Minium-attacking Al Qaeda Strategy

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I.

Attacking Al-Qaeda's Strategy By Scott Minium Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Strategy and Policy based on the following assigned topic: Question 11. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win a war is to attack the enemy‘s strategy. How does that insight apply to the Long War? The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:___________________ 31 May 09 Seminar 6A Moderators: Commander Peter Jannotta Professor Colin Jackson

Attacking Al-Qaeda's Strategy Sun Tzu said “What is best is to attack the enemy's strategy.” The principal opponent in our current conflict with transnational terrorism, Al-Qaeda, has specific goals and a strategy for attaining them. The components of this enemy's strategy, like all good strategies, are mutually reinforcing and interrelated. While this constitutes a strength, the short Chinese aphorism above provides insight for a different type of attack. First, we can attack Al-Qaeda's use of strategic communications.

Second, we can attack Al-Qaeda efforts to

undermine the unity of states opposed to them. Third, it is possible to deny this enemy the necessary conditions for victory.1 Enemy Goals and Strategy Before discussing how to combat the Al-Qaeda strategy, it is necessary to try and state what that their goals and strategy are. Strategy serves as the way to attain goals, and in the case of Al-Qaeda the far term goal is the establishment of a world wide Islamic Caliphate.

A more

attainable mid-range goal is to reestablish the Caliphate in predominantly Muslim countries from North Africa to India, the historic Dar al-Islam.2 Situated between these goals is the destruction of the Zionist state. Their strategy consists of several parts. First is controlling the message. Here they attempt to demonstrate a clear threat to Islam which will facilitate unification of the ummah (the community of Islam). Second, Western influence must be removed from Dar al-Islam because it is leading the ummah astray. Third, the Western presence must be removed. This is closely related, but not identical to the preceding point.

Fourth, corrupt Muslim leaders must be 2

removed from power. This is accomplished by removing external support, and then ruling them unfit and thus opening them to challenge. 3 Once the corrupting and misleading influences have been removed, the path to restoring Islamic rule is open. Whether or not this strategy can succeed, it is conceptually simple, brief and parts of it are easily converted into action at tactical levels with little direction. Changing Strategic Monolog into Strategic Dialog The Al-Qaeda elite (namely Zawahiri and Bin Laden) clearly have a good grasp of strategic dialog. Their video and audio tapes are well produced and thought out, and large scale operations directly authorized and sponsored by them (e.g., 9/11 and USS COLE) obtain the desired press coverage and shock effect. These communications are designed to bolster their legitimacy and acquire support. All of their written and video communications make frequent use of religious references to further shape and support their message. While those against AlQaeda have not generally challenged this unilateral dialog, at least two strategies will aid in attacking their message. First, the West can engage Al-Qaeda on the religious merits of its cause. Second, we can define our terms to ensure the correct people and actions are targeted. Al-Qaeda's use of religious reference and rhetoric is problematic because while the West is very secular, most of the Middle East is not. Religion is tightly woven into much of Middle Eastern society and politics, and because of this difference in culture, the West has elected not to challenge the enemy's message on their terms. However, by choosing to do so we have allowed Al-Qaeda to control the message, asserting time and time again that the war is one of the US (and the West in general) against Islam. The following assertions are part of nearly every AlQaeda statement: 1) the US is an expansionist and colonial power only interested in subjugating 3

and exploiting Dar al-Islam, 2) the current conflict is a crusade against against Islam led by the US, 3) the conflict is a clash of cultures (specifically religions), and either Islam or the West must perish. In Al-Qaeda's efforts to portray the West as anti-Islam, they are assisted by a unwittingly cooperative enemy. First, although a number of insurgencies in the world today may have Arabic names and Muslim members, most outside the Middle East do not have a specifically Muslim agenda, and none are fighting for Al-Qaeda's Caliphate. Yet by widening the definition of the war to include just about every insurgency on the planet, we have made it very easy for Al-Qaeda to demonstrate that the US is at war with Muslims everywhere. This allows them to claim a much wider audience than they may otherwise have. Second, as mentioned earlier, AlQaeda makes heavy use of religious references. Our staunchly secular society has an extremely difficult time responding to religious based arguments for strong cultural reasons. These include: 1) the assumption by secular society that socio-political issues are resolvable without religious arguments, 2) the view that religion does not have a part in logical arguments; and 3) that our secular society does not believe in challenging religious views in public discourse.

There are

many other ways to show the extent of this problem, but it comes down to this: due to culture and ignorance the West is very reluctant to build counter-arguments using religion for fear of giving offense. The use of religious rhetoric has thus allowed Al-Qaeda to reach their target audience in a way that has precluded a Western response. To seize some of the initiative in strategic communications it is necessary to address this religious rhetoric. This can be done by the countries of the West as well as those in the Middle East. For the West, this requires an acute sensitivity to language and knowledge of the religious 4

arguments. Certainly the West can find Islamic scholars to aid in crafting appropriate arguments and to educate our public and their leaders.

The West must show equal care in its

communications both at home and abroad, but addressing the Middle Eastern audience will be much more effective if it comes from within the region. The US should work diplomatically behind the scenes to get regional governments to strengthen the religious nature of their anti-AlQaeda messages. There are efforts to this effect, but more can be done. The second improvement in strategic communication is to define our enemy and their actions more precisely. Defining the enemy will make it clear who we are, and who we are not, fighting. In any conflict one seeks to demonize the enemy—while not alienating friends. At this time the forces aligned against Al-Qaeda do not have one term for the opposition. Jihadi, jihadist, terrorist, or violent extremist—the lack of a unifying term means that every time we speak we run the risk of alienating some and not including others. Some alternatives have been proposed, but it is important for us to be able to frame the discourse through a unified position. Since the main enemy happens to be Arabic, use of an Arabic word will help to limit the context of the fight. The word "hirabah," which most directly translates as piracy or unlawful warfare, has been advanced by some as a better label. One direct benefit is that unlike jihad, hirabah has no positive connotations. Defining terrorism would also assist our dialog in that we could better define acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. After all, the definition must support the legitimacy of combat operations while denouncing attacks on civilians. One proposal is to define terrorism as the deliberate targeting and killing of civilians for political purposes.4 Under this definition the attack in Oklahoma City was not terrorism since there really was no political objective. The 5

Unabomber was a terrorist, but the attackers of the USS COLE were not. Munich, 1972 was a terrorist act, but the Beirut barracks bombing in 1983 was not. Incidental and regrettable instances of civilian deaths resulting from military operations are also not terrorism. Thus, the military must remain valid targets for violence if the legitimacy of combat operations is not to be forfeit. This strategic communication works, and the US has been largely successful in communicating the legitimacy of its actions by publicly striving to reduce civilian casualties and acknowledging errors when they occur. In contrast, attempts by Zawahiri to show the legitimacy of Zarqawi's attacks on Muslim civilians in Iraq and Jordan backfired in spectacular fashion, and led to a significant loss of confidence in the region.5 Notably, coverage by most Arab media was overwhelmingly negative toward Al-Qaeda in this case. There can be no doubt that the battle against Al-Qaeda includes the fight for public opinion. The US and the rest of the anti-hirabah forces cannot and need not allow the enemy to be the dominant voice in the discussion because of imprecise terminology or squeamishness about religious rhetoric. Deny Efforts to Defeat the Array of Nations The history of warfare is one of shifting alliances and coalitions attempting to band together for long enough to overcome a threat. In the past such associations have frequently joined states together that otherwise would have themselves been in violent competition. In the West coalitions are viewed as legitimizing vehicles for action, but our secular culture enables us to compartmentalize differences of politics and religion to a degree that varies directly with the level of the threat. The West has a great desire to have all nations choose sides in the battle 6

against Al-Qaeda, and the West generally refers to its side as "the Coalition." But Western style compartmentalization is not always possible in Middle Eastern culture. Through its strategic dialog Al-Qaeda seeks to frame the conflict as one of the West vs. Islam. Unless this argument is defeated soundly before siding with the West, a Middle Eastern government can be accused of essentially renouncing their faith by so joining (see point four of the strategy). The stronger governments in the region were able to effectively counter this argument and had little trouble publicly siding against Al-Qaeda. The weaker governments, less able to make convincing arguments and more susceptible to internal strife, have typically not sided against Al-Qaeda until they suffered direct attacks (e.g., Jordan). All of these states need to realize the need for their own robust strategic dialogs in countering the hirabah logic. Some Muslim states are required to side against Al-Qaeda for more personal reasons than simple opposition to terrorism.

As the Al-Qaeda version of Sunni Islam views all Shi'a

leadership as apostates, the entirety of Shi'a Islam is forced to side against the enemy goal of a Sunni Caliphate.6 Shi'a Muslims are the majority in Iraq, Iran and Bahrain. The government of Iran, ruled by a Shi'a theocracy, is ultimately an Al-Qaeda target. However, opposing the final goal of Al-Qaeda is not the same as denouncing their strategies or methods. Nevertheless, it is extremely unlikely that a nation like Iran will harbor or support an organization that preaches its overthrow. Of course, it is equally unlikely that Iran will side with the West. Another option is that if Middle Eastern states cannot join forces with the West, perhaps they could form a regional anti-hirabah bloc. Given that this has not happened, other schisms and local rivalries are clearly more of a concern at this time than Al-Qaeda. Moreover, it is

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possible they perceive themselves as joined by a common culture, and thus formal statements of union are neither required nor desired. In enlisting the help of the world's nations to fight Al-Qaeda, the US should take assistance from wherever it comes and not insist on public declarations. Allowing a more silent membership will both downplay the coming and going of partners, and allow the inclusion of others that will act against Al-Qaeda but cannot or will not publicly declare it. This should guide our actions with respect to states like Iran, which clearly cannot accommodate Al-Qaeda religious aims, but neither is it in their interests to espouse any kind of unity with the US. States opposing Al-Qaeda should treat with other states based on the record of actions taken rather than public statements to one side or the other. Deny Conditions for Victory In addition to challenging their strategies, it is possible to act strategically and deny AlQaeda the conditions necessary for them to realize their goal of a Caliphate. The existence of strong states counters Al-Qaeda strategic goals in two important ways. First, governments of strong states will, by definition, resist challenges to their authority. Second, strong states have fewer ungoverned areas where violent rebellion minded groups like Al-Qaeda can find safe haven. State existence is anti-Al-Qaeda.

A truism of world history is that states desire

continued existence. Logically those in charge of the states want this as well. To maintain integrity of the state and authority of the government, all states impose a monopoly on the use of violence and specifically outlaw the use of violence for governmental change.7 It follows that strong states do not have violent internal dissention. And since no state has volunteered to 8

commit state-level suicide to host the Caliphate, they must be weakened to allow it to be established. Weakening of states is pursued by isolating them internationally and by planting the seeds of rebellion within them. This pattern has been attempted several times in the past (e.g., Egypt, Iraq). Keeping states strong denies the conditions needed for the Caliphate, and the longer its establishment is perceived to be in the far future the weaker the argument becomes. State existence denies safe-havens. One part of US strategy is to deny Al-Qaeda safe havens in ungoverned or weekly governed areas. As shown above, strong rational states will not allow rebellious groups like Al-Qaeda to take root since they must ultimately turn on their hosts to achieve their goals, and they also invite starkly negative international reaction. Most states with strong governments have few ungoverned areas and limit the so called lesser governed areas.8 Thus, strong states, regardless of political persuasion, are aligned with us on the subject of safe havens for Al-Qaeda-like organizations. The argument in favor of strong states does not mean the US must support all actions taken by these governments. It does, however, mean that the US must be very careful in its choices of which governments it seeks to destabilize. It has not been this careful in the past. The very act of destabilizing a government so that it can be replaced by one more to the liking of the US opens it to the possibility of becoming a harbor for Al-Qaeda-like entities as it passes through a violent phase of anarchy.9

Several governments throughout the world have policies that are

directly opposed to those of the US, yet not one of them has chosen to abdicate in favor of a Qutb-Bin-Laden version of an Islamic Caliphate.10 As such, their interests are at least in some small measure aligned with ours. Attacking Strategy is Unproductive and Some States are Just Dangerous 9

Some would argue that the policy of attacking the enemy's strategy is mostly a passive one. While there may be applications for this methodology in some circumstances, employment of a passive strategy has historically had bad consequences when dealing with someone predisposed toward violence.

After all, the passage from The Art of War that argues for

attacking the enemy's strategy comes after the passage that counsels "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

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Thus, it would seem the concept of attacking a strategy

is appropriate before the fighting starts, not after it has begun. Additionally, the notion that simply developing strong states will help to counter terrorism is at odds with past experiences with Iran, Libya, Syria and others. So while states may be the most capable at denying safe havens to terrorists, they may choose not to do so or even actively support them. Attacking Strategy in Addition, not in Exclusion It is agreed that attacks on strategy are more passive than what the US has generally pursued to date. Nevertheless, an attack on strategy is a pragmatic choice when the enemy offers little else in the way of targets and frames the battle as one of ideas.. The Taliban, a perfectly legitimate target given their harboring and support of terrorists, had no strategy, but rather just a relatively small number of conventional forces. The real enemy, Al-Qaeda, had even more limited conventional capabilities and nothing to gain from direct confrontation with regular forces. But Al-Qaeda does have a strategy, so while they can decline to meet us in a stand up fight, an attack on their strategy is something they cannot refuse to answer. It is also certainly true that many states demonstrate unacceptable behaviors. But the realist notion that we should desire strong states first, and good behavior later, is precisely what the US has always done as a first option. It is easier and far less costly in blood and treasure to 10

get states to adjust their behavior than it is to coerce them through force of arms—although force must remain an option. The principle is to have states, not us, do their own policing. This is even more critical in the current conflict, when our very presence strengthens the enemy's message while at the same time weakening the position of our friends. Put another way, developing strong states and relying on them may at least help us to not make things worse. In Somalia for example, our refusal to allow Islamic rule was followed promptly by a descent back into anarchy and a resurgence of piracy. 12 Or, closer to the point of this paper, as one Pakistani Captain recently said, "We didn't have an insurgency when the Russians left." 13 Conclusion It is rare within active hostilities that your opponent gives you the ability to challenge his strategy through anything but force of arms. We have the means and capability to bring AlQaeda to action full-time because an attack on their strategy must be answered. As a practical matter this is a useful development in a conflict where one side can choose to remain mostly invisible until after an attack. Whether this conflict is best viewed as a police action, counter-insurgency or a war, the manner in which we choose to fight it matters. In a conflict where the enemy wants it defined as a battle of ideas, attacking strategy is an opportunity to open up a new theater. And, as one writer pointed out, since our enemies believe they are acting strategically, we would be foolish not to exploit the chance to demonstrate its futility and undermine their confidence.14

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Notes. 1. Rather than refer to our opponent with the broad term of terrorist, Al-Qaeda will generally be used throughout. Further, the author does not subscribe to the idea of linking every terrorist act to AQ simply because it got the "official seal." Thus the term AQAM is not used. 2. A number of Arabic words are used in this paper because translating them is imprecise and removes the cultural aspect of this conflict. The author has attempted, probably poorly, to use these terms correctly, but this illustrates the point. Explanations for all of the terms can readily be found on-line. For example, at http://www.wikipedia.org. 3. Overthrow of a just Muslim ruler is a religious problem due to prohibitions against such actions under Shari'a. An ulema, or Muslim legal scholar, can declare a leader unbeliever (a process called takfir) based on his actions or words, and issue a fatwa (legal judgment) against him. Muslims are then no longer bound to follow this leader. Moreover, this can now make killing of the ruler completely legal. This line of reasoning was used by Qutb followers, namely Zawahiri and associates, to justify the killing of Anwar Sadat. (This is just a summary of a very long topic.) See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Takfir. 4. Prof. Genest, lecture 2008. 5. See Transnational Security Report for DoD, "Zawahiri Tries to Clear Name, Explain Strategy," http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/zawahiri.pdf. Also, Marc Lynch, "Al-Qaeda's Media Strategies", http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=1087&paper=2662. 6. Israel Elad-Altman, "The Sunni-Shia Conversion Controversy", The Hudson Institute. See http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/detail/the-sunni-shia-conversion-controversy 7. Prof. Jackson, lecture 2009. 8. Prof. Katz, lecture 2009. 9. Prof. Jackson, lecture 2009. 10. The Qutb-Bin-Laden characterization is based on ideas from Lawrence Wright, "The Looming Tower." 11. Sun Tzu, III:3. 12. JMO lecture, 2009. 13. Comments in lecture, 2009. 14. Lawrence Freedman, "The Transformation of Strategic Affairs," 91.

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