Minium-alternative Views Of Prc Deterrence

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I.

China's Nuclear Strategy and What It Means (or Should Mean) to the United States By Scott Minium Captain, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the China's National Security elective. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are most likely not endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. Signature:__________________ 25 October 2009 China's National Security

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China's Nuclear Strategy and What It Means (or Should Mean) to the United States Introduction The People's Republic of China (PRC) became a nuclear power in 1964. Since that time analysts have made predictions about the future of the PRC's nuclear forces that have been very consistent in one way: they were wrong. The periodic predictions of large and immediate increases in numbers and diversity of PRC nuclear weapons never came to be. This is because the fundamental strategy pursued by the PRC is misunderstood. As the PRC moves to an ever more important position on the world stage, this misunderstanding will prompt PRC responses that would not have occurred in previous decades. In an effort to discern this different strategy the following items will be reviewed: PRC motivations for the development of nuclear weapons, possible PRC nuclear strategies and PRC deployment of nuclear weapons. This paper concludes the PRC is following a unique, novel, and nonstandard approach to its nuclear forces that can only loosely be described as deterrence. Such a non-standard model warrants careful evaluation by the US. A Need for Nuclear Weapons The only piece of information that seems to be completely agreed upon regarding the start of the PRC nuclear program is the date of the first detonation: October 16, 1964. There is less agreement on when the PRC nuclear program started and for what reasons. Mao Zedong was certainly aware of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II, and he could have directed development of nuclear weapons starting in 1949 after winning the civil war. At the time, however, Mao spoke of the fallacy that “weapons decide everything” and went on to state that nuclear weapons “were a paper tiger.”1 Although the phrase 'paper tiger' can be seen as a sound bite used frequently to dismiss threats out of hand, it may also have been 2

an early indication of Mao's view of the utility of nuclear weapons. The date for the start of the nuclear program is important to determining the real motivation behind it. But, an actual date for the start of the PRC nuclear program is uncertain. By some accounts, Mao's statements in 1960 that the “future of the nuclear program would determine the destiny of the state,” were the announcement of the program.2 Others have placed the start as early as 1956.3

Regardless of the exact start date of the

nuclear program, two things are clear. First, the program was not initiated out of fear of the US since the program did not start until at least seven years after the PRC formed and eleven years after first use of nuclear weapons. Second, events of the Korean War (1950-3) did not really influence the decision since the program did not start until at least three years after the war. At least three years of inaction not withstanding (from the end of the Korean War to the earliest possible start date of the program), the assertion is still frequently put forward that threatened US use of nuclear weapons during the Korean War was a prime motivator for the PRC program.4 These threats are said to have made the US the 'hated enemy' throughout the 1950s.5 This was excellent propaganda in China, but those threats did not appear to be believed by the PRC leadership, and a threat is only real if it is believed. If the PRC really believed US nuclear threats during the Korean War, why did the war drag on for so long? What significant behavior changed as a result of the threat? More to the point, if the threat was perceived as real, why did PRC development of nuclear weapons not begin until the late 1950s or 1960? Another possible starting point for the initiation of a nuclear program was the first Taiwan Strait crisis of 1957, but the conflict did not reach the level of US and PRC forces engaging each other. As such, it is even less likely that a US threat to the PRC took 3

place, or if it did, that it would have been believed. In 1961, in an interview with the United Kingdom's Field Marshall Montgomery, Mao stated, “[nuclear weapons are] something to scare people, absorbing a lot of money but useless.”6 During the same interview Mao stated that “the more there are the more difficult they are to use.” This last statement is curiously reminiscent of US thinking of the 1950s.7 The start date of the nuclear program, coupled with frequent statements like this from Mao, indicate the PRC did not commence development of nuclear weapons for use as a deterrent as much as for a strong political statement at home and abroad. Another possible motivation was territorial security. However, after World War II the only real territorial threat facing the PRC was the USSR after the start of the Sino-Soviet split, which did not start until about 1961 and after the latest possible start of the PRC nuclear program. Despite the proximity of the USSR and the distance of the US, statements still surface about the threat of the US to PRC territory. After all, for many years the PRC only had missiles capable of reaching Russia. The conclusion, therefore, is if US were indeed the 'hated enemy,'8 then: 1) the fielding of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with the ability to range the US should have been done before 19789, and 2) the nuclear program should have started closer to the Korean War. Either way, the PRC did not act as if the US was their major threat. Possible Nuclear Strategies There are a number of ways to examine potential nuclear weapons strategies. At the highest level these strategies fit into one of two bins: deterrence or war-fighting. Deterrent strategies are prepared for a nuclear exchange but do not really plan on having those plans executed. The other set of strategies, war-fighting, considers nuclear weapons part of the 4

continuum of available force and considers nuclear exchange scenarios where victory is possible. This of course depends on how you define victory.10 A fascinating thing about the deterrence game is that your moves often influence those of your opponent. A good example can be taken from the US debates over deterrent posture toward the beginning of the Cold War. In the 1960s there was a debate involving the US Navy on one side and the Secretary of Defense and the US Air Force on the other. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, argued for a minimal deterrent posture, one that would become known as counter-value, based solely on submarine launched ballistic missiles.11 His argument was based on the idea that a secure second strike capability, even a limited one, was enough to deter the USSR from contemplating a nuclear first strike. The other side of the argument, championed by US Air Force interests and Secretary of Defense McNamara, insisted that the USSR was pursuing a war-fighting strategy. This meant the Soviets considered a victory possible even with severe civilian losses. One comment from the time was that “authoritarian regimes can absorb greater losses without losing their hold on power.”12 A side that is pursuing war-fighting13 intends to maintain some kind of military capability after an exchange such that they could continue the fight. In the face of a nuclear exchange, war-fighting strategy requires large numbers of weapons in diverse and secure locations. The question thus put forward is, can you counter a war-fighting thought process with a minimal deterrent that, based on limited numbers of weapons, could only be aimed at population centers rather than the opponent's full military capability?

McNamara

successfully argued that the answer was no: the only way to discourage the war-fighting strategy was with a massive deterrent force aimed at all military capabilities, what would 5

become known as counter-force. In part this thinking was based on exaggerated ideas about Soviet missile buildups. But when the US started to create very large arsenals to counter the war-fighting strategy, the Soviets did not see it that way. From the Soviet perspective, fielding a large number of diverse platforms looked exactly like the US was pursuing a warfighting strategy. It is unlikely the desired outcome was a protracted arms race. Deterrence has been defined by some pundits as 'whatever it is that nuclear weapons do.'14

The simplest mission of deterrence is to dissuade an opponent's use of nuclear

weapons. Deterrence is defined by the desired objective and the force used to obtain it. A multitude of definitions have been used to aid in discussing the various strategies: deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment,15 minimum deterrence, maximum deterrence, and moderate intensity deterrence.16 Deterrence by denial is a counter-war-fighting strategy: you tell your opponent he cannot win because he will not have sufficient force to do it. This strategy utilizes counter-force, which targets mostly military and industrial targets and requires a force proportional to the number of such targets. Deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, raises the cost of the exchange to a point where it is no longer considered worth it. This counter-value strategy depends on your opponent's mind set: if he values his people, a small force aimed at cities will work, but if he values the military more, you are back to counter-force. Minimum deterrent is the force posture needed to execute a deterrence by punishment (counter-value) strategy.17 A secure force is needed, but it may be small in number and have little or no diversified delivery vehicles. France and the UK arguably have this kind of deterrent force. The US might define maximum deterrence as the ability to respond to a devastating first strike with massive retaliation. Such a response includes elements of both denial and punishment. The PRC, however, defines maximum deterrence as 6

the ability “to threaten the opponent by disarming him with just the first massive nuclear strike for attaining the aim of containing and coercing him.” 18 A notably different view point. The last option, moderate intensity deterrence, is found in PRC literature. It is based solely on the size of the forces needed, and is at its core a deterrence by punishment strategy. Even with these definitions, however, it is difficult to put a label, even a PRC provided one, on the PRC deterrent strategy. As discussed above, all deterrent strategies rely on either denial or punishment. It also assumes the ability to deliver on the threat, and this demands at least some level of confidence in one's ability to reply. Up until very recently the US oriented portion of the PRC deterrent was based exclusively on siloed missiles. At times statements have surfaced that the PRC was relatively confident that not all sites could be positively located by an aggressor, and thus deterrence was served.19 Eventually, however, this assertion was no longer put forward. For a number of years the PRC likely had nothing the US considered a valid deterrent and yet the PRC did not take aggressive action to correct the situation. Thus, the PRC posture did not fit into any neat boxes. Another view of PRC deterrent thought, stated by at least one PRC official, is that they seek to maintain “the minimum means of reprisal.”20 Against an opponent like the US, one that is very unlikely to find even the loss of one city in a postulated exchange to be acceptable, this strategy can work with very few weapons. Proponents of the minimum means theory forecast the PRC will build relatively few numbers of additional weapons in the coming years, focusing on road mobile missiles for survivability and a modest increase in deployed warheads to counter possible US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses. The ABM treaty and the US withdrawal from it, cannot be discounted when considering PRC nuclear reasoning. First one must consider the impact of an ABM system 7

on a deterrent force. If a country builds an ABM system that can intercept 50% of a strike, then double the number of warheads are needed to ensure the same number get through.21 It is exactly this logic that led to the ABM treaty in 1972. If the PRC is interested in a minimal means strategy, then US deployment of an ABM system requires an estimate of effectiveness and a resulting increase in deliverable warheads. This could be a reason for the PRC interest in submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM); however, the new class of PRC ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), the JIN, launched in 2006, must have already been under construction at the time the US withdrew from the treaty. So the ABM treaty is not the reason for it. As well, development of the road mobile DF-31A began before the end of the ABM treaty. Even if the ABM system did not drive development of these new capabilities, it will have a precise effect on deployment numbers if the PRC is following a typical nuclear deterrent strategy. For example, if the small number of road mobile ICBMs is about half the number found in silos, then it can be seen as a counter ABM deployment designed to compensate for a system that is 33% effective. Once again, ABMs lead to arms races.22 Based on the number of weapons deployed, the minimum means of reprisal theory is the best fit for explaining observed PRC behavior. There is still, however, the lingering question of the PRC move to deploy fairly robust numbers (60 missiles in 5 hulls) of SLBMs. While construction of the JIN class appears to continue, development of the SLBM to fill it, the JL-2, has been slow. Given the PRC expertise in ballistic missiles, the slow pace of delivering numbers of JL-2s can only be the result a lack of motivation and real interest. Deterrent Orientation and Missions Not only does the size and type of the PRC nuclear force defy easy categorization by the west, their views on deterrence are considerably different as well. 8

While the US

considers deterrent orientation as only defensive in nature but with both offensive and defensive forces, the PRC holds that deterrent orientation can be defensive or offensive.23 Offensive strategy is the use of a strategic deterrent to compel another to give up resistance and secure an objective that only war would otherwise secure.24 A defensive posture, in contrast, is one that deters by convincing an opponent that an attack would fail or that the risks are to high. Somewhat naturally, the PRC asserts they have a defensive deterrent while 'hegemonic powers' have an offensive one. The PRC has long had a “No First Use” policy regarding nuclear weapons. While terms like “active strategic defense” and statements like “The strategy to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck, never means taking a beating passively” could be interpreted as refutations of the No First Use policy, the fact remains that the US has never renounced first use of nuclear weapons. A review of standing US Nuclear Doctrine reveals the wording is largely in keeping with a defensive posture.25 However, the phrase “Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making,” is found in a draft US Joint Publication on Nuclear Doctrine.26 This may appear to be offensive deterrence from the PRC perspective, but from the US perspective this is seen as defensive in nature: the US is trying to convince another that the risks are grievous and should not be taken. PRC has discussed additional aims and missions for its nuclear forces including counter-deterrence and counter-coercion.

Counter-deterrence of an offensive deterrent, n

PRC parlance, comes closest to the western concept of deterrence. The concept of countercoercion means to ensure that the PRC cannot be coerced by threat of nuclear attack. There has been a good deal of discussion by PRC scholars on the different levels of meaning between the terms of counter-deterrence and counter-coercion. That this is effective rhetoric 9

by the PRC for external public consumption should be obvious. In a realist view, the way in which the PRC chooses to characterize its deterrent does not matter: it only matters if they have it. The characterization, however, does serve to communicate a message to an audience other than the US; a message consistent with the odd bipolar view of offensive and defensive deterrence. That message is that the PRC is a non-aggressive state that maintains a defensive nuclear deterrent orientation with the missions of counter-deterrence and counter-coercion. The small size of the PRC deterrent force is an integral to communicating the inherent selfdefense part of this message. Past Predictions for PRC Nuclear Forces The US efforts to discern a PRC nuclear strategy continue to look toward numbers as prime indicators. Numbers of warheads, as well as types and numbers of delivery vehicles seem to be the standard for determining strategy despite a large volume of data that indicates PRC nuclear thinking is not dominated by numbers. Mao's philosophy on war and weapons (see discussion above) continue to be quoted frequently in PRC publications. Nevertheless, over the last 45 years the US has been preoccupied with the numbers of PRC nuclear forces. Unfortunately, if the US is trying to determine PRC strategy based on numbers and predictions of future numbers, our complete inability to correctly guess at future numbers does not bode well for our predictions and assessments of PRC strategy. A good first example of this predictive difficulty is taken from 1967 Congressional hearings on the US response to the development of PRC nuclear capabilities. The following prediction was offered: Some feel that, over the long term, Red Chinese technological and industrial progress stimulated by the nuclear effort may create a need for expanded foreign 10

trade and thus a more relaxed attitude toward the world at large. However, the more likely result is that the Chinese concept of the “middle kingdom or Celestial empire” the idea that China is superior to any other nation and always is right— will inspire an increasingly blatant aggressiveness based on naked nuclear blackmail.27 While the first prediction may have come partly into being, the second one, the threatening one, clearly did not. Yet it was partly in response to this perceived threat that the US deployed its ABM system.28 The PRC deployed its first ICBMs capable of reaching the US in the early 1980s, but the numbers remained very low: in the 1990s the PRC increased those ICBM forces from about 10 to about 20.29 Of course, in 1988 the predictions were that the PRC would soon be fielding many more nuclear weapons.30 Then, in 1993 intelligence estimates that the PRC planned to build at least three XIA class SSBNs.31 Defense projections and later estimates of PRC deployed nuclear missiles have consistently shown that the US over estimates.32 This is good business for the defense industry, but it also indicates a very poor understanding of PRC intentions. The PRC has always had the ability to produce larger numbers of ICBMs and yet has elected to not do so. The case of PRC SSBN development is even more telling. Despite what the US would assess as a clear need for an SSBN capability, the PRC has yet to field one. The XIA class SSBN is assessed to never have made a patrol and there was never more than one ship of the class.33 While the cause of the single ship class is widely assessed as poor performance of the XIA, the PRC did not launch a new SSBN, the JIN class, until 2006. The missile for the new SSBN, the JL-2, has been in development for 20 years.34 It appears that the PRC, a 11

country with excellent missile technology and manned space flight, does not perceive any pressing national security need for SSBNs and SLBMs or they would have put more effort into them. Analysts have guessed wrong on PRC nuclear development and deployment almost uniformly for 45 years. That past track record has not dissuaded current analysts from continuing to conclude that the PRC is on the brink of fielding a large number of weapons.35 Characterization From the beginning the PRC nuclear weapons program has defied all attempts to categorize it. In a way this is understandable given that western nations are attempting fit an eastern culture into a western mold. No doubt that the PRC's moves in the nuclear arena have been affected, in part at least, by the west (to include Russia). However, it may be that the problem of understanding the PRC nuclear stance results from the PRC having a fundamentally different view of nuclear weapons and deterrence. After reviewing the moves of the PRC over the past sixty years, it appears the fundamental assumption in PRC nuclear planning is that nuclear weapons will not be used. Any appearance of concern with the size and quality of a nuclear force is for domestic and international political purposes only—not for deterrence. By definition, a nation only needs a deterrent if they feel the opponent may attempt an attack. While much was written about PRC concerns over 'nuclear blackmail' in Korea and the first Taiwan Strait crisis, there are many reasons to believe the PRC did not really believe the threat. First, Mao firmly believed that weapons did not decide battles and this viewpoint has been present in Chinese writings well before and well after Mao. Second, if a threat was considered real, why wait seven or more years to start your own nuclear bomb program? Third, the PRC maintained a relatively 12

small number of nuclear armed ICBMs even though it had the capability and capacity to field more. Fourth, SLBMs and road mobile missiles are more survivable than ICBMs, but the PRC has invested relatively little of its national treasure in fielding them. The size of the PRC nuclear force remains very small. If the assumption is that nuclear weapons will in fact never be used, why have them at all? The answer is perception. Whether or not the PRC or the west wants China to have a bigger part on the world's stage is immaterial—given its population and economy it will have a bigger role. Can the PRC be taken seriously if other nations think the PRC can be 'bullied' or 'black-mailed' by a nuclear power like the US? If the answer is no, then the PRC must be seen as possessing an adequate deterrent. It is further in the interests of the PRC, as the champion of global nuclear disarmament,36 to possess the smallest nuclear force necessary to constitute a credible deterrent. A Non-Standard Nuclear Strategy As the fundamental assumption discussed above indicates, there are reasons to think the PRC is pursuing something other than a standard deterrent strategy. A strategy that might be called a more stealthy, deceptive, pragmatic or perhaps just a Chinese strategy. This strategy is more about the psychological aspects of deterrence, and in that event numbers have little to do with the calculus.37 An indicator of this different strategy is the assessment that PRC declaratory doctrine places emphasis on the “aspect of disutility rather than utility of nuclear weapons.”38 It is also be reflected in PRC military texts which make it clear that “conventional deterrence is more credible [than nuclear].”39 Is it possible that the PRC strategy is to convince the rest of the world, and not the US, that the PRC cannot be being coerced or bullied? 13

Akin to minimal means, such a strategy is not specifically influenced by the size of the US force. Since it is more political in nature, it is much more concerned about perception. In this case, US pronouncements about the weakness of PRC nuclear deterrent can only be answered in the minds of the world by larger or more capable forces. Perception that the US ABM system is more like an impenetrable shield than limited defensive capability could drive world opinion to believe the US can counter a smaller threat force like the PRC— regardless of the truth. Countering those assertions to shape opinion in the rest of the world would require a sizable increase in PRC forces or capabilities. To make such a strategy work, such as it is, the PRC must take action to appear to the rest of the world to be uncoercible by the US—regardless of whether or not the PRC already considers itself uncoercible. With the fundamental assumption that the US will never use nuclear weapons against the PRC in a first strike, the PRC is thus not deterring the US, but rather working to ensure the rest of the world never believes the PRC can be unduly influenced or coerced by the US. Why it Matters The nature of the real PRC deterrent line of reasoning is important for the simple reason that the same US actions will result in very different PRC reactions depending on their strategy. A standard model, such as minimum deterrence or minimum means of reprisal, is more based on internal decisions and perceptions than external actions. The US choice to pursue maximum deterrence against the USSR was driven by internal politics and US perceptions more than anything else. Likewise, if the PRC is pursuing a standard model akin to a minimal means of reprisal, then the amount of its nuclear force is basically unaffected by the size of the US force and little by US posturing or statements. They need only have the 14

ability to reach us with enough to scare us. Of note, in a standard model the deployment of ABM systems is countered through a calculated buildup of weapons. As a purely analytical process it has some definable end point that will be reached by a standard deterrent model. On the other hand, if the PRC is pursuing a non-standard model, one where external (not US) perception is key, then US proclamations and threats, as well as high profile tests of ABM capabilities, will have a very different outcome. In such a non-standard model the size and character of nuclear forces is governed by assessments of perception in areas of interest around the world, rather than unemotional mathematics and the perception of the primary opponent. Until recently there was no cause for the standard and non-standard models to be at odds.

However, the fielding of ABM systems and frequent US pronouncements of an

ineffective PRC deterrent capability, now that the PRC is fully stepping onto the world stage, are likely to be viewed as direct threats to security that must be answered. Before the dawn of PRC economic might and influence, such affronts were of no concern to nuclear posture regardless of the strategy followed, but that is no longer the case. In a standard model such nuclear saber rattling is handled with modest changes to ICBM forces, for example with survivable road mobile missiles. In the non-standard model one must ensure the appearance of being unthreatened is maintained, which would likely call for many more weapons and capabilities. The question of the PRCs nuclear strategy has been focused on a standard model since the 1960s and the US has acted accordingly. Information suggests that a different dynamic may be at work, one that is not readily seen when reading military publications. With the rise of a globally powerful PRC and an increase in US capabilities (specifically 15

ABMs), the question of PRC nuclear strategy needs to be revisited and the correct conclusion reached. US threats can be expected to have little impact on standard models of deterrence, but the expected reaction of a non-standard model is likely to be a new arms race that does not improve US security and may jeopardize US interests. The US should carefully evaluate the possibility of such non-standard strategies to preclude errors in judgment due to mirrorimaging.

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Notes. 1. Yi Long, The American Response to the Development of Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI dissertation services, 1994), 59. 2. John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 121. 3. Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988), 44. 4. As late as 1989 a commander of the PRC Second Artillery Corps stated that nuclear weapons were necessary to prevent nuclear blackmail. See Major General Yang Huan, “China's Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” in Defense Industry of China, 1949-1989 (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 1989). Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/huan.htm, (accessed 19 September 2009). 5. Lin, 40. 6. “Talks with Marshal Montgomery On the Three Principles and the Question of Nuclear Weapons,” Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong, found at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-09/28/content_6143129.htm, accessed 19 September 2009. 7 In the middle of the 'red scare,' in the first decade of the cold war, Dr. Henry Kissinger argued that the USSR had successfully blackmailed the west into no longer considering nuclear weapons use acceptable and thus had removed any advantage held by them. He also came to the conclusion that the west had determined any war would require a full response even while stating “The costs of all-out war are too fearful for it to be our only response to a challenge.” Through some perverse logic, by holding all-out war as the go/no-go test for use of nuclear weapons, the era of MAD came into being. It is important to recognize that this conclusion was reached without regard to what the Soviets might actually be doing. See Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), 373, 125, 231, 135. 8. Ibid., 40. 9. Although a precise date for IOC of the DF-5 is not given, the history of development indicates a third successful launch happened in 1978. An IOC before this date would thus not be credible. See “DongFeng 5 (CSS-4) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df5.asp (accessed 16 October 2009) 10. This is problematic if you are confronted with a true believer of communism. Such governments believe in the truth of the class struggle and the inevitability of the victory of communism over capitalism. Thus, if you are fighting a true communist, one might conclude that even if both sides are reduced to nothing, it is still a defeat for capitalism and 17

communism will rise again. This is part of what Mao meant by “weapons mean nothing.” Fortunately, it appears that the dogmatic view of dialectical materialism is no longer held by the PRC or Russia. 11. This memo was one of a series related to the CNOs drive for minimal deterrence. See the memo of 4 March 1959, "How Much is Enough?: The U.S. Navy and Finite Deterrence" http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb275/index.htm (accessed 2 September 2009) 12. Long, 108. 13. Elizabeth D. Olmo, China's Nuclear Agenda and the Implications for US Foreign Policy (Monterey, CA: Navy Post Graduate School, 1993), 113. 14. Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Ivan Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence:A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, April 2009. www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf, accessed 25 August 2009. 15. Lin, 115. 16. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, editors, The Science of Military Strategy, (Beijing, China: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), 218. 17. Christine A. Cleary, “Culture, Strategy, and Security,” in China's Nuclear Future, edited by Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2006), 25. 18. Guangqian and Youzhi, 218. 19. Lin, 52. 20. Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 1. 21. To demonstrate, Country A determines 100 warheads must impact for its security. It builds 100 weapons (an optimistic prediction of success). Country B, the target, builds an ABM system than can intercept 50% of the warheads. Country A doubles its force to 200 to still get 100 (200 x 0.5) through. 22. If the PRC possessed about 20 ICBMs and recently fielded a small number, say 10, of road mobile missiles to compensate for the US ABM system, then it is assuming the system is only 33% effective. (30 - 0.33 x 30=20) 23. Guangqian and Youzhi, 217. 18

24. Ibid., 216. 25. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-12 Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 15 December 1995. 26. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12 (Draft) Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 15 March 2005. 27. Long, 106. 28. Ibid., 109. 29. Lewis, 73. 30. Lin, 11. 31. Olmo, 153. 32. Lewis, 51. 33. Cleary, 13. 34. Lewis, 73. 35. Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson, Christopher Yeaw, “Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32:1, 67-114. 36. Lin, 42. 37. Evan S. Medeiros, “Evolving Nuclear Doctrine,” in China's Nuclear Future, edited by Paul J. Bolt and Albert S. Willner (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2006), 57. 38. Lin, 72. 39. Guangqian and Youzhi, 219.

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