Poli Rev 1 Case Digest.docx

`Javellana vs. Executive Exec On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable. 2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. 3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people. 4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief. 5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force. HELD: 1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable

as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show. 2. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and

secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution. 3. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But there is not even a

certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable." Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

PBA v. COMELEC FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883 which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the calling of the special election. Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos’ letter of conditional “resignation” did not create the actual

vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in 1987. The letter states that the President is: “irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after his proclamation.” The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair and honest. ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the elections HELD: The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7,

1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the President’s office) which can be truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president. Lansang v. Garcia Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.

It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually staging”. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and subprovinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in

order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority.

Issues: 1. W/N the proclamation of Proclamation No. 889 is valid and effective. 2. W/N the president can suspend the writ of habeas corpus under the said proclamation. 3. W/N the petitioners herein belong to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended

Held: 1. The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP. 2. Yes it is valid and such suspension is limited. The President could have declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith. 3. If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid — and We so hold it to be — and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing of a complaint or

information against him does not affect the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his release may not be ordered by Us AYTONA V. CASTILLO FACTS: On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void. ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid. RULING: No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was

duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments. IN RE SATURINO BERMUDEZ Facts: In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents, petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:

Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for the President and VicePresident under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and VicePresident Arturo M. Tolentino being referred to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...

Ruling: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto

government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.

exempted from taxes. Respondent, still pending investigation on the same subject, issued another assessment for estate tax worth P202,262.40 and inheritance taxed worth P267,402.84 with a total amount of P469,665.24.

B. Republic of the Phil as a State 1. Elements of a State; Def of a State CIR v. CAMPOS RUEDA Maria Cerdiera is a Spanish national (Filipina married to a Spanish citizen), lived in Morocco and died there. In the Philippines, she left intangible properties. The person tasked as administrator of the intangible properties is Antonio Campos Rueda. He filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all properties left by her. The Collector of Internal Revenue, the respondent, pending the investigation of the tax value of the properties, issued an assessment for estate tax worth P111,592.48 and inheritance tax worth P187,791.48 with a total amount of P369,383.96. These tax liabilities were paid by Antonio Rueda. Later, Campos Rueda filed an amended tax return wherein the properties worth P396,308.90 are claimed as

Issues: Respondent’s reply to the request for exemption of taxes, etc.: (1) There is no reciprocity as it did not meet the requirements mentioned in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Tangier is a mere principality and not a foreign country. (Note: As argued, section 122, in relation to the case, grants certain exemption of taxes provided that ‘reciprocity’ be met and for reciprocity to be met, Tangier must be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122).

(2) Respondent denied request for exemption because the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

(2) Whether acquisition of international personality is required for a ‘foreign country’ to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

(3) Respondent demanded the payment of the sums of

The Supreme Court referred the case back to the Court

239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance tax including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties.

of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by Section 122.

The Court of Tax Appeals ruled:

Held: (1) Requisite of Statehood is necessary.

(1) Tangier allows a similar law for the exemption of taxes. Such exemption is sufficient to entitle Antonio Rueda to the exemption benefits. There is no lacking of reciprocity. The Collector of Internal Revenue asked a question of law: (1) Whether the requisites of statehood is necessary (sine qua non) for the acquisition of international personality.

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound’s formulation that:“it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law.” (2) Tangier is a state.

(3) Section 122 does not require that the “foreign country” possess an international personality. In other words, international personality is not a requisite. (4) Supreme Court affirms Court of Tax Appeals ruling. (Note: Look at the ruling of the Court of Appeals found in the issue.)

US v. DORR Facts Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of violating Section 8 of Act No. 292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious words or speeches" and the writing, publication, or circulation of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety, and order of the Government". The same provision also punishes the deliberate concealment of the aforementioned acts.

The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the newspaper Manila Freedom criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission of certain persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera— to key government positions. The said article referred to the aforementioned appointees as "rascals" and "corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil Commission as "rotten" and "corrupt". Issue Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview of Section 8 of Act No. 292. Held No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8 of Act No. 292. In addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government in general, and not of specific individuals.

Ratio Decidendi N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did not have the tendency to produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act No. 292, other than all the justices agreed on the same conclusion. As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in

the abstract sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the Executive, which are also specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law intended to mean specific government personnel, they would have expressly stated so. In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil Commission and some of its individual members, not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the purview of Act No. 292. 2. The Doc of State of Immunity a. “That the State may not be sued w/o its consent.” Art XVI s3 KAWANANAKOA V. POLYBANK Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale under a mortgage executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister Albertina. 17 Haw. 82. The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction that after the execution of the mortgage a part of the mortgaged land had been conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory of Hawaii, and was now part of a public street. The bill originally made the territory a party, but the territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their bill as to it before the above plea was argued. Then the plea was overruled, and after

answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made, the appellants having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the land conveyed to the territory, and directed a judgment for the sum remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the debt. Eq. Rule 92. The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all parts of the mortgage land must be joined, and that no deficiency judgment should be entered until all the mortgaged premises have been sold. In aid of their contention they argue that the territory of Hawaii is liable to suit like a municipal corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes, which does not extend to this case. They liken the territory to the District of Columbia (Metr- [205 U.S. 349, 353] opolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 , 33 L. ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19), and point out that it has been a party to suits that have been before this court (Damson v. Hawaii, 194 U.S. 154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 , 50 L. ed. 470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248). The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 , 44 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. See act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 160. But in the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of

a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy.' Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61. As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is extended to those that, in actual administration, originate and change at their will the law of contract and property, from which persons within the jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they are so. But that is not the case with a territory of the United States, because the territory itself is the fountain from which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that Congress might intervene, just as, in the case of a state, the Constitution does, and the power that can alter the Constitution might. But the rights that exist are not created by [205 U.S. 349, 354] Congress or the Constitution, except to the extent of certain limitations of power. The District of Columbia is different, because

there the body of private rights is created and controlled by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. But for the territory of Hawaii it is enough to refer to the organic act. Act of April 30, 1900, chap. 339, 6, 55. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw. 478. See, further, Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.) 396, 405; Langford v. King, 1 Mont. 33; Fisk v. Cuthbert, 2 Mont. 593, 598. However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties and to sell all the land is due to a conveyance by the mortgagor directly or indirectly to the territory, the court is not thereby deprived of ability to proceed. Decree affirmed. Ruling: To Justice Holmes, however, the doctrine of nonsuability is based not on any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. Garcia v. COS FACTS: The plaintiff filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action to collect a sum of money against the above defendants. He suffered injuries while undergoing a 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. He filed a claim under

Commonwealth Act 400 and in April 1957 with the Adjutant General’s Office which later disallow his claim for disability benefit. After further demands of the plaintiff, the same Adjutant General’s Office denied the claim, alleging that the Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by RA 610 which took effect January 1, 1950. That by the reason of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, he was deprived of his sight or vision rendering him permanently disabled; and by the reason of unjustified refusal of defendants on the claim, plaintiff was deprived of his disability pension from July 1948 totaling no less than Php 4,000 at the rate of P20 per month and suffered moral damages and attorney’s fees the amount of Php 2,000. The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of AFP file separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before coming to court; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. Acting on the said Motion, the Court of First Instance, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that action has prescribed. Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied, the plaintiff has interposed this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the lower court has jurisdiction on the said matter and dismissing the complaint on ground it being the money claim against the government.

HELD: The court affirmed the lower court’s decision on dismissing the complaint for the simple reason that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being a money claim against the government. If there is a money claim against the government should be filed with the Auditor General. Plus, under the doctrine of state immunity, the state cannot be sued without its consent. Moreover, it is in line with the principle that the State cannot be charged without its content as provided by the Commonwealth Act 328 Sec. 1 that in all cases involving the settlement of accounts and claims other than those of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days. Also, if all administrative remedies have been made and if superior administrative officers could grant relief, it is not necessary to entertain actions against the administrative officers as established by the rule. THE HOLY SEE V. ROSARIO Petitioner in this case is the Holy See (who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome Italy and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Respondent in this case is Hon. Edilberto Rosario in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. The petition started from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5A registered under the name of the Holy See,

is connected to Lot 5B and 5D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation. The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio which represented the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome Italy for his residence.

On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before the SC by the DFA, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner. Issue: W/N Petitioner is immune from suits.

The said lots were sold to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales, Inc. When the squatters refused to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between these two parties because both were unsure as to whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from the said lots. Respondent Starbright insists that the Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that Starbright should do it or the earnest money will be returned. Since Starbright refused to clear the property, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, returned P100k earnest money. The same lots were sold to Tropicana Properties. Starbright filed a suit for annulment of sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, Philippine Realty Corporation and Tropicana. The Holy See moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity of suit. The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the petitioner already shed off its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. Petitioner filed for Petition for Certiorari in the SC.

Held: YES. The Court held that the Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. In Article 31 (A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, diplomatic envoy (a representative government who is sent on a special diplomatic mission) shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint Furthermore, the DFA certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted

from local jurisdiction and is entitled to immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

US V. RUIZ

Issues: W/N the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Facts: This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For

Rulings: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. USA V. GUINTO Facts: The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case

at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

waived its non-suability, but trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.

Issues:

The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not

1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America. 2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions: The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Rulings: 1. The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below. 2. Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the

United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further proceedings. TORIO V. FONTANILLA FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 156 whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the town fiesta committee with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the construction of two stages, one for the zarzuela and the other for the cancionan. On January 22, while in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla who died thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for recovery of damages.

Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting as agents of the municipality. 1. ISSUE: Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of the municipality? 2. Are the councilors liable for the death of Fontanilla? HELD: The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. The provision on Section 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent-superior, the municipality is held liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla. Since it is established that the municipality was acting a proprietary function, it follows that it stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation where officers are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official relation to it. Thus, the municipal councilors are absolved from any criminal liability for they did not directly participate in the defective construction of the stage. b. waiver of immunity Express consent; general or special law

MERRITT V. GOVT OF PH FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same. ISSUES: 1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? 2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance? HELD: 1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a

preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents.

2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable.

■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

NOTE: ■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code) ■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in

REPUBLIC VS PURISIMA Facts: A MTD was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service , where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss

dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed. I s s u e : W/N the respondent’s decision is valid R u l i n g : No. Rationale: The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent." "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to paraphrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening

scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so manyyears, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [ Switzerland General Insurance Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government USA VS GUINTO(SUPRA) These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. FACTS: 1.

USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607) The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber

services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.

perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties. RULING: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to

It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their official functions. There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its nonsuability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such waiver may be implied. In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly,

this case was remanded to the court below for further proceedings. NOTE: 1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTS. 2. Jure Gestionis – by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto) Jure Imperii – by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent. (US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487) FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO. FACTS: -Feb 3, 1951 - Plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appelant, Pan Oriental, alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 and due to non-payment of installments of chattel mortgage, the Shipping Commission took possession of the said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. -The Shipping Commission delivered the said vessel to Pan Oriental. Froilan appealed to the President of the Philippines and in its meeting, Aug 25 1950 - the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contact with the Shipping Commission. He demanded from Pan

Oriental possession of the vessel but the latter refused. -Nov 10, 1951 - The Government of the Republic of the Philippines intervened alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in question and that the State was entitled to the possession of the said vessel under the terms of the original contract. Therefore, it prayed for Froilan to deliver the vessel to its representative, the Board of Liquidators in accordance with the revisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. -Nov 29, 1951 - Pan Oriental filed a counterclaim that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel to it by virtue of a contract of bareboat charter with option to purchase. It alleged that it had made the necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right to it. It prayed that if the GRP was successful in obtaining the possession of the said vessel, it should comply with its obligations of delivering it to Pan O. -Nov 29, 1951 - Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators a check in payment of his balance/obligation to the Shipping Commission as claimed by the intervenor GRP. -Feb 3, 1952 - the lower court held that the payment of Froilan discharged his obligation to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines therefore the complaint in intervention has been dismissed

-May 10, 1952 - GRP filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping against it on the ground that the purpose of the counterclaim was to compel the GRP to deliver the vessel to it in the event that the GRP recovers the vessel from Froilan however since payment has already been made by Froilan, the counterclaim is no longer feasible. ISSUE: W/N the RP of the Philippines is immune from suit. HELD: No The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state. The United States Supreme Court thus explains: "No direct suit can be maintained against the United States. But when an action is brought by the United States to recover money in the hands of a party who has a legal claim against them, it would be a very rigid principle to deny to him the right of setting up such claim in a court of justice, and turn him around to an application to Congress." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Tenth Ed.,

pp. 36-37, citing U. S. vs. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 150, 8 L. ed. 899.) It is however, contended for the intervenor that, if there was at all any waiver, it was in favor of the plaintiff against whom the complaint in intervention was directed. This contention is untenable. As already stated, the complaint in intervention was in a sense in derogation of the defendant's claim over the possession of the vessel in question. c. Immunity against Execution of Judgment: suability vs liability PNB VS PABALAN Facts: The case was filed by petitioner requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA).

Philippine National Bank (PNB) of La Union filed an administrative complaint against Judge Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and therefore may not be garnished, attached or levied upon. The PNB La Union Branch invoked the

doctrine of non-suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Philippine National Bank can be sued. 2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment of funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco deposited with the petitioner bank is valid.

Discussions: The consent of the state to be sued may be given expressly or impliedly. In this case, Consent to be sued was given impliedly when the State enters into a commercial contract. When the State enters into a contract, the State is deemed to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Hence, Funds of public corporations could properly be made the object of a notice of garnishment. Rulings: 1. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The

government has entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied. 2. The Supreme Court ruled that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. Thus, the writ of execution be imposed immediately. d. suits against govt agencies i. charted agencies ARCEGA VS. CA FACT: The petitioner Alicia O. Arcega, doing business under the firm name “Fairmont Ice Cream Company,” filed a complaint before the court against the respondents Central Bank of the Philippines and Philippine National Bank, for the refund from allegedly unauthorized payments made by her of the 17% special excise tax on foreign exchange. The Central Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds,

among others, that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, because the judgment sought will constitute a financial charge against the Government, and therefore the suit is one against the Government, which cannot prosper without its consent, and in this case no such consent has been given. The petitioner appealed, but the court dismissed the complaint on the ground set forth in the Central Bank’s motion to dismiss. The petitioner Arcega filed a MR of the resolution to which an opposition was filed by the Central Bank. This time, the Central Bank submitted a certification that the balance of the collected special excise tax on sales of foreign exchange was turned over to the Treasurer of the Philippines. Then the court denied the petitioner’s MR as a result Arcega appealed to the Court of Appeals. Holding that the suit is indirectly against the Republic of the Philippines which cannot be sued without its consent, the CA affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Finally the petitioner filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the suit against the Central Bank for refund is a suit against the State? Held: It is a suit against the State but under the charter of Central Bank of the Philippines, is an entity authorized by

to sue and be sued. The consent of the State to thus be sued, therefore, has been given. This doctrine was reiterated in Philippines Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines where it was pointedly stated that "sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 601 (as amended) directs that refund of taxes be made by the Central Bank." RAYO VS CFI OF BULACAN FACTS: At the height of the infamous typhoon "Kading", the respondent opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam which resulted in a sudden, precipitate and simultaneous opening of said floodgates several towns in Bulacan were inundated. The petitioners filed for damages against the respondent corporation. Petitioners opposed the prayer of the respondents forn dismissal of the case and contended that the respondent corporation is merely performing a propriety functions and that under its own organic act, it can sue and be sued in court. ISSUE: W/N the power of the respondent to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort. HELD: YES the power to sued for tort is included. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to

sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. (See National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR, et al., L-17874, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781.) Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be sued in any court" is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners. PNR VS IAC Facts: The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of Defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La union and bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Calumpit, Bulacan got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to Plaintiff's bus and its passengers, 18 of whom died and 53 others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights, flagman or

switchman to warn the public of approaching train that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for damages against defendants. The defendants, in their answer traversed the material allegation of the complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo Hughes. Issue: WON PNR being a governmental agency has immunity from suit. Held: The PNR did not become immune from suit. The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs. Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil. 593). Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental capacity are not suits against the State. In the instant case, the State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR, which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.

ii. unchartered or unincorporated agencies NAC VS TEODORO Facts: The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.

Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an action in the court against the Philippine Airlines, Inc.

The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject

of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands.” The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a MTD on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, because first, because the National Airports Corporation “has lost its juridical personality,” and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued Issues: W/N Civil Aeronautics Administration is subject to suit. Held: Yes. Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are, under Section 3 of EO 365, to execute contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concession rights, and under Section 4, to charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its management.

These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration, in our opinion, the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its behalf, the Civil Aeronautics Administration with greater reason should have the power to prosecute and defend suits for and against the National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the properties, funds and choses in action and assumed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the National Airports Corporation's creditors access to the courts of justice against the Civil Aeronautics Administration is to say that the government could impair the obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient of converting them into unincorporated agencies. BOP VS BOP EMPLOYEES ASSO Facts: BPEA (respondents) filed a complaint by an acting prosecutor of the Industrial Court against petitioners BOP (secretary of Department of General Services and Director of BOP). The complaint alleged that both the secretary of DOG and the director of BOP have been engaging in unfair labor practices. Answering the complaint, the petitioners (BOP), denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and alleged that the BPEA complainants were suspended pending result of administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations; that the BOP is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but of the republic performing governmental functions. For relief, they prayed that the case be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But later on January 27, 1959, the trial judge of Industrial Court sustained the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that the functions of the BOP are “exclusively proprietary in nature,” since they receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, therefore consequently denied the prayed for dismissal, which brought the petitioners (BOP) to present petition for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether or not the BOP can be sued. Held: As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the BOP cannot be sued (Sec.1, Rule 33, Rules of court). It is true that BOP receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and holidays, but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are “exclusively proprietary in nature”. Overtime work in the BOP is done only when the interest of the service so requires. As a matter of administrative policy, the overtime compensation may be paid, but such payment is discretionary with the head of the Bureau depending upon its current appropriations, so that it cannot be the basis for holding that the functions of said Bureau are wholly proprietary in character. Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is

settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its jurisdiction. Disposition: The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than the respondent court.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant BOC as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals. Issues:

MOBIL INC VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE Facts:

Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the BOC can invoke state immunity.

This case was filed by Mobil Phil Exploration Inc. against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts.

Rulings:

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. The shipment was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case plus other damages.

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of money and damages involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. The Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said nongovernmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff should have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under

which money claims against the Government may be filed. The BOC is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a separate juridical personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. As stated in the law, agencies of the government is not suable if it is performing governmental functions and if it an unincorporated government entity without a separate juridical personality.

government and should not prosper without the consent of the government. ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit. HELD: No. The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the Bureau of Plant Industry has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in court and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.

e. Immunity not an instrument to perpetrate injustice SANTIAGO VS RP FACTS: In January 1971, Ildefonso Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976 there were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the

AMIGABLE V. CUENCA FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the government. Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for comlensatory damages, moral damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give its consent to be sued.

The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government. HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit. The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the time of the taking. A. Political Law; Definition

Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila. ISSUEs:

o

o

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

PP V. PERFECTO

HELD:

FACTS:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of government. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. "From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of nonjudicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people

themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks." DECISION: To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered. MACARIOLA V. JUDGE ASUNCION FACTS Reyes siblings filed a complaint for partition against Macariola, concerning the properties left by their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who rendered the decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion after the finality of the decision. This project of partition was only signed by the counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they were given authorization to do so. One of the properties in the project of partition was Lot

1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots. One of these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who later on sold a portion of the same lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their respective shares over the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and his wife were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as President and his wife as secretary of said company. A year after the company’s registration with the SEC, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion alleging: • that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a portion of the lot, which was one of those properties involved in the partition case; and • that he violated Art14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself with a private company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte. This case was referred to Justice Palma of the CA for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice recommended that Judge Asuncion should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the complaints filed against him. ISSUE 1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot

1184-E, which was among those properties involved in the partition case. 2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics when he associated himself with Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a ranking officer HELD 1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits justices, judges among others from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Thus, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy the lot directly from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who earlier purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical

transfer of said lot as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr. Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact, Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for valuable consideration, without any intervention of Judge Asuncion. Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in question. Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that judges’ official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety. It was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge Asuncion to have purchased the property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. His actuations must not cause doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. 2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits justices of the SC, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in active service from engaging in commerce, either in person or proxy or from holding any office or have an direct, administrative or financial intervention in

commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the territory in which they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the Philippines by a Royal Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US to the Philippines, Art14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no affirmative act that continued the effectivity of saidprovision. B. The Supremacy of the COnstitution MUTUC V. COMELEC FACTS: Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the

premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.” COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation. ISSUE: Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC. HELD: The Court held that “the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to”. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase “and the like”, could not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a

favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-

Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept. Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. 2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony. 3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature 4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that: 1. It is a self-executing provision. 1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. 2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-

executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium. 2. The Court agree.

1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. 2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. 3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. 3. It is not premature.

1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law. 2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know

his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum. 4. There was grave abuse of discretion. 1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions. 2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as

provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose. TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYESS ASSO ET AL VS CA 1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general areas of reform: A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; B. Secure funding for priority public health programs;

C. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance; D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; E. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) F. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. G. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” H. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the

people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation. I. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department. Issue: Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution? Held: The Court finds the present petition to be without merit. 1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled

to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara, wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA. 2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or

disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court. The Preamble AGLIPAY VS RUIZ Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the

appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of

international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government. Art I- national territory Art II Declaration of principles and state policies

BACANI VS. NACOCO During the pendency of a civil case in the said court, Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees.

The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. But the Auditor General required the plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts by virtue of a Department of Justice circular which stated that NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question. For reimbursement to take place, it was further ordered that the amount of P25 per payday be

deducted from the salary of Bacani and P10 from the salary of Matoto.

Petitioners filed an action in Court countering that NACOCO is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, the defendants set up a defense that NACOCO is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 hence, it is exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Issues: Whether or not National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), which performs certain functions of government, make them a part of the Government of the Philippines.

Discussions: NACOCO is not considered a government entity and is not exempted from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of the

Philippines”. The term “Government” may be defined as “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when referring to the national government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.

existence and the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government.

Rulings:

The Unions and ACCFA entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective for a period of one year. Few months have passed, however,The Unions, together with the CUGCO, filed a complaint against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practices and non implementation of said agreement. Court of Industrial Relations ordered ACCFA to cease from committing further acts tending to discourage the Union members in the exercise of their right to self-organizatoin, to comply with and implement the provisions of the CBA, and to bargain with good faith with the complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but it

No. NACOCO do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized for the purpose of “adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote the coconut industry. It was given a corporate power separate and distinct from the government, as it was made subject to the provisions of the Corporation Law in so far as its corporate

ACCFA VS. CUGCO FACTS: ACCFA was a government agency created under RA No. 821, as amended. Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its named changed to Agricultural Credit Administration under the Land Reform Code or RA 3844. ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association were referred to as Union in the ACCFA.

was turned down in a resolution. ACCFA appealed by certiorari. Issue: W/n ACA is a government entity Held: yes Ratio: It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the

functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,"5continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice.

PVTA VS CIR Facts: This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility t o provide for the general welfare. 1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444. 2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is

exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. 3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.” The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration. There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather

than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive. A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained. 3. parens patriae GOVT VS MONTE DE PIEDAD A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863. Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a loan.

In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the $80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs. After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant was to question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action, contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries themselves or by their heirs. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank. HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has

been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people. CABANAS VS PILAPIL Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child. On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries. ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy. HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the

mother as she was the immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation were no de facto government. Issues:

4. de jure and de facto govt CO KIM CHAN VS VALDEZ TAN KET Facts: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated during the time of the Japanese occupation.

The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of

1. Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces. 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts. 3. Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions: 

Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the

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laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.” General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other

governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Rulings: 1. The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and

Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. 2. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. 3. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the

administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the standpoint of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.

PERALTA VS DIR OF PRISONS FACTS: William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused. ISSUE: Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional. HELD: Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

ALCANTARA VS DIR OF PRISONS Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground that said the court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus from petitioner. ISSUE: Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid? HELD: The court held that the sentence served by Alcantara is a criminal act that has no political complexion. A punitive or penal sentence becomes that of political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal law or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offense committed against the belligerent occupant. It cited the case of co kim chan, where the Japanese republic and the Phil Executive Commission were governments de facto and the judicial acts of the courts were thereof good and valid and remained as such after

the Commonwealth Government was restored those crimes with political complexion (political crimes). Also there was no substantial change in the jurisdiction and structure of CA when the Japanese-initiated Republic abolished the pre-WW2 CA and reorganized it into several courts. 5. sovereignty a) b) c) d)

Legal Political Internal External

“sovereign as auto-limitation” TANADA VS ANGARA Facts: This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign

markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. 3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by Congress. 4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence. 5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.

Discussions: Issues: 

1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy. 2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of

1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

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Although the Constitution mandates to develop a selfreliant and independent national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.”

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In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes. The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the

adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.

Rulings: 1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a

judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.” 2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. 3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the

exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.” 4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system. 5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in. REAGAN VS COMM OF INTERNAL REVENUE

William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at 17,912.34 and that his income tax would be 2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation. ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax? HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s

assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable. PP VS GOZO Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country. ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base? HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of Philippine territory or divested itself completely jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under

not the of the

terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. B. section 2, Art II 1. the incorporation clause and doc of incorporation KURODA VS JALANDONI . THE FACTS Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of crimes not based on law, national and international. II.

THE ISSUES

Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional? III. THE RULING [The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.] YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that – The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and

policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution. xxx

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Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory. 2. Conflict between international law and municipal law or local law. ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ Facts:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are: (1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and (2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: 

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It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof. The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Discussions: A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Ruling/s: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by

legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.” GONZALES VS HECHANOVA Treaty vs Executive Agreements – Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of

his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up. As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress. REYES VS BAGATSING

Freedom of Speech – Primacy of the Constitution over International Law Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we “adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”. ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit. HELD: I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued

by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights. II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an issue in this case). Sec.4(2), sec.5(2)(a), Art.VIII Art.13, declaration of rights and duties of states (cited in bayan vs Zamora) C. Section 3, Art. II (Civilian Authority) Art. VII, Sec.18. President is Commander-in-chief Art. XVI, Sec.5 No partisan politics. No appointment in any capacity to a civilian position while in active service. D. Section 4, Art. II (government to serve and protect the pp. duty of pp to defend the state) PP VS LAGMAN Defense of State

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of the said law. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional. HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.” PP VS MANAYAO Citizenship – Defense of State – Treason Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino traitors aiding the Japanese cause). Manayao conspired together with his Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan

where they killed 60 to 70 residents. The residents they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of guerillas fighting the Japanese forces. Manayao was positively identified by credible witnesses and he was later convicted with the high crime of treason with multiple murder. He was sentenced to death and to pay the damages. Manayao’s counsel argued that his client cannot be tried with treason because Manayao has already lost his Filipino citizenship due to his swearing of allegiance to support the Japanese cause. Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under Philippine courts for any war crimes for only Japanese courts can do so. ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason. HELD: No. Manayao’s swearing of allegiance to Japan was not proven as a fact nor is it proven that he joined the Japanese Naval, Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and simple. The Supreme Court also emphasized that in times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional provision which state The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required to render personal, military or civil service… no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by merely swearing allegiance to an enemy country, leaving and joining the opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine Armed Forces. Or even if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is also indicated that no such person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held

guilty of a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty. E. sec5 Art II F. sec6 Art II Art III s5 Art VI s28(3) Art VI s29(2) Art IX, C s2(5) Art XIV, s3(3) GERONA VS SEC OF EDUCATION FACTS: 1. Republic Act No. 1265 took effect on June 11, 1955. The Secretary of Education, acting upon Section 2 of said Act authorizing and directing him to issue or cause to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony, issued Department Order No. 8 on July 21 of the same year. 2. Pertinent portions of the said department order include the directive that pupils and teachers or students and faculty who are in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. And, said assembly shall sing the Philippine National Anthem with everyone standing at attention and execute a salute. Moreover, immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison the patriotic pledge (in English or vernacular version).

3. Petitioners who are members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses wrote to the Secretary of Education allowing their children to remain silent and stand at attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge. 4. Petitioners’ religious beliefs, which served as bases for this action, state that: “thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them.” They consider that the flag is an “image within this command.” 5. Petitioners’ children were expelled as a consequence and the Sec of Education denied the former’s petition to reinstate the children from the school. 3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers. 2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow

citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending. EBRALINAG ET AL VS THE DIVISION SUPT OF SCHL OF CEBU FACTS:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge. All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Petitioners are Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the

explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and nondiscriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion? HELD: YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified. Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external

acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in “external acts” or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. PAMIL VS TELERON Facts: Petitioner/apellant is the rival candidate of Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest who won asp the mayor in Albuquerque, Bohol, who filed a quo waranto case against the latter. This is as per the 2175 Revised Administrative Code (RAC) that states: “In no case there shall be elected/appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastes, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial/national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.” Respondent-appellee is the judge of the Court of First

Instance of Bohol. Court of First Instance ruled that the RAC was repealed by the Election Code of 1971, which therefore allowed the prohibitions of the RAC.

Issue: Whether or not the RAC is not in effect or already repealed, thereby making the appointment of Fr. Gonzaga in mayor’s position as a priest, constitutional.

Held: Decision is indecisive, the said law, in the deliberations of the court, failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order for this law to be binding upon the parties in this case. For this, the petition must be granted and the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position. It is also pointed out that how can one who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied repeal. Dissenting Opinion:

J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds “are obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office because under Sec. 23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso facto cease in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of candidacy. This implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality are allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in the enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the election code, are eligible to run for public office. GERMAN VS BARANGAN Political Law – Religious Freedom vs Clear and Present Danger Doctrine One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago Barangan from entering the church because the same is

within the vicinity of the Malacañang. And considering that German’s group is expressively known as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacañang. ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to worship and pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their freedom to worship and locomotion. HELD: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an antigovernment demonstration since they wore yellow Tshirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted antigovernment slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the officials who would restrain

petitioners. Respondents were in full controland had the capability to stop any untoward move. There was no clearand present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang. Dissenting Opinions J. Fernando – It would be an unwarranted departure then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L. Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus entitled to the highest priority among human rights, involving as it does the relationship of man to his Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone at least for the majority of mankind. Without that faith, man’s very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of significance. J. Teehankee – The right to freely exercise one’s religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7 Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of expression and speech and peaceable assembly “along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so than on the other departments -rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes ‘as the sovereign

prerogative of judgment.’ Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. J. Makasiar – With the assurances aforestated given by both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and present danger to public peace and order or to the security of persons within the premises of Malacañang and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted measures and are prepared to insure against any public disturbance or violence. INK VS GIRONELLA Facts: 1. Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., on behalf of the INC, charged respondent Judge due to his opinion in the course of acquitting the defendants-accused of Triple Rape. In his opinion, Gironella said that, “it cannot, therefore, be discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of showing the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her problem.” 2.Respondent, in so doing, was charged with ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench.

Ruling: 1. The use of the word “gimmick” could offend the sensibilities of the members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a course of action, which without it may not be acceptable. 2. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a “gimmick” to gain coverts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of religion implies respect for every creed. No one, much less a public official, is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory sense. It should not be lost sight to either that the attendance at a trial of many members of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution. ESTRADA VS ESCRITOR Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugalarrangement. Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus

the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolentneutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolentneutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugalarrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion. IMBONG VS OCHOA

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: 1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. 2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. 3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. 4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. 5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. 6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. 7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. 8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

Facts: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy. 1. Power of Judicial Review 2. Actual Case or Controversy

3. 4. 5. 6.

Facial Challenge Locus Standi Declaratory Relief One Subject/One Title Rule

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Actual Case or Controversy Facial Challenge Locus Standi Declaratory Relief One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

Discussions:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

PROCEDURAL

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Right to life Right to health Freedom of religion and right to free speech Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) Freedom of expression and academic freedom Due process clause Equal protection clause Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized. Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely

depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.

Ruling/s: SUBSTANTIAL 1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.” In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization. The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed nonabortive, and thus constitutionally permissible. The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and

induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it. However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down. 2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these

contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”. 3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family. The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also antifamily and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority

or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.” However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in lifethreatening procedures. 5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it. Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right

of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. 6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider. The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers. The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is

valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education 8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise. However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now. 2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other

fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. 3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the

Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would

result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. 4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has farreaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: 1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RHIRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s; 2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

State Policies

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and 8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining

G. sec.7 Art II Sec.8 Art II H. sec.9 Art II Sec.10 Art II Sec.11 art II 1. what is social justice Art XIII sec.1 and 2 CALALANG VS WILLIAMS The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one

year from the date of the opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality. Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be

subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. 2) No. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the timehonored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.” ONDOY VS IGNACIO Facts: The petitioner, Estrella Ondoy, is a mother of one Jose Ondoy, an employee who worked under Virgilio Ignacio. According to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Andoy was aboard the ship of the respondent’s enterprise as part of the workforce. He was invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the ship and thereafter was found dead due to drowning. Thus the petitioner asked for compensation, however, the testimonies by the chief engineer were dismissed by the hearing officer due to lack of merit. Afterwards, a motion for reconsideration was also filed before the Secretary of Labor, but was denied again due to lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the compensation for Jose’s death is constitutional. Whether or not Social Justice has a role in this case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, granting Estrella Ondoy 6,000 pesos as compensation for Jose’s death, 300 pesos for burial fees and 600 pesos as attorney’s fee with the costs against respondent, Ignacio. Ratio Decidendi: The principle of social justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, and not equality. The Supreme Court recognized the right of petitioner to claim a compensation from the respondent, as Jose did drown while “in the actual performance of his duty.” To fortify this ruling, the SC cited cases wherein, with accordance to the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, Workmen’s Compensation Act, which dealt with the right of workers for compensation for personal injury, was applied. Among them is a case where there was no direct testimony attesting that the deceased drowned while in the performance of his duty, however, the compensation was sustained. Lastly from another case, the SC quoted that “as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter strict compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection. I. sec.12 Art II 1. Family; protection of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. IMBONG ET AL VS OCHOA (Supra)

2. natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth MEYER VS NEBRASKA 

(summary: The Court declared the Nebraska law unconstitutional, reasoning it violated the liberty protected by Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Liberty, the Court explained, means more than freedom from bodily restraint. It also includes the right of a teacher to teach German to a student, and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their child as they see fit. While the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging the growth of a population that can engage in discussions of civic matters, the means it chose to pursue this objective was excessive. )

that had not yet completed the 8th grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, Plaintiff claimed that education was a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected. He further claimed that the statute infringed the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff by the 14th amendment. Hence, this appeal to the US Supreme Court. Issues 

Is control over the education of their children a fundamental right of parents?

Holding/Rule 

Parents have the fundamental right to control the upbringing, including the education, of their children.

Reasoning Plaintiff is a teacher in Zion Parochial School in Nebraska. He was tried and convicted in the district court for Hamilton country, Nebraska on the ground that he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in German language to Raymond Parpart, a 10-year-old child who had not yet attained and successfully passed the 8th grade. This conviction was based on an “act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska (approved April 9, 1919). The said act prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students



Liberty denotes not only freedom from bodily restraint but also the right… o To contract o To engage in any occupation of his choosing o To acquire useful knowledge o To marry o To establish a home and bring up children

o



To worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience

This liberty may not be interfered with under the guise of protecting the public interest.



It is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life, and nearly all states make education of children compulsory. o Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Before the War, it was looked upon as helpful and desirable.



Meyer had the right to teach, and the parents of the child had the right to engage him so to instruct their child. These actions are within the liberty of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The right is clearly infringed upon. The state says their interest is to foster a homogenous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters. o The means adopted exceed the limitations upon the power of the state.  Proficiency is a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age, and experience shows that it is not injurious to the

 

health, morals, or understanding of an ordinary child. PIERCE VS SOCIETY OF SISTERS In 1922 Oregon amended its compulsory attendance statute to require that children between 8 and 16 years old be sent to public schools in the districts where they lived. Two organizations operating private schools in Oregon, the Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary and the Hill Military Academy, challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that it deprived them of property without due process of law. Walter M. Pierce, the governor of Oregon, was named as a respondent. A federal district court subsequently entered judgment for the schools, enjoining the state from enforcing the statute and finding that “the right to conduct schools was property” and that the statute not only had taken the schools’ property without due process but had also deprived parents of the right to “direct the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places.” Issue: Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control?

Ruling: US SC held that the statute violated the due process clause. The two schools, as Oregon corporations and property owners within the state, were entitled to “protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property.” Furthermore, the court ruled that the Oregon statute “unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children.” According to the court, the state could not force schoolchildren to “accept instruction from public teachers only.” However, the court did acknowledge that states have wide-ranging rights in regard to education: “No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.” Thus, the court invalidated only state action that prevents parents from making an educational choice for their

children; the court did not prohibit states from exercising regulatory control over education, including nonpublic schools. Finding that the Oregon statute was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the federal district court. Sec.4(1) Art XIV Constitution PACU VS SEC. OF EDUCATION The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools. PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of

Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.

PD 1102 PD 603 K.Sec. 14, Art II

ISSUE: W/N Act unconstitutional.

Then Metro Manila Mayor Antonio Villegas approved the appointing of 91 women street sweepers in the City of Manila. But the appointing would still have to be approved by the Office of Civil Service Commission under Commissioner Abelardo Subido. Subido refused to extend approval to such appointments on the ground that appointing women to manual labor is against Memorandum Circular No. 18 series of 1964. Subido pointed out that putting women workers with men workers outside under the heat of the sun and placing them under manual labor exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood. Villegas however pointed out that the said Memo has already been set aside by the Office of the President hence the same is no longer in effect.

No,

2706

as

amended

is

HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law. Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law. Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools. J. sec.13, Art II PD 684 PD 935

VILLEGAS VS SUBIDO

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of said women workers should be confirmed by the Civil Service Commissioner. HELD: Yes, the appointments must be confirmed. The basis of Subido was not on any law or rule but simply on

his own concept of what policy to pursue, in this instance in accordance with his own personal predilection. Here he appeared to be unalterably convinced that to allow women laborers to work outside their offices as street sweepers would run counter to Filipino tradition. A public official must be able to point to a particular provision of law or rule justifying the exercise of a challenged authority. Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. It must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid. This trend towards greater recognition of equal rights for both sexes under the shelter of the equal protection clause argues most strongly against this kind of discrimination. L. sec.15 Art II Sec.16 Art II

OPOSA VS FACTORAN Facts: The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:  

Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act

of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:  



Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court. Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that: 

The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court. 1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. 2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created world in its



entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. 1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in

our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. 1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. A. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate



all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement. 1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. Sec. 17 Art II Sec.5 Art XIV GUINGONA, JR. VS CARAGUE FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the

Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.” The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.” ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education. HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional. DEP.ED VS SAN DIEGO FACTS: Private respondent, San Diego, is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of B.S. in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the NMAT rule: H) A STUDENT SHALL BE ALLOWED ONLY THREE (3) CHANCES TO TAKE THE NMAT. AFTER THREE (3) SUCCESSIVE FAILURES, A STUDENT SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE THE NMAT FOR THE FOURTH TIME.

He then went to RTC Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his petition, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. ISSUE: Whether respondent was deprived of his right to a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. HELD: The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations is a valid exercises of governmental power. The Court agreed that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools” and of “improving the quality of medical education in the country.” The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the

medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. M. SEC.18, ART. II (LABOR as a primary social economic force) Art. XIII, sec. 3 VICTORNIAO VS ERWU Benjamin Victoriano, an Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) member, has been an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory (ERF) since 1958. He was also a member of the EPWU (Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union). Under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between ERF and EPWU, a close shop agreement is being enforced which means that employment in the factory relies on the membership in the EPWU; that in order to retain employment in the said factory one must be a member of the said Union. In 1962, Victoriano tendered his resignation from EPWU claiming that as per RA 3350 he is an exemption to the close shop agreement by virtue of his being a member of the INC because apparently in the INC, one is forbidden from being a member of any labor union. It was only in 1974 that his resignation from the Union was acted upon by EPWU which notified ERF about it. ERF then moved to terminate Victoriano due to his non-membership from

the EPWU. EPWU and ERF reiterated that he is not exempt from the close shop agreement because RA 3350, which provides that close shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization, is unconstitutional and that said law violates the EPWU’s and ERF’s legal/contractual rights.

The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by PD No. 232 as an independent public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 is unconstitutional.

PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to wouldbe coconut plant operators. In March 1993, however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas, underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.

HELD: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein. Further, the right to join a union includes the right not to join a union. The law is not unconstitutional. It recognizes both the rights of unions and employers to enforce terms of contracts and at the same time it recognizes the workers’ right to join or not to join union. RA 3550 recognizes as well the primacy of a constitutional right over a contractual right. N. Sec.19, Art. II (self-reliant and independent national economy) Sec.20, Art. II (role of the private sector) 1. Free enterprise vs. welfare state concept PCD VS. PCA

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted. HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the general public. This is so because

under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest so requires. O. Sec. 21, Art II (rural devt and agrarian reform) ASSO OF SMALL LANDOWNER VS HON. SEC OG AGRIAN REFORM These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844). Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a

comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. [Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below] G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary) The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a different class. G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico) Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in

eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. 2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process. 3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash. HELD: 1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program. 2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,

the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657: Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. 3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation. P. SEC. 22, Art. II (right of indigenous cultural communities) Art. X, sec 15-21 EO No. 220 ORDILLO VS COMELEC Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in

a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.” The official COMELEC results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned. Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit. Issue: W/N the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.

Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further provides that: “SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region . . .” From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress

never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. Q. Sec.23, Art. II (ngos and community based and sectoral orgs) R. Sec.24, Art II (role of communication and information) PLDT CO. VS NTC Facts: On June 22, 1958, Republic Act No. 2090, was enacted otherwise known as “An Act Granting Felix Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic telecommunications.” Felix Alberto & Co. Inc. was the original corporate name, which was changed to ETCI with amendment of the articles of incorporation in 1964. Much later, “CELLCOM Inc.” was the name sought to be adopted before the Securities and Exchange Commission, but this was withdrawn and abandoned.. On May 13, 1987, alleging urgent public need, ETCI filed an application with public respondent NTC for the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct, install, establish, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone system and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with prayer for provisional

authority to operate phase A of its proposal within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with MTD, however NTC over ruled it. NTC granted ETC provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile telephone system initially in Metro Manila subject to terms and conditions, one of which is that ETCI and PLDT shall enter into an interconnection agreement for the provision of adequate interconnection facilities between applicant’s cellular mobile telephone switch and the public switched telephone network and shall jointly submit such interconnection agreement to the commission for approval ETCI admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of more than 40% of the outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to Orbes. In 1968, the Albertos reacquired the shares they had sold to the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of their shares to Horacio Yalung. Thereafter, the present stockholders acquired their ETCI shares. Moreover, in 1964, ETCI had increased its capital stock from Php40,000 to Php360,000; and in 1987, from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000. Issue: Whether or not the transfers in 1987 of the shares of stock to the new stockholders amount to a transfer of ETCI’s franchise which needs congressional approval pursuant to RA 2090. Held: No. Section 10 of RA 2090 is directed to the grantee of the franchise, which is the corporation itself and refers to a sale, lease or assignment of that franchise. It does not include the transfer or sale of

shares of stock of a corporation by the latter’s stockholders.

The sale of shares of stock of a public utility is governed by another law, in section 20 (h) of the Public Service Act (CA 146). Pursuant thereto, the public service commission (now NTC) is the government agency vested with the authority to approve the transfer of more than 40% of the subscribed capital stock of a telecommunications company to a single transferee. In other words, transfer of shares of a public utility corporation need only NTC approval, not congressional authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. The approval of the NTC may be deemed to have been met when it authorized the issuance of the provisional authority to ETCI. There was full disclosure before the NTC of the transfers. In fact, the NTC order of November 12,1987 required ETCI to submit its present capital and ownership structure. Further, ETCI even filed a motion before the NTC, dated November 8, 1987 or more than a year prior to the grant of provisional authority, seeking approval of the increase in its capital stock from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000 and the stock transfers made by its stockholders. A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself

which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the corporation as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not thereby invalidated by the transfer of shares. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right to continuity or perpetual succession. S. Sec.25, Art. II (local govt autonomy) Art. X, sec.1-14 T. Sec.26, Art. II (Equal access to opportunities for public service) PAMATONG VS COMELEC Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office? RULING: No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as “equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.

The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. U. Sec.27, Art. II (honesty and integrity in the public service)

FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDPLaban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

RA 3019, as amended by PD 77 and BP 195 V. Sec. 28, Art. II (policy of full public disclosure) Art. III, Sec.7 Art. VI, sec. 20 VALMONTE VS BELMONTE

ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties. HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The

judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to

compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

LEGASPI VS CSC FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information

from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people

even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.

TANADA VS TUVERA FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of

Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

ISSUE: Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

RULING: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be

bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect. LANTACO VS LLAMAS FACTS: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who for a number of years has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & palce of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this for at least 3 years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 & 1997. Respondent’s last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present. He likewise admit that as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least 6 years and therefore liable for his actions. Whether or not the respondent is exempt from paying his membership duesowing to limited practice of law and for being a senior citizen.

HELD: Yes. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. No. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment covers a period of 1year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their

annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment of membershipor association dues. Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merits the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his duesand plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. Respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. BALDOZA VS DIMAANO FACTS: Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story". The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla who was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of

the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history." Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend. On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and deletions in the movie. On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining, the petitioner and private respondent executed a “Licensing Agreement” where the petitioner agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of P20,000.00 payable without need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor (private respondent) grants authority and permission to Licensee (Petitioner) to exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the PICTURE, and in connection with matters incidental to said production, such as advertising and the like, as well as authority and permission for the use of LICENSOR's name in the PICTURE and have herself portrayed therein, the authority and permission hereby granted, to

retroact to the date when LICENSEE first committed any1. of the acts herein authorized. After its premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in different theaters all over the 2. country. Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs. Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that private respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that he signed the same only because of the coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of the private respondent. ISSUES:

Whether or not private respondent have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter was a public figure. Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press. RULING: 1. Yes. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis,” a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased." Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.

2. No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-ofinterests test." The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation." In the case at bar, the interest observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

CHAVEZ VS PCGG FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on illgotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information? HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or interagency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general --such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

PART II ART. IV SUFFRAGE A.Sec. 1, Art. V B. Sec.2, Art. V MACALINTAL VS COMELEC Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others: 1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election; 2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so. ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No. 1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter. 2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189. PART III THE STRUCTURES AND POWERS OF THE NATL GOVT INTRODUCTORY A. Inherent powers of the State A. Police Power

1. General RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD FACTS: Rubi and other Manguianes residing in the Province of Mindoro alleged that they were being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions were said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one of their fellow tribe, Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for running away from the reservation. Manguianes, as Non-Christian tribe, were considered as very low in culture, have shown no desire for community life and have not progressed sufficiently in civilization. That the purpose of containing them in a reservation, as stated by the Solicitor General, is for their advancement, education, and to introduce civilized custom among them. The order was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, which reads as follow: SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such

inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board. Hence, the validity of Sec. 2145 of the Administrative Code is being questioned. ISSUE: Whether Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty. HELD: Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men. However, Liberty is not a license. Liberty is regulated by law. Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.” 2. Nat’l Security LAO ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ Facts:

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: 

 

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law. The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof. The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:

Issue/s:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and

Discussions:

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power

which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Ruling/s: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.” US VS POMPEYA FACTS: This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal ordinance. Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer,

stating that the acts charged in the complaint do not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens. The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights therein guaranteed HELD: Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill? The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55, as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by

giving information of the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same. The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise, in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and good government? In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal system, the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community. The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby. Is there a cause of action? The complain is unable to show (a) that the defendant

was a male citizen of the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon him for the services mentioned in the law. "For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered." 4. Public Safety AGUSTIN VS EDU Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires. ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid. HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-

powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. On Police Power The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only

in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future

where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.” It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with

petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety. 5. Public Health US VS GOMEZ JESUS

Ruling: 1. The state has general power to enact such laws, in relation to persons and property within its borders, as may promote public health, public morals, public safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants. 2. To make reasonable provision for determining the qualifications of those engaging in the practice of medicine and surgery, and punishing those who attempt to engage therein in defiance of such provisions. This power of the state is generally denominated the police power. It has been held that the state cannot be deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police power and the right to exercise its constitute the very foundation, or at least one of the corner stones, of the state. For the state to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the right to enact laws to promote the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public morals, and public safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of the state. No legislature can bargain away the public health, public

safety, or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are organized with a view to the preservation of these things. They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide for them. It has been held that a constitutional prohibition upon State laws impairing the obligation of contracts does not restrict the power of the State to protect the public health, public morals, or public safety, as the one or the other may be involved in the execution of such contracts. Rights and privileges arising from contracts with a State are subject to regulations for the protection of the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, in the same sense and to the same extent as are all contracts and all property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations. In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may, under certain conditions, become necessary to deprive its citizens of property and of a right providing for the continuance of property, when the property or the exercise of the right may tend to destroy the public health, the public morals, the public safety, and the general welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants. For example, a tannery, a slaughterhouse, or a fertilizing establishment may be located in such proximity to the residence portion of a city as to become a menace to the public health and the welfare of the inhabitants. In such a case the discontinuance or the removal of such institutions may be ordered, under the police power of the

state, even though it amounts to depriving persons of their private property. 6. Public Morals ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS CITY OF MAYOR Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process: refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view; prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also); making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and cancellation of license for subsequent violation. The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari. Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution? Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. There is no violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any

irregularity on its face. As such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted. 7. Public welfare and advancement BUCK VS BELL Facts: Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution. Her condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to determine whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do. Issue: Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment? Held: The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's

challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the substantive law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of observation" could the operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough." 8. The Nat’l economy

RUTTER VS ESTEBAN On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and

the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342. Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on nonimpairment clause grounds. Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end. However based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation and enforcement of

RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations. US VS TORIBIO Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.”

B. Eminent Domain 1. In general 2. What constitute taking US VS CAUSBY Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents’ property contained a house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’ property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is earlier. The United States’ four motored bombers make loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights. Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the value of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted. Issue. Has the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?

Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the easement and whether the easement was permanent or temporary. The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the sky above the land. However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable. However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the present case. The United States had conceded in oral argument that if flights over the Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain. The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences. The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court does not set the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent easement.

Dissent. The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of Claims and hold that there has been no taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. This is because of the modern nature of the airplane, and the desire to avoid confusion. US VS CALTEX Facts: 1. Caltex, shell and standard vacuum oil owned terminal facilities in Pandacan, Manila at the time of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor. These were used to receive, handle and store petroleum products from incoming ships and to release them for further distribution throughout the PH islands. 2. The military situation in the PH grew worse and in the face of the Japanese advance, the Pandacan oil deposits were requisitioned by the US army. 3. The oil companies received an order to demolish the facilities and destroy all unused petroleum products to deprive the enemy of valuable logistic weapon. 4. After the war, respondents demanded compensation of all of the properties, which had been used or destroyed by the army. The US govt paid for the petroleum stocks and transportation equipment, which were either used or destroyed but it refused to compensate the respondents for the destruction of the facilities.

5. Claiming a constitutional right under the 5th amendment to just compensation for these facilities, respondents sued in the court of claims. Recovery was allowed. 6.The US SC granted certiorari for review of this judgment. Issue: W/N the private respondents are entitled for just compensation. Held: No. The judgment was reversed. The SC held that the principle laid down by Justice Field in US vs. Pacific Railroad must govern this case. In that case, it involved bridges which had been destroyed during the war between the states by a retreating Northern Army to impede the advance of the Confederate Army. It was held in that case that the destruction or injury of private property in battle or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the war, had to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its consequences. The safety of the state in such cases overrides all considerations of private loss. Pacific Railroad case was later made the basis for the holding in Juragua Iron Co. vs US, where recovery was denied to the owners of a factory which had been destroyed by American soldiers in the field in Cuba because it was thought that the structure housed the germs if a contagious disease.

The destruction of respondents’ terminal in the face of their impending seizure by the enemy was no different than the destruction of the bridges in the Pacific Railroad case. The deliberation behind the order was no more than a design to prevent the enemy from realizing any strategic value from an area, which it was soon to be captured. Dissent by Justice Douglas and Justice Black: I believe that the 5th Amendment requires compensation for the taking. It was as clearly appropriated to that end as animals, food and supplies requisitioned for the defense effort. As the Court says, the destruction of this property deprived the enemy of a valuable logistics weapon. The guiding principle should be that whenever the government determines that one’s personal property, whatever it may be, is essential to the war effort and appropriated it for the common good, the public purse rather than the individual, should bear the loss.

is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539. Commonwealth Act No. 539 authorized the President of the Philippines to acquire private lands or any interest therein through purchaser or farms for resale at a reasonable price. The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that the Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals. Issue: W/n the expropriation of Guido’s land is in conformity of to the principle of Social Justice.

GUIDO VS RURAL PROGRESS

Held: NO. Hand in hand with the principle that no one shall be deprived of his property without due process of law, herein invoked, and that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy.

Justa Guido, owner of the land being expropriated by the Rural Progress Administration (RPA), filed a petition for prohibition to prevent RPA and Judge Oscar Castelo from proceeding with the expropriation. Guido alleged, among others, that the land sought to be expropriated

Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise

3. Public use 4. Eminent Domain and police power

within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another. The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and received on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means for the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without ventilation. light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings for the poor and the destitute. As will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears direct relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal.

The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises. 5. Just Compensation REPUBLIC VS JUAN Facts: Sps Celestino Juan and Ana Tanseco Juan are the registered owners of the 2 adjoining parcels of land situated in LU. The government filed a complaint for the expropriation of the said land to be used as the site of the LU agricultural school. In negotiating for the price of the property the Juans initially offered to sell the land for P190k (P170k+ bank loan of P20k) with a down payment of P90k. Subsequently, the lower court authorized the government to take possession of the property after depositing the amount of P90793.70 as provisional value. However, the Juans increased valuation further to P300k in his MR. the court ordered the government to deposit P100k as provisional value until the true valuation of the lots can be determined. Subsequently, the government

deposited the amount of P100k which the Juans withdrew that same day. Thereafter, the government started developing the area and constructing the buildings needed for the school. Soon after the Juans again complained that the provisional value fixed by the court is still inadequate, claiming that the property is worth P5k per hectre or a total of P1693040. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the government should pay the Juans the amount of P190k, which is the just and reasonable compensation. Issue: W/N the amount of P190k is just and reasonable compensation. Held: Yes. The amount of P190k is just and reasonable. Besides, the unqualified withdrawal of the partial deposit of value of land by the Juans constituted as recognition on their part of the right of the government to expropriate the lots. In the instant case, it cant be said that the amount is unjust to the Juans because 1) the property was bought in 1957 for only P50k; 2) the value of their improvements only amounted to P1712.60 as of 1963; 3) the alleged cost for leveling surveying and titling thereof from 19571959 amounts only to P40k; 4) the assessed value and the tax declarations of theses lots amounts only to P42120; 5) its also doubtful that the property would increase in value over 6x in 6 yrs from 1957-1963; 6) the property is also 6km from the poblacion of Bacnotan;

C. Taxation 1. In general COMMISIONER VS BOTELHO CORP F: Reparations Commish of the PH sold to Botelho the vessel “M/S Maria Rosello” for the amount of P6,798,888.88. the former likewise sold to General Shipping the vessel “M/S General Lim” at the price of P6,951,666.66. Upon arrival at the port of Manila, the BOC placed the same under custody and refused to give due course (to applications for registration), unless the aforementioned sums of P483,433 and P494,824 be paid as compensation tax. The buyers subsequently filed with the CTA their respective petitions for review. Pending the case, RA 3079 amended RA 1789 –the original Reparations Act, under which the aforementioned contracts with the Buyers had been executed- by exempting buyers of reparations good acquired from the Commish, from liability for the compensation tax. Invoking s20 of RA 3079, the buyers applied for the renovation of their utilizations contract with the Commish, which granted the application and then filed with the Tax court their supplemental petitions for review. The CTA rule in favor of the buyers. CIR appealed and argued upon the ground that a tax exemption must be clear and explicit; that there is no express provision for the retroactivity of the exemption, established by Republic Act No. 3079, from the compensating tax; that the favorable provisions, which

are referred to in section 20 thereof, cannot include the exemption from compensating tax; and, that Congress could not have intended any retroactive exemption, considering that the result thereof would be prejudicial to the Government.

to particular persons. In fact, it is not unusual to grant legislative franchises to specific individuals or entities, conferring tax exemptions thereto. What the fundamental law forbids is the denial of equal protection, such as through unreasonable discrimination or classification.

I: W/N tax exemption may be applied retroactively.

Furthermore, Section 14 of the Law on Reparations, as amended, exempts from the compensating tax, not particular persons, but persons belonging to a particular class. Indeed, appellants do not assail the constitutionality of said section 14, insofar as it grants exemptions to end-users who, after the approval of Republic Act No. 3079, on June 17, 1961, purchased reparations goods procured by the Commission. From the viewpoint of Constitutional Law, especially the equal protection clause, there is no difference between the grant of exemption to said end-users, and the extension of the grant to those whose contracts of purchase and sale mere made before said date, under Republic Act No. 1789.

H: Yes. The SC held that tax exemptions may and do exist, such as the one prescribed in section 14 of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended by Republic Act No. 3079, which, by the way, is "clear and explicit," thus, meeting the first ground of appellant's contention. It may not be amiss to add that no tax exemption — like any other legal exemption or exception — is given without any reason therefor. In much the same way as other statutory commands, its avowed purpose is some public benefit or interest, which the law-making body considers sufficient to offset the monetary loss entitled in the grant of the exemption. Indeed, section 20 of Republic Act No. 3079 exacts a valuable consideration for the retroactivity of its favorable provisions, namely, the voluntary assumption, by the end-user who bought reparations goods prior to June 17, 1961 of "all the new obligations provided for in" said Act. The argument adduced in support of the third ground is that the view adopted by the Tax Court would operate to grant exemption to particular persons, the Buyers herein. It should be noted, however, that there is no constitutional injunction against granting tax exemptions

2. Taxation LUTZ VS ARANETA Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3

of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 19491950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or persons in control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of sugarcane and ceded to others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land. It was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied. The action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: W/N the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are unconstitutional. Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, a said objective of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds

what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the implement of the state’s police power. In addition, it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional. RP VS BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING FACTS: RA 632 created the Philippine Sugar Institute, a semipublic corporation. In 1951, the Institute acquired the Insular Sugar Refinery for P3.07 million payable in installments from the proceeds of the Sugar tax to be collected under RA 632. The operation of the refinery for 1954 to 1957 was disastrous as the Institute suffered tremendous losses. Contending that the purchase of refinery with money from the Institute’s fund was not authorized under RA 632, and that the continued operation of the refinery is inimical to their interest, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Ma-ao Sugar Central, Talisay-Silay Milling Co. and the Central Azucarera del Danao refused to continue with their contribution to said fund. The trial court found them liable under RA 632. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Are the milling companies liable?

RULING: Yes. The special assessment or levy for the Philippine Sugar Institute Fund is not so much an exercise of the power of taxation, nor the imposition of a special assessment, but the exercise of police power for the general welfare of the entire country. It is, therefore, an exercise of a sovereign power which no private citizen may lawfully resist. Section 2a of the charter authorizes Philsugin to acquire the refinery in question. The financial loss resulting from the operation thereof is no means an index that the industry did profit therefrom, as other gains of a different nature (such as experience) may have been realized. B. Doctrine of Separation of Powers BELGICA ET AL VS EXEC SEC This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251. The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.); b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects; c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects. The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned. Presidential Pork Barrel The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983. Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system. ISSUES: I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional. II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. HELD: I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles: a. Separation of Powers As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The

executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go). This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned. b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution. Exceptions to the rule are: (i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on nondelegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress. c. Principle of Checks and Balances One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators. II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit: (i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869. 1. Inherent of republicanism; purpose Interdependence vs. independence 2. System of Checks and Balances 3. Inherent or incidental power ARNAULT VS NAZARENO This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949.

Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation. HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law. IN RE DICK R. McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free Press, a periodical published weekly in the city of Manila. There was a publication of certain articles in that paper which tends to obstruct the Government of the Philippine Islands in policies

inaugurated for the prosecution of the war between the United States and the German Empire, and other articles which have tended to create a feeling of unrest and uneasiness in the community. He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation but before the GovernorGeneral gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code. Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of police of the city of Manila. I: W/N the Governor-General has the power of deportation absent of a statutory grant of authority. H: Y e s , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l h a s the power to institute and m a i n t a i n d e p o r t a t i o n proceedings. The discretionary power to deport "undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the Philippine Islands is a menace to the peace and safety of the community," as an act of state, having been conferred upon the Governor-General, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion as to whether the facts disclosed by an investigation had in accord with section 69 of the Administrative Code justify or necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal is at liberty to re examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.

ARTICLE VI THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT A. Legislative Power; basic limitations a. no irrepealable laws b. separation of powers c. improper delegation of powers Delegation of Powers i. Tariff powers, s.28(2) art. VI;’ ii. Emergency powers, s.23(2) art. VI; iii. Delegation to the people 1) referendum, 2)plebescite; s.2, art. XVII s.32, art. VI PEOPLE VS VERA Facts: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City

Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues: 1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power 2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. 2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions, which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

Discussions: Rulings:

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to

appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. 2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights, which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation

would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards. iv.

delegation to local governments

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD

was challenged.

Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:

HELD: I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area,

and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.” PP VS VERA supra s.16, RA 7160, LGC of 1991: “The General Welfare Clause; Police Power.” s.19, RA 7160, LGC of 1991: Power of eminent domain s.5, art. X of the Constitution: power of taxation.

v.

delegation to administrative bodies. The “power of subordinate legislation” by administrative agencies.

PP VS VERA supra CRUZ VS YOUNGBERG F: Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature. The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file

another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court. I: W/N AN 3052 is ineffective upon the declaration of unconstitutionality of AN 3155. H: No. The SC said aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. In this connection it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.

ABAKADA VS EXEC SECRETARY Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit: . . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%). Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon

merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.

Issues: 1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution. 2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Discussions:

1. Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. 2. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.

3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.”

Rulings: 1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. 2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our

complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. 3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness. vi.

delegation of express authority

GARCIA VS EXEC SEC In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and

other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: Whether constitutional.

or

not

EO

475

and

478

are

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President to issue the said EOs. vii.

delegation to carry out defined policy according to prescribed standard

EDU VS ERICTA FACTS: Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. Galo followed with a manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue

exercise of legislative power. ISSUE: Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid. RULING: Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order. Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took

effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack,

far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo. RAFAEL VS EMBROIDERY BD In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided that the Board shall be composed of: (1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of Finance; (2) a representative from the designated by its Governor;

Central Bank to be

(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry; (4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman; and (5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines. Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made certain assessments against Cecilio Rafael but the latter refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred that RA 3137 is unconstitutional for while Congress may create an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be

appointed by the President in accordance with Article 7, Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act prescribes that the chairman and members of the EACIB should come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the constitutional power of the President to make appointments. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 appointing power of the president.

bypassed

the

HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed “the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive office.” In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB are not appointed by the Department Heads. They are merely going to be designated hence whoever was designated was merely sitting as an ex officio member. It must also be noted that Congress took care to specify that the representatives should come from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce and Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious reason must be because these departments and/or bureaus perform functions which have a direct relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into embroidery and apparel products and their subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt in

RA 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make appointments. The law is not unconstitutional. viii.

promulgation regulations

of

rules

and

VDA. DE PINEDA VS PEÑA The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After Sibayan's death, his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein they waived their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir Feliza Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes. The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in February, 1932, and was subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan. In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21 Mining Association, later converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the members conveyed their respective mining claims, including the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining Company for operation. During this time, an amended declaration of location for the "Ullmann" claim was registered.

On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case against Feliza Sibayan, Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the CFI, Quezon City. Petitioners claimed that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement from which private respondents derived their ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was maliciously falsified and prayed for annulment of all subsequent transfers involving the mining claims. During the pre-trial of Civil Case, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, agreeing that: (1) private respondents win return to petitioners the disputed mining claims, including the "Ped" claim; (2) petitioners will reimburse private respondents all expenses, like assessment taxes, incurred in the preservation of the claims; and (3) private respondents shall execute the necessary documents to reconvey the mining claims to petitioners. Thus, the CFI rendered a decision ordering the parties to comply with the above settlement. On 1974, petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter-complaint against private respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim and which the Dir. of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict between the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974)

took effect, the provisions of the law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost. An appeal and MR was made to the Minister of Natural Resources, which the latter denied such.

delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute. Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, public respondents were duly empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in the protest case, even if not raised in issue.

Hence, this petition. I: W/N public respondents may not validly and legally take cognizance of an issue not raised in the complaint, i.e., the issue of the validity of the "Ped" mining claim. H: It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. In order to be valid, the administrative regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, conform to the standards that the law prescribes and must relate solely to carrying into effect the general provisions of the law. With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the Department Head pursuant to validly

3. test of delegation a. the completeness test US VS ANG TANG HO In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5

months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General. HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

TUPAS VS OPLE The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and the National Federation of Labor Unions (NFLU) are unions representing the agricultural and industrial sectors. They alleged they represent over a million workers all over the country. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision which states that 3 sectors are to be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor). Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao respectively. These sectors can submit their nominees to the President for approval/appointment through the Minister of Labor. TUPAS however questions the constitutionality of the said BP because it allegedly lacks duly published rules on accreditation, nomination and appointment of industrial labor representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned the acts of Blas Ople, then Minister of Labor, in accrediting certain nominations provided by other industrial labor groups. TUPAS claims that since there are no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the nominations must be handled, the said law has provided undue delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left him with absolute discretion in carrying out the duty of accrediting such nominations. TUPAS did not submit their nomination within the given 20day period of nominating their representation; they instead proceeded to question the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality of the acts of Ople. Because of their failure to submit their nominees, Ople did not accredit them.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697. HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite obvious. Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion. What is involved then is not a legislative power but the exercise of competence intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who could make the recommendation is the Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The argument, therefore, that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force. To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have to be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Such standard is set forth with clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full the limits and scope of the functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said provisions. TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to the President by merely writing a letter coursed through respondent, and their nominees should have

been submitted to the President. They did not do so. In fact, as of May 30, 1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they wrote a letter to Ople which in effect stated that they were not submitting any nomination and informing him that they were questioning the validity of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697. Hence, if petitioners were not able to submit any nominee they had no one to blame but themselves. And the law cannot be declared unconstitutional on such ground. b. the sufficiency of standard test PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part: The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require… The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under

this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?” The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC. HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether

the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality. The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in character not administrative (not executive). c. examples of sufficient standards “public interest” PP VS ROSENTHAL Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. Later, Rosenthal and Osmeña were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581.

Section 2 provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos. Section 5, on the other hand, provides that “whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel said certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.” Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance,

with the result that, legislative powers being unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied with the provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public interest.” In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581 — to protect the public against “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky” and against the “sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, — the SC held that “public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits.

Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in question show the contrary. . . ” “simplicity, economy and efficiency”

b)

o

NAFCO

is

in

precarious

financial

condition. I: W/N Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void. W/N R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

CERVANTES VS AUDITOR GENERAL 

This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioner’s claim for quarters allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).  Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00  NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650 for 1949.  This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the Auditor general on two grounds: o a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting manager’s salary to P15,000/year.

H: As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. “public welfare”

CALALANG VS WILLIAMS Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.

On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second endorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila Issues: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power? Ruling: There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe

transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.”

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals” in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.

Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.

To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. “reasonableness” PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor

of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power. HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of ratefixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the

administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT. “other standards” TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REG. BOARD In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct. HELD: No. 1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. 2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the

deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].” FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS MINISTRY OF LABOR In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting discretion to the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining. ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power. HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law. The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the

exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to be determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor dispute in issue. There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to “strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.” “insufficient standard” YNOT VS IAC Police Power – Not Validly Exercised There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from inter-provinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a

valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. B. S1, Art. VI; congress C. Composition, qualification and terms of ofc

a. senate – art. VI s2-4 b. HOR – art. VI, 5-8; Ar.t IX-C, s 6-8; Art. XVIII s7 DIMAPORO VS MITRA FACTS: Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states: Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and VicePresident shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as

congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress. In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment. ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION? 2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH? HELD:

officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that: Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Under this commentary on accountability of public

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable. That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode

of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment … All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if wellfounded, does not suffice. 2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article

IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office. NOTES: - In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened: a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries; b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior; c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and, d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office. QUINTO VS COMELEC Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto

resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. ISSUE: Are appointed officials considered resigned upon filing of their certificates of candidacy? Is Section 13 of RA 9369 violative of the equal protection clause? RULING: No, to the first question and yes to the second. “ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.” The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil

servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause. QUINTO VS COMELEC (MR OF 1ST CASE) Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in

government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that “For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional Held: No To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is

equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain." In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they

were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. i.

Residency/reapportionment/gerrymande ring AQUINO VS COMELEC Relevant Provisions: Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident

thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months. Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election. Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes. Move Makati filed a MR with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for

lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders. Issue: 1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district. 2. W/N it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in. Held: 1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied. The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.

While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. 2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence. The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac. Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent

home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City. Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion, which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. The Commission on Elections thus rightfully disqualified Aquino due to his lack of one-year residence in the district. CENIZA VS COMELEC Equal Protection” – Gerrymandering **”Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.” ** FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which

effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and

therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection. ISSUE: W/N there is a violation of equal protection. W/N there is gerrymandering HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners’ allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969. The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller

income need the continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some instances. The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage. Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. Gerrymandering” is a “term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. The questioned statutes in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The said representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that there is an unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor General pointed out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters of the administration candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes will work to their disadvantage. ii.

Party-List Representatives- RA 7941

VETERANS FED PARTY VS COMELEC Facts: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House. Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially

the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMAKATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS. On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up”.

Issue: How to determine the winners of the subject partylist election can be settled by addressing the following issues: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of

the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time? 2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives — two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties — are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation. In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the COMELEC effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to

define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review. The COMELEC, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law find lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.

In view of the party-list system elements per COMELEC First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should have at least one representative."

In view of to whom should the seats be given In the suits, made respondents together with the

COMELEC were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the COMELEC "to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999 Resolution, until further orders from this Court."

In view of the 20% being mandatory The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them. On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress. Our task now, as should

have been the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the actual election process.

In view of the 2% threshold In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

In view of the 2.5% vote equivalent "MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal.

Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

In view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party limit An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod: "MR. MONSOD: …but we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats among the fifty. . . ."

In view of the method of allocating additional seats Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the

three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to.

In view of the Niemeyer Formula Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to.

In view of the legal and logical formula for the Philippines Step One. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements — two percent for us and five for them.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

One half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect; deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to . . ."

proportion to those of the first party. In view of the formula for determining additional seats for the first party The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in

In view of the formula for additional seats of other qualified parties Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

In view of the 2% threshold rationale The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized as follows: 1.To avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position; 2.To discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the elections; 3.To avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system; 4.To encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system; 5.To enable sectoral representatives to rise to the

same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines; 6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; 16 and 7. To ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented.

The framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral groups suffer from major disadvantages in the competitive election arena. They sought to remedy this inequality through an outright constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first three terms of the sectoral representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have to earn their seats through participation in the party-list system.

In view of the 3-seat limit rationale The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute partylist representation to as many party groups as possible.

According to Senator Tolentino, if one party will be allowed to dominate, then the idea of giving as much as possible to the marginalized groups may be defeated. The purpose is to allow as many as possible of the marginalized groups that would be entitled to representation to have a seat in Congress, and to have enough seats left for those who are way below the list. The party-list system of proportional representation is based on the Niemeyer formula, embodied in Art. 6(2) of the German Federal Electoral Law, which provides that, in determining the number of seats a party is entitled to have in the Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the number of votes obtained by each party and then the product should be divided by the sum total of the second votes obtained by all the parties that have polled at least 5 percent of the votes. First, each party receives one seat for each whole number resulting from the calculation. The remaining seats are then allocated in the descending sequence of the decimal fractions. The Niemeyer formula was adopted in R.A. No. 7941, §11. Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-list representatives, which at present are 52. The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district representatives to 20 percent party-list representatives. If in fact all seats reserved for party-list representatives are not filled, that is due to the fact that the law limits parties, organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats each. To maintain this ratio, the entire number of seats for the party-list system, after deducting the number of seats

initially distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them. I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's fixation with designating the highest ranking participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as admitted by the majority, assumes that the seats to be allocated to the qualified parties depend on the seats of the so-called first party. In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply to the following prescription: (1) follow the "1 seat for every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking party only and (2) with respect to the rest of the 2 percenters, give each party one (1) seat, unless the first ranking party gets at least six percent, in which case all 2 percenters with at least one-half of the votes of the first ranking party should get an extra seat.. The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all 2 percenters, which are not the first ranking party, from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is so because, with their votes being proportioned against the votes of the first ranking party, there will never be an instance where the additional seats of these parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A. No. 7941, §11 which contemplates the possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining the maximum number of seats allowed by law. ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY VS COMELEC

Facts: Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or overrepresented. Issues: a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. b. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to ‘marginalized and underrepresented’ sectors and organizations. Held: The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELEC which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC “to refrain proclaiming any winner” during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the COMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance.

a. Yes b. No.

to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was.

Rationale: a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."

BANAT VS COMELEC (APRIL 2009) 586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party List System; Proportional Representation; Proper Computation

b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter – may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-list-system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up

Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the Constitution – Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295). In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules: 1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); 2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat; 3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3

seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

ISSUES:

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of partylists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest). On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid. IV. How are party-list seats allocated? V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections. VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid. HELD: I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula: (Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List Representatives Hence, (220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55 II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled. III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained: To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list

seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat. But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to

additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

How is this done?

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for partylists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation). The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed. Example: In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900). Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79 Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats. Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

1. the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns.Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.

BANAT VS COMELEC (JULY 2009) Facts: This is a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)and

On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multisectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. Petitioner argues the following:

2. Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal

(SET).According to petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELECen banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senatorsmay now entertain preproclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators.Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.

-Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; -Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution -Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution

Ruling: The petition is denied. RA 9369 is constitutional. 3. Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses. 4. section 34 which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at Pon election day.Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.

Issue/s:

Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional.

1. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections.The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37

and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and(2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881.Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter ofRA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others. 2. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass.The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en bancmay now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts. 3. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained. 4. The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies to previously perfected contracts.In this case, there is no

perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail over a contract.According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes.The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power.The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare.The OSG also states that this was a reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts. ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC 94 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Department – Party-List System This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC. Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists. HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows: I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “welldefined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above). Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined political constituencies.” Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system, which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.) III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the partylist system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and causeoriented parties who lack “well-defined political

constituencies”. The common denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections. If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house. As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have welldefined political constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized. iii.

Vacany

LOZADA VS COMELEC 120 SCRA 337 – Political Law – Vacancy in the Legislature

Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.

In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature. HELD: No. The SC’s jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter’s decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.

RA 6645 1. Election a. Regular election – art. VI s8 b. Special election – art. 6 s9

2. Salaries, privileges and disqualification a. Salaries – art. 6 s10; art. 13 s 17 PHILCONSA VS MATHAY Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969. The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired. LIGOT VS MATHAY Political Law – Salaries of Representatives – Retirement

Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government” was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased under said Act from 7,200.00 to 32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.” Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.” The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which

ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum. ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit. HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the

similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, “Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.” b. Freedom from arrest- art. 6 s11; RPC art. 145 MARTINZE VS MORFE Political Law – The Legislative Department – Immunity from Arrest under the 1935 Constitution

representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were arrested fall under the category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the Constitution. NOTE: Under the 1987 Constitution:

Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of a public document before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for violation of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest. They contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the charges upon which they were arrested are within the immunity.

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in Congress or in any committee thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by

HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and

c. Speech and Debate clause – art. 6 s11 JIMENEZ VS CABANGBANG Political Law – Freedom of Speech and Debate

some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous. ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress. HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.” The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by

Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged. OSMENA VS PENDATUN Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to be

baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house. Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its members. ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated? HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed. FLORES VS DRILON FACTS

Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.” ISSUES (1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. (2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance. (3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post. (4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. (5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his appointment.

HELD (1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents. (2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. (3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law. (4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA,

he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another public office. (5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

e. Duty to disclose – art. 6 s12 and 20; art. 11 s17 3. Internal Govt. of Congress a. Election of Officers – art. 6 s16 (1)

RULING: The petition fails. The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto. ISSUE: o

o

Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority leader Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms. In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader. Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the

Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must

be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority. In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and

judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law. To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail. b. Quorum – id s6 (2) AVELINO VS CUENCO Political Law – The Legislative Department – Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Tañada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas

Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case. HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution? There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. **Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA. Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session? The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of

the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949) Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is ½ + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum. The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majority’s pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a

mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuenco’s election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the Avelino’s persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority’s ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed. Justice Feria: (Concurring) Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact that said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,” shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is

empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the members” as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required “concurrence of twothirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member” was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority. c. Rules of proceedings – Id s16(3); Id s21 PACETE VS SEC OF COA Facts: Feliciano Pacete was appointed by the President as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on 11 September 1964. His appointment was made during recess of Congress and was only submitted to COA in 1965 session and was unanimously confirmed on 20 May 1965. On 07 February 1966 the Secretary of Justice advised him to vacate his post on the ground that his appointment was by-passed. Pacete clarified the matter with Commission on Appointments. COA took no action and the Secretary of Justice still moved to Pacete to vacate his post and withheld his salaries.

Issue: W/N appointment of petitioner must be confirmed. Held: Yes. The controlling principle is discussed in the case of Altarejos vs Molo which interpreted the Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointment. It held that the mere filing of MR doesn’t have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. Instead, it only reopen the appointment and submit it for approval or disapproval of the majority members of the COA. Moreover, there’s a distinction between appointments made during recess of Congress and appointment made while Congress is in session. When Congress is in session, presidential nominees can only assume office once confirmed by the COA. On the other hand, when the Congress is in recess, the president makes an ad interim appointment, which takes effect at once until its disapproved by the COA or next adjournment of the Congress. ARROYO VS DE VENECIA Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised

repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. OSMENA VS PENDATUM (supra) ABAKADA VS ERMITA Facts: Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit: . . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not. Issue: W/N RA 9337 is unconstitutional Held: No. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex

economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In the same breadth, the Court reiterates its finding that its not a property or a property right, and a VATregistered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of RA 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which RA 9337 was passed, the means thru which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within the constitutional bounds.

that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election. Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution. Issues of the Case:

MR denied and TRO lifted.

d. Power over members and right to sit VERA VS AVELINO The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of the local electorate. During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the report ordering

Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid. Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections. Held: The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted

to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of the courts. The case is therefore dismissed. e. Discipline of members- Id s16(3) ALEJANDRINO VS QUEZON Facts: On 5 January 1924, the Philippine Senate composed of respondent Senators, including Senate President Manuel L. Quezon, issued a resolution depriving petitioner, Senator Jose Alejandrino Senator for the Twelfth District, of all the prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from the first of January 1924, having found the petitioner guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Vince de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District, on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of Senator Alejandrino. Alejandrino contests the resolution, claiming the same to be unconstitutional, praying to the Supreme Court (1) to issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution;(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights of the

petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of suspension into effect. Respondents, through the Attorney General, objects, claiming the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction therein. Issue: WON the Supreme Court has the power to annul the Resolution made by the Philippine Senate against Senator Alejandrino. Held: NO. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed. Osmena vs Pendatum (supra) SANTIAGO VS SB Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress – Violations of RA 3019 In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was

said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days. ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution. HELD: Yes. It is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides: Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of

the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him. Here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order. But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended? The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

f. Journal and Congressional records- art. 6 s16(4) 1. The Enrolled Bill Theory MABANAG VS VITO Political Law – Journal – Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The 3 senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC can’t take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE: W/N the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. W/N the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress. HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.” **Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.” The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals. CASCO (PHIL) CHEMICAL CO. VS GIMENEZ Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and

formaldehyde. Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde). Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides: The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following: xxx

xxx

xxx

“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users. Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view

the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. The enrolled bill formaldehyde”

however

used

the

term

“urea

ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”. HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”. The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the

cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree. FARINAS VS EXEC SEC Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – How a Bill Becomes a Law – Bicameral Conference Committee – Enrolled Bill Doctrine Equal Protection Clause – Valid Classification Election Law – Appointive Officials vs Elective Officials In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section 14 thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an elective official, except the President and the VicePresident, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence, under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his certificate of candidacy for an elective office while he is still in office.

clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination). The Fariñas group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They contend that irregularities attended to the creation of the said law. Fariñas explained that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there were contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference Committee was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its record and the compromise bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said compromise bill was reached was instantly made and made to be passed around for signing – all these irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.

Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official hall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.

Rodolfo Fariñas, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial

HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional. On Equal Protection

distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no

concern. Whatever irregularities there may have been in the Bicameral Conference Committee involve internal rules which cannot be inquired into by the Court. 2. Probative value of the journal UNITED STATES VS PONS Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914. HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case. 3. Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory ASTORGA VS VILLEGAS Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journal; When to be Consulted In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices of

the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority of RA 4065). Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said “law” passed the 3 rd reading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for approval and sent

to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted. HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not

become law. As done by both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. MORALES VS SUBIDO Political Law – The Legislative Department – Journals vs Enrolled Bill Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does not possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:

Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of a city …” can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following: No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher. Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the

phrase “or has served as chief of police with exemplary record.” Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being deliberated upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the matter. HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters

entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy. 4. Congressional record art VI s. 16(4) par.2 g. Sessions- art. VI s15 and 16(5); art. VII s10-11 and 18 par. 3 4.Electoral Tribunals- art. VI s 17 & 19 a. composition TANADA V CUENCA ABBAS V SET 166 SCRA 651 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals – Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of

public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24) —- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature —- is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought. ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas’ proposal could be given due weight. HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers. “Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six

shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.” It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest. b. nature of function

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMM 63 Phil. 139 – Political Law – Judicial Review – Electoral Commission In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.

That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. c. Independence of ET

Separation of Powers

Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.

Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

BONDOC V PINEDA 201 SCRA 792 – Political Law – HRET – Removal of a Member

HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. **HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the minority. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,

and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.” DAZA V SINGSON Tribunal and its Composition The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: As provided in the constitution, “there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation” of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of

each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court. Furthermore, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

COSETENG V MITRA Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine congressmen. Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP). Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that

the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority. The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority. Issue: W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation. Held: Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because revision in House representation in CA wasbased on proportional representation. The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being

a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA. Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap. There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House. Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.

Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.

2.Powers of Congress a. general plenary powers- art. VI s1

HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.

ARNAULT V NAZARENO Inquiry in Aid of Legislation

b. limitations on the legislative power

This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949.

1) substantive limitations a) express substantive limitations;

b)implied substantive limitations 1. prohibition against delegation of legislative power 2. prohibition against passage of irrepealable laws 2) procedural limitations c. power of inquiry v. question hour- art. 6 s22 SENETA OF THE PHIL V ERMITA 495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality of E.O. 464 In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of

the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval. The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional. HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the

SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of

legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom. The requirement then to secure

presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in contempt as a punitive measure. FACTS: This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry. Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution states:

d. legislative investigations- art. 6 ss21 ARNAULT V NAZARENO, supra ARNAULT V BALAGTAS

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS

CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.

xxx

xxx

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner may be released from his Senateimposed incarceration.

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold; WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;

The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and ordered his release.

1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate. 2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure. HELD: YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated. 3. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was still

trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The Judicial department has no right or power or authority to do this, in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion. 4. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive measure.

Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that petitioner’s acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate’s dignity and authority. The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative department should not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced. The exercise of the legislature’s authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations.

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee. BENGZON V SBRC 203 SCRA 767 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in Aid of Legislation – When not Allowed It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability

of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious. Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea. Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC. ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted. HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.

the SB would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the SB, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the SB can not be discounted.

Furthermore, It can’t be overlooked that when SRBC decide to conduct its investigation of the P, the complaint had already been filed with the SB. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein P, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the SRBC is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the SB. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the SRBC to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before

j. concur in treaties- art. 7 s21 (thru the senate)

e. act as Board of canvassers for Pres and VP electionart. 7 s4 p4; ra7166. f. call special election for P and VP- art. 7 s10 g. revoke/extend suspension of privilege of HC and declaration of ML- art. 7 s18 h. approve P amnesties- art. 7 s19 i. confirm certain appointments- art. 7 s9 (by congress; id., s16 (by COA) k. declaration of war and delegation of emergency powers- art. 6 s23 ARANETA V DINGLASAN 84 Phil. 368 – Political Law – First Emergency Powers Cases

Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from

proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis. Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L3055 which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit issued to him. L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which was appropriating funds to hold the national elections. They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said CA had likewise ceased. ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased. HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to the president, became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the

first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal. RODRIGUEZ V GELLA 92 Phil. 603 – Political Law – Second Emergency Powers Cases

Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They sought to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EO’s were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also

that CA 671 was already declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta vs Dinglasan. ISSUE: Whether or not the EO’s are valid. HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest. l. be judge of the Pres’ physical fitness- art. 7 s11 p4 m. power of impeachment

ROMULO V YNIGUEZ Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling for the impeachment of President Marcos together with a verified complaint by impeachment. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government (CJHRGG). The committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved the Resolution and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the Archives. The next day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of RN 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan. The present petition was then filed with the Court praying that pertinent provisions of the Batasan Rules granting power to the Batasan to determine whether an impeachment complaint is sufficient and its power to approve of deny such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also pray that dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN 644 and the impeachment complaint attached thereto be declared null and void. It is the petitioner’s contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the amendatory process provided in the Constitution. Further, the said provisions vest with the CJHRGG the power to decide

whether to impeach or not, which should be decided by the Batasan as a collegiate body and not by a small body of the Batasan. They also content that the Batasan Rules impose an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose at least 1/5 of all the members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings. ISSUEs 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment? 2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and complaint for impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges of the complaint? 3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional? HELD No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for the recall from the Archives of RN 644 and the complaint for impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing said

complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of its members. In this case, a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the CHRGG makes mathematically impossible the required vote for conviction of at least 2/3 of all the members. It would serve no purpose to proceedany further when it is obvious that the require 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained. Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order. A dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the resolution and complaint for impeachment – as in the dismissal of Mitra’s motion in the case – makes irrelevant under what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of the powers vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of the court to review. The court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the CJHRGG to recall from the Archives the complaint and resolution would produce the effect of ordering the Batasan to proceed with the impeachments proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed provisions are constitutional. The Batasan, pursuant to its powers to adopt rules of its proceeding, may adopt necessary rules of procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. The Batasan Rules of Procedure in impeachment cases providing for the dismissal of an impeachment complaint which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or

probable cause has not been established, or requiring majority vote of all members of the Batasan for the approval of a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the 1973 Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the enforcement of the particular provisions of the Rules (aside from the fact that the question involved is a political one), because the acts of the committee sought to be restrained had already been consummated. They are fait accompli.

Thus, the above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. n. power w/ regard to utilization of natural resources- art. 12 s2 o. amendment of the Consti- art. 17 s1-2.

LECAROZ V SB

3. legislative process

Held: The information against petitioner was filed in 1980; therefore, respondent court retains jurisdiction over the case subject of instant petition.

a. req. as to bills

The broad power of the New Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over "public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations." There are exceptions, however, like constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by impeachment. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provides:

DELA CRUZ V PARAS

"SEC. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption."

(1) as to titles of bills- art. 6 s26(1)

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise

Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. 3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. 4.

Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs. 2.

In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs.

They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. 4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. LIDASAN V COMELEC 21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter

registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato. ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”? HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790. TIO V VRB 151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs. In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds: 1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the law. 2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct. HELD: No. 1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be

comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. 2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].” INSULAR LUMBER V CTA 104 SCRA 710 – Political Law – One Subject Embraced in the Title of a Bill

Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In 1956, Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax refund to those

using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions. In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of P19,921.37 pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such provision because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the provision ceased to be effective. ILC appealed the issue to the CTA and the CTA ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the ILC’s right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the CTA. The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way: The title of RA 1435 is “An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund.” The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly

not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund. ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ILC. HELD: Yes, but only in the amount as found by the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed it. (2) req. as to certain laws i. appropriation laws- art. 7 s22; art. 6 ss-24-25, 29 GINGONA V CARAGUE

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled “Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act),” by P.D. No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution? Held: No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,” such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.

Issue: ii. tax laws- art. 6, s28; art. 14 s4 (3-4) TAN V DEL ROSARIO

1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law. 2.

Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution: -Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. - Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. - Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads,

'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process. 5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents. 6. The Court has given due course to both petitions. ISSUE: Whether RA 7496 and RR Nos. 2-93 are unconstitutional. RULING: No. RA 7496 does not impose tax on single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Such system of income taxation has long been the prevailing rule even prior to RA 7496. Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Also, the Court clarifies that a general professional partnership is not itself an income taxpayer. The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax exempt, but on the partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits as provided in Section 23 of the Tax

Code. There is no distinction in income tax liability between a person who practices his profession alone or individually and one who does it through partnership with others in the exercise of a common profession. Under the present income tax system all individuals deriving income from any source whatsoever are treated in almost invariably the same manner and under a common set of rules. The phrase "income taxpayers" is an all embracing term used in the Tax Code, and it practically covers all persons who derive taxable income. Partnerships no matter how created or organized, are subject to income tax which, for purposes of the above categorization, are by law assimilated to be within the context of, and so legally contemplated as, corporations.

Section 6 of Revenue Regulation No. 2-93 did not alter, but merely confirmed, the above standing rule as now so modified by Republic Act No. 7496 on basically the extent of allowable deductions applicable to all individual income taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

GARCIA V ES 211 SCRA 219 – Political Law – Congress Authorizing the President to Tax In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures. ISSUE: Whether constitutional.

or

not

EO

475

and

478

are

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.

1.

Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

2.

BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs. iii. jurisdiction of the SC FIRST LEPANTO CERAMIC V CA

4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. 5.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

6.

Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and

Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court. 7.

While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED). Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case against Agustin which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:

295 SCRA 470 – Political Law – Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court

In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Appeal from Decisions of QuasiJudicial Bodies

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

FABIAN V HON. DESIERTO

HELD: No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC. Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over “final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies. But what is the proper remedy? Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

b. PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF BILLS- ART. 6 S26(2) ARROYO V DE VENECIA HELD: No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's... question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any further... consideration of the question.[31] To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum

is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the... business of the House.[ Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. Furthermore, the Constitution doesn’t require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members... present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer... tedium to repeat the process. c. the pres’ veto power 1. qualified v absolute veto 2. executive impoundment compare 1987 consti art. 27 vs 1935 consti art. 6 s20 BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORP V VALENCIA 11 SCRA 486 – Political Law – Veto Power – Condition Attached to an Item

Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations

in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damages to his department. ISSUE: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages. HELD: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. Note: This ruling, that the executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same

produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. GONZALES V MACARAIG Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power. ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the itemveto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power. BENGZON V DRILON 208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials. Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said

PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions. Congress took notice of the readjustment and soon in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary. However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297. This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon. ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional. HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the

decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government. PHILCONSA V ENRIQUEZ 235 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative Process Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development Fund”

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality

of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA). ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid. HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. Veto on special provisions The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme

in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision

which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is

lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the wellestablished principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the

GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities. Pork Barrel Constitutional The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated. TANDA V TUVERA supra ART VII THE EXECUTIVE DEPT 1. The President a. singular executive PLANAS V GIL 67 Phil. 62 – Political Law – Separation of Powers – Rule of NonInterference

In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations. She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative in character. ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President. 2. ISSUE: W/N the President has the legal authority to order the investigation HELD: 1. The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers. In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither decisive nor conclusive upon this

court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended. Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the right to elicit the truth. 2. YES. Provided the investigation should be in accordance with law. The constitution grants to the President the powers of control and supervision. The power to exercise general supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed authorizes him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not

automatic and brutal, it must be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation. The President in the exercise of the executive power under the Constitution may act through the heads of the executive departments. The heads of the executive departments are his authorized assistants and agents in the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his acts. The power of removal which the President may exercise directly and the practical necessities of efficient government brought about by administrative centralization easily make the President the head of the administration. VILLENA V SECRETARY 67 Phil. 451 – Political Law – Control Power – Supervision – Suspension of a Local Government Official – Power to suspend comes with the power to remove Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative

Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation. HELD: Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude“.

The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation. Furthermore, The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the department secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the acts of the President.” The power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the President to act personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of

the departments are assistants and agents of the President. ANG-ANGCO V CASTILLO power of control and security of tenure 

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Pepsi sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce to request for a special permit to withdraw pepsi concentrates from the customs house. They were imported without any dollar allocation or forex remittance. They also wrote the Secretary of Finance, the Central Bank Governor. The Import-Export Committee of the CB submitted to the Monetary Board a memorandum of Pepsi’s letter. The Monetary Board however failed to take up the matter because the transaction did not involve any dollar allocation or forex. Pepsi still had no authorization to withdraw the concentrates. So, Pespsi approached Angangco (the Collector of Customs) to secure the immediate release of the concentrates. However, since there was no CB certificate, Angangco told Pepsi to get one from the No-Dollar Import Office who had jurisdiction over the case. Later, the said Office also said that it was not within their jurisdiction.

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Thus, Angangco called up the Secretary of Finance (Hernandez) and the Secretary VERBALLY APPROVED THE RELEASE OF THE PEPSI PRODUCTS. Angangco thus authorized the release. The Commissioner of Customs Manahan however ordered the seizure of the goods. Manahan filed a case against Angangco for grave neglect of duty, prejudicial to the Bureau of Customs President Magsaysay wanted an investigation. Angangco was suspended from office but was reinstated by Secretary of Finance Hernandez. Magsaysay died.. But after 3 years Executive Secretary Castillo by authority of now President Garcia, rendered a decision finding Angangco GUILTY and CONSIDERED RESIGNED. Angangco assails this decision and argues that it deprives him of his office without due process. Castillo however claims that the President has the power of control over officers and employees in the executive department.

ISSUE: Whether the President has the power to take direct action even if Angangco belongs to the classified service under Civil Service Act of 1959 SC: Angangco was deprived of due process!! Officers in the CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE comes within the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE

COMMISSION OF CIVIL SERVICE, except as otherwise provided for by law. So is there any other law empowering the President to remove officers in the classified civil service? The only law we can recall is the RAC which grants the power to remove officials “conformably to law”. It shows that the President does not have blanket authority to remove any officer or employee of the government, but that his power must still be subject to the law that may be passed. Here, there is such a law (Civil Service ACT) which governs officers and employees in the classified civil service. The President is bound to follow that law. So, even granting for administrative purpose the President is considered the Department Head of the CSC, his power to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act. Under said law, the proper forum would be the COMMISSIONER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, OR THE CIVIL SERVICE APPEALS BOARD. As to the power of control, it is defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The President’s control over the executive department REFERS ONLY TO MATTERS OF GENERAL POLICY. Policy means any settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government or body.

Here, the REMOVAL OF AN OFFICER (Angangco) cannot be said to come within the meaning of CONTROL OVER A SPECIFIC POLICY OF GOVERNMENT. The power of control of the President may indeed extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers who belong to the executive, under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. However this applies only if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service. As to those officers who belong to the classified service that power cannot be exercised. The action of the Executive Secretary, without submitting the case to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law. Angangco reinstated.

b. qualifications, election, term and oath- art. 7 s2,4 & 5. PBA V COMELEC The Court failed to have 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg. 883 unconstitutional. Whereas the original issue on B.P Blg. 883’s constitutionality, the issue has now transformed into a political question where only the sovereign people can decide in a fair, clean and honest election. As such, the Court dismissed the petitions and denied their prayers of prohibition. c. privilege and salary- art. 7 s6 d. succession

2. in case of vacancy at the beginning of the term 3. in case of vacancy during the term 4. in case of temporary disability Constructive Resignation ESTRADA V DESIERTO Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries,

undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day. After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President (2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid

resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the

sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as VicePresident. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which

cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. e. removal ( impeachment – see prov under art. 11: accountability of PubOff) f. prohibitions- art. 7 s13 CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284 In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides: “Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or

their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.” CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional. HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2

positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

g. exceptions to prohibition from holding another office 1. VP as member of the cabinet 2. SOJ as member of the JBC CLU V SECRETARY supra DELA CRUZ V COMM ON AUDIT Held: "The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise 'any other office' within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. x x x xxx

xxx

xxx

"To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means 'from office; by virtue of office'. It refers to an 'authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.' Exofficio likewise denotes an 'act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.' An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority. xxx

xxx

xxx

"The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his

principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an exofficio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution." h. powers and functions of the Pres 1. executive power- art. 7 s1 & 17 L.S. MOON AND CO. V HARRISON Facts: The defendants, pursuant to Act No. 2868 of the Philippine Legislature and pursuant to EO No. 56 and 67 issued by authority of said Act, have seized the said 2,3301⁄2 kilos of Siam rice of plaintiff and deprived him of it, for the purpose of distribution to the public at large; that said seizure was made without compensation to plaintiff, although defendants have promised to pay there for at the rate of P16.25, Philippine currency, a cavan and no more, which price is below the reasonable value of the rice and is unjust; that payment at said rate does

not constitute just compensation and a seizure under the circumstances alleged constitutes a confiscation of private property contrary to the fundamental and organic law of the Philippine Islands and an invasion of those constitutional rights that no one may be deprived of his property except by due process of law and with just compensation; that the just and reasonable value of the rice seized as aforesaid in Manila at the time of said seizure was with respect to the Siam rice mentioned P26.32 per cavan. The complaint is against the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The alleged acts of Jakosalem and Lukban were committed by them as agents and servants of the Governor-General. (Hon. Dionisio Jakosalem is the duly appointed, qualified and acting Secretary of Commerce and Communications and the official designated by executive order of the said Govern-General as the executive in charge of rice, its sale and distribution in the Philippine Islands; that the said Justo Lukban is the duly appointed, qualified and acting Mayor of the city of Manila, and, as such, designated by the said Governor-General and Secretary of Commerce and Communications as their assistant in charge for the city of Manila of rice, its sale and distribution) Issue:

1. Whether or Not the enforcement of Act No. 2868 is valid. 2. May the Chief Executive refuse to enforce a law on the ground that in his opinion it is unconstitutional? Held: 1. Yes, it is assumed that in the commission of the alleged acts, the Governor-General was acting in his official capacity, and was engaged in the performance of a duty enjoined upon him by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands. It is now contended that the law in question is unconstitutional and void. At the time of the alleged acts, he was exercising the discretionary power which was vested in him as Governor-General. There is a legal presumption that any law enacted by the Legislature is valid, and the Governor-General had a legal right to assume that Act No. 2868 was valid. It was neither his official province nor duty to say whether the Act was or was not constitutional. 2. No. Otherwise, he will be violating the doctrine of separation of powers because by doing so, he will be claiming the power to interpret the law, not merely to implement it. By the organic law, it is the duty of the legislature to make the law; of the executive to enforce; and of the courts to construe the law. The courts only have the power to declare a law unconstitutional. In the very nature of things, it is not the duty of the Governor to say

whether a law is or is not constitutional. It is his duty to enforce the law until such time as it has legally been declared unconstitutional. In the instant case, Act No. 2868 was enacted by the Legislature. By its terms and provisions, certain duties were thrust upon the Governor-General. He had a legal right to assume that the law was valid, and in the exercise of his discretion, he undertook to enforce the law and to carry out its terms and provisions. The acts of the defendants were official and discretionary, and they had a legal right to assume that the law was valid. In the commission of the alleged acts, they were acting for, and representing, the Government of the Philippine Islands under a law enacted by its Legislature. GOVT V SPRINGER 50 Phil 259 – Law on Public Officers – Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.” In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting

rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC. HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature

may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American

MARCOS V MANGLAPUS

President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the

power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive.

constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty

She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national

residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part

of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

minimize rampant red taping and corruption among

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national

Herein petitioner Senator Blas Ople, filed the case

interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

government employees.

at bar questioning the said A.O. on 3 grounds 1) implementation of a national ID system requires a legislative act, as such A.O. no. 308 is usurpation of legislative functions. 2) that said A.O. tends to infringe the right to privacy of citizens 3) the appropriation of funds for the implementation of said A.O. is also an exclusive legislative function. On

the

other

hand,

herein

respondent

as

Executive Secretary refutes all said arguments. OPLE V TORRES On December 12, 1996, then President Ramos

Issue: 1. Whether or not A.O. no. 308 is a valid exercise

enacted Administrative order no. 308, which laid down the ground work for the implementation of a National ID

of the Executive power. 2. Whether or not the issuance of A.O. 308 by the

system. The A.O. mandated major government agencies

President in establishing a national computerized

to pool their resources together to implement a

identification reference system is an unconstitutional

centralized data bank of all citizens which shall be used

usurpation of the legislative powers of the Congress.

to streamline day to day government transactions and

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

In holding the A.O. no. 308 as an invalid exercise of

3. A.O. no. 308 failed to substantiate any

the Presidents Executive power, the Court provided the

justifiable reason to allow the would be

following:

infringement.

1. As raised by petitioner, A.O. no. 308 does

To

streamline

government

transactions and to remove red taping was not

indeed infringe upon the legislature’s exclusive

sufficiently shown to be valid reasons to

function as it laid down a system whereby

counter

compliance therewith is a condition to transact

act

the

strict

protection

of

the

individual’s right to privacy.

with the government. 2. A.O. no. 308 is a potential threat to the Constitutional right to Privacy as it allows the

2.

While Congress is vested with the power to enact

government to pool various data regarding an

laws, the President executes the laws.As head of the

individual without any clear concise direction

Executive Department, the President is the Chief

as to the manner to keeping, safeguards against improper use, and any definite answer

Executive.Corollary to the power of control, the President has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is

as to what type of information may or may not

granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under

be used.

his control to enable him to discharge his duties



But

what

broadness,

is

not the

arguable

is

vagueness,

the the

overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if

effectively.Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.

As

said

administrative

order

redefines

the

respect,

the

authority

to

prescribe

rules

and

parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-

regulations is not an independent source of power to

vis the State as well as the line that separates the

make laws."

administrative power of the President to make rules

Thus,

Adminisrative

Order No. 308 entitled

and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be

"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification

evident that it deals with a subject that should be

Reference System" was declared null and void for

covered by law.From these precepts, the Supreme

being unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

Court holds that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. The dissenting opinions of the Justices unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently erode the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach

defining

the

traditional

limits

of

administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policymaking that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to

2.control of executive Depts- art. 7 s17 HEBRON V REYES Issue: is whether a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly fry the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code. HELD: 1. At the outset, it should be noted that, referring to local elective officers, we held, in Lacson vs. Roque, that the President has no "inherent power to remove or suspend" them. In said case, we declared, also:

"* * * Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitation. ******* * * * "There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal officials. By article VII, section 10, paragraph (1) of the Constitution the President 'shall * * * exercise general supervision over all local governments', but supervision does not contemplate control. (People vs. Brophy, 120 P., 2nd., 946; 49 Cal. App., 2nd., 15.) Far from implying: control or power to remove the President's supervisory authority over municipal affairs is qualified by the proviso 'as may be provided by law', a clear indication of constitutional intention that the provisions was not to be self-executing but requires legislative implementation. And the limitation does not stop here. It is significant to note that section 64(b) of the Revised Administrative Code in conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove specifically enjoins that the said power should be exercised conformably to law, which we assume to mean that renewals must be accomplished only for any of the causes and in the fashion prescribed by law and the procedure." Indeed, it is, likewise, well settled that laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers, especially those

chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly construed in their favor. 2. Respondent and the amici curiae invoke sections 79 (C) and 86 of the Revised Administrative Code, which are of the following tenor: "SEC. 79 (C). Power of direction and supervision.The Department Head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chief of said bureaus or offices when advisable in the public interest. "The Department Head may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations, and such committee, official, or person, may summon witnesses by subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, administer oath, and take testimony relevant to the investigation." "SEC. 86. Bureaus and offices under the Department of Interior.-The Department of "the Interior shall have executive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities, and other local political subdivisions, except the financial affairs and financial agencies thereof, * * *." Referring to these provisions, we postulated in Mondano vs. Silvosa:

"The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and organized before the approval of the Constitution continued to exist as 'authorized by law until the Congress shall provide otherwise.' Section. 10, paragraph 1, Article VH, of the Constitution provides: 'The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction' as provided for in section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation by any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of Section 79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he

may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office; such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If 'general supervision over all local governments' is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section "79(C) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to 'receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.' And if the charges are serious, 'he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and

he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.' Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of * * * municipalities * * *. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (C) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution." DRILON V LIM ISSUE: W/N SEC. 187 OF LGC IS UNCONSTITUTION HELD: The SC said its Constitutional. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it

was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. LACSON-MAGALLANES CO. INC. V PANO 21 SCRA 895 – Political Law – Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary

Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner. Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter. ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected

to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB V EXEC SECRETARY 360 SCRA 718 – Law on Public Officers – Security of Tenure in a Public Office – No Vested Right to a Public Office – Power to Create and Destroy Public Office

During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000, President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force “Aduana”, which EIIB employees claim to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB,

through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power to abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right to security of tenure. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit. HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the executive department, the president may deactivate them pursuant to control power over such offices, unless such office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the president’s power to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it needed to abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million.

Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest. Lastly, EEIB employees’ right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. 3. general supervision of local gov’t and autonomous regions MONDANO V SILVOSA 97 Phil. 143 – Political Law – Control Power – Revised Administrative Code – Supervision

Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.

In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations. ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor. HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano). The Constitution provides: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all localgovernments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the

President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a

subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.” Sec 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of municipalities. In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondano’s office. If the issue is not related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.

PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments. HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of

Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGU’s IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. GANZON V CA 200 SCRA 271 – Political Law – Control Power – Local Government Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and

strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials. HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible with disciplinary authority. The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot

be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires. The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension. 4. power of appointment GOT V SPRINGER 50 Phil 259 – Law on Public Officers – Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.” In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage government

affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker. However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC. ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC. HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

RAFAEL V EMBROIDERY APPAREL 21 SCRA 336 – Political Law – Appointments – When Not Bypassed by a Law

In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law created the Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided that the Board shall be composed of: (1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of Finance; (2) a representative from the designated by its Governor;

Central Bank to be

(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of Commerce and Industry; (4) a representative from the National Economic Council to be designated by its Chairman; and (5) a representative from the private sector coming from the Association of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters of the Philippines. Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made certain assessments against Cecilio Rafael but the latter refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred that RA 3137 is unconstitutional for while Congress may create an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed therein; that the members of the EACIB can only be

appointed by the President in accordance with Article 7, Sec. 10 2 of the Constitution; that since the Act prescribes that the chairman and members of the EACIB should come from specified offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to who should be appointed, thereby infringing the constitutional power of the President to make appointments. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3137 appointing power of the president.

bypassed

the

HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that indeed “the appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to the given appointive office.” In the case at bar, the representatives in the EACIB are not appointed by the Department Heads. They are merely going to be designated hence whoever was designated was merely sitting as an ex officio member. It must also be noted that Congress took care to specify that the representatives should come from the Bureau of Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce and Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious reason must be because these departments and/or bureaus perform functions which have a direct relation to the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof into embroidery and apparel products and their subsequent exportation abroad. There is no attempt in

RA 3137 to deprive the President of his power to make appointments. The law is not unconstitutional.

a. with consent of COA SARMIENTO V MISON 156 SCRA 549 – Political Law – Appointment of “Head of Bureaus” – Officers Requiring Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.

HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA. BAUTISTA V SALONGA

172 SCRA 150 – Political Law – Appointments – Commission on Human Rights – Security of Tenure

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to COA’s confirmation.

In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made the designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her oath of office.

HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint.” The law which authorizes the president to make appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.

Later however, Bautista received a letter from the Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to submit certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman, Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison. Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR. In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his part invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president. Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to take his seat as chairman of the CHR.

The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the COA for confirmation is merely political in nature and it has no basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR should be made without the participation of the COA. Thus, Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR is done without or in excess of jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit such appointment to the COA for the latter’s approval or rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of submission, the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and was the incumbent CHR chairperson.

There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position of chairman and members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be ad interim. Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides that the chairman and members of the CHR may be removed at the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-A is unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7 years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is guaranteed that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed upon cause and with the observance of due process. QUINTOS-DELES V COA

Deles then questioned the objection of the COA. She said that her appointment does not need the concurrence of the COA. This is in pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution, which does not require her appointment to be confirmed by the COA to qualify her to take her seat in the lower house. ISSUE: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. HELD: Yes. There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

177 SCRA 259 – Political Law – Appointment of Sectoral Representatives

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Teresita Quintos-Deles was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as a sectoral representative for women in 1988. Their appointment was done while Congress was in session. They were subsequently scheduled to take their oath of office but the Commission on Appointments (COA) filed an opposition against Deles et al alleging that their appointment must have the concurrence of the COA.

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Only those appointments expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII (or the first group abovementioned) are to be reviewed by the COA, namely, ‘the heads of the executive departments,

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution.’ All other appointments by the President are to be made without the participation of the Commission on Appointments. Sectoral representatives belong to the phrase “and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution“. The provision of the Constitution which provides power to the president in this regard is Section 7, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution: Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of this Constitution. MANALO V SISTOZA 312 SCRA 239- Political Law – Law on Public Officers – Appointments – Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Duty of Courts in Respecting the Constitutionality of Laws Passed By Congress – Presumption of Constitutionality; when not enjoyed

In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 was passed. This law created the Department of Interior and Local Government. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner as to how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be appointed. It was

provided that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and Chief Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before said officers can take their office. In 1992, then president Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et al as Directors and Chief Superintendents within the PNP. Said appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on Appointments hence, Jesulito Manalo questioned the validity of the appointments made. He insists that without the confirmation by the Commission, Sistoza et al are acting without jurisdiction, their appointment being contrary to the provisions of R.A. 6975. He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry out the provisions of the said law. Manalo also insists that the law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, and hence, it must be carried out by the courts. ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. No. 6975 are valid. HELD: No. Said provisions are unconstitutional. It is true that prior to this case, as with all other laws, R.A. 6975 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. As such, laws enacted by Congress must be respected by courts and as much as possible, courts must avoid delving into the constitutionality of a law.

However, it is also the duty of the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, to see to it that every law passed by Congress is not repugnant to the Constitution.

alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.

Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President:

CALDERON V CARALE

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group are the only ones whose appointments are required by the Constitution to be affirmed by the Commission on Appointments. All others need not be confirmed. Officers of the PNP are not included therein. There is also no merit to the contention that PNP officers are akin to officers of the armed forces. Sections 26 and 31 of R.A. 6975 are void for amending the provisions set forth in the Constitution. Courts have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit

208 SCRA 254 – Political Law – Appointment – List of Appointees Requiring COA Confirmation Cannot Be Expanded by Law

In 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Pursuant to the said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed Bartolome Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC. The appointments were however not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Peter John Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon insisted that RA 6715 should be followed as he asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec. 16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President in addition to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, expand the list of public officers required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointment as listed in the Constitution.

law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

“Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase “and other officers required by law” at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, “with the consent of the Commission on Appointments” at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

This jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

HELD: No. Under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General: confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions (first group). With respect to the other officers (second to fourth group) whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional

manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. NIERA V CFI 54 SCRA 165 – Political Law – Appointments – Residual Power to Appoint

La Carlota City (Negros Occidental) was created by Republic Act 4585 in 1965. In 1966, Rodulfo Niere was appointed by the mayor of La Carlota as the City Engineer. In 1968, Jose Quiambao was appointed by the President as the City Engineer of the same city (La Carlota). Quiambao’s appointment was pursuant to the Decentralization Act (effective January 1968). Sec 4 thereof provides that the position of the city engineer must be filled in by the appointment of the President. Niere relinquished the office but it was in protest and so he filed a quo warranto case before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Niere lost in that case and so he filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Nieri asserts that the charter of La Carlota provides that it is the City Mayor who should appoint the City Engineer. ISSUE: Whether or not Nieri was legally appointed as the City Engineer.

HELD: No. It appears that the charter of La Carlota did not have a provision which authorizes the mayor thereof to appoint the city engineer. In fact, the deliberations in Congress when La Carlota’s charter was being drafted revealed that it was the intention of the lawmakers to exclude the position of city engineer from among those local officers whom the mayor can appoint. Since the city mayor, under La Carlota’s charter, is without authority to appoint the city engineer, this prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines, who, under Section 10(3) of Article 7 of the [1935] Constitution, shall nominate “all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for”; because when a statute does not specify how an officer is to be appointed, the appointment must be made by the President (residual power of appointment). The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the President. Consequently, any diminution in its scope must be clear and unequivocal. b. limitations on appoint power of the president- art. 7 s13 and 15 AYTONA V CASTILLO 4 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Appointing Power – Midnight Appointments

Dominador Aytona was one of those appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank. When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his office, he issued Order No. 2 which recalled Aytona’s position and at the same time he appointed Andres Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank. Aytona then filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he was validly appointed by the former president. Macapagal averred that the ex-president’s appointments were scandalous, irregular, hurriedly done, contrary to law and the spirit of which, and it was an attempt to subvert the incoming presidency or administration.

QUIMSING V TAJANGLANGIT

ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his post.

ISSUE WON Quimsing’s appointment was not lawfully confirmed, because of the motion for reconsideration of his confirmation, which has, to the present, remained unacted upon.

HELD: No. Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcia’s appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in here it may be since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.

May 16, 1962- Quimsing’s, as well as other people’s appointments were confirmed- May 17, 1962- at the session of the Commission on Appointments, a motion for reconsideration of all the confirmed appointments was approved, and the Commission was adjourned with no future date fixed for its next meeting- June 11, 1962President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo. Hence this petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo Tajanglangit from occupying the position of Chief of Police to which petitioner Quimsing had previously been appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which he was actually discharging.

RULING: The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City was null and void, because said position was not vacant. The Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments provide:“SEC. 21: …Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid on the table, and this shall be final disposition on such a motion." “SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be sent to the

President of the Philippines before the expiration of the period for its reconsideration, or while a motion for reconsideration is pending." The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsing’s appointment, it was merely under reconsideration. It has been established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsing’s appointment was delivered to Malacañang. This, as well as the provisions above, supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withholding the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of the appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the appointment was confirmed. DE CASTRO V JBC The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution

prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so

in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President

making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together

with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. c. Interim or recess appointment art. 6 s19 art7 s16 JORGE V MAYOR Nicanor Jorge attained the position of Acting Director in the Bureau of Lands through regular and successive promotions. He was appointed by President Carlos Garcia ad interim Director of Lands in December 13, 1961, he took his oath of office on the 23rd, his appointment was transmitted to the CoA in 26th. In May 1962, CoA confirmed the said ad interim appointment. President Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 revoking ad interim appointments extended and released

by former Pres. Garcia after the joint session of Congress that ended on December 13 1961. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of Macapagal administration, informed Jorge that pursuant to a letter from the Asst. Executive Sec., served on Jorge that his appointment was among those revoked by Admin Order No. 2, and that his position of Director of Lands was considered vacant. Jovencio Mayor had been designated by the President to be Acting Director of Lands. Jorge instituted a petition for mandamus and quo warranto, claiming that he is the legally appointed Director of Lands. ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 of President Macapagal operated as valid revocation of Jorge's ad interim appointment. RULING: No. Jorge's ad interim appointment is dated December 13, 1961, but there is no evidence on record that it was made and released after the joint session of Congress that ended on the same day. It is a matter of contemporary history, of which this Court may take judicial cognizance, that the session ended late in the night of December 13, 1961, and, therefore, after regular office hours. In the absence of competent evidence to the contrary, it is to be presumed that the appointment of Jorge was made before the close of office hours, that being the regular course of business. The appointment, therefore, was not included in, nor intended to be

covered by, Administrative Order No. 2, and the same stands unrevoked. Consequently, it was validly confirmed by the CoA and thereafter, the office never became vacant. d. temporary designations- admin code of 1987 bk III s17 e. limitations on appointing power of the acting President 5. Executive clemencies Art. 7 s19 Art. 9-C s5 a. pardon distinguished from probation b. pardon distinguished from parole c. pardon distinguished from amnesty PP V PATRIARCA, JR The person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished. Facts: Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him

to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC. Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal. Patriarca was acquitted of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 while Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672 were ordered dismissed. d.effects of pardon

Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant? Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

PP V SALLE JR Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal.

Facts: On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson before the RTC of Quezon

City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993.

the grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal.

In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his appeal.

Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was necessary for his early release from the New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993. She also stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon and that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.

On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his conviction.

On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.

Issue:

After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the President may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-appellants to submit their memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it recommended to the President

Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable. Held: Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:

“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.” Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is " final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is

still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant. The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.

e. sanctions for violations of conditional pardons TORRES V GONZALES 152 SCRA 272 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Pardon – Not Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: The SC affirmed the following: 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not

subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.

That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

g. who may avail of amnesty? PP V PATRIARCA JR supra

LLAMAS V SEC. ORBOS Pardon – Applicable to Administrative Cases

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him. ISSUE: Whether or administrative cases.

not

pardon

is

applicable

to

HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

6.powers as commander-in-chief- art. 7 s18; art. 3 s13; art. 8 s1 par. 2 IBP V ZAMORA Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. Issues: (1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review (2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the

military

and

the

civilian

character

of

the

PNP

Held: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP. LACSON V PEREZ

Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them. Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same. Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to

warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners’ prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to. Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from

arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang. SANLAKAS V ANGELO REYES During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some threehundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

ISSUE: Whether Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? HELD: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section

18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commanderin-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. In declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, the President was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. DAVID V GMA 489 SCRA 160 – Political Law – The Executive Branch – Presidential Proclamation 1017 – Take Care Clause – Take Over Power – Calling Out Power

Bill of Rights – Freedom of Speech – Overbreadth

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot

be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and take over power. ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional. HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional. The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC declaration

on the Factual Basis of its

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and

Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally

unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to

prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily

Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president. GUDANI & BALUTAN V SENGA Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to shed

light on the “Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer. Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate. Issue: 1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?

2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise? 3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last 4 October 2005? Held: 1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not

the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed

by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government. 3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. 7.emergency powers- art. 6 s23(2) 8.contracting and guaranteeing foreign loans- art. 7 s20, art. 12 s 21, RA 4860 9. power over foreign affairs a. recognition of foreign states

US V BELMONT Brief Fact Summary. The U.S. (P) claim was based on the fact that funds deposited in a U.S. bank by a Russian corporation that had been nationalized by the Soviet government was due to it. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The states cannot interfere in the complete powers which the national government has in the conduct of international affairs. Facts. Before to the 1918 nationalization and liquidation by the Soviet government, a Russian corporation had deposited money in Belmont (D), a private bank in New York City. In 1993, the Soviet Union and the United States (P) agreed to a final settlement of claims and counterclaims. The agreement of the Soviet Union was to take no steps to enforce claims against American nationals and assigned and released all such claims to the U.S. (P). The court however held that the situs of the bank deposit was within the state of New York and was not an intangible property right within soviet territory and that it would be contrary to the public policy of the State of New York to recognize or enforce the nationality decree when the U.S. (P) sought to recover the money. The U.S. (P) appealed to the Supreme Court which granted certiorari.

Issue. Does the national government have complete power in the conduct of international affairs? Held. (Sutherland, J.). Yes. The states cannot interfere in the complete powers which the national government has in the conduct of international affairs. The U.S. (P) recognized the Soviet government coincidentally with the assignment of all claims. The President does not need the consent of the Senate to conduct foreign relations. In respect of foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. Reversed and remanded. Discussion. The recognition of the Soviet Union and the release of all claims were interdependent and this was noted by the Court. Thus it was purely in the realm of foreign policy to make this agreement. States cannot therefore interfere in the conduct of foreign relations. b. conduct of foreign relations PIMENTEL V OFFICE OF EXEC SECRETARY Facts: 1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. 2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes

as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state. 3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII). 3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth. d. executive agreements BAYAN V EXEC SEC FACTS:

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President. The Supreme Court held NO. 1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs. 2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3

The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel

Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate. ISSUES AND RULING:

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement. Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such

1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA? NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show that they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA. As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by

taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.

Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”

Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to commence the present action.

Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions. 2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution? Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties. All treaties, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Sec

25 further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies. Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate. It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent”. We find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law; the Court should not distinguish. We do not

subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription covers “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.” Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated — a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII. 3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA effective? YES Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators that concurred. As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard, has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed compliance with the mandate of the Constitution. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the

concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. e. distinction between treaty and executive agreement COMM. OF CUSTOMS V EASTERN 3 SCRA 351 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Treaties vs Executive Agreements Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into the

Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar. EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate. HELD: No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’.

The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation. f. deportation of undesirable aliens

GO TEK V DEPORTATION BOARD The Court of First Instance denied the petition for writs of habeas corpus, mandamus and certiorari by the petitioners. On May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged petitioner before the Deportation Board. The crimes: •Purchasing $130,000 with license from Central Bank and remitted it to Hong Kong •Attempted bribery of Phil and US officials. In effect, Deportation Board issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner (E.O. No 398, series of 1951). Upon fixing of bonds, petitioner was temporarily set free. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the President has authority to deport aliens. 2. Whether or not the Deportation Board also has authority to file warrants of arrest. HELD: 1. YES Section 69 of Act NO. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code – Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines EXCEPT UPON PRIOR INVESTIGATION,

conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.” * In effect, the President (Quezon, May 29, 1936) created the Deportation Board to conduct investigations. 2. Yes but only after investigation has resulted to the actual order of deportation. Arrest would have been necessary for deportation to take effect. However, in the case at bar, investigations were still ongoing and no order for deportation was yet made. Decision: E.O. No 398, series of 1951: declared illegal Deportation may be effected in 2 ways: 1. by order of President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the RAC 2. by Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. 10. power over legislation 11. immunity from suits IN RE BERMUDEZ, supra BELTRAN V MAKASIAR

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

Issues:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the

complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaintaffidavit. Held: (1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counteraffidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counteraffidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded. (2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding

the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts

minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. (4) Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts. Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect” point.

NIXON V FITZGERALD (3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President of the United States (President) is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages for acts done in his official capacity as President.

In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his dismissal was unjust. ISSUE: Was the President immune from prosecution in a civil suit?

HELD: Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history." Discussion. The President must be empowered with the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the duties of his office. If not, his visibility would subject him to numerous suits for civil damages. To keep the public safe, there is the constitutional remedy of impeachment, vigilant oversight by Congress and the press. CLINTON V JONES Synopsis of Rule of Law. The United States Constitution (Constitution) does not automatically grant the President of the United States immunity from civil lawsuits based upon his private conduct unrelated to his official duties as President. Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioner alleging that the Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas. The Petitioner filed motions asking the district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity and to prohibit the Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his presidency. The district court rejected the presidential immunity argument, but held that no trial would take place until the Petitioner was no longer president. Both parties appealed

to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court), which granted certiorari. Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his presidency for actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency and that were not related to official duties of the presidency? Held. Affirmed. The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his tenure for actions not related to his official duties as President. It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this lawsuit until after the President’s tenure. The District Court’s decision to order a stay was premature and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatsoever of the Respondent’s interest in bringing the suit to trial. Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could significantly interfere with the public duties of an official. The concurring judge believed that ordinary case-management principles were likely to prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits, unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement that district courts schedule proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the President’s ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities. Discussion. A sitting President of The United States does not have immunity from civil lawsuits based on the President’s private actions unrelated to his public actions as President. The doctrine of separation of powers does

not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co-equal branches of government. ESTRADA V ARROYO It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada. On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA

as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office. ISSUE: (4) W/N Estrada enjoys immunity from suit (4) The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The SC rejected petitioner’s argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 “Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.” Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him.

The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that “incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. 12. executive privilege NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE 549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive Privilege Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers

In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of

$329,481,290.00 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt. ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.

HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. 1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And 3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. CHAVEZ V PCGG HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed

settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or interagency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general --such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

2. the VP- art. 7 s3-5, s6 and s9; art. 11 s2-3 Right of succession and membership in cabinet- art. 7 s8, 11 and 3 par.2 ESTRADA V ARROYO ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president. HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace

due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. VII. distribution and separation of powers 

system of checks and balances

A. legislative intrusion into executive domain CONCEPCION V PAREDES

HELD: It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred by an Act of Congress on the Chief Executive and a branch of the Legislature. Deliberately considered solely as a question of constitutional law, and putting to one side all irrelevant question of expediency and of motive, we conclude that the power of appointment and confirmation vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate is usurped by a lottery of judicial offices every five years. An independent and self-respecting judiciary must continue to exist in the Philippine. The orderly course of constitutional government must be maintained. It is our holding that the second paragraph of section 148 of the Administrative Code, as superseded by Act No. 2941, is in violation of the provisions of the Organic Act and, consequently, invalid. B. Legislative intrusion into judicial domain IN RE CUNANAN Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a

judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

jeopardize our national defense, President Truman issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the nation’s steel mills. After obeying the orders under protest, the steel companies brought suit in District Court. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order against the government, which the Court of Appeals stayed. Issue. Did President Truman have the authority to order the seizure of the steel mills? Held. No. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that expressly conferred upon President Truman the power to seize the mills. There are no provisions of the Constitution, or combination of provisions thereof, which gave the President the authority to take possession of property as he did.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional. C. Executive intrusion into legislative domain

D. Executive intrusion into judicial domain

ARANETA V DINGLASAN supra

ZABALLERO V NHA

YOUNGTOWN TUBE AND STEEL V SAWYER Synopsis of Rule of Law. The President’s power, if any, to issue an order must stem from an act of Congress or the United States Constitution (Constitution). Facts. In 1951, a labor dispute arose between the United States steel companies and their employees. In 1952, the employees union gave notice of a nationwide strike. Thereupon, fearful that such a work stoppage would

Citing precedents on the matter of just compensation, this Court held in the EPZA case that: The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may

not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. The trial court correctly applied the law on the matter of just compensation in rendering the disputed decision of April 7, 1982. In the words of the trial court: Since courts must first construe acts of government conformably with the Constitution, the proper, nay, inexorable, meaning to be given the cited Presidential Decrees should be that the rules therein enumerated are intended merely to provide guidelines for the courts as they go about their functions of determining just compensation. The plaintiff, therefore, may not impute upon the presidency the unconstitutional intent of direct executive determination of just compensation in the promulgation of the cited decrees and as a delegate of presidential powers, the National Housing Authority certainly cannot rise higher constitutional source of authority.

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ARTICLE VIII THE JUDICIAL DEPT 1. power of judicial review s 4(2) art. VIII Consti s5 art. 8 consti art. 7 NCC MARBURY V MADISON Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive actions and legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution), which may not be enlarged by the Congress. Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court? Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been made, and Marbury has a right to the commission Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,” mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if available to the Supreme Court. To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court. Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case establishes the traditions of judicial review and a litigable constitution on which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an equipotent head of a branch of the federal government. 2. functions of judicial review a. legitimizing function b. checking function c. symbolic/educational function

SALONGA V PANO ISSUE: Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court

HELD: 2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that: “The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.” In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial law.

Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution). In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports. 3. justiciable v. political question JAVELLANA V EXEC SEC supra 4. req of judicial review DAVID V ARROYO supra a. actual case or controversy i. prematurity FERNANDEZ V TORRES DUMLAO V COMELEC ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action. HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence

of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void. The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be

to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. ii.

mootness v. ripeness

DAVID V ARROYO supra GONZALES V NARVASA Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case Held: In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a

result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penaltiesor burdens as a result of the issues raised. In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive’s power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if

he possesses a taxpayer’s interest in this particular issue. iii.

exceptions to the mootness rule

DAVID V GMA supra b. earliest opportunity ARCETA V MANGROBANG HELD: Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In a special civil action of certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Yet nowhere in these petitions is there any allegation that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is manifested. Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any attachments or annexes in the form of a copy of an order, decision, or resolution issued by the respondent judges so as to place them understandably within the ambit of Rule 65. What are appended to the petitions are only copies of the Informations in the respective cases, nothing else. Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and appropriate cases contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this

Courts power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their faces petitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action. Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before the horse, figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the hierarchy of courts outlined in Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Taking into account the early stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature. LAGMAY V CA 199 SCRA 501 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial Department – Judicial Review – Legitimizing Function – Proper Raising of Questions of Law

Adela Tuason is the owner of a parcel of land. She leased the same to Julio Lagmay and 2 others. Tuason

got sick and she needed to sell her land. She then sent letters to each of her lessees advising them of her intention to sell the land and that she is giving them the option to buy what they are occupying. Lagmay et al did not bother to reply. Tuason thereafter did not collect the rentals from each. Lagmay et al bothered not to pay. After 2 years, Tuason’s sisters politely advised Lagmay et al to vacate the land so that Tuason could sell the same. Lagmay et al did not reply not until 3 months and this time they agreed to buy the parcel of land. Tuason however did not reply. Lagmay et al the filed a complaint asserting their right over the land they’ve been occupying for quite some time as guaranteed by PD 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Law. The lower court ruled that Lagmay et al waived their right under the said PD when they refused to reply to Tuason’s initial offer. Lagmay et al appealed before the Court of Appeals. The CA upheld the lower court. The CA additionally pointed out that the parcel of land in question is not declared as an “urban land” under PD 1967. Lagmay et al filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the constitutionality of PD 1967. The CA denied the motion ruling that Lagmay et al cannot raise a question of law since they did not raise the same during the trial of merits. ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutionality of PD 1967 is ripe for judicial determination in this case. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they must avoid the issue of constitutionality in this case because the controversy can be decided by other means. The issue of constitutionality of a statute, executive order or

proclamation must be the very lis mota presented in a case. The Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case and is necessary to its determination. Although the Court may deem it best for public policy to resolve the constitutional issue considering that numerous persons are affected by the questioned proclamation there are other grounds by which this case may be resolved on a non-constitutional determination. Furthermore, under said provision, the terms and conditions of the sale in exercise of the lessee’s right of first refusal to purchase shall be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee. Hence, the lower court rightfully ruled that certain prerequisites must be complied with by anyone who wishes to avail himself of the benefits of the decree. Section 6 should not be isolated from the other provisions of the decree. After all, the rule is that all the provisions of a law, even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and be given effect by reconciling them if necessary. The intention of the lawmaker must be ascertained not from a consideration of a single word or a particular phrase of the law, but from the context of the whole law or from a portion thereof, as compared with the whole.s c. standing of a party DAVID V GMA

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "realparty-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.

xxx

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec, the Court reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to concerned citizens’ cases involving constitutional issues. It held that "there

must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act." In Lacson v. Perez, the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson. Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.

In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights. In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez, Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, and Tañada v. Tuvera, that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members. We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of

the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases." This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi. PASCUAL V SECRETARY Facts: 1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item providing for an appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder road in Pasig. The said law was passed in Congress and approved by the President. 2. The property over which the feeder road will be

constructed is however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The property was to be donated to the local government, though the donation was made a few months after the appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the said planned feeder road would relieve Zulueta the responsibility of improving the road which is inside a private subdivision. 3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to assail the validity of RA 920, due to the public interest involved in the appropriation. However, he does not have a standing with respect to the donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by said donation, hence it dismissed the petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the petition

Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions. 2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest NO.

BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION V LARON

The rule is that the taxpayer-plaintiff must sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to members of the public.

Facts: 1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot called the

The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private

YES. 1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor of the province of Rizal which is considered one of the most populated biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the country.

party which will fund the planned construction of the market building. NEPA V ONGPIN 171 SCRA 657 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial Department – Judicial Review – Requisites After the lifting of martial law in 1981, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1789 and some other PDs. The said PD was issued in order to suspend for one year the requirement that in order for companies to validly operate in the country it must be composed of at least 60% Filipino. NEPA (National Economic Protectionism Association), an association of local businessmen, assailed the said PD averring that as taxpayers and Filipinos they will be greatly adversed by such PD. They sought to enjoin Roberto Ongpin, then the Minister (Secretary) of Trade and Industry, from enforcing the said law. The Sol-Gen commented that NEPA et al have no personality and standing to sue in the absence of an actual controversy concerning the enforcement of the PD in question – that they were not actually adversely affected by said PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the requisites for judicial review are met. HELD: No. NEPA et al question the constitutionality of Secs 1 and 3 of PD 1892 in relation to PD 1789, the 1981 Investment Priorities Plan and EO 676, as being violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 1973 Constitution as well as Secs 8 & 9 of Article 14 thereof, and seek to prohibit Ongpin from implementing said laws. Yet,

not even one of the petitioners has been adversely affected by the application of those provisions. No actual conflict has been alleged wherein NEPA could validly and possibly say that the increase in foreign equity participation in non-pioneer areas of investment from the period of Dec 2, 1983 to Dec 4, 1984 had any direct bearing on them, such as considerable rise in unemployment, real increase in foreign investment, unfair competition with Philippine nationals, exploitation of the country’s natural resources by foreign investors under the decrees. NEPA et al advance an abstract, hypothetical issue which is in effect a petition for an advisory opinion from the SC. The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. There must be a bona fide suit. Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants.

Standing vs. real-party-in-interest i. citizen/taxpayers

types of standing

TATAD V GARCIA HELD: Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing to initiate the instant action. Petitioners, however, countered that the action was filed by them in their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA. 240 [1989]). For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. ITF V COMELEC Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its

Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I — Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II — Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III — Electronic Transmission. On January 24, 2003, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Executive Order No. 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million. On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid". On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a rebidding. Issue: W/N P has locus standing

HELD: On the other hand, petitioners — suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens — respond that the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." Allegedly, Comelec's flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Thus, any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Petitioners further argue that the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly. Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds," 22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; 23 or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law." JUMAMIL V CAFÉ Facts:

Facts: In 1989, Vivencio V. Jumamil filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo, Davao del Norte a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order against

Mayor Jose J. Cafe and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo, Davao del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal Resolution 7, Series of 1989 (Resolution 7). Resolution 7, enacting Appropriation Ordinance 111, provided for an initial appropriation of P765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panabo Public Market which was destroyed by fire. Subsequently, the petition was amended due to the passage of Resolution 49, series of 1989 (Resolution 49), denominated as Ordinance 10, appropriating a further amount of P1,515,000 for the construction of additional stalls in the same public market. Prior to the passage of these resolutions, Mayor Cafe had already entered into contracts with those who advanced and deposited (with the municipal treasurer) from their personal funds the sum of P40,000 each. Some of the parties were close friends and/or relatives of Cafe, et al. The construction of the stalls which Jumamil sought to stop through the preliminary injunction in the RTC was nevertheless finished, rendering the prayer therefor moot and academic. The leases of the stalls were then awarded by public raffle which, however, was limited to those who had deposited P40,000 each. Thus, the petition was

amended anew to include the 57 awardees of the stalls as private respondents. Jumamil alleges that Resolution Nos. 7 and 49 were unconstitutional because they were passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents, some of which were close

Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Jumamil filed the petition for review on certiorari.

friends and/or relative of the mayor and the sanggunian, who deposited the amount of P40,000.00 for each stall, and with whom also the mayor had a prior contract to award the would be constructed stalls to all private respondents; that resolutions and ordinances did not provide for any notice of publication that the special privilege and unwarranted benefits conferred on the

Held [1]: Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged. It calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless a

private respondents may be availed of by anybody who can deposit the amount of P40,000; and that nor there were any prior notice or publication pertaining to contracts entered into by public and private respondents for the construction of stalls to be awarded to private respondents that the same can be availed of by anybody willing to deposit P40,000.00. The Regional Trial Court dismissed Jumamil’s petition for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and writ of restraining order, and ordered Jumamil to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P1,000 to each of the 57 private respondents. On appeal, and on 24 July 2000 (CA GR CV 35082), the

Issue [1]: Whether Jumamil had the legal standing to bring the petition for declaratory relief

person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he has no legal standing. Jumamil brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of Panabo, Davao del Norte and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the mayor and the members of the Sanggunian in passing the ordinances and entering into the lease contracts with private respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money

raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The resolutions being assailed were appropriations ordinances. Jumamil alleged that these ordinances were “passed for the business, occupation, enjoyment and benefit of private respondents” (that is, allegedly for the private benefit of respondents) because even before they were passed, Mayor Cafe and private respondents had already entered into lease contracts for the construction and award of the market stalls. Private respondents admitted they deposited P40,000 each with the municipal treasurer, which amounts were made available to the municipality during the construction of the stalls. The deposits, however, were needed to ensure the speedy completion of the stalls after the public market was gutted by a series of fires. Thus, the award of the stalls was necessarily limited only to those who advanced their personal funds for their construction. Jumamil did not seasonably allege his interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public funds or the specific injury to him as a result of the enforcement of the questioned resolutions and contracts. It was only in the “Remark to Comment” he filed in the Supreme Court did he first assert that “he

(was) willing to engage in business and (was) interested to occupy a market stall.” Such claim was obviously an afterthought. Issue [2]: Whether the rule on locus standi should be relaxed. Held [2]: Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of the suit. There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;

and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. But, even if the Court disregards Jumamil’s lack of legal standing, this petition must still fail. The subject resolutions/ordinances appropriated a total of P2,280,000

del Norte, he should have clearly established that such ordinances operated unfairly against those who were not notified and who were thus not given the opportunity to make their deposits. His unsubstantiated allegation that the public was not notified did not suffice. Furthermore,

for the construction of the public market stalls. Jumamil alleged that these ordinances were discriminatory because, even prior to their enactment, a decision had already been made to award the market stalls to the private respondents who deposited P40,000 each and who were either friends or relatives of the mayor or members of the Sanggunian. Jumamil asserted that

there was the time-honored presumption of regularity of official duty, absent any showing to the contrary.

“there (was) no publication or invitation to the public that this contract (was) available to all who (were) interested to own a stall and (were) willing to deposit P40,000.” Respondents, however, counter that the “public respondents’ act of entering into this agreement was authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Panabo per Resolution 180 dated 10 October 1988” and that “all the people interested were invited to participate in investing their savings.” Jumamil failed to prove the subject ordinances and agreements to be discriminatory. Considering that he was asking the Court to nullify the acts of the local political department of Panabo, Davao

DUMLAO V COMELEC supra Associational IBP V ZAMORA Voters Legislative PHILCONSA V ENRIQUEZ HELD: Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the conditions for the implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994. We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill.

Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain of the Legislature arises It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin. Governmental PP V VERA Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case. Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It

goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. d. constitutionality is the very lis mota of the case SANTOS III V NORTHWEST AIRLINES 210 SCRA 256 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Judicial Department – Judicial Review – Constitutionality of a Treaty – Warsaw Convention Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor represented by his dad. In October 1986, he bought a round trip ticket from Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) in San Francisco. His flight would be from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back to San Francisco. His scheduled flight was in December. A day before his departure he checked with NOA and NOA said he made no reservation and that he bought no ticket. The next year, due to the incident, he sued NOA for damages. He sued NOA in Manila. NOA argued that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article 28(1) of the Warsaw

Convention, which provides that complaints against international carriers can only be instituted in: 1. the court of the domicile of the carrier (NOA’s domicile is in the USA); 2. the court of its principal place of business (which is San Francisco, USA); 3. the court where it has a place of business through which the contract had been made (ticket was purchased in San Francisco so that’s where the contract was made); 4. the court of the place of destination (Santos bought a round trip ticket which final destination is San Francisco). The lower court ruled in favor of NOA. Santos III averred that Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the case and he questioned the constitutionality of Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention. ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to conduct judicial review. HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC is bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was ratified by the Senate. Until & unless there would be amendment to the Warsaw Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the place indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA. The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. In the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by the legislative and the

executive. The presumption is that it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in this country. In this case, Santos was not able to offer any compelling argument to overcome the presumption. The petitioner's allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption. Apparently, the Convention considered the four places designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its passenger, as distinguished from all other places. At any rate, we agree with the respondent court that this case can be decided on other grounds without the necessity of resolving the constitutional issue. DUMLAO V COMELEC supra LAGMAY V CA supra e. effect of declaration of unconsti of a law NORTON V SHELBY COUNTRY SHEPPARD V BARRON AGBAYANI V PNB B. Judiciary

1. judicial power- art. 8 s1 LOPEZ V ROXAS 17 SCRA 756 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial PowerDefined

Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that: “There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.” In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body. HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the Supreme Court.

Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which body should decide controversies relating to the election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law” The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the” judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively. Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall

have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law. The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the court’s jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial. SANTIAGO V BAUTISTA FACTS: Teodoro Santiago, a grade 6 pupil, was adjudged 3rd honor. 2 days before his graduation, Ted and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. They filed a Certiorari case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating honors.. Respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and even assuming it was proper, the question has become academic (bc the graduation already proceeded. They also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions, under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy against judicial function ISSUE: WoN judicial function be exercised in this case.

RULING: A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the court. In order for an action for certiorari to exist, Test to determine whether a tribunal or board exercises judicial functions: 1) there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for hearing and determination. 2) that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision. 3) the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at least the not the legislative nor the executive) It may be said that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy. Judicial power is defined: • as authority to determine the rights of persons or property. • authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication. • The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them. • The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.

The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuring there from is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to determine YNOT V IAC On the power of courts to decide on constitutional matters – Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by lower courts subject to review of the Supreme Court. “..while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to the review of the highest tribunal.” – Sec. 5[2(a)] Art VIII, 1987 Constitution. 2. supreme court a. jurisdiction art. 8 s5(2)(d) b. congressional power over the jurisdiction of SC- art. 8 s2 par.1, art. 6 s 30 c. en banc vs division d. composition

VARGAS V RILLORAZA FACTS: Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional RULING: No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional. Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court. Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued

by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).

Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this

However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5). e. JBC and qualification f. salary g. security of tenure DE LA LLANA V ALBA

Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. h. removal i. reqs as to decisions OIL & GAS NATURE CORP V CA FACTS:

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to deliver 43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite petitioner’s several demands. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun. The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth the

arbitral award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari, ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract.

RULING: The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise. AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO Facts Rafael Carrascoso was part of a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. Air France, through PAL, issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip ticket. From Manila to Bangkok, he traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the manager of Air France forced him to vacate his seat, because a “white man” had a “better right” to it. He

refused and even had a heated discussion with the manager but after being pacified by fellow passengers, he reluctantly gave up the seat. Air France asserts that the ticket does not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties, and that the issuance of a first class ticket did not guarantee a first class ride (depends upon the availability of seats). CFI and CA disposed of this contention. Issue: WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims. YES Held: On CA’s decision Air France charges that CA failed to make complete findings of fact on all issues presented. SC says that so long as CA’s decision contains the facts necessary to warrant its conclusions, there is nothing wrong in withholding any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the defense. Furthermore, SC said that the judgment of affirmance of the CA has merged the judgment of the lower court. Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". We reached this policy construction because nothing in the

decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. VDA DE ESPIRITU V CFI Held: It may be mentioned, for the rest, that petitioner contends that the order of dismissal above-quoted, being a decision, violates the constitutional requirement, as well as of the rules, that it should state the facts and the law on which it is based. The contention is not well taken. As may be seen, the said order adopts by reference the reasons, alleged in the motion to dismiss of respondents, which, the record reveals, includes the facts and the law in support thereof. There is, therefore, substantial compliance with the fundamental law and the rules, albeit, judges are advised that mere general reference should be avoided, since anyway it is not difficult to quote textually the subject of the reference for a closer adherence to the obvious spirit and reason behind the requirements. BUSCAYNO V ENRILE HELD: One other issue raised by petitioner remains. It was likewise contended that a judgment of respondent Military Commission would be violative of Article X, Section 9 of the Constitution. That provision requires that

a decision of a court of record "shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based." The proceeding in a military commission terminates with a guilty or not guilty verdict. Hence this objection. It can be said of course that a military commission is not a court of record within the meaning of this Articles on the judiciary. Moreover, the procedure followed, including the form the judgment takes, was given the seal of approval in the above Aquino decision citing the applicable section of the Article on Transitory Provisions. That would remove any taint of unconstitutionality. It may be stated further that the record of the proceedings are available to the reviewing authorities. Hence any imputation of arbitrariness sought to be avoided by the above provision would not be warranted. MANGELEN V CA Held: Thus, that decision faithfully complied with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts of the law on which it is based. Now, if such decision had to be completely overturned or set aside, upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration, in a subsequent action via a resolution or modified decision, such resolution or decision should likewise state the factual and legal foundation relied upon. The reason is obvious: aside from being required by the Constitution, the court should be able to justify such a sudden change of course; it must be able to convincingly explain the taking back of its solemn

conclusions and pronouncements in the earlier decision. In the instant case, the public respondent miserably failed to do so; this is reflected in the quoted resolution of 12 July 1989 which leaves in limbo the trial court's challenged decision because it is not the latter which is reserved but rather the public respondent's own decision of 30 January 1989. Public respondent simply restore the parties to the status quo obtaining prior to 30 January 1989. Clearly, therefore, an amended decision on the appeal proper or on the merits of the decision of the trial court would be in order.

“THAT ALL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED FOR DECISION OR DETERMINATION FOR A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS HAVE BEEN DETERMINED AND DECIDED ON OR BEFORE JANUARY 31, 1998,” when in contrary, no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases. It was also further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his cert. of service for the months of February, April to August 1989; and the months of January to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.

j. mandatory period for deciding cases

Petitioner Contention: Petitioner contends that he had been granted by the Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases. He also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case since the offense charged arose from the judge’s performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts. ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the criminal complaint filed by PAO against the RTC Judge.

k. PET LOPEZ V ROXAS supra l. admin powers 1. supervision of lower courts MACEDA V VASQUEZ Respondent Napoleon Abiera of Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) filed a criminal complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman against the petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, RTC Judge Branch 12 of Antique, who was alleged to have falsified his Cert. of Service on February 1989, by certifying,

RULING:

A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

Ombudsman cannot compel the Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. Petition is Granted.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner’s certificates of service to the Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The

IN RE DEMETRIA This administrative charge was triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared on the July 2000 issues of The Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively reported that Court of Appeals Assoc. Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai.

THE FACTS AS EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION ARE QUITE CLEAR. YU YUK LAI, TOGETHER WITH HER SUPPOSED NEPHEW, A CERTAIN KENNETH SY ALIAS WILLIAM SY, WAS ALLEGED OF “CONSPIRING, CONFEDERATING AND MUTUALLY HELPING ONE ANOTHER, WITH DELIBERATE INTENT AND WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF LAW . . . (TO) SELL AND DELIVER TO A POSEUR-BUYER THREE (3) KILOGRAMS, MORE OR LESS, OF (SHABU), WHICH IS A REGULATED DRUG.” ON 2000, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT “THE EVIDENCE IS STRONG AND SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE TWO ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME CHARGED”. JUSTICE DEMETRIA ALLEGEDLY INTERCEDE IN BEHALF OF SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN YU YUK LAI WHEN HE CALLED AND INSTRUCTED THE PROSECUTOR TO WITHDRAW THE MOTION TO INHIBIT OF JUDGE MURO, THE JUDGE WHO HANDLE THE CASE AND WAS ALLEGED TO BE PARTIAL TO YU YUK LAI. ISSUE: Whether Judge Demetria violated Code of Judicial Conduct. RULING:

Yes. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion. His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual. Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved. There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.

Justice Demetria is GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency or instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled corporation or institution. 2. temporarily assign judges to other stations in public interest 3. order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice MONDIGUING V ABAD Alipio Mondiguing and Andres Dunuan are accused of double murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder in Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ifugao Province. The case was filed in connection with an ambuscade, that, as a result of that incident, Governor Gualberto Lumauig of Ifugao was wounded and his exec. assistant and his driver were killed. Up to this time the accused in that case have not been arraigned. . Mondiguing and Dunuan filed a petition to transfer the venue of the case to Baguio City or Quezon City. They claimed that they could not expect a fair and impartial trial in Lagawe, Ifugao because the Judge of the CFI of that province is a protege’ of the then Governor and his

brother, former Congressman, and because their witnesses would be afraid to testify for fear of harassment and reprisals. The petitioners further claimed that their lives and the lives of their witnesses and lawyers would be in grave danger because of the tensions and antagonisms spawned by the case and the political rivalry between the Lumauig and Mondiguing factions. (The accused, George Bayucca was killed on October 28, 1970 and Alipio Mondiguing resigned as mayor of Banaue and took refuge in Baguio City). . Respondent presiding Judge Abad disputed the correctness or truth of the grounds on the change of venue and prayed that the petition be dismissed. He said that, if there would be bias on his part, he would be biased in favor of the People of the Philippines since the charged was not “committed personally against” the Governor. However, this statement is not correct since the governor is one of the victims mentioned in the information. The fact also, is that, previously, the Court has disqualified Judge Abad from trying the electoral protests filed against the governor since allegedly the judge was a political leader of the Governor and was recommended to his present position by the latter. ISSUE: Whether Mondiguing’s plea for a change of venue is justified.

RULING: The petition is meritorious.

should be tried by the Circuit Criminal Court in the City of Baguio.

A change of the place of trial in criminal cases should not be granted for whimsical or flimsy reasons. “The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime.

Petition is granted.

The Court is invested with the prerogative of ordering “a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice” (Sec. 5[4], Art. X of the Constitution). It “possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a CFI be transferred to another CFI within the same district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice”. A change of venue was ordered by this Court in a case where it was shown that the accused might be liquidated by his enemies in the place where the trial was originally scheduled to be held. In the interest of a fair and impartial trial and to avoid a miscarriage of justice and considering that his life would be in danger if he were to be tried in Lagawe, Ifugao, he

PP V SOLA In 1980, the Philippine Constabulary, armed with a search warrant proceeded to the place of Sola for the search and seizure of the bodies of 7 dead persons believed to be within the hacienda of the latter at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. Diggings made in his canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7 dead bodies of Fernandez, Olimpos, Perez, Juanica, Juanica, Callet and Emperado. Seven (7) separate complaints for murder was filed against the accused Pablo Sola, et.al. While the investigation was on going, the witnesses in the said murder cases informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial will be held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is only 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. ISSUE:

Whether change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds is valid. RULING: Yes to both. The SC could order “a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” A change of venue is imperative if the witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of their fear, they may either refuse to testify or testimony falsely to save their lives. It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. The cancellation of the bail bonds is justified. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without hearing the prosecution. The prosecution was deprived of procedural due process hence, must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case, the prosecution is denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.