that children between 8 and 16 years old be sent to public schools in the districts where they lived. Two organizations operating

private schools in Oregon, the Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary and the Hill Military Academy, challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that it deprived them of property without due process of law. Walter M. Pierce, the governor of Oregon, was named as a respondent. A federal district court subsequently entered judgment for the schools, enjoining the state from enforcing the statute and finding that “the right to conduct schools was property” and that the statute not only had taken the schools’ property without due process but had also deprived parents of the right to “direct the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places.” Issue: Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control? Ruling: US SC held that the statute violated the due process clause. The two schools, as Oregon corporations and property owners within the state, were entitled to “protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property.” Furthermore, the court ruled that the Oregon statute “unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children.” According to the court, the state could not force schoolchildren to “accept instruction from public teachers only.” However, the court did acknowledge that states have wide-ranging rights in regard to education: “No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”

Thus, the court invalidated only state action that prevents parents from making an educational choice for their children; the court did not prohibit states from exercising regulatory control over education,

including nonpublic schools. Finding that the Oregon statute was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the federal district court. Sec.4(1) Art XIV Constitution PACU VS SEC. OF EDUCATION The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools. PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship. ISSUE: W/N Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional. HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law. Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and

instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law. Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools. J. sec.13, Art II PD 684 PD 935 PD 1102 PD 603 K.Sec. 14, Art II VILLEGAS VS SUBIDO Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission under Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out that putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence the same is no longer in effect. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service Commissioner. HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street

sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid. This trend towards greater recognition of equal rights for both sexes under the shelter of the equal protection clause argues most strongly against this kind of discrimination. L. sec.15 Art II Sec.16 Art II OPOSA VS FACTORAN Facts: The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to: 

Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;



Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:  



Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that: 

The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.



1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. 2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. 1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. 1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. 1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. 

The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement. 1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . 2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. Sec. 17 Art II Sec.5 Art XIV GUINGONA, JR. VS CARAGUE FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.” The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.” ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional. DEP.ED VS SAN DIEGO FACTS: Private respondent, San Diego, is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S. in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the NMAT rule: H) A STUDENT SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY THREE (3) CHANCES TO TAKE THE NMAT. AFTER THREE (3) SUCCESSIVE FAILURES, A STUDENT SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THE NMAT FOR THE FOURTH TIME.

He then went to RTC Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his petition, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. ISSUE: Whether respondent was deprived of his right to a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.

HELD: The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations is a valid exercises of governmental power. The Court agreed that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the country.” The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.