Mfr Nara- T3- Dos- Richardson Bill- 12-15-03- 00981

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MEMORADUMFORTHERECORD Event: Phone interview with Governor Bill Richardson of New Mexico (former Congressman from New Mexico, former US Secretary of Energy, and former US Ambassador to the United Nations) Date: December 15,2003 Prepared by: Dan Leopold Reviewed by: Scott Allan Team number: 3 Participant (non-Commission): Participants (Commission):

Bill Richardson

Scott Allan and Dan Leopold

The subject of this interview was Mr. Richardson's trip to South Asia in April 1998. At the time, Mr. Richardson was the US Ambassador to the United Nations. With him on this trip were the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, .and Bruce Riedel, who was the head of Near East and South Asian Affairs atthe NSC (and the de facto head of the NSC's Afghan policy account). During this trip, Richardson, Inderfurth, and Riedel visited Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka. [U] According to Mr. Richardson, this trip had two purposes. First, Mr. Richardson was being sent to Pakistan and India to lessen the tensions between the two countries with regard to nuclear weapons testing and proliferation. Second, Mr. Richardson was sent to South Asia to help the USG address several Afghani issues. More specifically, the USG wanted the Northern Alliance and the Taliban to enter into peace negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. Also, Richardson was instructed to press the Taliban on its poor human rights record and its relationship with Usama bin Ladin ("UBL"). [U] During this trip, Mr. Richardson met with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. In his discussions with Sharif, it was clear to Richardson that Sharif was "eager to please the US." According to Richardson, the US did have some leverage with Sharif because the US had a pending aircraft deal with Pakistan. Moreover, Sharif felt that the USG had been leaning toward India's side in the two countries' nuclear standoff, thus Sharif was eager to strengthen the US-Pakistan rapport. Sharifs willingness to help the US deal with the Taliban was further strengthened by his concerns over the inordinate number of Afghan refugees spilling over into Pakistan as a result of the civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. [U] When Richardson spoke with Sharif about the Taliban specifically, Sharif provided some insight. First, Sharif stated that the Taliban was "insecure and it [the Taliban] felt

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the US given that it had fought side-by-side with the US against the Soviets."

Furthermore, Sharif stated that UBL was connected with the Taliban, and UBL had substantial power within Afghanistan. Sharif urged Richardson to offer carrots to the Taliban, such as financial aid, in an attempt to moderate the Taliban and find a peaceful end to the Afghan civil war. [U] In discussing the USG's view of the Taliban, Richardson said that the USG had a "very negative" view of the movement. The USG did not want to engage the Taliban directly, but rather under the UN's auspices. According to Richardson, the USG's major carrot in getting the Taliban to the negotiation table was Richardson's very presence; a high level official. Richardson did not come to South Asia with a financial package as a carrot; however, he did make it clear to the Taliban that they needed investment and assistance. Richardson did not broach the issue of an oil pipeline during his conversations with Pakistan or the Taliban. [U]

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Richardson then shifted to a discussion of Pakistan and the USG's view of the Northern Alliance. Sharif did mention to Richardson that the Northern Alliance "could not be trusted." On the other hand, Richardson said, the USG favored the Northern Alliance over the Taliban because the Northern Alliance had broader support, less human rights violations, and was more willing to make peace. [U]

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Richardson's initial meeting with the Northern Alliance was a meeting between him and General Abdul Rashid Dostum. In this meeting, he told the General that the Taliban was willing to negotiate in Islamabad under the UN's auspices. General Dostum was extremely jubilant about this proposition. Following Dostum's jubilation, Richardson warned Dotsum that the Northern Alliance had to be unified in order to ensure a strong position at the negotiation table. [U]

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In Richardson's initial meeting with the Taliban, he met with Mullah Rabbani. In this meeting, Richardson discussed, inter alia, a peace agreement between the Northem Alliance and the Taliban negotiated under the auspices of the UN; human rights, and more specifically the treatment of women; and the importance of rebuilding Afghanistan. Richardson averred that the Taliban was "remarkably ready to work with the US." According to Richardson, he did not have to, and did not plan to use, any carrots or sticks to persuade the Taliban to be agreeable. He did not dangle the possibility of granting the

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Taliban a permanent UN seat, but rather he said that the issue of the UN seat could be negotiated at a later date. [UJ Sensing that Rabbani was in a cooperative mood, Richardson then brought upthe issue of VBL. Rabbani responded that he did not want to discuss UBL at the moment, but would discuss this issue over an informal lunch. When Richardson and Riedel met with Rabbani the next day for lunch, Riedel raised the VBL issue toward the end of the meal. Richardson and Riedel told Rabbani that UBL was a terrorist who was disruptive to Afghanistan and the outside world, and the USG wanted UBL turned over to the US "through a process." Rabbani responded by saying that VBL was in Afghanistan, but he didn't know UBL's exact whereabouts. Rabbani ensured Richardson and Riedel that if UBL attempted to conduct any terrorist attacks, that he would be stopped. Richardson and Riedel followed by asking ifUBL had formal ties to the Afghan government. Rabbani avoided the question with a vague response. [UJ Richardson and Riedel then asked Rabbani if the Taliban would commence a process to tum over UBL. Rabbani responded by saying "no, but we will watch him." Rabbani continued by elucidating that Afghanistan was a sovereign territory, and he [Rabbani] did not believe that UBL was engaging in terrorist acts. Judging from Rabbani's responses, Richardson was further assured of a connection between the Taliban and UBL. Richardson ended the lunch meeting by expressing his disappointment with Rabbani on this issue, and he told Rabbani that he planned to follow up on the UBL issue. [U] According to Richardson, a few weeks after he left, a cease fire between the Taliban and Northern Alliance was brokered by the UN. Richardson stated that this meeting was encouraged by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. However, the cease fire only lasted between two and four weeks (until June of 1998) because ofa disagreement in the peace agreement over a power-sharing provision. When asked if the cease fire was simply an attempt by the Taliban to buy time to rearm, Richardson dismissed this claim and argued that the Taliban was "sincerely ready to deal." Richardson did agree that the USG should have played a more integral and attentive role in the peace process, rather than placing the burden on the UN to broker an agreement. [U]

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In closing, Mr. Richardson said that the Commission should speak with Mr. Inderfurth and Mr. Riedel. He said that these two gentlemen could provide an even more accurate account of the April 98' trip. Richardson felt that he had achieved a temporary success during his South Asia trip. [U]

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