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(IJ Pi< o 30/ ()-'~~t..J Meeting of Team 7: Sa~ Brinkley, ~ill Johnstone: and.John Raidt with ViceChairman Hamilton and Chris KOJrn Lunch at Wilson Center Wednesday, October 29, 2003

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Notes Taken by Ben Rhodes

Deadline: Lee began by asking the team if they were on schedule to meet the Commission's deadline. Sam Brinkley said they were, but did not yet understand how they would interface with Commissioners. If the report goes in a philosophical direction that they are unaware of, they might need more time.

Subpoenas: Lee asked if the team had the documents that they need. Sani Brinkley said they were still waiting for some documents. from local authorities - for instance Massport - and were particularly troubled by the airlines, which had clearly held back information out of concern over pending lawsuits. He said that if another subpoena is used it will likely be on the airlines, and that United was the worst offender.

Work of Team: Lee asked if the team had a narrative in place. Sam Brinkley said they were working on three sets of documents: -- 1) the state of aviation security on September 10, 2001 -- 2) the narrative of September 11, 2001 -- and 3) the current state of aviation and recommendations for the future.

Recommendations: Sam Brinkley said they probably had around 65 recommendations, but they were already working that down to 4-6, which could be given priority - the others could be issued as "sub-recommendations." They are working through a vetting process to isolate the most effective recommendations, which would have a chance at implementation. He cited the question of interaction with Commissioners as a necessary part of this vetting process.

CAPPS II: Lee asked about CAPPS II - when will it be ready. The team said they did not think CAPPS II would be ready for 18 months to 2 year - if that. The rules are not being expedited, and OMB is taking interest in the project. Testing has begun, though, and the "no-fly list"is being implemented. John Raidt said CAPPS II is essentially CAPPS I with more dynamism introduced into the system so that terrorists have less of a chance to beat it. Sam Brinkley raised questions about the cost-benefit analysis of the system - even the no-fly list could be vast when accounting for all terrorists and their aliases. He also suggested that there is no foolproof technological solution to securing aviation - terrorists can find ways to beat these systems (eg. some hijackers were carrying "legal" blades).

Cargo: Lee raised the issue of cargo security. The team said that they are working on this - almost all cargo on planes is not screened and it is tough to find a technological solution to this problem.

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MANPADS: Lee asked about the threat from shoulder-fired missiles - MANPADS. The team said they were looking at this issue, and were waiting for some findings from GAO. Lee asked what the perimeter is for the weapons. Sam Brinkley said when airlines are below 5000-6000 feet, which extends up to 5 miles from take-off or landing - too big of a perimeter to establish around an airport. He suggested that equipping planes with antimissiles devices (flares, etc) is too expensive. He has worked on this issue for ten years and favors other, less expensive methods - for example, working with air traffic to change flight patterns and establish randomness.

Privacy: Lee asked if the team was looking carefully at the issue of privacy in light of new security measures. What is the trade offbetween security and liberty? Security and efficiency? Lee feels that the issue of privacy needs to be addressed in the report. He feels the American people will ultimately have to sacrifice some liberty for security. The Commission needs to educate the American people on this issue and get them thinking about it. The team said they would look more closely at the privacy issue, and felt that the issue of efficiency might be just as - if not more important. Principles of System: Sam Brinkley said the government has not figured out the principles of its aviation security system. Is aviation a matter of national security or is it a regulatory issue (as it largely was pre-9/11)? He said that security has not been engineered into the airlines' system of efficiency (as safety has). Instead, they have met minimum guidelines and written off security - including non-compliance fines - as an expense. Since 9111, they have shifted costs and liability for security to the USG. Brinkley said our aviation security has been reactive - always fighting the last war and never looking several years into the future. The Team wants to address that. That said, there will always be a gap between the ideal and what you can detect. With human screeners you aim to minimize these limitations. Ultimately, it is a human issue because there can be no 100% technological fix.

Would 9/11 happen? Lee asked if9/11 could happen today. The team had conflicting answers - no, because cockpits had been reinforced andlor people would not tolerate someone trying to take over a plane with boxcutters. Before 9/11, the procedure for a hijacking was for the crew to not resist and dissuade anyone from being a hero. That said, it is clear that certain things are still getting through checkpoints and there are other, new threats - cargo and MANP ADS. Airlines have still not integrated security into their systems - they focus on producing compliance, not minimizing risk. Terrorists find ways around security systems.

Priorities: Lee raised the issue of priorities in aviation security and transportation security in general. The team said they were addressing this issue - which they refer to as risk-management. Lee stressed that priorities should be part of the vetting system for recommendations, and the team said it was. They said that in their next hearing they were going to try and get Secretary Ridge to speak to this, but did not think he would answer. Lee asked what other areas we had to focus on since there are unlimited targets policymakers never want to choose because if you get burned you look bad, but you must

choose because you have limited resources. Sam Brinkley said he though ports were a particular vulnerability.

Local Guidance: Lee suggested the Commission - in a broad sense - needs to educate people about what they can do in their community. He knows a town in Indiana with a chemical plant - if it gets blown up the whole town will blow up. People want to know how to protect the vulnerabilities in their communities and nobody is telling them. For a lot of communities, the vulnerability is in the transportations sector. He sees it as a responsibility of the Commission to give people some guidance across the country. John Raidt said this was a very good idea and would be incorporated into the team's work. General Commission: Lee asked if there was any general comment. Bill Johnstone raised the issue of Congress. He said that the Team - and Commission - could not focus solely on the Executive Branch, that the Congress bore some of the responsibility for failings. Members - or key staff - need to be interviewed. He acknowledged that because the Commission wants to get recommendations implemented, it has to work with the Congress, but said people like Rep. Sensennbrenner had a lot to offer by way of information. Lee agreed that Congress had to be talked to, and Chris said that he would take requests and try to arrange interviews.

Implementation: Lee returned to the issue of implementation. He said that ultimately the Commission would have to get a feel for the Congress. The Team needed to evaluate what the chances were for implementing these recommendations. If its only a 5% chance for a particular recommendation, he won't spend the capital on it unless it is absolutely vital and worth fighting for. The Team reiterated that it was including probability of implementation in its vetting strategy for recommendations.