Minium-opening Secondary Theaters

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I.

Considerations for Opening a Secondary Theater By Scott Minium Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Strategy and Policy based on the following assigned topic: 6. "The principle of aiming everything at the enemy's center of gravity admits of only one exception-that is, when secondary operations look exceptionally rewarding." (Clausewitz, p. 618) What circumstances make opening a secondary theater exceptionally rewarding? The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:___________________ 31 May 09 Seminar 6A Moderators: Commander Peter Jannotta Professor Colin Jackson

Considerations for Opening a Secondary Theater In On War, Clausewitz counseled that secondary operations only be undertaken when they "look exceptionally rewarding."

The circumstances under which a proposed secondary

operation may be considered exceptionally rewarding include, at a minimum: 1) the risk relative to the primary operation is low, 2) the operation presents a direct way to attack the enemy or his interests, and 3) the operation provides a way to exploit an advantage.

Secondary Operations Should Be Lower Risk Rational actors contemplating the undertaking of a secondary operation must consider many factors to ensure the risk of the proposed operation can be kept acceptable. Above all else there must be relative certainty that a failure of the secondary operation will not result in a loss of the war proper. In the case of the Sicilian Expedition, the Athenians did not fully consider that their forces could be lost, captured or unable (physically or mentally) to disengage.

This

secondary operation, incurring the loss of so many men and ships, severely impacted the main war effort by Athens. In contrast, the British Peninsula Campaign by Wellington posed little risk to Britain's overall effort, and the failure of Napoleon's Ireland invasion was not a direct contributor to his ultimate defeat. Next, in order to maintain the secondary theater at a lower risk level, the allowable cost must be coldly calculated such that when it becomes to costly it can be terminated. This is difficult for all belligerents, democratic or otherwise, because the concept of a sunk cost does not adequately factor in the passions of war after blood has been spilt. Unfortunately, once the shooting has started belligerents tend to see all combat operations as the same, making little

distinction between primary and secondary theaters. Such behavior inflates the value of the secondary theater, masking the higher the risk it poses to the primary theater and the main objective.

Thus, the value of the object must be very carefully appraised before opening the

second theater so that it does not become more valuable just because losses are incurred. As an example, Britain could have persisted in its costly 1915 Gallipoli campaign, but unlike when Athens fought to the bitter end in Sicily, Britain ultimately chose to abort Gallipoli even though significant losses had been incurred. Lastly, secondary operations must not increase risk by expanding the scope of the war. By definition, secondary operations are going to be in a location removed from the main event, and that location may involve a new player. This should be carefully considered lest the operation bring new enemies into the conflict. While the negatives of drawing third parties into the war as new opponents should be obvious, the reaction of third parties has been overlooked or poorly estimated from time to time. The German decision to use unrestricted submarine warfare in World War I, which can be viewed as the opening of a secondary theater, is a good example. 1 By itself the use of submarines did not really impact the German war machine, making it low risk to the war in Europe. For it to be effective, however, US shipping had to be targeted as well, and this dramatically increased risk to Germany when the US entered the war. In summary, when analyzing the risks of a secondary operation the analysis needs to be worst case to ensure the risks posed cannot rise to a level that will threaten the primary operation.

Secondary Operations Should Directly Impact the Enemy

Secondary operations, like all combat, will require blood and money to undertake.

As

such any secondary operation that is undertaken must have the same goal as the primary operation: to break the enemy's capacity and will to fight. Thus, the more oblique this attack the less impact it has. Vietnam(1965-1972) and Korea (1950-) are examples of secondary theaters opened by the Soviet Union (and China) and answered by the US. As secondary theaters in the Cold War they were aimed directly at the US in order to challenge the containment policy and further the spread of communism. It is somewhat harder to see the US effort as directly aimed at the Soviets. To be effective the secondary operation must provoke a response by the principal opponent. Because the secondary is by definition on the periphery of the main effort, the principal belligerent may choose not to engage. Wellington's efforts in the Peninsula Campaign would have yielded much less impact had Napoleon not chosen to fully engage him. Had Napoleon moved far enough away from Wellington's fleet support the increased risk would likely have pushed him to end the campaign. Similarly, the German army did not have to hold North Africa against Operation TORCH. A different sequence of events would have resulted had the Germans simply withdrawn to Europe. From the Allied perspective, while TORCH had its deficiencies, at least it was directed targeted at German forces. The secondary operation must be able to directly affect the enemy. If the impact on the enemy is not directly obvious, then it is a poor choice. Failure to make this link has resulted in several secondary operations looking much more like new fronts or even new wars. This does not mean that the gain need be combat victories over the enemy, only that the effect on the enemy is not a second or third order effect. The Gallipoli campaign, in seeking a resupply route to Russia as well as the taking of the Ottoman capitol, was direct and thus met this criteria. In

contrast, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt sought to disrupt British trade with India, something that would have involved far more than just occupation and thus could not be a direct effect. To summarize, a secondary operation must be aimed as directly as possible at the enemy lest it simply expend resources for insufficient gain in pursuit of the primary object.

Exploiting an Advantage The belligerent launching a secondary operation does so with the intent of bringing an asymmetric advantage into play so that the battle can be fought on more favorable terms than those offered in the primary theater.

As always, the providing of forces to the secondary

operation must not significantly slow the primary effort. Thus, secondary operations should be undertaken with forces that are not of immediate use elsewhere. Amphibious mobility is one advantage that can be exploited when the land forces of one side are unlikely to succeed in a direct action against the primary forces of the enemy. This is a recurring problem when maritime powers engage with continental ones. The 'whale', not having an army of sufficient size to meet the 'elephant' head-on, seeks a secondary theater where it can bring its naval forces to bear as a counterweight or force multiplier.

This has figured

prominently in amphibious operations through history. As the naval forces cannot serve in the primary theater and the army is of insufficient size to fight in the main theater, a smaller joint operation is a good choice. Pylos and Sphacteria, the Peninsula Campaign, and TORCH are excellent examples. In each case the operations were chosen carefully in that: they exploited amphibious mobility while limiting the mobility options of the enemy, they took on an enemy

force of appropriate capability, they targeted something the enemy wished to contest, and they used forces that were not immediately needed for the primary effort. A second possible case is when one side may have a capability that the other cannot effectively counter, but that cannot be used in the primary theater. Submarines were used by both sides in World War II as a way to take the fight to the enemy in a way that, at least initially, could not be countered or avoided--a perfect choice for a secondary theater. In a similar manner, strategic bombing can be seen as the opening of a secondary theater away from, and in this case above, the front line. As the Allies had no front in Western Europe before June 1944, no air support was needed for it and the bombers were perfectly available for use in a secondary theater.

Clausewitz' Point: Maintain Your Focus to End the War One can argue that the only exceptional reward a secondary theater can bring about is a quicker end to the greater war. Clausewitz is trying to communicate that although estimates and calculations may show the secondary theater to be of great value, they are probably incomplete. This is crucial in decision making because states tend to enter much more readily into secondary theaters of questionable value than primary theaters of critical value because the perceived present cost is lower. Unwilling to go head-to-head, Athens and Sparta each persisted for years in opening secondary theaters instead of figuring out how to directly fight each other. In World War II Eisenhower voiced frequent concerns that TORCH was going to unnecessarily delay Allied entry into France at the risk of losing Russia.2 In Vietnam and Korea the US elected to engage in the Soviet's secondary theaters of choice, with mixed results of somewhat questionable

value. More than anything, secondary theaters tend to prolong war, which is very rarely a good thing and something Clausewitz was definitely against.

It seems that in many cases the

correctness of the secondary theater is evaluated not on conditions at the time, but on reflection of history. Unfortunately this leads to the conclusion that it does not matter if you get it right for the wrong reason; however, this line of reasoning poorly informs decisions in the present. Given all the uncertainties, in almost every case blood and treasure would have been conserved had a decisive battle in the primary theater been sought more diligently.

Secondary Theaters are Often Pragmatic Choices Secondary operations can indeed have the effect of extending the duration of a war. But the purpose is not to delay the war but rather to engage the enemy with the means now available until victory in a decisive match becomes possible. It is also possible that a decisive engagement cannot be made to occur. In this case secondary operations offer the chance to impact the enemy, force a change, and develop conditions that might bring about a decisive engagement. Years of stalemate in World War I were not due to secondary operations, but rather the cause of them. Another example is the Cold War, wherein both sides actively avoided a decisive battle and fought the entire war in secondary theaters. While calculations of the costs and benefits of a secondary operation may never provide the best answer, it is often the case that it may be the best answer right now.

Acts of war

demand a swift response by the public, and civilian and military leaders need to answer aggression in the quickest manner available. As such, the leadership may not have the political

luxury of denying a ready secondary theater when the primary one is unavailable or risks certain defeat. It is undoubtedly sophistry to argue that a decision for secondary operations was good based solely on historical perspective, but you likewise cannot argue against a secondary operation now based simply on what you think will happen later. It may not have been the best of all answers, but in 1942 Britain and the US had to hit Germany, and TORCH was a much better option than OVERLORD at that time. Going back further in time, while it should not have taken the Spartans thirty years to rent a Navy and interdict grain shipments, they nevertheless decided to conduct secondary operations they saw as the best fit for their means at the time.

Final Thoughts First, it is interesting to note that a maritime power has most always been involved on one side of the secondary theater. The reason is freedom of action. Command of the sea gives a maritime power the ability to choose when and where to give battle. As reasoned above, command of the air allows the same choices. For the continental power, all ground combat is on a border, while secondary theaters allow maritime and air powers a way to attack the enemy at a distance. On a cautionary note, advancements in conventional ballistic missiles may now offer a way to dispute command of territory, air and sea in a wholly new manner. Second, an important aspect of secondary operations is their ability to confer the initiative. Although it may be hard to estimate its value, initiative greatly affects the morale of

the military as well as the people at home. Well executed, taking the initiative will have many hard to predict effects for both sides, but fortune favors the bold. Lastly, while Clausewitz is right to urge caution in the conduct of secondary operations, he is using a bit of hyperbole when he insists the conditions be exceptional. A carefully thought out sequence of qualifying points, some of which have been discussed in this paper, is a better answer than a de facto prohibition.

Notes. 1. In a lecture (Kaiser?) a chart was displayed showing the trajectories of WWI in which the use of U-boats was alluded to as a secondary theater. 2. Weigley, ~p320, discussion of one lecturer (possibly Pain)